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United States Special Operations Command
Image:SOCOM.jpg
United States Special Operations Command emblem.
Active April 16, 1987
Country United States
Type Special Operations
Role Provide fully capable Special Operations Forces to defend the United States and its interests. Plan and synchronize operations against terrorist networks.
Size 48,000
Part of Department of Defense
Garrison/HQ MacDill AFB
Nickname USSOCOM or SOCOM
Engagements Operation Just Cause
Operation Desert Storm
Battle of Mogadishu
Operation Enduring Freedom
Operation Iraqi Freedom
Commanders
Current
commander
Admiral Eric T. Olson

The United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM or SOCOM) is the Unified Combatant Command charged with overseeing the various Special Operations Commands (SOC or SOCOM) of the Army, Air Force, Navy and Marines of the U.S. military. The command is part of the U.S. Department of Defense. USSOCOM is headquartered at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, Florida.

Since its activation on April 18, 1987, United States Special Operations Command has participated in many operations, from Operation Just Cause to the War in Iraq.[1][2]USSOCOM conducts several overt and clandestine missions such as; unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, special reconnaissance, direct action, counter-terrorism and counter-drug operations. USSOCOM's global performance in combat and noncombat areas has proven the value of a mature, culturally attuned, properly equipped, adaptive Special Operations Force (SOF).[3]Each branch has a Special Operations Command that is unique and capable of running their own operations, but when the different Special Operations Forces need to work together for an operation, USSOCOM becomes the joint component command of the operation, instead of a SOC of a specific branch.[4]

Contents

[edit] History

[edit] Establishment of USSOCOM

The idea of a unified special operations command had its origins in the aftermath of Operation Eagle Claw, the disastrous attempted rescue of hostages at the American embassy in Iran. The ensuing investigation, chaired by Adm. James L. Holloway III, the retired Chief of Naval Operations, cited command and control and inter-service coordination as significant factors in the failure of the mission.[5]

Desert One did serve to strengthen the resolve of some within the Department of Defense to reform SOF. Army Chief of Staff General Edward C. “Shy” Meyer called for a further restructuring of special operations capabilities. Although unsuccessful at the joint level, Meyer nevertheless went on to consolidate Army SOF units under the new 1st Special Operations Command in 1982, a significant step to improve Army SOF.

By 1983, there was a small but growing sense in the Congress for the need for military reforms. In June, the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC), under the chairmanship of Senator Barry Goldwater (R-AZ), began a two-year long study of the Defense Department which included an examination of SOF. With concern mounting on Capitol Hill, the Department of Defense created the Joint Special Operations Agency on 1 January 1984; this agency, however, had neither operational nor command authority over any SOF.[6][7] The Joint Special Operations Agency thus did little to improve SOF readiness, capabilities, or policies hardly what Congress had in mind as a systemic fix for SOF’s problems. Within the Defense Department, there were a few staunch SOF supporters. Noel Koch, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, and his deputy, Lynn Rylander, both advocated SOF reforms.[8]

At the same time, a few visionaries on Capitol Hill were determined to overhaul SOF. They included Senators Sam Nunn (D-GA) and William Cohen (R-ME), both members of the Armed Services Committee, and Representative Dan Daniel (D-VA), the chairman of the Readiness Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee. Congressman Daniel had become convinced that the U.S. military establishment was not interested in special operations, that the country’s capability in this area was second rate, and that SOF operational command and control was an endemic problem.[8] Senators Nunn and Cohen also felt strongly that the Department of Defense was not preparing adequately for future threats. Senator Cohen agreed that the U.S. needed a clearer organizational focus and chain of command for special operations to deal with low-intensity conflicts.[6]

In October 1985, the Senate Armed Services Committee published the results of its two-year review of the U.S. military structure, entitled “Defense Organization: The Need For Change.”[9] Mr. James R. Locher III, the principal author of this study, also examined past special operations and speculated on the most likely future threats. This influential document led to the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.[10] [11]

By spring 1986, SOF advocates had introduced reform bills in both houses of Congress. On 15 May, Senator Cohen introduced the Senate bill, co-sponsored by Senator Nunn and others, which called for a joint military organization for SOF and the establishment of an office in the Defense Department to ensure adequate funding and policy emphasis for low-intensity conflict and special operations.[12] Representative Daniel’s proposal went even further—he wanted a national special operations agency headed by a civilian who would bypass the Joint Chiefs and report directly to the Secretary of Defense; this would keep Joint Chiefs and the Services out of the SOF budget process.[7]

Congress held hearings on the two bills in the summer of 1986. Admiral William J. Crowe Jr., Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, led the Pentagon’s opposition to the bills. He proposed, as an alternative, a new Special Operations Forces command led by a three-star general. This proposal was not well received on Capitol Hill—Congress wanted a four-star general in charge to give SOF more clout. A number of retired military officers and others testified in favor of the need for reform.[8]

By most accounts, retired Army Major General Richard Scholtes gave the most compelling reasons for change. Scholtes, who commanded the joint special operations task force in Grenada, explained how conventional force leaders misused SOF during the operation, not allowing them to use their unique capabilities, which resulted in high SOF casualties. After his formal testimony, Scholtes met privately with a small number of Senators to elaborate on the problems that he had encountered in Grenada.[13]

Both the House and Senate passed SOF reform bills, and these went to a conference committee for reconciliation. Senate and House conferees forged a compromise. The bill called for a unified combatant command headed by a four star general for all SOF, an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, a coordinating board for low-intensity conflict within the National Security Council, and a new Major Force Program (MFP-11) for SOF (the so-called “SOF checkbook”).[14] [15] The final bill, attached as a rider to the 1987 Defense Authorization Act, amended the Goldwater-Nichols Act and was signed into law in October 1986. Congress clearly intended to force DOD and the Administration to face up to the realities of past failures and emerging threats. DOD and the Administration were responsible for implementing the law, and Congress subsequently had to pass two additional bills to ensure proper implementation.[8]

The legislation promised to improve SOF in several respects. Once implemented, MFP-11 provided SOF with control over its own resources, better enabling it to modernize the force. Additionally, the law fostered interservice cooperation: a single commander for all SOF promoted interoperability among the forces assigned to the same command. The establishment of a four-star Commander in Chief and an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict eventually gave SOF a voice in the highest councils of the Defense Department.[14]

Implementing the provisions and mandates of the Nunn-Cohen Act, however, was neither rapid nor smooth. One of the first issues to surface was appointing an ASD (SO/LIC), whose principal duties included monitorship of special operations activities and low-intensity conflict activities of the Department of Defense. The Congress even increased the number of assistant secretaries of defense from 11 to 12, but the Department of Defense still did not fill this new billet. In December 1987, the Congress directed Secretary of the Army John O. Marsh to carry out the ASD (SO/LIC) duties until a suitable replacement was approved by the Senate. Not until 18 months after the legislation passed did Ambassador Charles Whitehouse assume the duties of ASD (SO/LIC).[16]

