Pakistan and weapons of mass destruction
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Pakistan started focusing on nuclear development in January 1972 under the leadership of Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. Pakistan's nuclear weapons development program was in response to India's development of nuclear weapons. Bhutto called a meeting of senior scientists and engineers on January 20, 1972, in Multan. It was here that Bhutto rallied Pakistan's scientists to build the atomic bomb for national survival. At the Multan meeting, Bhutto also appointed a Pakistani nuclear engineer, Munir Ahmad Khan, as chairman of Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC), who till then had been working as Director of Nuclear Power and Reactor Division at IAEA, in Vienna. This marked the beginning of Pakistan's pursuit of nuclear capability. Following India's surprise nuclear test, code named Smiling Buddha in 1974, the goal to develop nuclear weapons received considerable impetus.
Consequently, Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, a metallurgical engineer, working in a Dutch research firm used URENCO blueprints for designing the ultracentrifuges at Kahuta (near Islamabad) also joined Pakistan's nuclear weapons-grade Uranium enrichment program. The uranium enrichment program had been launched in 1974 by PAEC chairman Munir Ahmad Khan as Project-706. AQ Khan joined the project in the spring of 1976 and was made Project-Director in July 1976 after taking over from Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood. Although in 1983, A.Q.Khan was convicted of the theft of these blueprints, the conviction was overturned on some technicality. [1]. A few weeks after India's Shakti (Power) operation (second nuclear test), on 28 May 1998, Pakistan detonated 5 nuclear devices in the Chagai Hills in the Chaghai district, Balochistan. This operation was named Chagai-I by Pakistan. Pakistan's fissile material production takes place at Kahuta and Khushab/Jauharabad, where weapons-grade Plutonium is made; the latter, allegedly, with the assistance of Chinese-supplied technology.[2]
Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Program was established in 1974 when the Directorate of Technical Development (DTD) was set up in PAEC by chairman Munir Ahmad Khan, who was credited as the true "father" of Pakistan's atomic bomb by a recent IISS, London's Dossier on Pakistan's nuclear program. DTD was assigned the task of developing the implosion design, trigger mechanism, physics calculations, high-speed electronics, high-precision chemical and mechanical components, high explosive lenses for Pakistan's nuclear weapons. DTD comprised the Diagnostics Group, the Fast Neutron Physics Group, Wah Group and the Theoretical Physics Group. The DTD had come up with its first implosion design of a nuclear weapon by 1978 which was then improved and later tested on March 11, 1983 when PAEC carried out Pakistan's first successful cold test of a nuclear device. Between 1983 and 1990, PAEC carried out 24 more cold tests of various nuclear weapon designs. DTD had also developed a miniaturized weapon design by 1987 that could be delivered by all Pakistan Air Force Aircraft. It was the same DTD that carried out the Chaghi tests of May 28, 1998 and the Kharan test of May 30, 1998.
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[edit] Nuclear weapons
[edit] Policy
Pakistan acceded to the Geneva Protocol on April 15, 1960, the Biological Weapons Convention in 1974 and the Chemical Weapons Convention on October 28, 1997.In 1999 Pakistan signed the Lahore Accords with India, agreeing on a bilateral moratorium on nuclear testing. However, Pakistan, like India and Israel, is not a signatory of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and, consequently, not bound by any of its provisions. Some Pakistani nuclear scientists have been reported by the CIA to be involved in the proliferation of nuclear weapons technology. In particular, one of Pakistan's chief nuclear scientists, Dr. A.Q. Khan, has admitted his role in nuclear proliferation, leading to fears in the international community about nuclear terrorism; but the Government of Pakistan has taken strict actions against such individuals and stated that the Pakistani nuclear weapons are in "safe" hands and there is no need of any international worries about nuclear proliferation from Pakistan.[1]
[edit] Infrastructure
Pakistan's nuclear weapons development program is based, primarily, on highly-enriched uranium (HEU), which is produced at the Kahuta Research Laboratories at Kahuta, a Zippe centrifuge-based uranium-enrichment facility. The Kahuta facility has been in use since the early 1980s. By the early 1990s, Kahuta had an estimated 3,000 centrifuges in operation, and Pakistan has continued its pursuit of expanded uranium-enrichment capabilities.
