Paris Peace Conference, 1919
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The Paris Peace Conference took place in 1919 and involved diplomats from more than 30 countries. They met in an attempt to form a lasting peace throughout the world. Met in Paris and Versailles, soon after the end of World War I.
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[edit] Overview
The following treaties were prepared at the Paris Peace Conference (in absence of the affected countries):
- German Empire (in Weimar Republic form) (Treaty of Versailles, 1919, 28 June 1919),
- Austria (Treaty of Saint-Germain, 10 September 1919),
- Bulgaria (Treaty of Neuilly, 27 November 1919),
- Hungary (Treaty of Trianon, 4 June 1920), and the
- The Ottoman Empire (Treaty of Sèvres, 10 August 1920; subsequently revised by the Treaty of Lausanne, 24 July 1923).
Also considered was the "holy grail" of Palestine, the Faisal-Weizmann Agreement (3 January 1919). The Paris peace treaties, together with the accords of the Washington Naval Conference of 1921-1922, laid the foundations for the so-called Versailles-Washington system of international relations. The remaking of the world map at these conferences gave birth to a number of critical conflict-prone international contradictions, which would become one of the causes of World War II.[1]
The decision to create the League of Nations and the approval of its Charter both took place during the conference.
The 'Big Four' — Georges Clemenceau, Prime Minister of France; David Lloyd George, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom; Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States; and Vittorio Orlando, Prime Minister of Italy — were the dominant diplomatic figures at the conference. The conclusions of their talks were imposed on the defeated countries.
[edit] Australian approach
The Australian delegates were Billy Hughes (Prime Minister), and Joseph Cook (Minister of the Navy), accompanied by Robert Garran (Solicitor-General). John Greig Latham later Sir, was also part of the delegation. Frederic Eggleston had been invited, but left in disgust at Hughes' behaviour. Indeed, Latham was to run successfully for the Federal seat of Kooyong on a policy of 'Get Rid of Hughes', so appalled was he at Hughes' behaviour. Their principal aims were war reparations, annexation of German New Guinea and rejection of the Japanese racial equality proposal (see below). Hughes had a profound interest in what he saw as an extension of the White Australia Policy. Despite causing a big scene, Hughes had to acquiesce to a class C mandate for New Guinea.
[edit] French approach
The chief goal of the French leader, Georges Clemenceau, was to weaken Germany so that it could never again threaten France. "Mr. Wilson bores me with his Fourteen points," complained Clemenceau. "Why, God Almighty has only ten!" (referring to the Ten Commandments)
[edit] Japanese approach
The Japanese delegation was headed by Saionji Kimmochi, with Baron Makino Nobuaki, Viscount Chinda Sutemi (ambassador in London), Matsui Keishiro (ambassador in Paris) and Ijuin Hikokichi (ambassador in Rome) and others making a total of 64. Neither Hara Takashi (Prime Minister) nor Yasuya Uchida (Foreign Minister) felt able to leave Japan so shortly after their election. The delegation focused on two demands: (a) the inclusion of their racial equality proposal and (b) territorial claims for the former German colonies; Shandong (including Jiaozhou Bay)and the Pacific islands north of the Equator i.e., the Marshall Islands, Micronesia, the Mariana Islands, and the Carolines. Makino was de facto chief as Saionji's role was symbolic, limited by ill-health. The Japanese were unhappy with the conference because they got only one half of the rights of Germany, and walked out of the conference.
[edit] The racial equality proposal
After the end of seclusion, Japan suffered unequal treaties and dreamed of obtaining equal status with the Powers. In this context, the Japanese delegation to the Paris peace conference proposed the racial equality proposal. The first draft was presented to the League of Nations Commission on 13 February as an amendment to Article 21:
The equality of nations being a basic principle of the League of Nations, the High Contracting Parties agree to accord as soon as possible to all alien nationals of states, members of the League, equal and just treatment in every respect making no distinction, either in law or in fact, on account of their race or nationality.