Meanwhile, the establishment of USSOCOM provided its own measure of excitement. A quick solution to manning and basing a brand new unified command was to abolish an existing command. U.S. Readiness Command (USREDCOM),with an often misunderstood mission, did not appear to have a viable mission in the post Goldwater-Nichols era. and its Commander in Chief, General James Lindsay, had had some special operations experience. On 23 January 1987, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended to the Secretary of Defense that USREDCOM be disestablished to provide billets and facilities for USSOCOM. President Ronald Reagan approved the establishment of the new command on 13 April 1987. The Department of Defense activated USSOCOM on April 16, 1987 and nominated General Lindsay to be the first Commander in Chief Special Operations Command (USCINCSOC). The Senate accepted him without debate.[8]

[edit] Operation Earnest Will

USSOCOM's first tactical operation involved SEALs, Special Boat Teams (SBT), and 160th Special Operations Regiment (Airborne)("Nightstalkers") aviators working together during Operation Earnest Will in September 1987.

During Operation Earnest Will, the United States ensured that neutral oil tankers and other merchant ships could safely transit the Persian Gulf during the Iran-Iraq War. Iranian attacks on tankers prompted Kuwait to ask the United States in December 1986 to register 11 Kuwaiti tankers as American ships so that they could be escorted by the U.S. Navy. President Reagan agreed to the Kuwaiti request on March 10, 1987, hoping it would deter Iranian attacks.[8] The protection offered by U.S. naval vessels, however, did not stop Iran, which used mines and small boats to harass the convoys steaming to and from Kuwait.

In late July 1987, Rear Admiral Harold J. Bernsen, commander of the Middle East Force, requested NSW assets. Special Boat Teams deployed with six Mark III Patrol Boats and two SEAL platoons in August.[8] The Middle East Force decided to convert two oil servicing barges, Hercules and Wimbrown VII, into mobile sea bases. The mobile sea bases allowed SOF in the northern Persian Gulf to thwart clandestine Iranian mining and small boat attacks.

MH-60 landing on Hercules
MH-60 landing on Hercules

On the evening of September 21, Nightstalkers flying MH-6 and AH-6 Little Birds took off from the frigate Jarrett to track an Iranian ship, the Iran Ajr. The Nightstalkers observed the Iran Ajr turn off its lights and begin laying mines. Receiving permission to attack, the helicopters fired guns and rockets, stopping the ship. As the Iran Ajr’s crew began to push mines over the side, the helicopters resumed firing until the crew abandoned ship. Special Boat Teams provided security while a SEAL team boarded the vessel at first light and discovered nine mines on the vessel’s deck, as well as a logbook revealing areas where previous mines had been set. The logbook implicated Iran in mining international waters.[8]

Within a few days, the Special Operations forces had determined the Iranian pattern of activity—the Iranians hid during the day near oil and gas platforms in Iranian waters and at night they headed toward the Middle Shoals Buoy, a navigation aid for tankers. With this knowledge, SOF sent three of their helicopters and two patrol craft toward the buoy. The Little Bird helicopters arrived first and were fired upon by three Iranian boats anchored near the buoy. After a short but intense firefight, the helicopters sank all three boats.

SOF next saw action in mid-October, three days after an Iranian Silkworm missile hit the reflagged tanker Sea Isle City near the oil terminal outside Kuwait City. Seventeen crewmen and the American captain were injured in the missile attack.[8][17] During Operation Nimble Archer, four destroyers shelled two oil platforms in the Rostam oil field on October 19. After the shelling, a SEAL platoon and a demolition unit planted explosive charges on one of the platforms to destroy it. The SEALs next boarded and searched a third platform two miles away. Documents and radios were taken for intelligence purposes. Iran AJR, caught laying mines, was disabled by Night Stalker helicopters and boarded by SEALs.[17][8]

On April 14, 1988, approximately 65 miles east of Bahrain, the U.S. frigate Samuel B. Roberts (FFG-58) hit a mine, blowing a 30 by 23 foot hole in its hull. Ten sailors were injured. The United States struck back hard, attacking the Iranian frigate Sabalan and oil platforms in the Sirri and Sassan oil fields on April 18 during Operation Praying Mantis.[17] After U.S. warships bombarded the Sirri platform and set it ablaze, a UH-60 with a SEAL platoon flew toward the platform but was unable to get close enough because of the roaring fire. Secondary explosions soon wrecked the platform. Elsewhere, U.S. forces wreaked havoc on Iranian vessels, sinking two and damaging five others.[8]

Thereafter, Iranian attacks on neutral ships dropped drastically. On July 18, Iran accepted the United Nations cease fire; on August 20, 1988, the Iran-Iraq War ended. The remaining SEALs, patrol boats, and helicopters then returned to the United States.[8]

Despite American overconfidence in the ability to deter Iran, the first nine months of Operation Earnest Will could be declared a success.[17] Special Operations Forces provided the critical skills necessary to help CENTCOM gain control of the northern Persian Gulf and counter Iran’s small boats and minelayers. Their ability to work at night proved vital, since Iranian units used darkness to hide their actions. The most important lessons to come out of Operation Earnest Will were the need to have highly trained Special Operations Forces capable of responding rapidly to crises anywhere around the globe and the vital need for interoperability between conventional and Special Operations Forces. Additionally, based on Earnest Will operational requirements, USSOCOM would acquire new weapons systems—the patrol coastal ships and the Mark V Special Operations Craft.[8]

[edit] Somalia

USSOCOM first became involved in Somalia as part of Operation Provide Relief. In August 1992, soldiers of the 5th Special Forces Group deployed to Kenya to provide security for relief flights. C-130s circled over Somali airstrips during delivery of relief supplies. SOF medics and ground observers accompanied many relief flights into the airstrips throughout southern Somalia to conduct assessments of the area. In many cases, they were the first U.S. soldiers in Somalia, arriving before U.S. forces who supported the expanded relief operations of Restore Hope.[18][19][8]

The earliest missions during Operation Restore Hope were conducted by Navy SEALs. The SEALs performed several hydro-graphic reconnaissance missions to find suitable landing sites for Marines. On the night of December 7, the SEALs swam into Mogadishu Harbor, where they found suitable landing sites, assessed the area for threats, and ascertained that the port could support maritime prepositioned ship offloads. This was a tough mission because the SEALs has swam against a strong current which left many of them overheated and exhausted. Furthermore, they had to swim through raw sewage in the harbor, which made them sick.[8]

When the first SEALs hit the shore the following night, they were surprised to meet members of the news media. Thankfully, the first Marines came ashore soon thereafter, and the press corps redirected their attention to them, freeing the SEALs to proceed with their duties. Later, the SEALs provided personal security for President George Bush during a visit to Somali.[19][8]