In the mid 1980s, Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission began to pursue Plutonium production capabilities. Consequently Pakistan built the 40-50 MW (Mega Watt, Thermal) Khushab Research Reacto at Joharabad, and in April 1998, Pakistan announced that the nuclear reactor was operational. The Khushab reactor project was initiated in 1986 by PAEC chairman Munir Ahmad Khan, who insisted that the reactor was totally indigenous, i.e. that it was designed and built by Pakistani scientists and engineers. Pakistani industry contributed in 82 % of the reactor's construction. The Project-Director for this project was Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood. According to public statements made by the US Government officials, this unsafeguarded heavy-water reactor can produce up to 8 to 10 kg of Plutonium per year,[3] sufficient for at least one nuclear weapon.[4] The reactor could also produce Tritium if it were loaded with Lithium-6, although this is unnecessary for the purposes of nuclear weapons, because modern nuclear weapon designs use Li6 directly. According to J. Cirincione of Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Khushab's Plutonium production capacity could allow Pakistan to develop lighter nuclear warheads that would be easier to deliver through ballistic missiles.[citation needed]
Plutonium separation, reportedly, takes place at the New Labs Reprocessing Plant, which was completed by 1981 by PAEC and is next to the Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology (PINSTECH) near Islamabad, which is not subject to IAEA inspections and safeguards.
In late 2006, the US Institute for Science and International Security released intelligence reports and imagery showing the construction of a new plutonium reactor at the Khushab nuclear site. The reactor is deemed to be large enough to produce enough plutonium to facilitate the creation of as much as "40 to 50 nuclear weapons a year." [5] [6][7] The New York Times carried the story with the insight that this would be Pakistan's third plutonium reactor[8], signalling a shift to dual-stream development, with Plutonium-based devices supplementing the nation's existing HEU stream to atomic warheads.
[edit] Arsenal
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The U.S.-based Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) estimates that Pakistan has built 24-48 HEU-based nuclear warheads with HEU reserves for 30-52 additional warheads.[9][10] The US Navy Center for Contemporary Conflict estimates that Pakistan possesses between a low of 35 and a high of 95 nuclear warheads, with a median of 60.[11].But these are outdated sources.
The NRDC's and the Carnegie Foundation's estimates of approximately 50 weapons are from 2002-3 estimations. In 2000, US Military intelligence estimated that Pakistan's nuclear arsenal may be as large as 100 warheads.[12]. The actual size is hard for experts to gauge owing to the secrecy which surrounds the program in Pakistan. In recent developments, retired Brig. General Feroz Khan, previously second in command at the Strategic Arms Division of Pakistans' Military told a Pakistani newspaper the nation has "about 80 to 120 genuine warheads"-and also revealed that Pakistan has decoy or dummy warheads to complicate any designs by aggressors. [13][14]
Pakistan already tested plutonium capability in the sixth nuclear test of May 30, 1998 at Kharan. In this test, the latest and most sophisticated bomb design made to be carried by missiles was tested. And it was a very compact, yet powerful device. Secondly, compactness is also an issue with F-16s and other fighter-bomber aircraft of the same class, unless the platform happens to be a dedicated strategic bomber. F-16s have limits to the size and weight of the bombs they can carry.
Now the critical mass a bare mass sphere of 90 % enriched Uranium-235 is 52 kg. Correspondingly, the critical mass of a bare mass sphere of Plutonium-239 is 8-10 kg. The bomb that destroyed Hiroshima used 60 kg of U-235 while the Nagasaki Pu bomb used only 6 kg of Pu-239. And that was in 1945! Since all Pakistani bomb designs are implosion-type weapons, they will typically use between 15-25 kg of U-235 for their cores. Reducing the amount of U-235 in cores from 60 kg in gun-type devices to 25 kg in implosion devices is only possible by using good neutron reflector/ tamper material such as beryllium metal, which increases the weight of the bomb. And the uranium like plutonium is only usable in the core of a bomb in metallic form. Add about 50 or so chemical high-explosive lenses, triggering circuits, and outer aluminum casing, all this adds to the overall weight of the device. Therefore if a bomb has to use only U-235, it will impose serious restrictions on the amount of U-235 that can be used, and the size of the bomb itself, thus restricting its explosive yield. True PAEC did develop bomb designs that could be carried by all PAF aircraft, but after years of effort and R & D, and then too, there were serious limitations on the further extent of miniaturization of the bombs. If Uranium is used as bomb fuel, it cannot be miniaturized beyond a certain point.
