User:Outdawg/Sandbox-USSOCOMhist

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Contents 1 History 1.1 Establishment of USSOCOM 1.2 Operation Earnest Will 1.3 Somalia 1.4 Current Role 1.5 Afghanistan 1.5.1 TF Dagger SF 1.5.2 Kbar 1.5.3 major stuff 1.6 Iraq 1.7 Pakistan 2 refs

[edit] History

[edit] Establishment of USSOCOM

The idea of a unified special operations command had its origins in the aftermath of Operation Eagle Claw, the disastrous attempted rescue of hostages at the American embassy in Iran. The ensuing investigation, chaired by Adm. James L. Holloway III, the retired Chief of Naval Operations, cited command and control and inter-service coordination as significant factors in the failure of the mission.^[1]

Desert One did serve to strengthen the resolve of some within the Department of Defense to reform SOF. Army Chief of Staff General Edward C. “Shy” Meyer called for a further restructuring of special operations capabilities. Although unsuccessful at the joint level, Meyer nevertheless went on to consolidate Army SOF units under the new 1st Special Operations Command in 1982, a significant step to improve Army SOF.

By 1983, there was a small but growing sense in the Congress for the need for military reforms. In June, the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC), under the chairmanship of Senator Barry Goldwater (R-AZ), began a two-year long study of the Defense Department which included an examination of SOF. With concern mounting on Capitol Hill, the Department of Defense created the Joint Special Operations Agency on 1 January 1984; this agency, however, had neither operational nor command authority over any SOF.^[2][3] The Joint Special Operations Agency thus did little to improve SOF readiness, capabilities, or policies hardly what Congress had in mind as a systemic fix for SOF’s problems. Within the Defense Department, there were a few staunch SOF supporters. Noel Koch, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, and his deputy, Lynn Rylander, both advocated SOF reforms.^[4]

At the same time, a few visionaries on Capitol Hill were determined to overhaul SOF. They included Senators Sam Nunn (D-GA) and William Cohen (R-ME), both members of the Armed Services Committee, and Representative Dan Daniel (D-VA), the chairman of the Readiness Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee. Congressman Daniel had become convinced that the U.S. military establishment was not interested in special operations, that the country’s capability in this area was second rate, and that SOF operational command and control was an endemic problem.^[4] Senators Nunn and Cohen also felt strongly that the Department of Defense was not preparing adequately for future threats. Senator Cohen agreed that the U.S. needed a clearer organizational focus and chain of command for special operations to deal with low-intensity conflicts.^[2]

In October 1985, the Senate Armed Services Committee published the results of its two-year review of the U.S. military structure, entitled “Defense Organization: The Need For Change.”^[5] Mr. James R. Locher III, the principal author of this study, also examined past special operations and speculated on the most likely future threats. This influential document led to the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.^{[6] [7]}

By spring 1986, SOF advocates had introduced reform bills in both houses of Congress. On 15 May, Senator Cohen introduced the Senate bill, co-sponsored by Senator Nunn and others, which called for a joint military organization for SOF and the establishment of an office in the Defense Department to ensure adequate funding and policy emphasis for low-intensity conflict and special operations.^[8] Representative Daniel’s proposal went even further—he wanted a national special operations agency headed by a civilian who would bypass the Joint Chiefs and report directly to the Secretary of Defense; this would keep Joint Chiefs and the Services out of the SOF budget process.^[3]

Congress held hearings on the two bills in the summer of 1986. Admiral William J. Crowe Jr., Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, led the Pentagon’s opposition to the bills. He proposed, as an alternative, a new Special Operations Forces command led by a three-star general. This proposal was not well received on Capitol Hill—Congress wanted a four-star general in charge to give SOF more clout. A number of retired military officers and others testified in favor of the need for reform.^[4]

By most accounts, retired Army Major General Richard Scholtes gave the most compelling reasons for change. Scholtes, who commanded the joint special operations task force in Grenada, explained how conventional force leaders misused SOF during the operation, not allowing them to use their unique capabilities, which resulted in high SOF casualties. After his formal testimony, Scholtes met privately with a small number of Senators to elaborate on the problems that he had encountered in Grenada.^[9]