In December 1992, the Special Forces assets in Kenya moved to Somalia and joined Operation Restore Hope. January 1993, a Special Forces command element deployed to Mogadishu as the Joint Special Operations Forces-Somalia (JSOFOR) that would command and control all special operations for Restore Hope. JSOFOR’s mission was to make initial contact with indigenous factions and leaders; provide information for force protection; and provide area assessments for future relief and security operations. Before redeploying in April, JSOFOR elements drove over 26,000 miles, captured 277 weapons, and destroyed over 45,320 pounds of explosives.[8]

In August 1993, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin directed the deployment of a Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) to Somalia in response to attacks made by General Mohamed Farrah Aidid's supporters upon U.S. and UN forces and installations. The JSOTF, named Task Force (TF) Ranger, mission named Operation Gothic Serpent was to capture Aidid. This was an especially arduous mission, for Aidid had gone underground in June, after several AC-130 air raids and UN ground assaults on his strongholds.[20][21][8]

The task force arrived in the country, and began conducting training exercises, and setting up the necessary liaison and communications networks. TF Ranger was made up of special operators from Delta Force 75th Ranger Regiment, 160th SOAR, Air Force special tactics units, and SEALs from the Naval Special Warfare Development Group. [20][8]

During August and September 1993, the task force conducted six missions into Mogadishu, all of which were successes. The TF ran these missions both in the day and at night, and used both helicopters and vehicles to reach their targets. Although Aidid remained free, the overall effect of these missions limited his movements.[21]

On October 3, TF Ranger launched its seventh mission, this time into Aidid’s stronghold the Bakara Market to capture two of his key lieutenants. The mission was expected to take only one or two hours.[20] Helicopters carrying assault and security teams with a ground convoy launched in the late afternoon from the TF Ranger compound at Mogadishu airport. The assault team had arrived at the target location and began searching the compound for Aidid’s supporters, as the security force was setting up perimeter positions. The TF came under increasingly heavy fire from, more intense than during previous raids. The assault team captured 24 Somalis including Aidid's lieutenants and was loading them onto the convoy trucks when a MH-60 Blackhawk was hit by a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) and crashed about three blocks from the target location.[21][8]

A small element from the security force, as well as an MH-6 assault helicopter and an MH-60 carrying a fifteen man combat search and rescue (CSAR) team, rushed to the crash site.[20] When the CSAR helicopter arrived the team began exiting the helicopter by sliding down fast ropes. As the last two members of the CSAR team were sliding down the fast ropes, their helicopter was also hit by an RPG, but the pilot was able to maintain control and fly to safety. [21][8]

The battle became increasingly worse. An RPG struck another MH-60, crashing less than a mile to the south of the first downed helicopter. The task force faced overwhelming Somali mobs that overran the crash sites, causing a dire situation.[20] A Somali mob overran the second site and, despite a heroic defense, killed everyone except the pilot, whom they took prisoner. Two defenders of this crash site, Master Sergeant Gary Gordon and Sergeant First Class Randall Shughart, were posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor.[20][21][8]

About this time, the mission’s quick reaction force (QRF) also tried to reach the second crash site. This force too was pinned by Somali fire and required the fire support of two AH-6 helicopters before it could break contact and make its way back to the base.[8]

After loading the detainees on the ground convoy trucks, the assault and security elements moved on foot towards the first crash area, passing through heavy fire that wounded a number of soldiers, and occupied buildings south and southwest of the downed helicopter. They fought to establish defensive positions so not to be pinned down by very heavy enemy fire, they held the Somalis at bay for several hours while treating their wounded, and worked to free the pilot’s body from the downed helicopter. Their supplies began to run increasingly low.[20][21]

With the detainees loaded on trucks, the ground convoy force attempted to reach the first crash site. Unable to find it amongst the narrow, winding alleyways, the convoy came under devastating small arms and RPG fire. The convoy had to return to base after suffering numerous casualties, losing two five ton trucks, and sustaining substantial damage to the their Humvees. The soldiers stuck at the first crash site were resupplied from a helicopter after several hours of waiting. [20]

Reinforcements, consisting of elements from the QRF, 10th Mountain Division soldiers, Rangers, SEALs, and Malaysian armored personnel carriers, finally arrived at 1:55 A.M. on October 4. The combined force worked until dawn to free the pilot’s body, receiving RPG and small arms fire throughout the night.[8] All the casualties were loaded onto the armored personnel carriers, and the remainder of the force was left behind and had no choice but to move out on foot.[20] The run-and-gun movement, known as the “Mogadishu mile,” began at 5:42 A.M.. AH-6 gunships raked the cross streets with fire to support the movement. The main force of the convoy arrived at the Pakistani Stadium-compound for the QRF-at 6:30 A.M..[20]

Thus ended one of the bloodiest and fiercest urban firefights since the Vietnam War. Task Force Ranger experienced a total of 17 killed in action and 106 wounded. Various estimates placed Somali casualties above 1,000.[20] Task force members had to operate in an extremely difficult environment that required constant innovation, flexibility and sound judgment. The task force had more than held its own against a vastly superior enemy that was battle-hardened from years of civil war and urban fighting. Although Task Force Rangers few missions were successes, the overall outcome of Operation Gothic Serpent was deemed a failure because of the Task Force's failure to complete their mission statement, capturing Mohamed Farrah Aidid.[20]

In the aftermath of what would be known as the Battle of Mogadishu or for Somalis The Day of the Rangers, U.S. military presence in Somalia increased significantly. This was a stratagem by President Bill Clinton and Defense Secretary Les Aspin to end combat operations in Somalia by appearing to increase military activity.[20] Two AC-130s deployed to Kenya and flew reconnaissance missions over Mogadishu. More Special Forces also deployed as did a platoon from SEAL Team 2 and one from SEAL Team 8. Most U.S. forces pulled out of Somalia by March 1994. The withdrawal from Somalia, was completed on March 1995.[8]

USSOCOM made significant contributions to the operations in Somalia. They performed reconnaissance and surveillance missions, assisted with humanitarian relief, protected American forces and conducted riverine patrols. Additionally, they ensured the safe landing of the Marines and safeguarded the arrival of merchant ships carrying food.[8]

[edit] Current Role

United States Special Operations Command has played a pivotal role in toppling the former Taliban government in Afghanistan and combating the insurgency since capturing Saddam Hussein in Iraq.[22] USSOCOM is now developing plans to have an expanded and more complex role in the global campaign against terrorism.[23]

[edit] Afghanistan

USSOCOM has achieved remarkable results during Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. Task Forces Dagger and K-Bar deployed into southern Afghanistan to prepare for operations in September 2001. Their mission was to conduct unconventional warfare with coalition forces to free Afghanistan from Taliban oppression and to no longer allow the area be a safe haven for terrorist organizations.