On the other hand, only 2-4 kg of plutonium is needed for the same device that would need 20-25 kg of U-235. Add a few grams of tritium (a by-product of plutonium production reactors and thermonuclear fuel) and you can increase the overall yield of the bombs by a factor of three to four.
A whole range and variety of weapons using Pu-239 can be easily built, both for aircraft delivery and especially for missiles (in which U-235 cannot be used). So if Pakistan wants to be a nuclear power with an operational deterrent capability, both first and second strike, based on assured strike platforms like ballistic and cruise missiles (unlike aircraft), the only solution is with plutonium, which has been the first choice of every country that built a nuclear arsenal.
As for Pakistan's plutonium capability, it has always been there, from the early 1980s onwards. There were only two problems. One was that Pakistan did not want to be an irresponsible state and so did not divert spent fuel from the safeguarded KANUPP for reprocessing at New Labs. This was enough to build a whole arsenal of nuclear weapons straight away. So PAEC built its own unsafeguarded plutonium and tritium production reactor at Khushab, beginning in 1985. The second one was allocation of resources.
Ultra-centrifugation for obtaining U-235 cannot be done simply by putting natural uranium through the centrifuges. It requires the complete mastery over the front end of the nuclear fuel cycle, which begins at uranium mining and refining, production of uranium ore or yellow cake, conversion of ore into uranium dioxide UO2 ( which is used to make nuclear fuel for natural uranium reactors like Khushab and KANUPP), conversion of UO2 into Uranium tetrafluoride UF4 and then into the feedstock for enrichment (UF6).
All this also needs the complete mastery over fluorine chemistry and production of highly toxic and corrosive hydrofluoric acid and other fluorine compounds. Then this UF6 is pumped into the centrifuges for enrichment and afterwards it has to go through the same process, but in reverse till UF4 is produced which leads to the production of uranium metal, the form in which U-235 is used in a bomb.
It is estimated that there are about 10000 centrifuges in Kahuta. This means that with P2 machines, they would be producing between 75-100 kg of HEU since 1986, when full production of weapons-grade HEU began. Also the production of HEU was voluntarily capped by Pakistan between 1991 and 1997, and the five nuclear tests of May 28, 1998 also consumed HEU. So it is safe to assume that between 1986 and 2005 (prior to the 2005 earthquake) , KRL produced 1500 kg of HEU. Now accounting for losses in the production of weapons, it is safe to assume that each weapon would need 20 kg of HEU. This is sufficient for 75 bombs, produced in 20 years!.
Pakistan's first nuclear tests were made in May 1998, when six warheads were tested. It is reported that the yields from these tests were 12 kT, 30 to 35 kT and four low-yield (below 1 kT) tests. From these tests Pakistan can be estimated to have developed operational warheads of 20 to 25 kT and 150 kT inshape of low weight compact designs and may have 300-500kt large size warheads. The low-yield weapons are probably in nuclear bombs carried on F-16 Fighting Falcon aircraft and fitted to Pakistan's short-range ballistic missiles, while the higher-yield warheads are probably fitted to the Shaheen and Ghauri ballistic missiles
[edit] Foreign assistance
Historically, China has played a major role in the establishment of Pakistan's nuclear weapons development infrastructure, especially, when increasingly stringent export controls in the western countries made it difficult for Pakistan to acquire nuclear materials and technology from elsewhere. Additionally, Pakistani officials have supposedly been present to observe at least one Chinese nuclear test. According to a 2001 Department of Defense report, China has supplied Pakistan with nuclear materials and has provided critical technical assistance in the construction of Pakistan's nuclear weapons development facilities. This assistance was illegal, per the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, of which China is a signatory.[citation needed]
[edit] Doctrine
Pakistan's motive for pursuing a nuclear weapons development program is to counter the threat posed by its principal rival, India[citation needed].