Both the House and Senate passed SOF reform bills, and these went to a conference committee for reconciliation. Senate and House conferees forged a compromise. The bill called for a unified combatant command headed by a four star general for all SOF, an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, a coordinating board for low-intensity conflict within the National Security Council, and a new Major Force Program (MFP-11) for SOF (the so-called “SOF checkbook”).^{[10] [11]} The final bill, attached as a rider to the 1987 Defense Authorization Act, amended the Goldwater-Nichols Act and was signed into law in October 1986. Congress clearly intended to force DOD and the Administration to face up to the realities of past failures and emerging threats. DOD and the Administration were responsible for implementing the law, and Congress subsequently had to pass two additional bills to ensure proper implementation.^[4]

The legislation promised to improve SOF in several respects. Once implemented, MFP-11 provided SOF with control over its own resources, better enabling it to modernize the force. Additionally, the law fostered interservice cooperation: a single commander for all SOF promoted interoperability among the forces assigned to the same command. The establishment of a four-star Commander in Chief and an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict eventually gave SOF a voice in the highest councils of the Defense Department.^[10]

Implementing the provisions and mandates of the Nunn-Cohen Act, however, was neither rapid nor smooth. One of the first issues to surface was appointing an ASD (SO/LIC), whose principal duties included monitorship of special operations activities and low-intensity conflict activities of the Department of Defense. The Congress even increased the number of assistant secretaries of defense from 11 to 12, but the Department of Defense still did not fill this new billet. In December 1987, the Congress directed Secretary of the Army John O. Marsh to carry out the ASD (SO/LIC) duties until a suitable replacement was approved by the Senate. Not until 18 months after the legislation passed did Ambassador Charles Whitehouse assume the duties of ASD (SO/LIC).^[12]

Meanwhile, the establishment of USSOCOM provided its own measure of excitement. A quick solution to manning and basing a brand new unified command was to abolish an existing command. U.S. Readiness Command (USREDCOM),with an often misunderstood mission, did not appear to have a viable mission in the post Goldwater-Nichols era. and its Commander in Chief, General James Lindsay, had had some special operations experience. On 23 January 1987, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended to the Secretary of Defense that USREDCOM be disestablished to provide billets and facilities for USSOCOM. President Ronald Reagan approved the establishment of the new command on 13 April 1987. The Department of Defense activated USSOCOM on April 16, 1987 and nominated General Lindsay to be the first Commander in Chief Special Operations Command (USCINCSOC). The Senate accepted him without debate.^[4]

[edit] Operation Earnest Will

USSOCOM's first tactical operation involved SEALs, Special Boat Teams (SBT), and 160th Special Operations Regiment (Airborne)("Nightstalkers") aviators working together during Operation Earnest Will in September 1987.

During Operation Earnest Will, the United States ensured that neutral oil tankers and other merchant ships could safely transit the Persian Gulf during the Iran-Iraq War. Iranian attacks on tankers prompted Kuwait to ask the United States in December 1986 to register 11 Kuwaiti tankers as American ships so that they could be escorted by the U.S. Navy. President Reagan agreed to the Kuwaiti request on March 10, 1987, hoping it would deter Iranian attacks.^[4] The protection offered by U.S. naval vessels, however, did not stop Iran, which used mines and small boats to harass the convoys steaming to and from Kuwait.

In late July 1987, Rear Admiral Harold J. Bernsen, commander of the Middle East Force, requested NSW assets. Special Boat Teams deployed with six Mark III Patrol Boats and two SEAL platoons in August.^[4] The Middle East Force decided to convert two oil servicing barges, Hercules and Wimbrown VII, into mobile sea bases. The mobile sea bases allowed SOF in the northern Persian Gulf to thwart clandestine Iranian mining and small boat attacks.