[edit] TF Dagger SF

In September 2001, at the start of the War in Afghanistan, United States Central Command (CENTCOM) did not have an unconventional warfare (UW) plan for Afghanistan. Initially, CENTCOM only tasked the Special Operations Command Central (SOCCENT) with Combat Search and Rescue missions, but SOCCENT planners, nonetheless, created a plan for a UW campaign for Afghanistan. SOCCENT briefed its UW campaign plan, the CENTCOM Commander, General Tommy Franks, said, “Okay. Do it.” Thus, USSOCOM became his main force against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban.

U.S. Army Special Forces plans delineated seven stages of a U.S. sponsored insurgency. These stages were: psychological operations preparing anti-Taliban insurgency forces, initial contact, infiltration, organization, buildup, combat operations, and demobilization. Government agencies, like the State Department and the CIA, would enter the leading role in the first three phases. U.S. Special Operations Forces and DoD would typically take the leading role in the next three phases: organizing the insurgent forces; training and equipping the insurgent forces; and conducting combat operations with the insurgents. The final phase would be the demobilization, which would involve a number of U.S. agencies and the newly-established government.[24][25]

The use of indigenous Islamic, anti-Taliban forces would undermine Taliban legitimacy and reinforce the concept that this conflict was between Afghans, and not a U.S. led war against Afghanistan or Islam.[24]

To execute the plan, SOCCENT would create Joint Special Operations Task Forces (JSOTFs), the first of which would be established in Uzbekistan and would give direct attention to combat-search-and-rescue and unconventional warfare missions. Beginning on October 5, Joint Special Operations Task Force-North (JSOTFN) stood up CSAR operations at Karshi-Kanabad (K2), Uzbekistan, and the bombing of Afghanistan began on October 7.

The 5th Special Forces Group (5th SFG), under the command of Col. John Mulholland, deployed to K2 and formed the core of this JSOTF, commonly known as Task Force Dagger. Unconventional warfare became TF Dagger’s principal mission. TF Dagger's included pilots from the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR) and Air Force Special Tactics teams from Air Force Special Operations Command.[24]

Task Force Dagger operators were to land deep in hostile territory, contact members of the Northern Alliance (NA), coordinate their activities in a series of offensive operations, using U.S. airpower to annihilate Al-Qaeda and Taliban forces, and bring down the cruel Taliban government of Afghanistan. After the first Special Forces Operational Detachment-Alpha (ODA), ODA 595, reached its landing zone south of Mazar-e-Sharif, it joined up with General Abdul Rashid Dostum, a warlord with a strong power base in this area. ODA 595 split into two groups to better assist Dostum’s scattered forces.[25]

The first half of ODA 595 named Team Alpha began calling in close air support (CAS) from U.S. aircraft.[24] Dostum initially prevented the team from moving close to the Taliban lines. Dostum was fearful that if any Americans were killed or injured that they would be withdrawn. Once the team was able to choose its own observation posts (OPs), their calls for fire became more effective. The massive close air support, brought down by the team, had a huge adverse psychological effect on the Taliban and a correspondingly positive effect on General Dostum’s men.[24] [25]

Starting on October 22, Team Alpha rode on horses with Dostum’s men to new observation posts, where the team members called in CAS missions.[24] In one 18-hour period, they destroyed over 20 armored and 20 support vehicles. At first, the Taliban sent in reinforcements, but those efforts proved fruitless as it only provided more targets for the SOF in the hidden OPs.

Meanwhile, Team Bravo, also riding on horses, moved south and interdicted Taliban forces in the Alma Tak Mountain Range, destroying over 65 enemy vehicles, 12 command positions, and a large enemy ammunition storage compound. Another Special Forces ODA, had inserted in early November allied with Dostum, also directed CAS to similar effect.

Mazar-e-Sharif fell to Dostum and the ODA on November 10. The capture of Mazar-e-Sharif was the first major victory for the U.S.led coalition in the war in Afghanistan, giving it a strategic foothold and an airfield in northern Afghanistan. This victory again validated Special Forces unconventional warfare role as a combat force multiplier. This strategy was employed effectively elsewhere in Afghanistan.[24][25]

[edit] Kbar

Shortly after September 11, CENTCOM tasked its Joint Force Special Operations Component Command (JFSOCC) to establish JSOTFs to perform unconventional warfare throughout Afghanistan. TF Dagger, as previously mentioned, was established in October 2001. The JFSOCC also established another JSOTF, which would be designated as Task Force K-BAR, to conduct operations in southern Afghanistan.

The K-Bar element, commanded by Captain Robert Harward, a Navy SEAL, began organizing at Masirah, Oman, in mid-October. TF K-BAR’s role would be to perfrom special reconnaissance (SR) and direct action (DA) to seek and destroy or capture the remaining elements of the Al-Qaeda and Taliban networks. TF K-Bar initially established headquarters at Camp Rhino with the Marines on November 22.[26] Navy SEALs had conducted SR in that area to ensure it was safe and vacant before the Marines arrived.[27] By December 15, however, it permanently moved to Kandahar Airfield. A assortment of diverse elements comprised TF K-Bar: CSOF from Denmark, Canada, Norway, New Zealand, Germany, and Australia; two Platoons from SEAL Team 3; combat controllers from 720th Special Tactics Group; and a battalion from 5th Special Forces Group, provided by TF Dagger.

TF K-Bar began conducting large-scale direct action missions in January 2002. One the first missions of this kind happened in Zhawar Kili valley, a suspected Al-Qaeda training camp, located in southeastern Afghanistan. A Echo Platoon from SEAL Team 3 lead this operation with 75 marines, 2 FBI agents for evidentiary purposes, 2 Air Force Combat Controllers and 1 Army chemical officer.[27] After a major aerial bombardment, Echo Platoon and its team inserted into Zhawar Kili to capture surviving Al-Qaeda members and investigate a cave complex created by mujahideen. The operation was to be a quick in-and-out sweep of the valley, projected to take 12 hours.[27] To the teams surprise the caves were sophisticated interconnected tunnels. The team found classrooms and millions of pounds of explosive ordnances in caves and valley floor. After eight days on the ground, the force withdrew after dropping 406,000 pounds of JDAMs, destroyed a vast tunnel complex and killed several Al-Qaeda fighters.[27]

[edit] major stuff
Combat areas during Operation Anaconda.
Combat areas during Operation Anaconda.