Pakistan has not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). According to the US Defense Department report cited above, "Pakistan remains steadfast in its refusal to sign the NPT, stating that it would do so only after India joined the Treaty. Consequently, not all of Pakistan's nuclear facilities are under IAEA safeguards. Pakistani officials have stated that signature of the CTBT is in Pakistan's best interest, but that Pakistan will do so only after developing a domestic consensus on the issue, and have disavowed any connection with India's decision."
Pakistan does not abide by a no-first-use doctrine and has also not issued any official nuclear doctrine. There has also been criticism of Pakistan's nuclear doctrine which gives rise to ambiguity.
The organization authorized to make decisions about Pakistan's nuclear posturing is the NCA. Here is a link showing NCA of Pakistan. [2] (NCA)it was established in February 2000. The NCA is composed of two committees that advise the present President of Pakistan, on the development and deployment of nuclear weapons; it is also responsible for war-time command and control. In 2001, Pakistan further consolidated its nuclear weapons infrastructure by placing the Khan Research Laboratories and the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission under the control of one Nuclear Defense Complex.
It has been recently reported by the Pakistani Press namely Jang that Pakistan has the ability to MIRV its missiles. This has been seen as possibly the greatest achievement to date. It has also been reported that Pakistan would likely MIRV its Shaheen-II missile.
[edit] Role of the USA in guarding the nuclear weapons
From the end of 2001 the United States has provided material assistance to aid Pakistan in guarding its own nuclear weapons. This included the safeguarding of Pakistan's nuclear material, its warheads as well as its laboratories. The cost of the program has been almost $100 million. Specifically the USA has provided helicopters, night-vision goggles and nuclear detection equipment.[15]
Pakistan turned down the offer of PALS technology, a sophisticated "weapon release" program which initiates use via specific checks and balances as it feared the secret implanting of "dead switches". [16]
[edit] National Security Council
- National Command Authority
- Ministry of Defense
- Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (JCSC)
- Strategic Planning Directorate (SPD - ex CDD)
[edit] Weapons development agencies
| Nuclear weapons | |
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| Nuclear-armed countries | |
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[edit] National Engineering & Scientific Commission (NESCOM)
- National Development Complex (NDC), Islamabad
- Pakistan Missile Organization (PMO), Khanpur
- Air Weapon Complex (AWC), Hasanabdal
- Maritime Technologies Complex (MTC), Karachi
[edit] Ministry of Defense Production
- Pakistan Ordnance Factories (POF), Wah
- Pakistan Aeronautical Complex (PAC), Kamra
- Defense Science and Technology Organization (DESTO), Chattar
[edit] Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC)
- Directorate of Technical Development
- Directorate of Technical Equipment
- Directorate of Technical Procurement
- Directorate of Science & Engineering Services
- Institute of Nuclear Power, Islamabad
- Pakistan Institute of Science & Technology (PINSTECH)
- New Laboratories, Rawalpindi
- Pilot Reprocessing Plant
- PARR-1 and PARR-2 Nuclear Research Reactors
- Center for Nuclear Studies (CNS), Islamabad
- Computer Training Center (CTC), Islamabad
- Nuclear Track Detection Center (Solid State Nuclear Track Detection Center)
- Khushab Reactor, Khushab
- Atomic Energy Minerals Centre, Lahore
- Hard Rock Division, Peshawar
- Mineral Sands Program, Karachi
- Baghalchur Uranium Mine, Baghalchur
- Dera Ghazi Khan Uranium Mine, Dera Ghazi Khan
- Issa Khel/Kubul Kel Uranium Mines and Mills, Mianwali
- Multan Heavy Water Production Facility, Multan, Punjab
- Uranium Conversion Facility, Islamabad
- Golra Ultracentrifuge Plant, Golra
- Sihala Ultracentrifuge Plant, Sihala
- Directorate of Quality Assurance,Islamabad
- New Labs Nilore,Islamabad
[edit] Space and Upper Atmospheric Research Commission (SUPARCO)
- Aerospace Institute, Islamabad
- Computer Center, Karachi
- Control System Laboratories
- Flight Test Range, Sonmiani Beach
- Instrumentation Laboratories, Karachi
- Material Research Division
- Quality Control and Assurance Unit
- Rocket Bodies Manufacturing Unit
- Solid Composite Propellant Unit
- Space and Atmospheric Research Center, Karachi
- Static Test Unit, Karachi
[edit] Precision Engineering Complex (PEC)
[edit] Ministry of Industries & Production
- State Engineering Corporation (SEC)
- Heavy Mechanical Complex Ltd. (HMC)
- Peoples Steel Mills Limited, Karachi.