On the evening of September 21, Nightstalkers flying MH-6 and AH-6 Little Birds took off from the frigate Jarrett to track an Iranian ship, the Iran Ajr. The Nightstalkers observed the Iran Ajr turn off its lights and begin laying mines. Receiving permission to attack, the helicopters fired guns and rockets, stopping the ship. As the Iran Ajr’s crew began to push mines over the side, the helicopters resumed firing until the crew abandoned ship. Special Boat Teams provided security while a SEAL team boarded the vessel at first light and discovered nine mines on the vessel’s deck, as well as a logbook revealing areas where previous mines had been set. The logbook implicated Iran in mining international waters.^[4]

Within a few days, the Special Operations forces had determined the Iranian pattern of activity—the Iranians hid during the day near oil and gas platforms in Iranian waters and at night they headed toward the Middle Shoals Buoy, a navigation aid for tankers. With this knowledge, SOF sent three of their helicopters and two patrol craft toward the buoy. The Little Bird helicopters arrived first and were fired upon by three Iranian boats anchored near the buoy. After a short but intense firefight, the helicopters sank all three boats.

SOF next saw action in mid-October, three days after an Iranian Silkworm missile hit the reflagged tanker Sea Isle City near the oil terminal outside Kuwait City. Seventeen crewmen and the American captain were injured in the missile attack.^[4][13] During Operation Nimble Archer, four destroyers shelled two oil platforms in the Rostam oil field on October 19. After the shelling, a SEAL platoon and a demolition unit planted explosive charges on one of the platforms to destroy it. The SEALs next boarded and searched a third platform two miles away. Documents and radios were taken for intelligence purposes. Iran AJR, caught laying mines, was disabled by Night Stalker helicopters and boarded by SEALs.^[13][4]

On April 14, 1988, approximately 65 miles east of Bahrain, the U.S. frigate Samuel B. Roberts (FFG-58) hit a mine, blowing a 30 by 23 foot hole in its hull. Ten sailors were injured. The United States struck back hard, attacking the Iranian frigate Sabalan and oil platforms in the Sirri and Sassan oil fields on April 18 during Operation Praying Mantis.^[13] After U.S. warships bombarded the Sirri platform and set it ablaze, a UH-60 with a SEAL platoon flew toward the platform but was unable to get close enough because of the roaring fire. Secondary explosions soon wrecked the platform. Elsewhere, U.S. forces wreaked havoc on Iranian vessels, sinking two and damaging five others.^[4]

Thereafter, Iranian attacks on neutral ships dropped drastically. On July 18, Iran accepted the United Nations cease fire; on August 20, 1988, the Iran-Iraq War ended. The remaining SEALs, patrol boats, and helicopters then returned to the United States.^[4]

Despite American overconfidence in the ability to deter Iran, the first nine months of Operation Earnest Will could be declared a success.^[13] Special Operations Forces provided the critical skills necessary to help CENTCOM gain control of the northern Persian Gulf and counter Iran’s small boats and minelayers. Their ability to work at night proved vital, since Iranian units used darkness to hide their actions. The most important lessons to come out of Operation Earnest Will were the need to have highly trained Special Operations Forces capable of responding rapidly to crises anywhere around the globe and the vital need for interoperability between conventional and Special Operations Forces. Additionally, based on Earnest Will operational requirements, USSOCOM would acquire new weapons systems—the patrol coastal ships and the Mark V Special Operations Craft.^[4]

[edit] Somalia

USSOCOM first became involved in Somalia as part of Operation Provide Relief. In August 1992, soldiers of the 5th Special Forces Group deployed to Kenya to provide security for relief flights. C-130s circled over Somali airstrips during delivery of relief supplies. SOF medics and ground observers accompanied many relief flights into the airstrips throughout southern Somalia to conduct assessments of the area. In many cases, they were the first U.S. soldiers in Somalia, arriving before U.S. forces who supported the expanded relief operations of Restore Hope.^[14][15][4]

The earliest missions during Operation Restore Hope were conducted by Navy SEALs. The SEALs performed several hydro-graphic reconnaissance missions to find suitable landing sites for Marines. On the night of December 7, the SEALs swam into Mogadishu Harbor, where they found suitable landing sites, assessed the area for threats, and ascertained that the port could support maritime prepositioned ship offloads. This was a tough mission because the SEALs has swam against a strong current which left many of them overheated and exhausted. Furthermore, they had to swim through raw sewage in the harbor, which made them sick.^[4]

When the first SEALs hit the shore the following night, they were surprised to meet members of the news media. Thankfully, the first Marines came ashore soon thereafter, and the press corps redirected their attention to them, freeing the SEALs to proceed with their duties. Later, the SEALs provided personal security for President George Bush during a visit to Somali.^[15][4]