During the War in Afghanistan U.S. Special operators have been engaged in furious battles. One such battle happened during Operation Anaconda the mission to squeeze life out of a Taliban and Al-Qaeda stronghold dug deep into the Shah-i-Kot mountains of eastern Afghanistan. The operation was seen as one of the heaviest and bloodiest fights in the War in Afghanistan.[28] The battle on an Afghan mountaintop called Takur Ghar featured Special Operations forces from three of the 4 services. Navy SEALs, Army Rangers and pilots and Air Force Combat Controllers and Pararescuemen fought against entrenched Al-Qaeda fighters atop a 10,000-foot (3,000 m) mountain. According to an executive summary, the battle of Takur Ghar was the most intense firefight American special operators have been involved in since 18 U.S. Army Rangers were killed in Mogadishu, Somalia, in 1993.[29][30][31]

During Operation Red Wing on June 28, 2005, four Navy SEALs, pinned down in a firefight, radioed for help. A Chinook helicopter, carrying 16 service members, responded but was shot down. All members of the rescue team and three of four Seals on the ground died. It was the worst loss of life in Afghanistan since the invasion in 2001.The Navy SEAL Marcus Luttrell was the sole surviver.[32][33]

The success of unconventional warfare operations in Afghanistan generated many lessons for future operations, but their swift success, with minimal U.S. casualties, also demonstrated the effectiveness of SOF unconventional warfare.

[edit] Iraq

SOF were given key roles in Operation Iraqi Freedom such as stopping Saddam Hussein from creating an ecological disaster by dumping massive quantities of oil into the Arabian Gulf and lighting oil fields on fire as he had done during Desert Storm.

At the launch of the Iraq War dozens of 12-member Special Forces teams infiltrated southern and western Iraq to hunt for Scud missiles and pinpoint bombing targets. Scores of Navy SEALs seized oil terminals and pumping stations on the southern coast.[34] Air Force combat controllers flew combat missions in AC-130 gunships and established austere desert airstrips to begin the flow of soldiers and supplies deep into Iraq. SOF were also assigned key missions including preventing the Iraqi Republican Guard in the north from reinforcing Baghdad. It was a far cry from the Persian Gulf War of 1991, where Special Operations forces were kept largely on the sidelines. But it would not be a replay of Afghanistan, where Army Special Forces and Navy SEALs led the fighting. After their star turn in Afghanistan, many special operators were disappointed to play a supporting role in Iraq. Many special operators felt restricted by cautious commanders.[35] From that point, USSOCOM has since killed or captured hundreds of insurgents and Al-Qaeda terrorists. It has conducted several foreign internal defense missions successfully training the Iraqi security forces.[36][37]

[edit] Pakistan

U.S. Special Operations forces have recently began training Pakistan's elite Special Service Group.[38][39] Suspicions persist that the Pakistani intelligence service, a Taliban patron before U.S. forces overthrew the Islamist government in Kabul in 2001, continues to protect the Taliban's exiled leadership and to facilitate its resurgent operations across the border into Afghanistan.[40] Currently, C.I.A. operatives and Special Operations forces have limited authority to conduct counter-terrorism missions in Pakistan based on specific intelligence about the whereabouts of Osama bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahri or other members of their terrorist organization, Al-Qaeda, hiding in or near the tribal areas.[41]

[edit] Air Force

Air Force Special Operations Command was established May 22, 1990, with headquarters at Hurlburt Field, Florida. AFSOC is one of nine major Air Force commands, and the Air Force component of U.S. Special Operations Command, a unified command located at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida.

AFSOC provides Air Force special operations forces for worldwide deployment and assignment to regional unified commands. The command's SOF are composed of highly trained, rapidly deployable Airmen, conducting global special operations missions ranging from precision application of firepower, to infiltration, exfiltration, resupply and refueling of SOF operational elements.[42] AFSOC's unique capabilities include airborne radio and television broadcast for psychological operations, as well as aviation foreign internal defense instructors to provide other governments military expertise for their internal development.

The command's core missions include battlefield air operations; agile combat support; aviation foreign internal defense; information operations; precision aerospace fires; psychological operations; specialized air mobility; specialized refueling; and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.[43][44][35]

[edit] Units

  • The 1st Special Operations Wing mission focus is unconventional warfare: counter-terrorism, combat search and rescue, personnel recovery, psychological operations, aviation assistance to developing nations, "deep battlefield" resupply, interdiction and close air support. The wing's core missions include aerospace surface interface, agile combat support, combat aviation advisory operations, information operations, personnel recovery/recovery operations, precision aerospace fires, psychological operations dissemination, specialized aerospace mobility and specialized aerial refueling.[45]Among its aircraft is the MC-130 Combat Talon, a low-flying transport/rescue plane that can evade radar detection and slip into enemy territory at a 200-foot (61 m) altitude, even in zero visibility, dropping off men or supplies with pinpoint accuracy.[46]
  • The 27th Special Operations Wing's primary mission includes infiltration, exfiltration and re-supply of special operations forces; air refueling of special operations rotary wing and tiltrotor aircraft; and precision fire support. These capabilities support a variety of special operations missions including direct action, unconventional warfare, special reconnaissance, counter-terrorism, personnel recovery, psychological operations and information operations.[47]
Air Force Special Operators on a training mission.
Air Force Special Operators on a training mission.
  • 352nd Special Operations Group serves as the core to European Command's standing Joint Special Operations Air Component headquarters. The squadron provides support for three flying squadrons, one special tactics squadron and one maintenance squadron for exercise, logistics, and war planning; aircrew training; communications; aerial delivery; medical; intelligence; security and force protection; weather; information technologies and transformation support and current operations.[48]
  • The 353rd Special Operations Group is the focal point for all U.S. Air Force special operations activities throughout the United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) theater. The group is prepared to conduct a variety of high- priority, low-visibility missions. Its mission is air support of joint and allied special operations forces in the Pacific. It maintains a worldwide mobility commitment, participates in Pacific theater exercises as directed and supports humanitarian and relief operations.[49]
  • The 720th Special Tactics Group organizes, trains and equips Special forces worldwide to integrate, synchronize, and/or control the elements of air and space power in the area of operations. It also provides long-range operational and logistics planning, and deploys command and control elements during special tactics force employment or deployment. The 720th STG is also the functional manager for AFSOC's two overseas STS': the 320th under the command of the 353rd Special Operations Group, Kadena Air Base, Japan, and the 321st under the command of the 352nd Special Operations Group at RAF Mildenhall, England.[50]
  • The United States Air Force Special Operations School is a primary support unit of the Air Force Special Operations Command. The USAFSOS prepares special operations Airmen to successfully plan, organize, and execute global special operations by providing indoctrination and education for AFSOC, other USSOCOM components, and joint/interagency/ coalition partners.[51]
  • The 18th Flight Test Squadron evaluates aircraft, equipment and tactics in realistic battlespace environments to provide decision makers accurate, timely and complete assessments of mission capability.[52]