It should be noted that the Japanese delegation did not realize the full ramifications of their proposal, and the challenge its adoption would have put to the established norms of the (Western dominated) international system of the day, involving as it did the colonial subjugation of non-white peoples. In the impression of the Japanese delegation, they were only asking for League of Nations to accept the equality of Japanese nationals; however, a universalist meaning and implication of the proposal became attached to it within the delegation, which drove its contentiousness at the conference.[2]
The proposal received a majority vote on 28 April 1919. 11 out of the 17 delegates present voted in favor to its amendment to the charter, and no negative vote was taken. The votes for the amendment tallied thus:
- Japan (2) Yes
- France (2) Yes
- Italy (2) Yes
- Brazil (1) Yes
- China (1) Yes
- Greece (1) Yes
- Serbia (1) Yes
- Czechoslovakia (1) Yes
Total: 11 Yes
- British Empire - Not Registered
- United States - Not Registered
- Portugal - Not Registered
- Romania - Not Registered
- Belgium (2) - absent[3]
The chairman, U.S. President Woodrow Wilson, overturned it saying that although the proposal had been approved by a clear majority, that in this particular matter, strong opposition had manifested itself, and that on this issue a unanimous vote would be required. This strong opposition came from the British delegation. Though in a diary entry by House it says that President Wilson was at least tacitly in favor of accepting the proposal, but in the end he felt that British support for the League of Nations was a more crucial goal. There is not much evidence to show that Wilson agreed strongly enough with the proposal to risk alienating the British delegation over it. It is said that behind the scenes Billy Hughes and Joseph Cook vigorously opposed it as it undermined the White Australia Policy. Later, as conflicts between Japan and the U.S. widened, the Japanese media reported the case widely — leading to a grudge toward the U.S. in Japanese public opinion and becoming one of the main pretexts of Pearl Harbor and World War II.[citation needed]
As such, this point could be listed among the many causes of conflict which lead to World War II, which were left unaddressed at the close of World War I. It is both ironic and indicative, of the scale of the changes in the mood of the international system, that this contentious point of racial equality would later be incorporated into the United Nations Charter in 1945 as the fundamental principle of international justice.
[edit] Territorial claims
The Japanese claim to Shandong was disputed by the Chinese. In 1914 at the outset of First World War Japan had seized the territory granted to Germany in 1897. They also seized the German islands in the Pacific north of the equator. In 1917, Japan had made secret agreements with Britain, France and Italy as regards their annexation of these territories. With Britain, there was a mutual agreement, Japan also agreeing to support British annexation of the Pacific islands south of the equator. Despite a generally pro-Chinese view on behalf of the American delegation, Article 156 of the Treaty of Versailles transferred German concessions in Shandong, China to Japan rather than returning sovereign authority to China. The leader of the Chinese delegation, Lu Zhengxiang, demanded that a reservation be inserted before he would sign the treaty. The reservation was denied, and the treaty was signed by all the delegations except that of China. Chinese outrage over this provision led to demonstrations known as the May Fourth Movement. The Pacific islands north of the equator became a class C mandate administered by Japan.
[edit] Italy's approach
Italy had been persuaded first to join the Triple Alliance and then to join the Allies in order to gain land. In the Treaty of London, 1915, they had been offered the Trentino and the Tyrol as far as Brenner, Trieste and Istria, all the Dalmatian coast except Fiume, full ownership of Albanian Valona and a protectorate over Albania, Antalya in Turkey and a share of Turkish and German Empires in Africa.
Vittorio Orlando was sent as the Italian representative with the aim of gaining these and as much other territory as possible. The loss of 700,000 Italians and a budget deficit of 12,000,000,000 Lire during the war made the Italian government and people feel entitled to these territories. There was an especially strong opinion for control of Fiume, which they believed was rightly Italian due to the Italian population.
Nevertheless, by the end of the war the allies had made contradictory agreements with other nations, especially in Central Europe and the Middle-East. In the meetings of the "Big Four" (in which his powers of diplomacy were inhibited by his lack of English) the Great powers were only willing to offer Trentino to the Brenner, the Dalmatian port of Zara, the Island of Lagosta and a couple of small German colonies. All other territories were promised to other nations and the great powers were worried about Italy's imperial ambitions. As a result of this Orlando left the conference in a rage (Jackson, 1938).
[edit] United Kingdom's approach
Maintenance of the British Empire's unity, holdings and interests were an overarching concern for the United Kingdom's delegates to the conference, but it entered the conference with the more specific goals of:
- Ensuring the security of France
- Settling territorial contentions
- Supporting the Wilsonian League of Nations
with that order of priority.
The Racial Equality Proposal put forth by the Japanese did not directly conflict with any of these core British interests. However, as the conference progressed the full implications of the Racial Equality Proposal, regarding immigration to the British Dominions (specifically Australia), would become a major point of contention within the delegation.
