Talk:Operation Downfall

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Contents

[edit] Copyright permission letter

Moved to Image:Operation Downfall.jpg

[edit] Unit 731

Did the U.S. know of the existence of this unit during planning for the attack or only after the war was over? Rmhermen 22:51, Aug 16, 2004 (UTC)

Further to this point, the quote is wrong on the name of the intelligence gained by SIGINT. Ultra was strictly from breaking the German enigma codes. Magic was a codename used for SIGINT from Japanese sources, although I'm not sure whether that referred to all Japanese-sourced SIGINT, or one of the military or diplomatic codes broken during the war. David Newton 00:21, 17 Aug 2004 (UTC)

[edit] Japanese forces

The info on Japanese defenses needs work.

From Downfall, p. 201-203
... At the beginning of 1945, the island was defended by only one field division, the 86th. ... Thus, when Truman reviewed the invasion plans [on June 18], Kyushu was known to be garrisoned by four divisions and two army headquarters.[A Japanese army being ~equivalent to a US Army corps.]
In July came the deluge. ... By July 9, estimates of total Japanese strength on Kyushu had already reached the 350,000 total Marshall had predicted would be the maximum the invasion would face. ...
... By August 10, the [JCS] estimated that by October 15, the Home Islands would house fifty-six field divisions, ... In the final revision of this estimate on August 20, the total on Kyushu [would have] reached 625,000 man and fouteen field divisions. (This total was exactly correct as to field divisions, but the actual number of Japanese servicemen on Kyushu [would have been] much greater: 900,000.)
p. 211
The intelligence revelations about Japanese preparations on Kyushu emerging in mid-July transmitted powerful shock waves both in the Pacific and in Washington. On July 29, [MacArthur's intelligence chief] Willoughby ... noted first that the April estimate allowed for the Japanese capability to deploy six divisions on Kyushu, with the potential to deploy ten. "These [six] divisions have since made their appearance, as predicted," he observed, "and the end is not in sight." If not checked, this threatened "to grow to [the] point where we attack on a ratio of one(1) to one(1) which is not the recipe for victory."
—wwoods 22:50, 14 Sep 2004 (UTC)

[edit] "Americans"

It seems to be typical of articles related to the Pacific War that authors often incorrectly refer to "Americans", rather than Allied forces. Apart from the issue of what an American is, I think this article overuses "Americans" as well. I mean if Operation Coronet had gone ahead, the Honshu campaign would have involved substantial non-US army (probably equivalent to at least two corps), as well as naval and air forces. What do others think? Grant65 (Talk) 23:28, Sep 14, 2004 (UTC)

Would you care to name a single major non-American unit scheduled to take place in either invasion? I have the order of Battle in front of me - Olympic was to be mounted by the American I, II, V, and IX corps, under Krueger. Coronet was to be mounted with the American I and 8 Corps. Meanwhile, in "The Invasion of Japan", the chapter named "Allied participation" says Unlike the war in the European and Medaterrain, the war in the Pacific was an American affair... Scenting victory in 1944-45, American planners and commanders were not altogether enthusiastic about letting Allied forces in on the kill. Churchill himself had only come to offer British forces only after long prodding from his own chiefs of staff. The prime minister preferred instead to use British naval power in the Indian Ocean and Southeast Asia to help recover Britian's lost colonies... American planners took no note that Allied ground troops might participate in the invasion of the Kanto plain. The published plans indicated that assault, followup, and reservce units would all come from US forces." It goes on to say that the Allies offered to send help, but the American planners were quite unethusiastic about it. In short, you are flat out, dead wrong. "Americans" is the proper word to use in this article. →Raul654 23:48, Sep 14, 2004 (UTC)
1. You are referring to one books'/historians' version of the "truth", and this is not good enough for Wikipedia. I think you need to look at more non-US sources. 2. The article even says non-US forces would be used (e.g. the bombers in Tiger Force). Amphibious operations are not just about soldiers, they are also about air and naval forces. 3. It's odd to speak of an "order of battle" for something which never took place. It's a proposed order of battle, concerning US forces only. Faced with casualties in the millions, how could the US high command have refused the offers of experienced Australian, Canadian, British and Indian army divisions? How is it that I have read in several sources that Macarthur agreed to the use of a token combined Commonwealth division, but the Australian government was contesting this, in favour of a whole Australian division? 4. It's simply wrong to say that the "the war in the Pacific was an American affair", even if one is speaking about the Pacific Islands campaign. A US-planned/commanded operation is not the same thing as an operation with exclusively US personnel. By the way, the focus on "British" forces — represented by "Churchill" — in that quote is revealing in itself. 5. Why is "American", which could mean Paraguayan, a better word to use than "US"? Allied is the right word in terms of the operation as a whole; US is the right word in terms of specific units and commanders.Grant65 (Talk) 00:54, Sep 15, 2004 (UTC)
Easy, easy. Grant's got a point. Code-name Downfall (Allen & Polmar) mentions "four British fleet carriers available in mid-1945 (and more coming out), ... The Royal Air Force (RAF) planned to shift heavy bombers to the Pacific, and a mostly Australian tactical air force was getting ready to support the Commonwealth Corps for the planned invasion of Honshu. ... The RAF was assembling the so-called Tiger Force of Lancaster Mark VII bombers, which would be based on Okinawa with Doolittle's Eighth Air Force. ... arriving ... about September 1945. Between 30 and 36 squadrons, each with 16 aircraft..." The Commonwealth Corps, aka the British X Corps, would have included the British 3rd Infantry Division, 6th Canadian Division, and 10th Australian Division. "The Commonwealth Corps was to have formed an afloat reserve for the Honshu assault. The British intended to provide two follow-up divisions on about Day Y+40." So only the Royal Navy was actually operating in the area before the Japanese surrendered, but if the war had continued through 1946, the non-American Allied forces would have made a noteworthy, if relatively small, contribution.
The British carriers had already taken part in the Battle of Okinawa. A combination of Google and Wikipedia tells me the carriers were Victorious, Illustrious, Indefatigable and Indomitable, as part of the US 5th Fleet.
—wwoods 01:10, 15 Sep 2004 (UTC)
I can vouch for the part about the carriers. Those British carriers helped in the invasion of Okinawa, and proved invaluable because of their steel flight decks (the American carriers used teakwood, which proved susceptible to kamikazes). →Raul654 01:13, Sep 15, 2004 (UTC)
Thanks, W. I have incorporated some of that information into a couple of other pages.Grant65 (Talk) 10:56, Sep 17, 2004 (UTC)

