Paul Diamond (lawyer)

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

This page is currently protected from editing until disputes have been resolved. This protection is not an endorsement of the current version. See the protection policy and protection log for more details. Please discuss any changes on the talk page; you may use the {{editprotected}} template to ask an administrator to make the edit if it is supported by consensus. You may also request that this page be unprotected.

Paul Diamond LL.M. (Cantab) is an English barrister, based in Cambridge, who is notable for acting for Christian claimants, whose cases plead religious discrimination or have a prolife aspect. Originally at 1 Essex Court Chambers, he now runs his own practice. His cases often involve challenges to employers or government authorities under the Human Rights Act 1998.

In 2005 he was disciplined by the Bar Council for expressing his own personal opinions in an Evangelical Christian publication on a case he represented (defending a man prosecuted for public order offences for holding a sign reading "Stop immorality" and on the other side "Stop homosexuality", see below, Hammond v. DPP). It transpired that Mr Diamond had not intended that the article be publicly published, and further prosecutions by the Bar Council were dropped.^[1]

Mr Diamond has publicly expressed his contempt for European "secularism" on a number of occasions, calling the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg "truly appalling".^[2]

Contents 1 Cases 2 See also 3 Notes 4 External links

Cases

Mr Diamond's cases have been controversial and the subject of media attention. The cases have ranged from employment tribunals to the House of Lords and the European Courts. Virtually none of them have been successful, and he has lost every claim he has attempted under the Human Rights Act.

• Eweida v. British Airways plc (2008) Case No.2702689/06 Reading Employment Tribunal, known as the British Airways cross controversy, Mr Diamond represented Miss Eweida, who refused to conceal her necklace that bore a cross in compliance with company uniform policy. She had worn it concealed for some time, but the uniform had changed, exposing her neck, where she wore the necklace. She claimed that the company policy violated her right to freedom of religion under Art.9 ECHR. They lost the case, because it was found that a cross was not an inherent requirement of a Christian, and that any interference with Miss Eweida's Art.9 ECHR right would have been justified by the legitimate aim of the employer seeking a uniform dress code. See also, British Airways cross controversy. Mr Diamond is also reported to have taken up representation of another BA employee, a man named Daniel Rosenthal of Jewish faith, who wishes to be exempt from working Saturdays.^[3]
• McClintock v. Department of Constitutional Affairs [2008] IRLR 29, Times 5 December 2007, Mr Diamond's client was a magistrate, who raised objection to sitting on cases where he might have to place children in foster homes with same sex couples. Elias J at the Employment Appeals Tribunal dismissed the case, because Mr McClintock was not shown to have had a real philosophical or religious belief.^[4][5]
• R. (on the application of Playfoot) v. Millais School Governing Body [2007] EWHC 1698 (Admin), Mr Diamond represented a girl who insisted that wearing a chastity ring was a manifestation of her religious beliefs as a Christian, and that the school's policy against jewelry violated her right to freedom of religion under Art.9 ECHR. Michael Supperstone QC held in the Administrative Court that not only was the wearing of the ring not linked to a belief in chastity before marriage, but that it was not any requirement of the Christian faith. The uniform policy, which she had accepted by going to the school, did not create any undue hardship. The policy was prescribed by law in the legitimate pursuit of creating equality and cohesion, minimising pressure from markings of difference in wealth or status. So any interference with her Art.9 rights was justified.^[6]
• Connolly v. DPP [2007] EWHC 237 (Admin); [2008] 1 W.L.R. 276, Mr Diamond represented a lady, Veronica Connolly, who sent graphic images of aborted foetuses to pharmacies. She was a Roman Catholic who objected to the morning after pill. She was prosecuted under the Malicious Communications Act 1988. Her appeal against prosecution was dismissed. Under the Human Rights Act 1998, the restriction on her "freedom of expression" was justified because the images were grossly indecent and offensive and restriction was for the protection of the rights of others.^[7]
• Copsey v. WWB Devon Clays Ltd [2005] EWCA Civ 932; [2005] IRLR 811, Mr Diamond's client was working in a sand quarry, where the work schedule was changed to keep pace with growing production. Although changes to the timetable were approved by every other worker in the plant, Mr Copsey refused to work Sundays, because he argued this breach his fundamental human right to freedom of religion, as a Christian. Mummery LJ in the Court of Appeal held that interference with this right was justified in the pursuit of a legitimate aim (to run an effective business). Moreover Mr Copsey had been offered generous redundancy and another job where he would not have to work Sundays. They did everything to accomodate his needs, and so when he refused these offers and still refused to work his dismissal was fair.
• R. (on the application of Williamson) v Secretary of State for Education and Employment [2005] UKHL 15; [2005] 2 A.C. 246, Mr Diamond represented the heads of a number of Christian private schools who wished to use corporal punishment as a disciplinary device in their schools. They claimed that the prohibition of corporal punishment in the Education Act 1996 s.548 was a breach of their freedom of religion under Article 9 ECHR. The House of Lords held that there was a big difference between freedom of religious belief and freedom to manifest that belief. Any interference was deemed justified, "necessary in a democratic society... for the protection of rights and freedoms for others".^[8]
• Hammond v. Department of Public Prosecutions [2004] EWHC 69 (Admin), Mr Diamond was junior counsel to Hugh Tomlinson QC in an unsuccessful appeal against the sadly late Mr Hammond's conviction for breach of public order. Mr Hammond, 68, had taken a sign into the Bournemouth town square reading on one side "STOP IMMORALITY" and on the other "STOP HOMOSEXUALITY" and "STOP LESBIANISM". In the corners read "Jesus is Lord". Mr Hammond was preaching. Within minutes, he had attracted an aggravated crowd of 30-40 people. One threw mud at him. Another tried to grab the sign. Another threw water at him. Two police officers arrived, and one decided that he was disrupting public order. He was charged under s.5 of the Public Order Act 1986 for insulting words, and fined £390. After the prosecution, Mr Hammond passed away. His executors argued the prosecution breached his human rights under Art.9 ECHR. But May LJ and the Court of Appeal held unanimously that the law, and his prosecution, was justified in the pursuit of the legitimate aim of preventing crime and disorder, as necessary in a democratic society.
• Stedman v. United Kingdom (1997) 23 EHRR CD 168, Mr Diamond represented Ms Stedman, a Christian, who was dismissed for refusing to work on Sundays. She claimed this was a breach of her right to freedom of religion under Art.9 ECHR. Under Art.1 the MS must secure Convention rights. She also complained of breach of her right to a family life under Art.8, because she was bound to work some Sundays, and her husband did not. The European Commission of Human Rights stated that she resigned because she did not want to work. She was not dismissed because of her religion. Even if she had been employed by the state and dismissed in similar circumstances, there would not have even been an interference with her Art.9(1) rights. The application was ‘manifestly ill founded’ under Art.27(2) ECHR. For Art.8, ‘given the almost inevitable compromise and balance between work and family commitments, particularly in families where both partners work’ there was no interference, to constitute any violation. Other challenges under Art.14 and Art.6 were similarly dismissed, and the case was inadmissible.

See also

• Lawyer

Notes

External links

• Paul Diamond's practice website
• Paul Diamond as The Times lawyer of the week
• Talk by Paul Diamond, 'Securing Religious Liberty: A Comparative Look at Europe and the U.S.', with downloadable mp3