[edit] Missiles
List of Pakistani strategic missiles:
| Designation | Other Name | Range | Payload | Status | Inventory |
| Hatf-I/IA (BRBM) | Hatf-I/IA | 80/100 km | 500 kg | Deployed | 100+ |
| Abdali (SRBM) | Hatf-II | 180 km | 500 kg | Deployed, Under production | Unknown |
| Ghaznavi (SRBM) | Hatf-III | 290 km | 500 kg | Deployed, Under production | ~100+ |
| Shaheen-I (MRBM) | Hatf-IV | 750 km | 750 kg | Deployed, Under production | ~75-150 |
| Ghauri-I (MRBM) | Hatf-V | 1500 km | 700-1000 kg | Deployed, Under production | ~100+ |
| Ghauri-II (MRBM) | Hatf-VA | 2,400 km, More range with lighter payload. | 1200 kg | Operational, Under production | ~100+ |
| Shaheen-II (IRBM) | Hatf-VI | 2,500 km, More range with lighter payload. | 1000+ kg | Deployed, Under production | 200+ |
| Babur (Cruise Missile) | Hatf-VII | 700 km | 500 kg | Deployed | 400-1000 |
| Ra'ad (Air Launched Cruise Missile) | Hatf-VIII | 350 km | Tested | --- | |
| Ghauri-III (IRBM) | 4,500+ km | 1000+ kg | Under Development | ||
| Shaheen-III (IRBM) | 4,500+ km | 1000+ kg | Under Development | ||
| M-11 (SRBM) | 300 km | 500 kg | In service | Unknown |
Note: Not every missile has nuclear payload.
The M-11 Chinese missile is in service too, which is a Short-Range Ballistic Missile with a max range of 300 km it uses solid fuel and can carry a payload of around 500 kg.
In addition, there exists the Shaheen-III which is under research and development and will be solid fueled like the others in the shaheen series. It will have a range of 3600+ km and a payload of 1000+ kg. This weapon is an Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile.
[edit] Aircraft delivery
There are two units operating the Chinese-built A-5 (No. 16 Sqn and No. 26 Sqn), an aircraft believed to be a leading candidate for the aerial delivery of Pakistan's nuclear weapons. The others are the Mirage IIIOs, Mirage IIIODs and Mirage IIIEs. The Pakistani Air Force, currently, operates some 156 Mirage (III & V) aircraft. The allocation of 90 of these aircraft is not, currently, known. Pakistan also has 34 F-16 Fighter aircraft - all block 15s. As of now, it recently received 2 block 15OCUs through Peace Gate 3/4 as a good-will gesture from the US Government in November 2006. All of these F-16s are capable of delivering nuclear warheads, they are split into 2 squadrons, both, stationed at PAF Sargodha. It is rumoured that the 34 current PAF F-16s have been modified for nuclear weapons delivery by PAC, Kamra. Also, in the 1990s, the PAF F-16s have practised toss bombing which is a method to deliver nuclear weapons. Pakistan prefers to use ballistic missiles and cruise missiles to deliver nuclear warheads because they have a much longer range than aircraft and do not need the airspace to be cleared of aircraft and SAMS.