[edit] Prospects for Downfall

This section is rather speculative--necessarily, since the invasion didn't happen--but what's the "original research" that Raul objects to? [1]
—wwoods 20
52, 6 Jan 2005 (UTC)
Can you (or anyone else) cite a single reputable source that agrees with those speculations? Because the source I used to write this article does not agree with those conclusions at all. Quite frankly, it it sounds to me like whoever wrote it was making it up as they went along. It makes some pretty haughty conclusions with no evidentiary citation (that the japanese were going to surrender; that the invasion was going to be retargetted, when there is *NO EVIDENCE AT ALL* that that was going to happen, 'etc). →Raul654 21:18, Jan 6, 2005 (UTC)
Well, I wrote it, and I thought I threw in enough "likely"s and "unlikely"s to avoid sounding conclusive, much less haughty. :-)
Which source have you been using? I've mostly drawn from Richard Frank's Downfall; have you read it?
For the difficulties the Japanese were facing, from p. 350-352:
  Of this quartet [of events which were about to happen], without the atomic bombs, the new strategic-bombing directive of August 11 would have had the most significant effect. ...
  The redistribution of the fall 1945 harvest staved off the food-supply crisis to mid-1946. If bombing had disrupted this process, mass starvation would have been unleashed far earlier. As the new air-targeting directive promised to shatter Japan's rail system--the only means of gathering and distributing the harvest--this outcome appears likely.
I've already quoted stuff about the prospective Soviet invasion of Hokkaido in late August over on the Atomic bombings Talkpage.
For the difficulties the Americans were facing, I've previously quoted chunks about the Japanese buildup; see above. In the spring, the planners had assumed the invasion would be facing three Japanese divisions in southern Kyushu, reinforced by three from northern Kyushu and perhaps four from Honshu. By summer, there were facing nine in southern Kyushu, supported by four more in northern Kyushu. As you know, the rule of thumb is that the attacker needs a three-to-one advantage; that was gone. From p. 273-6:
... [On August 6], the Joint War Plans Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded a report, "Alternatives to 'OLYMPIC,'" ... An attached draft message to MacArthur and Nimitz observed that while the dramatic increase in Japanese strength did not yet require a change of the directive, ... It advised that "operations against northern Honshu, against the Sendai area, and directly against the Kanto Plain are now under intensive study [in Washington]."
  Nimitz had advised King "Eyes Only" on May 25 that he no longer supported an invasion of Japan, ... King now forced Nimitz either to avow support of Olympic (an action that can safely be ruled out, given the intelligence developments since May 25) or to break the apparent interservice consensus. [Nimitz waited to see what effect Nagasaki would have before responding.]
From p. 357:
  At this juncture, the key interaction would likely have been between Marshall and Truman. There is strong evidence that Marshall remained committed to an invasion as late as August 15. In his August 7 message to MacArthur, Marshall suggested the substitution of other locations for Kyushu, not cancellation. On August 13, General Hull, on Marshall's behalf, explored the use of atomic weapons to support a landing. [And, as the article already says, Marshall also considered the use of chemical weapons.] But tempering Marshall's personal commitment to invasion would have been his comprehension that civilian sanction in general, and Truman's in particular, was unlikely for a costly invasion that no longer enjoyed consensus support from the armed services.
So, all in all, it seems safe to say that before X-Day came in November, both the Japanese and American leaders would have been under extreme pressure to change policies, though God only knows how things would have worked out.
—wwoods 00:51, 7 Jan 2005 (UTC)
I personally think it's quite a stretch to beleive that two weeks prior to what-would-have-been the largest invasion in history, Truman would have called it off. Your own citation says as of August 6 (X-day - 3 weeks), the Joint Chiefs memo was advising no change of directive. On othe other hand, I have the same feeling that Japan would not have surrendered, because of the hard liners. Remember, these are the same folks who didn't want to surrender *after* the US dropped the atomic bomb on them and after their emperor told them to surrender (and, in fact, attempted a coup to prevent 'said surrender). Had the atomic bomb not been dropped, I don't think there's any way Japan would have surrendered prior to the Nov 1 invasion. →Raul654 03:49, Jan 7, 2005 (UTC)
Did you mean 3 months? X-Day was 1 November. That's enough time for things to change. With the Japanese people facing millions of deaths in the coming winter and the Red Army already invading the Home Islands, something would have to be done. The Japanese Army couldn't only keep on preparing to throw the Americans back into the sea. Meanwhile the Joint Chiefs weren't advising a change yet, but they were actively reconsidering their options, and with the Navy opposed to Kyushu, the plan would have changed somehow: more troops, chemical/atomic weapons, different target--something. And they didn't know it of course, but there was that typhoon coming in October.
—wwoods 04:49, 7 Jan 2005 (UTC)