In December 1992, the Special Forces assets in Kenya moved to Somalia and joined Operation Restore Hope. January 1993, a Special Forces command element deployed to Mogadishu as the Joint Special Operations Forces-Somalia (JSOFOR) that would command and control all special operations for Restore Hope. JSOFOR’s mission was to make initial contact with indigenous factions and leaders; provide information for force protection; and provide area assessments for future relief and security operations. Before redeploying in April, JSOFOR elements drove over 26,000 miles, captured 277 weapons, and destroyed over 45,320 pounds of explosives.^[4]

In August 1993, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin directed the deployment of a Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) to Somalia in response to attacks made by General Mohamed Farrah Aidid's supporters upon U.S. and UN forces and installations. The JSOTF, named Task Force (TF) Ranger, mission named Operation Gothic Serpent was to capture Aidid. This was an especially arduous mission, for Aidid had gone underground in June, after several AC-130 air raids and UN ground assaults on his strongholds.^[16][17][4]

The task force arrived in the country, and began conducting training exercises, and setting up the necessary liaison and communications networks. TF Ranger was made up of special operators from Delta Force 75th Ranger Regiment, 160th SOAR, Air Force special tactics units, and SEALs from the Naval Special Warfare Development Group. ^[16][4]

During August and September 1993, the task force conducted six missions into Mogadishu, all of which were successes. The TF ran these missions both in the day and at night, and used both helicopters and vehicles to reach their targets. Although Aidid remained free, the overall effect of these missions limited his movements.^[17]

On October 3, TF Ranger launched its seventh mission, this time into Aidid’s stronghold the Bakara Market to capture two of his key lieutenants. The mission was expected to take only one or two hours.^[16] Helicopters carrying assault and security teams with a ground convoy launched in the late afternoon from the TF Ranger compound at Mogadishu airport. The assault team had arrived at the target location and began searching the compound for Aidid’s supporters, as the security force was setting up perimeter positions. The TF came under increasingly heavy fire from, more intense than during previous raids. The assault team captured 24 Somalis including Aidid's lieutenants and was loading them onto the convoy trucks when a MH-60 Blackhawk was hit by a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) and crashed about three blocks from the target location.^[17][4]

A small element from the security force, as well as an MH-6 assault helicopter and an MH-60 carrying a fifteen man combat search and rescue (CSAR) team, rushed to the crash site.^[16] When the CSAR helicopter arrived the team began exiting the helicopter by sliding down fast ropes. As the last two members of the CSAR team were sliding down the fast ropes, their helicopter was also hit by an RPG, but the pilot was able to maintain control and fly to safety. ^[17][4]

The battle became increasingly worse. An RPG struck another MH-60, crashing less than a mile to the south of the first downed helicopter. The task force faced overwhelming Somali mobs that overran the crash sites, causing a dire situation.^[16] A Somali mob overran the second site and, despite a heroic defense, killed everyone except the pilot, whom they took prisoner. Two defenders of this crash site, Master Sergeant Gary Gordon and Sergeant First Class Randall Shughart, were posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor.^[16][17][4]

About this time, the mission’s quick reaction force (QRF) also tried to reach the second crash site. This force too was pinned by Somali fire and required the fire support of two AH-6 helicopters before it could break contact and make its way back to the base.^[4]

After loading the detainees on the ground convoy trucks, the assault and security elements moved on foot towards the first crash area, passing through heavy fire that wounded a number of soldiers, and occupied buildings south and southwest of the downed helicopter. They fought to establish defensive positions so not to be pinned down by very heavy enemy fire, they held the Somalis at bay for several hours while treating their wounded, and worked to free the pilot’s body from the downed helicopter. Their supplies began to run increasingly low.^[16][17]

With the detainees loaded on trucks, the ground convoy force attempted to reach the first crash site. Unable to find it amongst the narrow, winding alleyways, the convoy came under devastating small arms and RPG fire. The convoy had to return to base after suffering numerous casualties, losing two five ton trucks, and sustaining substantial damage to the their Humvees. The soldiers stuck at the first crash site were resupplied from a helicopter after several hours of waiting. ^[16]

