Paul Klemperer

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Paul David Klemperer, FBA, is an economist and the Edgeworth Professor of Economics at Oxford University.

He has an engineering degree from Cambridge University, and an MBA and an economics PhD from Stanford University. He was elected John Thomson Fellow and Tutor of St. Catherine’s College, Oxford in 1984, and a Professorial Fellow of Nuffield College, Oxford in 1995, when he became Edgeworth Professor in succession to Nobel prizewinner James Mirrlees.

He works on industrial economics, competition policy, auction theory, and climate change economics and policy.

He was a Member of the UK Competition Commission from 2001-5. He was elected a Fellow of the Econometric Society in 1994, a Fellow of the British Academy in 1999, and a Foreign Honorary Member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 2005.


Contents

[edit] Academic Contributions

His 1985 papers (with Jeremy Bulow and John Geanakoplos) developed the concept - and invented the terminology - of "strategic complements" that is now commonly used in game theory, industrial organization and elsewhere.

His PhD thesis, and independent work by Carl Christian von Weizsacker, began the study of consumer switching costs.

His paper on supply function equilibria (with Margaret Meyer) developed a standard model for the analysis of privatized electricity markets, and has been important in developing the theory of multiunit auctions.

Many of his papers apply ideas from auction theory to other economic contexts, including finance and political economy.

He has also written about the practical design of auctions (including his book Auctions: Theory and Practice).


[edit] Public Policy

He was principal auction-theorist designing the UK '3G' mobile-phone license auction that raised £22½ billion and was far more successful than several parallel exercises on the European continent; it has been argued that the UK Treasury therefore owes £15 billion or more to him and Ken Binmore who led the auction team.

In 2002 he advised the UK government on the world's first auction for greenhouse gas emissions reductions, working with Nobel prizewinner Eric Maskin.

In spring 2008 he was advising the Bank of England on using auctions to help alleviate the liquidity crisis.

He advised the US Federal Trade Commission 1999-2001, was a Member of the UK Competition Commission from 2001-5, and remains on its Panel of Economic Advisors.

He participated in the meeting that drafted the Potsdam Memorandum to the 2007 UN Climate Change Conference in Bali; he is on the Environmental Economics Academic Panel to the UK’s Department of the Environment (Defra).


[edit] Selected publications

[edit] Books

Auctions: Theory and Practice, Princeton University Press, Princeton, US, 2004.

The Economic Theory of Auctions (ed.), Edward Elgar (pub.), Cheltenham, UK, 2000.


[edit] Articles

“Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements”, Journal of Political Economy 1985, 93, 488 511 (with Bulow and Geanakoplos).

“Price Competition vs. Quantity Competition: The Role of Uncertainty”, Rand Journal of Economics 1986, 17, 618 38 (with Meyer) (reprinted in Cournot Oligopoly, A. Daughety (ed.) 1988).

“Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently”, Econometrica 1987, 55, 615 32 (with Cramton and Gibbons).

“Markets with Consumer Switching Costs”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 1987, 102, 375 94 (reprinted in The Economics of Business Strategy, J. Kay (ed.) 2003).

“The Competitiveness of Markets with Switching Costs”, Rand Journal of Economics 1987, 18, 138 50.

“Entry Deterrence in Markets with Consumer Switching Costs”, Economic Journal 1987, 97, 99S 117S.

“Supply Function Equilibria in Oligopoly under Uncertainty”, Econometrica 1989, 57, 1243-77 (with Meyer).

“Exchange Rate Pass Through when Market Share Matters”, American Economic Review 1989, 79, 637-54 (with Froot).

“Price Wars Caused by Switching Costs”, Review of Economic Studies 1989, 56, 405-20.

“How Broad should the Scope of Patent Protection Be?”, Rand Journal of Economics 1990, 21, 113-30 (reprinted in The Economics of Intellectual Property, R. Towse and R. Holzhauer (eds.) 2002).

“Multi-Period Competition with Switching Costs”, Econometrica 1992, 60, 651-66 (with Beggs).

“Equilibrium Product Lines”, American Economic Review 1992, 82, 740-55.

“Rational Frenzies and Crashes”, Journal of Political Economy 1994, 102, 1-23 (with Bulow).

“Competition when Consumers have Switching Costs”, Review of Economic Studies 1995, 62, 515-39.

“Auctions vs. Negotiations”, American Economic Review 1996, 86, 180-94 (with Bulow).

“Do Firms' Product Lines Include Too Many Varieties?”, Rand Journal of Economics 1997, 28, 472-88 (with Padilla).

“The Tobacco Deal”, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: Microeconomics 1998, 323-94 (with Bulow).

“Auctions with Almost Common Values”, European Economic Review 1998, 42, 757-69.

“Toeholds and Takeovers”, Journal of Political Economy 1999, 107, 427-454 (with Bulow and Huang) (reprinted in New Research in Corporate Finance and Banking, B. Biais and M. Pagano (eds.) 2002).

“The Generalized War of Attrition”, American Economic Review 1999, 89, 175-89 (with Bulow).

“An Equilibrium Theory of Rationing”, Rand Journal of Economics 2000, 31, 1-21 (with Gilbert).

“How (Not) to Run Auctions: the European 3G Telecom Auctions”, European Economic Review 2002, 46, 829-845 (reprinted in Spectrum Auctions and Competition in Telecommunications, G. Illing and U. Klüh (eds.) 2003).

“Prices and the Winner's Curse”, Rand Journal of Economics 2002, 33, 1-21 (with Bulow).

“The Biggest Auction Ever: the Sale of the British 3G Telecom Licenses”, Economic Journal 2002, 112, C74-C96 (with Binmore).

[edit] References

[edit] External links