In an attempt to modernize its Air Force, Pakistan has recently signed a deal for the purchase of 26 F-16 block 15OCUs that were under Peace Gate 3/4 and 60 MLU [3] kits for block 15s, AMRAAMs, LGBs, and various other missiles and bombs and other items, the purchase of 18 F-16 block 50/52+ [4] with an option of 18 more. If all options are exercised, this deal will cost US$5 billion. All of these F-16s will be capable of nuclear weapons delivery.
Also, by early 2007, the first 8 JF-17 Thunder aircraft [5] (FC-1s) will enter the PAF service. These are pre-production aircraft and more JF-17 Thunder aircraft will follow. These, too, will be capable of nuclear weapons delivery. Pakistan has also ordered 36 Chinese J-10s [6] for its airforce for a cost of $1.4 billion. The Pakistan Air Force is in the midst of a great change in terms of capability.
Pakistan has also recently tested its Babur cruise missile having a range of 500 km. Its design seems to be influenced by the Tomahawk cruise missile of the US in terms of appearance, however, it is an indigenous weapon. It is a ground-launched version and, according to the Pakistan Military sources, the submarine- and air-delivered versions are soon to follow.
Naval Delivery: PNS Hamza has just been commissioned this year in August, This submarine is an Augosta 90B and, with a number of modifications, will be able to fire ballistic missiles. These modifications may be happening soon. It can also fire Babur Cruise Missiles and that is if the submarine uses larger tubes to fire this missile. Soon, other ships and submarines maybe retrofitted to fire ballistic and cruise missiles.
[edit] Notes
- ^ Global Security
- ^ Pakistan Nuclear Weapons. Retrieved on 2007-02-22.
- ^ Uranium Institute News Briefing 00.25 14 - 22 June 2000. Uranium Institute (2000). Retrieved on 2006-05-07.
- ^ Key Issues: Nuclear Energy: Issues: IAEA: World Plutonium Inventories
- ^ BBC NEWS | World | South Asia | Pakistan nuclear report disputed
- ^ Pakistan Expanding Nuclear Program - washingtonpost.com
- ^ BBC NEWS | World | South Asia | Pakistan 'building new reactor'
- ^ U.S. Group Says Pakistan Is Building New Reactor - New York Times
- ^ Federation of American Scientists
- ^ Center for Defense Information
- ^ US Navy Strategic Insights. Feb 2003. US Navy (2003). Retrieved on 2006-10-28.
- ^ Pakistan's Nuclear Arsenal Underestimated, Reports Say
- ^ Impact of US wargames on Pakistan N-arms ‘negative’ -DAWN - Top Stories; December 03, 2007
- ^ Calculating the Risks in Pakistan - washingtonpost.com
- ^ "U.S. Secretly Aids Pakistan in Guarding Nuclear Arms", The New York Times, 2007-11-18. Retrieved on 2007-11-18.
- ^ [http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/18/washington/18nuke.html New York Times/18 November 2007
[edit] See also
- Chronology of Pakistan's rocket tests
- Nuclear power in Pakistan
- Pakistan Army
- List of countries with nuclear weapons
[edit] External links
- BCCI May have funded Bomb
- The Islamic Bomb - Tashbih Sayyed
- The South Asian Strategic Stability Institute Weapons Related Datasets
- Pakistan Security Research Unit (PSRU) Military and Weapons Section
- China,Pakistan and the Bomb The Declassified File on U.S. Policy, 1977-1997-----National Security Archives.
- http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/pakistan/nuke/index.html
- Nuclear Notebook: Laddi's nuclear program, 2005, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Jan/Feb 2002.
- Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Program - The Beginning
- Pakistani Military Consortium
- Nuclear Files.org Pakistan's nuclear conflict with India- background and the current situation
- Nuclear Files.org Current information on nuclear stockpiles in Pakistan
- Ideas Pakistan - International Defense Exhibition at Karachi, Pakistan
- Defense Export Promotion Organization - Ministry of Defense
- Time line of Pakistan's nuclear weapon development and tests
- - Pakistani & Indian Missile Forces (Tarmuk missile mentioned here)
- - Annotated bibliography on Pakistan's nuclear weapons from the Alsos Digital Library
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