[edit] Army

On December 1, 1989 the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) activated as the 16th major Army command. These special operations forces have been America's spearhead for unconventional warfare more than 40 years. USASOC commands such units as the well known Special Forces (SF) and Rangers, and such relatively unknown units as the Psychological Operations Group (PSYOP) and Civil Affairs Brigade (CA). These are one of the USSOCOM's main weapons for waging unconventional warfare and counter-insurgency. The significance of these units is emphasized as conventional conflicts are becoming less prevalent as insurgent and guerrilla warfare increases.[53][54]

[edit] Units

The Rangers are a flexible and rapid-deployable force. Each battalion can deploy anywhere in the world with 18 hours notice. The Army places much importance on the 75th Ranger Regiment and its training, it possess the capabilities to conduct conventional and most special operations missions. Rangers are capable of: infiltrating by land, sea and air, direct action operations such as conducting raids or assaulting buildings or airfields.[56]

  • United States Army Special Forces (SF) aka Green Berets perform several doctrinal missions: Unconventional Warfare, Foreign Internal Defense, Special Reconnaissance, Direct Action, Counter-Terrorism and Counter-proliferation. These missions make Special Forces unique in the U.S. military, because they are employed throughout the three stages of the operational continuum: peacetime, conflict and war.[57]
    Special Forces on a patrol in Afghanistan.
    Special Forces on a patrol in Afghanistan.

Foreign Internal Defense operations, SF’s main peacetime mission, are designed to help friendly developing nations by working with their military and police forces to improve their technical skills, understanding of human rights issues, and to help with humanitarian and civic action projects. Special Forces unconventional warfare capabilities provide a viable military option for a variety of operational taskings that are inappropriate or infeasible for conventional forces. Special Forces are the U.S. military’s premier unconventional warfare force.[58]

Foreign internal defense and unconventional warfare missions are the bread and butter of Special Forces soldiers. For this reason SF candidates are trained extensively in weapons, engineering, communications and medicine. SF soldiers are taught to be warriors first and teachers second because they must be able to train their team and be able to train their allies during a FID or UW mission.[57][39]Often SF units are required to perform additional, or collateral, activities outside their primary missions. These collateral activities are coalition warfare/support, combat search and rescue, security assistance, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, humanitarian de-mining and counter-drug operations.[59]

  • The 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Night Stalkers) headquartered at Fort Campbell, Kentucky provides aviation support to Army special operations forces. The Regiment consists of MH-6 and AH-6 light helicopters, MH-60 helicopters and MH-47 heavy assault helicopters. The capabilities of the 160th SOAR (A) have been evolving since the early 1980s. Its focus on night operations resulting in the nickname, the "Night Stalkers."[60]The primary mission of the Night Stalkers is to conduct overt or covert infiltration, exfiltration, and resupply of special operations forces across a wide range of environmental conditions.[61]
  • 4th Psychological Operations Group (Airborne) Soldiers use persuasion to influence perceptions and encourage desired behavior. The cornerstone of PSYOP is truth, credibly presented to convince a foreign audience to cease resistance or take actions favorable to friendly forces.[62][63]4th PSYOP Gp supports national objectives at the tactical, operational and strategic levels of operations. Strategic psychological operations advance broad or long-term objectives; global in nature, they may be directed toward large audiences or at key communicators. Operational psychological operations are conducted on a smaller scale. 4th PSYOP Gp is employed by theater commanders to target groups within the theater of operations. 4th PSYOP Gp purpose can range from gaining support for U.S. operations to preparing the battlefield for combat. Tactical psychological operations are more limited, used by commanders to secure immediate and near-term goals. In this environment, these force-enhancing activities serve as a means to lower the morale and efficiency of enemy forces.[64]
  • 95th Civil Affairs Brigade (Airborne) specialists identify critical requirements needed by local citizens in war or disaster situations. They also locate civilian resources to support military operations, help minimize civilian interference with operations, support national assistance activities, plan and execute noncombatant evacuation, support counter-drug operations and establish and maintain liaison with civilian aid agencies and other nongovernmental organizations. In support of special operations, these culturally-oriented, linguistically-capable Soldiers may also be tasked to provide functional expertise for foreign internal defense operations, unconventional warfare operations and direct action missions.[65]
  • Special Operations Support Command (Airborne) has a difficult mission supporting ARSOF. In their respective fields, signal and support soldiers provide supplies, maintenance, equipment and expertise allowing Special Operation Forces to "shoot, move and communicate" on a continuous basis. Because ARSOF often uses SOF-unique items, soldiers assigned to these units are taught to operate and maintain a vast array of specialized equipment not normally used by their conventional counterparts. SOSCOM also provides the ARSOF with centralized and integrated materiel management of property, equipment maintenance, logistical automation and repair parts and supplies.[66]

[edit] Navy

The United States Naval Special Warfare Command (SPECWARCOM, NAVSOC, or NSW) was commissioned April 16, 1987, at Naval Amphibious Base Coronado in San Diego, California. As the Naval component to the United States Special Operations Command headquartered in Tampa, Florida. Naval Special Warfare Command provides vision, leadership, doctrinal guidance, resources and oversight to ensure component maritime special operations forces are ready to meet the operational requirements of combatant commanders.[68] Today, SEAL Teams, SEAL Delivery Vehicle Teams, and Special Boat Teams comprise the elite combat units of Naval Special Warfare. These teams are organized, trained, and equipped to conduct a variety of missions to include unconventional warfare, direct action, special reconnaissance, foreign internal defense, counter terrorism missions, and support psychological and civil affairs operations. Their highly trained specialists are deployed worldwide in support of National Command Authority objectives, conducting operations with other conventional and unconventional forces.

[edit] Units

SEALs emerge from the water during a demonstration.
SEALs emerge from the water during a demonstration.
  • United States Navy SEALs have distinguished themselves as an individually reliable, collectively disciplined and highly skilled maritime force. The most important trait that distinguishes Navy SEALs from all other military forces is that SEALs are maritime special forces, as they strike from and return to the sea. SEALs (Sea, Air, Land) take their name from the elements in and from which they operate. Their stealth and clandestine methods of operation allow them to conduct multiple missions against targets that larger forces cannot approach undetected. Because of the dangers inherent in their missions, prospective SEALs go through what is considered by many military experts to be one of the toughest training regimes in the world.[69][70]
  • SEAL Delivery Vehicle Teams are SEALs who use the SDV MK VIII and the Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS), submersibles that provides NSW with an unprecedented capability that combines the attributes of clandestine underwater mobility and the combat swimmer.[71][72]
  • Special Warfare Combatant-craft Crewmen (SWCC) are trained extensively in craft and weapons tactics, techniques and procedures. Focusing on clandestine infiltration and exfiltration of SEALs and other special operations forces, SWCC provide dedicated, rapid mobility in shallow water areas where larger ships cannot operate. Like SEALs, SWCC must have excellent physical fitness, highly motivated, combat-focused and responsive in high stress situations.[73]