Reinforcements, consisting of elements from the QRF, 10th Mountain Division soldiers, Rangers, SEALs, and Malaysian armored personnel carriers, finally arrived at 1:55 A.M. on October 4. The combined force worked until dawn to free the pilot’s body, receiving RPG and small arms fire throughout the night.^[4] All the casualties were loaded onto the armored personnel carriers, and the remainder of the force was left behind and had no choice but to move out on foot.^[16] The run-and-gun movement, known as the “Mogadishu mile,” began at 5:42 A.M.. AH-6 gunships raked the cross streets with fire to support the movement. The main force of the convoy arrived at the Pakistani Stadium-compound for the QRF-at 6:30 A.M..^[16]

Thus ended one of the bloodiest and fiercest urban firefights since the Vietnam War. Task Force Ranger experienced a total of 17 killed in action and 106 wounded. Various estimates placed Somali casualties above 1,000.^[16] Task force members had to operate in an extremely difficult environment that required constant innovation, flexibility and sound judgment. The task force had more than held its own against a vastly superior enemy that was battle-hardened from years of civil war and urban fighting. Although Task Force Rangers few missions were successes, the overall outcome of Operation Gothic Serpent was deemed a failure because of the Task Force's failure to complete their mission statement, capturing Mohamed Farrah Aidid.^[16]

In the aftermath of what would be known as the Battle of Mogadishu or for Somalis The Day of the Rangers, U.S. military presence in Somalia increased significantly. This was a stratagem by President Bill Clinton and Defense Secretary Les Aspin to end combat operations in Somalia by appearing to increase military activity.^[16] Two AC-130s deployed to Kenya and flew reconnaissance missions over Mogadishu. More Special Forces also deployed as did a platoon from SEAL Team 2 and one from SEAL Team 8. Most U.S. forces pulled out of Somalia by March 1994. The withdrawal from Somalia, was completed on March 1995.^[4]

USSOCOM made significant contributions to the operations in Somalia. They performed reconnaissance and surveillance missions, assisted with humanitarian relief, protected American forces and conducted riverine patrols. Additionally, they ensured the safe landing of the Marines and safeguarded the arrival of merchant ships carrying food.^[4]

[edit] Current Role

United States Special Operations Command has played a pivotal role in toppling the former Taliban government in Afghanistan and combating the insurgency since capturing Saddam Hussein in Iraq.^[18] USSOCOM is now developing plans to have an expanded and more complex role in the global campaign against terrorism.^[19]

[edit] Afghanistan

USSOCOM has achieved remarkable results during Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. Task Forces Dagger and K-Bar deployed into southern Afghanistan to prepare for operations in September 2001. Their mission was to conduct unconventional warfare with coalition forces to free Afghanistan from Taliban oppression and to no longer allow the area be a safe haven for terrorist organizations.

[edit] TF Dagger SF

In September 2001, at the start of the War in Afghanistan, United States Central Command (CENTCOM) did not have an unconventional warfare (UW) plan for Afghanistan. Initially, CENTCOM only tasked the Special Operations Command Central (SOCCENT) with Combat Search and Rescue missions, but SOCCENT planners, nonetheless, created a plan for a UW campaign for Afghanistan. SOCCENT briefed its UW campaign plan, the CENTCOM Commander, General Tommy Franks, said, “Okay. Do it.” Thus, USSOCOM became his main force against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban.

U.S. Army Special Forces plans delineated seven stages of a U.S. sponsored insurgency. These stages were: psychological operations preparing anti-Taliban insurgency forces, initial contact, infiltration, organization, buildup, combat operations, and demobilization. Government agencies, like the State Department and the CIA, would enter the leading role in the first three phases. U.S. Special Operations Forces and DoD would typically take the leading role in the next three phases: organizing the insurgent forces; training and equipping the insurgent forces; and conducting combat operations with the insurgents. The final phase would be the demobilization, which would involve a number of U.S. agencies and the newly-established government.^[20]

The use of indigenous Islamic, anti-Taliban forces would undermine Taliban legitimacy and reinforce the concept that this conflict was between Afghans, and not a U.S. led war against Afghanistan or Islam.