Ultimately, Britain did not see the Racial Equality proposal as being one of the fundamental aims of the conference. The delegation was therefore willing to sacrifice this proposal in order to placate the Australian delegation and thus help satisfy its overarching aim of preserving the unity of the British Empire. [Shimazu (1998), p. 14-15,117]
Britain also managed to rebuff attempts by the envoys of the Irish Republic to put its case to the Conference for self-determination, diplomatic recognition and membership of the proposed League of Nations.
[edit] United States' approach
Prior to Wilson's arrival in Europe, no American President had ever visited Europe while in office [MacMillan (2001) p.3]. Since Wilson had established the conditions for the armistices that had brought an end to World War I, Wilson felt it was his duty and obligation to the people of the world to be a prominent figure at the peace negotiations. In doing so, Wilson ultimately began to lead the foreign policy of the United States down the path of interventionism, which it continues to this very day. Wilson's Fourteen Points had helped win the hearts and minds of Germans as the war ended, and high hopes and expectations were placed on him to deliver what he had promised. Once arrived, however, he found himself working diligently to try and sway the direction the French (Georges Clemenceau) and British (Lloyd George) delegations were taking towards Germany and its allies. Unlike France and Germany, who still aspired to be dominant colonial powers, the United States hoped to establish a more liberal and diplomatic world where democracy and sovereignty would be respected. However, Wilson's attempts to ensure that his Fourteen Points would lead to change ultimately failed, after France and Britain refused to adopt its core principles of liberty and self-determination, in part because of the control they wielded over their colonies around the world. The leaders of Europe were more interested in retaining glory for their empires, refusing to acknowledge that they were, in fact, in decline. France and Britain tried to appease the American President by consenting to the establishment of his League of Nations. However, because some of the articles in the League's charter conflicted with the United States Constitution, the United States never did ratify the Treaty of Versailles nor join the League of Nations [MacMillan (2001) p.83], an institution it had helped to create, to further peace through diplomacy rather than war. The United States sued for peace with Germany and its allies in 1920, because it believed the Treaty of Versailles was unfair and unjust. The United States did not encourage nor believe that the War Guilt Clause placed on Germany was fair or warranted [MacMillan (2001) p.6]. In fact, the United States was entirely against subjecting Germany to this clause because it did not believe it to be a good, liberal way of conducting diplomacy. Germany, under the Weimar Republic looked to the United States as a friend for guidance rather than the rocky and tumultuous relationship it would have with Great Britain and France.
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Because of the problems the United States Congress caused Wilson, his bargaining power was severely damaged and his position weakened. Although the United States had come out of the war relatively unscathed, its economy and infrastructure fully intact, the old colonial powers of Europe (mainly France and England), refused to take it or its liberal minded President seriously. The United States had proved itself to be a major world player and a dominant military and economic power, but it had still failed to win the peace at Paris.
It would not be until 1921, when the United States finally signed peace treaties with Germany, Austria and Hungary. The treaties reserved for the United States all reservations it might have had if it had joined the League of Nations, but accepted none of the obligations. By this time, Warren G, Harding was President of the United States, and these separate treaties broke the deadlock on the League of Nations. These separate treaties kept the United States out of the League.
[edit] World Zionist Organization's Statement
The World Zionist Organization issued a statement requesting a fulfillment of the Balfour Declaration, a national home for the Jewish people.
[edit] See also
- Minority Treaties
- Czech Corridor
- League of Nations mandate
- German New Guinea (given as a mandate to Australia)
- German Samoa (given as a mandate to New Zealand)
- Prince Lichnowsky
[edit] Notes
[edit] References
- Hampden Jackson (1938), The Post-War World: A Short Political History, Fourth edition, The Camelot Press Ltd,
- Dimitri Kitsikis (1963), Propagande et pressions en politique internationale. La Grèce et ses revendications à la Conférence de la Paix, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France.
- Margaret MacMillan (2001), Peacemakers: Six months that changed the world, John Murray (Publishers) Ltd.. ISBN 0-7195-6237-6
- Naoko Shimazu (1998), Japan, Race and Equality, Routledge, ISBN 0-415-17207-1
- Emile Joseph Dillon, The Inside Story of the Peace Conference, Harper, New York, 1920
[edit] External links
- Charles T. Evans NVCC|Info
- Excerpt and reviews of Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed The World by Margaret MacMillan ISBN 0-375-76052-0 (softcover), ISBN 0-375-50826-0 (hardcover)