[edit] Marine Corps

In October 2005, the Secretary of Defense directed the formation of United States Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command the Marine component of U. S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). It was determined that the Marine Corps would initially form a unit of approximately 2500 to serve with USSOCOM. On February 24, 2006, MARSOC activated at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. MARSOC initially consisted of a small staff and the Foreign Military Training Unit (FMTU), which had been formed to conduct Foreign Internal Defense. FMTU is now designated as the Marine Special Operations Advisor Group (MSOAG).[74]

As a service component of USSOCOM, MARSOC is tasked by the Commander USSOCOM to train, organize, equip; deploy task organized, scalable, and responsive U.S. Marine Corps special operations forces worldwide in support of combatant commanders and other agencies. MARSOC has been directed to conduct Foreign Internal Defense, Direct Action and Special Reconnaissance. MARSOC has also been directed to develop a capability in Unconventional Warfare , Counter Terrorism , and Information Operations. MARSOC deployed its first units in August 2006, six months after initial activation. MARSOC will reach full operational capability in October of 2008. [75]

[edit] Units

U.S. Marine giving weapon advice to a Philippine soldier.
U.S. Marine giving weapon advice to a Philippine soldier.
  • Marine Special Operations Battalions (MSOB) are organized, trained and equipped to deploy for worldwide missions as directed by MARSOC. MSOBs consists of five Marine Special Operations Companies (MSOCs) and is task-organized with personnel uniquely skilled in special equipment support, intelligence and fire-support.[76][77]
  • Marine Special Operations Advisor Group (MSOAG), formerly the Foreign Military Training Unit train, advise and assist friendly host-nation forces—including naval and maritime military and paramilitary forces—to enable them to support their governments’ internal security and stability, to counter subversion and to reduce the risk of violence from internal and external threats.[78]
  • The Marine Special Operations Support Group (MSOSG) provides specified support capabilities for worldwide special operations missions as directed by MARSOC. The MSOSG specifically provides combined arms planning and coordination, K-9 support, special operations communications support, combat service support (including logistics) and all-source intelligence fusion capability. The MSOSG can deploy tailored support detachments as directed by MARSOC.[79]
  • The Marine Special Operations School (MSOS) performs the screening, recruiting, training, assessment and doctrinal development functions for MARSOC. It includes two subordinate Special Missions Training Branches (SMTBs), one on each coast.
    • The Special Mission Training Branch—East provide special operations training in tactics, techniques and procedures, and evaluation and certification of MARSOC forces to specified conditions and standards for SOF. The Marines of MSOS are operators with the training, experience and mature judgment to plan, coordinate, instruct and supervise development of SOF special reconnaissance and direct action skills.[80]

[edit] Joint Special Operations Command

The Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) is the component that controls the special mission units (SMU) of USSOCOM. These units perform highly classified activities.[46][81][82]

[edit] Units

  • 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment-Delta (Combat Applications Group (CAG), Delta Force) is the first of the two primary counter-terrorist units of JSOC and SOCOM.[46] Modeled after the British Special Operations force Special Air Service, Delta is arguably one of the best SOF in the world.[83] This is because of Delta's stringent training and selection process. Delta recruits primarily from the most talented and highly skilled operators in the Army Special Forces and the 75th Ranger Regiment although CAG will take anyone and everyone that can pass their screening.[83][20] Recruits must pass a rigid selection course before beginning training. Delta has received training from numerous U.S. government agencies and other tier one SOF and has created a curriculum based on this training and techniques that it has developed.[83] Delta Force conducts clandestine and overt special operations all over the world.[83] It has the capability to conduct a myriad of special operations missions but specializes in counter-terrorism and hostage rescue operations.[46][81][20]
  • Naval Special Warfare Development Group (DEVGRU) is the second of the two primary counter-terrorist units of JSOC and SOCOM.[46] DEVGRU is the Naval Special Warfare's counter-part to Delta Force. Like Delta DEVGRU recruits the best operators from the best units in its branch, the Navy SEALs. DEVGRU is also capable of performing any type of special operations mission, but trains especially for maritime counter-terrorist operations.[46][20]
  • The Intelligence Support Activity (ISA ,The Activity) is the support branch of JSOC and USSOCOM. Its primary missions are to obtain intelligence mainly for Delta and DEVGRU's operations.[46][84] Before the establishing of the Strategic Support Branch in 2001, the ISA needed the permission of the CIA to conducts its operations which sometimes caused it to be less effective in its support of JSOC's primary units.[85][46][86]
  • The 24th Special Tactics Squadron (24th STS) is the AFSOC component of JSOC. The 24th STS operates similarly to the 720th Special Tactics Group. The 24th STS usually operates with Delta and DEVGRU because of the convenience of 24th STS ability to synchronize and control the different elements of air power and enhance air operations deep in enemy territory.[20]

Portions of JSOC units have made up the constantly changing special operations task force, operating in the U.S. Central Command area of operations. The Task Force 11, Task Force 121, Task Force 6-26 and Task Force 145 are creations of the Pentagon's post-Sept. 11 campaign against terrorism, and it quickly became the model for how the military would gain intelligence and battle insurgents in the future. Originally known as Task Force 121, it was formed in the summer of 2003, when the military merged two existing Special Operations units, one hunting Osama bin Laden in and around Afghanistan, and the other tracking Sadaam Hussein in Iraq.[87][88]

[edit] List of USSOCOM commanders

Name and Affiliation Start of Term End of Term
1 GEN James J. Lindsay, USA April 1987 June 1990
2 GEN Carl W. Stiner, USA June 1990 May 1993
3 GEN Wayne A. Downing, USA May 1993 February 1996
4 GEN Henry H. Shelton, USA February 1996 September 1997
RADM Raymond C. Smith, Jr., USN (acting)   September 1997 November 1997
5 GEN Peter J. Schoomaker, USA November 1997 October 2000
6 Gen Charles R. Holland, USAF October 2000 September 2003
7 GEN Bryan D. Brown, USA September 2003 July 2007
8 ADM Eric T. Olson, USN July 2007 Present