To execute the plan, SOCCENT would create Joint Special Operations Task Forces (JSOTFs), the first of which would be established in Uzbekistan and would give direct attention to combat-search-and-rescue and unconventional warfare missions. Beginning on October 5, Joint Special Operations Task Force-North (JSOTFN) stood up CSAR operations at Karshi-Kanabad (K2), Uzbekistan, and the bombing of Afghanistan began on October 7.

The 5th Special Forces Group (5th SFG), under the command of Col. John Mulholland, deployed to K2 and formed the core of this JSOTF, commonly known as Task Force Dagger. Unconventional warfare became TF Dagger’s principal mission. TF Dagger's included pilots from the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR) and Air Force Special Tactics teams from Air Force Special Operations Command.

Task Force Dagger operators were to land deep in hostile territory, contact members of the Northern Alliance (NA), coordinate their activities in a series of offensive operations, using U.S. airpower to annihilate Al-Qaeda and Taliban forces, and bring down the cruel Taliban government of Afghanistan. After the first Special Forces Operational Detachment-Alpha (ODA), ODA 595, reached its landing zone south of Mazar-e-Sharif, it joined up with General Abdul Rashid Dostum, a warlord with a strong power base in this area. ODA 595 split into two groups to better assist Dostum’s scattered forces.^[20]

The first half of ODA 595 named Team Alpha began calling in close air support (CAS) from U.S. aircraft. Dostum initially prevented the team from moving close to the Taliban lines. Dostum was fearful that if any Americans were killed or injured that they would be withdrawn. Once the team was able to choose its own observation posts (OPs), their calls for fire became more effective. The massive close air support, brought down by the team, had a huge adverse psychological effect on the Taliban and a correspondingly positive effect on General Dostum’s men. ^[20]

Starting on October 22, Team Alpha rode on horses with Dostum’s men to new observation posts, where the team members called in CAS missions. In one 18-hour period, they destroyed over 20 armored and 20 support vehicles. At first, the Taliban sent in reinforcements, but those efforts proved fruitless as it only provided more targets for the SOF in the hidden OPs.

Meanwhile, Team Bravo, also riding on horses, moved south and interdicted Taliban forces in the Alma Tak Mountain Range, destroying over 65 enemy vehicles, 12 command positions, and a large enemy ammunition storage compound. Another Special Forces ODA, had inserted in early November allied with Dostum, also directed CAS to similar effect.

Mazar-e-Sharif fell to Dostum and the ODA on November 10. The capture of Mazar-e-Sharif was the first major victory for the U.S.led coalition in the war in Afghanistan, giving it a strategic foothold and an airfield in northern Afghanistan. This victory again validated Special Forces unconventional warfare role as a combat force multiplier. This strategy was employed effectively elsewhere in Afghanistan.^[20]

[edit] Kbar

Shortly after September 11, CENTCOM tasked its Joint Force Special Operations Component Command (JFSOCC) to establish JSOTFs to perform unconventional warfare throughout Afghanistan. TF Dagger, as previously mentioned, was established in October 2001. The JFSOCC also established another JSOTF, which would be designated as Task Force K-BAR, to conduct operations in southern Afghanistan.

The K-BAR element, commanded by Captain Robert Harward, a Navy SEAL, began organizing at Masirah, Oman, in mid-October. TF K-BAR’s role would be to perfrom special reconnaissance (SR) and direct action (DA) to seek and destroy or capture the remaining elements of the Al-Qaeda and Taliban networks. TF K-BAR initially established headquarters at Camp Rhino with the Marines on November 22. Navy SEALs had conducted SR in that area to ensure it was safe and vacant before the Marines arrived. By December 15, however, it permanently moved to Kandahar Airfield. A assortment of diverse elements comprised K-BAR: CSOF from Denmark, Canada, Norway, New Zealand, Germany, and Australia; two Platoons from SEAL Team 3; combat controllers from 720th Special Tactics Group; and a battalion from 5th Special Forces Group, provided by TF Dagger.