[edit] Notes

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  3. ^ Robinson, Linda (October 2004). Masters of Chaos: The Secret History of the Special Forces. PublicAffairs. ISBN 1586482491. 
  4. ^ USSOCOM Posture Statement. USSOCOM (2007). Retrieved on 2008-02-12.
  5. ^ Biography of Admiral James L. Holloway III, US Navy (Ret.) (June 2006). Retrieved on 2008-03-21.
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  8. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z USSOCOM Command History. Retrieved on 2008-02-08.
  9. ^ Goldwater, Barry; Sam Nunn. "S.CON.RES.80". A concurrent resolution to authorize the printing of 2,000 additional copies of the Committee Print of the Committee on Armed Services (99th Congress, 1st Session) entitled "Defense Organization: The Need for Change".. Retrieved on 2008-03-22. 
  10. ^ Nichols, Bill; Barry Goldwater (1986). "H.R.3622". A bill to amend title 10, United States Code, to strengthen the position of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to provide for more efficient and effective operation of the Armed Forces, and for other purposes.. Retrieved on 2008-03-22. 
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  27. ^ a b c d Couch, Dick (2006). Down Range: Navy SEALs in the War on Terrorism. New York, New York: Three Rivers Press. ISBN 1400081017. 
  28. ^ Operation Anaconda”, Time, <http://www.time.com/time/covers/1101020318/popup/> 
  29. ^ Garamone, Jim. "The Battle of Takur Ghar", American Forces Press Service. 
  30. ^ "Executive Summary of the Battle of Takur Ghar".. 
  31. ^ MacPherson, Malcolm (2006). Roberts Ridge: A Story of Courage and Sacrifice on Takur Ghar Mountain, Afghanistan. Dell. ISBN 0553586807. 
  32. ^ Blumenfield, Laura. "The Sole Survivor", Washington Post, June 11, 2007. 
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  35. ^ a b Dao, James. "Aftereffects: Special Operations Forces; War Plan Drew U.S. Commandos From Shadows", The New York Times, April 28, 2003. Retrieved on 2008-03-11. 
  36. ^ Kruzel, John. "Navy SEALs share war stories from Anbar province", American Forces Press Service, May 26, 2007. Retrieved on 2008-03-11. 
  37. ^ R. Gordon, Michael. "After The War: The Allies; In Major Assault, U.S. Forces Strike Hussein Loyalists", New York Times, June 13, 2003. Retrieved on 2008-03-11. 
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  40. ^ DeYoung, Karen. "In U.S., Much Interest in Pakistani Election but Few Options", Washington Post, February 18, 2008. Retrieved on 2008-03-13. 
  41. ^ David E. Sanger, Steven Lee Myers; Eric Schmitt. "U.S. Considers New Covert Push Within Pakistan", New York Times, January 6, 2008. Retrieved on 2008-03-13. 
  42. ^ Steven Lee Meyers, Thom Shanker. "A Nation Challenged: The Offensive; Special Operations Gunship Being Used Against Taliban", New York Times, October 16, 2001. Retrieved on 2008-03-13. 
  43. ^ AFSOC. Retrieved on 2008-01-11.
  44. ^ Meyers, Steven Lee; Thom Shanker. "A Nation Challenged: Air War; Pilots Told to Fire at Will in Some Zones", New York Times, October 17, 2001. Retrieved on 2008-03-13. 
  45. ^ 1st SOW Fact Sheet. AFSOC. Retrieved on 2008-01-20.
  46. ^ a b c d e f g h Emerson, Steven. "Stymied Warriors", New York Times, November 13, 1988. Retrieved on 2008-03-13. 
  47. ^ (August 29, 2007). "N.M. Delegation Welcomes 27th Special Ops. Wing to Cannon". Press release. Retrieved on 2008-03-21.
  48. ^ 352nd Fact Sheet. AFSOC. Retrieved on 2008-01-21.
  49. ^ 353rd SOG Fact Sheet. AFSOC. Retrieved on 2008-01-21.
  50. ^ 720th STG Fact Sheet. Retrieved on 2008-01-21.
  51. ^ USAFOS Fact Sheet. Retrieved on 2008-01-21.
  52. ^ 18th FTS Fact Sheet. Retrieved on 2008-01-21.
  53. ^ USASOC overview. Retrieved on 2008-01-08.
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  55. ^ 75th Ranger Regiment website. Retrieved on 2008-02-12.
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  57. ^ a b Couch, Dick (March 2007). Chosen Soldier: The Making of a Special Forces Warrior. Three Rivers Press. ISBN 0307339394. 
  58. ^ Shanker, Thom. "A Nation Challenged: Battlefield; Conduct of War Is Redefined By Success of Special Forces", New York Times, January 21, 2002. Retrieved on 2008-03-20. 
  59. ^ USASF mission. Retrieved on 2008-01-08.
  60. ^ Night Stalkers fact sheet. Retrieved on 2008-01-08.
  61. ^ 160th SOAR,MH-60 Black Hawk Helicopter Fact Sheet. Retrieved on 2008-02-12.
  62. ^ PSYOP Recruiting website. Retrieved on 2008-02-12.
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  64. ^ PSYOP fact sheet. Retrieved on 2008-02-12.
  65. ^ 95th Civil Affairs Fact Sheet. Retrieved on 2008-01-21.
  66. ^ SOSCOM Home Page. Retrieved on 2008-02-12.
  67. ^ USAJFKSWCS. Retrieved on 2008-02-19.
  68. ^ NAVSOC info website. Retrieved on 2008-01-08.
  69. ^ Official U.S. Navy SEAL Info Website. Retrieved on 2008-01-11.
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[edit] References

  • Andrew Kelley, Stephen (June 2007). Better Lucky Than Good: Operation Earnest Will as Gunboat Diplomacy. Naval Postgraduate School. Retrieved on 2008-05-12.
  • Briscoe, Charles (2001). Weapon of Choice: ARSOF in Afghanistan. Combat Studies Institute Press. 
  • Couch, Dick (March 2007). Chosen Soldier: The Making of a Special Forces Warrior. Three Rivers Press. ISBN 0307339394. 
  • Couch, Dick (2006). Down Range: Navy SEALs in the War on Terrorism. New York, New York: Three Rivers Press. ISBN 1400081017. 
  • Lee Wise, Harold (May 2007). Inside the Danger Zone: The U.S. Military in the Persian Gulf, 1987-1988. US Naval Institute Press. ISBN 1591149703. 
  • Pushies, Fred (2007). U.S. Air Force Special Ops. Osceola, Wisconsin: MBI Publishing Company. ISBN 0-7603-0733-4. 
  • R. Pirnie, Bruce (August 1998). Assessing Requirements for Peacekeeping, Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief. RAND Corporation. ISBN 0833025945. 
  • Smith, Michael (2007). Killer Elite: The Inside Story of America's Most Secret Special Operations Team. New York, New York: St. Martin's Press. ISBN 0312362722. 
  • Sweetman, Jack (March 1999). Great American Naval Battles. Naval Institute Press. ISBN 1557507945. 
  • USSOCOM Posture Statement. USSOCOM (2007). Retrieved on 2008-02-12.
Web
Bibliography
  • David Tucker, Christopher J. Lamb (2007). United States Special Operations Forces. Columbia University Press. ISBN 0231131909. 
  • Luttrell, Marcus; Patrick Robinson (June 2007). Lone Survivor: The Eyewitness Account of Operation Redwing and the Lost Heroes of SEAL Team 10. Little, Brown and Company. ISBN 0316067598. 

[edit] External links