[edit] major stuff

During the War in Afghanistan U.S. Special operators have been engaged in furious battles. One such battle happened during Operation Anaconda the mission to squeeze life out of a Taliban and Al-Qaeda stronghold dug deep into the Shah-i-Kot mountains of eastern Afghanistan. The operation was seen as one of the heaviest and bloodiest fights in the War in Afghanistan.^[21] The battle on an Afghan mountaintop called Takur Ghar featured Special Operations forces from three of the 4 services. Navy SEALs, Army Rangers and pilots and Air Force Combat Controllers and Pararescuemen fought against entrenched Al-Qaeda fighters atop a 10,000-foot (3,000 m) mountain. According to an executive summary, the battle of Takur Ghar was the most intense firefight American special operators have been involved in since 18 U.S. Army Rangers were killed in Mogadishu, Somalia, in 1993.^[22][23][24]

During Operation Red Wing on June 28, 2005, four Navy SEALs, pinned down in a firefight, radioed for help. A Chinook helicopter, carrying 16 service members, responded but was shot down. All members of the rescue team and three of four Seals on the ground died. It was the worst loss of life in Afghanistan since the invasion in 2001.The Navy SEAL Marcus Luttrell was the sole surviver.^[25][26]

The success of unconventional warfare operations in Afghanistan generated many lessons for future operations, but their swift success, with minimal U.S. casualties, also demonstrated the effectiveness of SOF unconventional warfare.

[edit] Iraq

SOF were given key roles in Operation Iraqi Freedom such as stopping Saddam Hussein from creating an ecological disaster by dumping massive quantities of oil into the Arabian Gulf and lighting oil fields on fire as he had done during Desert Storm.

At the launch of the Iraq War dozens of 12-member Special Forces teams infiltrated southern and western Iraq to hunt for Scud missiles and pinpoint bombing targets. Scores of Navy SEALs seized oil terminals and pumping stations on the southern coast.^[27] Air Force combat controllers flew combat missions in AC-130 gunships and established austere desert airstrips to begin the flow of soldiers and supplies deep into Iraq. SOF were also assigned key missions including preventing the Iraqi Republican Guard in the north from reinforcing Baghdad. It was a far cry from the Persian Gulf War of 1991, where Special Operations forces were kept largely on the sidelines. But it would not be a replay of Afghanistan, where Army Special Forces and Navy SEALs led the fighting. After their star turn in Afghanistan, many special operators were disappointed to play a supporting role in Iraq. Many special operators felt restricted by cautious commanders.^[28] From that point, USSOCOM has since killed or captured hundreds of insurgents and Al-Qaeda terrorists. It has conducted several foreign internal defense missions successfully training the Iraqi security forces.^[29][30]

[edit] Pakistan

U.S. Special Operations forces have recently began training Pakistan's elite Special Service Group.^[31][32] Suspicions persist that the Pakistani intelligence service, a Taliban patron before U.S. forces overthrew the Islamist government in Kabul in 2001, continues to protect the Taliban's exiled leadership and to facilitate its resurgent operations across the border into Afghanistan.^[33] Currently, C.I.A. operatives and Special Operations forces have limited authority to conduct counter-terrorism missions in Pakistan based on specific intelligence about the whereabouts of Osama bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahri or other members of their terrorist organization, Al-Qaeda, hiding in or near the tribal areas.^[34]

[edit] refs

• Lee Wise, Harold (May 2007). Inside the Danger Zone: The U.S. Military in the Persian Gulf, 1987-1988. US Naval Institute Press. ISBN 1591149703. 
• Sweetman, Jack (March 1999). Great American Naval Battles. Naval Institute Press. ISBN 1557507945. 
• Andrew Kelley, Stephen (June 2007). Better Lucky Than Good: Operation Earnest Will as Gunboat Diplomacy. Naval Postgraduate School. Retrieved on 2008-05-12.
• USSOCOM Command History. Retrieved on 2008-02-08.</ref>
• R. Pirnie, Bruce (August 1998). Assessing Requirements for Peacekeeping, Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief. RAND Corporation. ISBN 0833025945. 
• Briscoe, Charles (2001). Weapon of Choice: ARSOF in Afghanistan. Combat Studies Institute Press. 
• Couch, Dick (2006). Down Range: Navy SEALs in the War on Terrorism. New York, New York: Three Rivers Press. ISBN 1400081017. 
• Priddy, Maj. Wade (June 2006). "Marine Detachment 1: Opening the door for a Marine force contribution to USSOCom". Marine Corps Gazette (June 2006): 58–59. Marine Corps Association. </ref>