So Raul, how do you think this section should read? —wwoods 03:10, 19 Jan 2005 (UTC)

Since your conclusions are weighty, I'd prefer a direct quotation from a reputable source (or sources) or at least some kind of citation to back it up. →Raul654 03:25, Jan 19, 2005 (UTC)
Well, I've given slabs of direct quotations from what I consider a reputable source, for instance, "But tempering Marshall's personal commitment to invasion would have been his comprehension that civilian sanction in general, and Truman's in particular, was unlikely for a costly invasion that no longer enjoyed consensus support from the armed services." Google says Downfall won some sort of award for military history.[2]
The second Giangreco reference in the article[3] says,
The Divine Wind, or Kamikaze, of a powerful typhoon destroyed a foreign invasion force heading for Japan in 1281, and it was for this storm that Japanese suicide aircraft of World War II were named. On October 9, 1945, a similar typhoon packing 140-mile per hour winds struck the American staging area on Okinawa that would have been expanded to capacity by that time if the war had not ended in September, and was still crammed with aircraft and assault shipping- much of which was destroyed. US analysts at the scene matter-of-factly reported that the storm would have caused up to a 45-day delay in the invasion of Kyushu. The point that goes begging, however, is that while these reports from the Pacific were correct in themselves, they did not make note of the critical significance that such a delay, well past the initial- and unacceptable- target date of December 1, would have on base construction on Kyushu, and consequently mean for the Honshu invasion, which would have then been pushed back as far as mid-April 1946.
"Giangreco, is an editor for the US Army's professional journal, Military Review, published by the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Giangreco has lectured widely on national security matters. An award-winning author of five books on military and political subjects..."
So, whatever anyone wanted, the plan was going to have to be changed.
—wwoods 09:43, 22 Jan 2005 (UTC)

Yes, I agree that the typhoon probably would have delayed and hampered the operation. However, in the paragraph I removed you concluded that (had the atomic bomb not been used) the operation would likely have been cancelled, which is something I do not see evidence for, either in my sources or in your citation. (Btw, when I said reputable, I only meant that to exclude personal websites and other crackpottery). A ham-strung invasion is a long way from a negotiated peace. →Raul654 17:59, Jan 22, 2005 (UTC)

That "Downfall—as planned—" would have probably been cancelled, yes, in favor of something that could be done with less cost in lives and better chance of success.
—wwoods 08:36, 24 Jan 2005 (UTC)

[edit] My Thanks to You All

I note that this article, which as I began as a stub 18 months ago is now a Featured Article. Little or none of this is thanks to me, and so I thank you all. What a remarkable demonstration of what 'Wiki' is all about. [[PaulinSaudi 14:33, 16 Jan 2005 (UTC)]]

[edit] US versus U.S.

For consistency, a consensus needs to be reached as to what version to use. Wayward 09:06, May 10, 2005 (UTC)

Scout1026 08:21, 27 November 2006 (UTC) You are right - but no reply to date. Is there, by chance, a decision at the higher level (wiki level?) on what the proper usage is to be?

tom

[edit] Intro

I reworded the intro a bit so it does not give an impression that Japan surrendered because of the bombing and Soviet's invasion. I think, generally speaking it is more prudent for us not to make explicit statements about the causes behind Japan's surrender. -- Taku 01:37, August 6, 2005 (UTC)

As I said in my edit summary, no rational person disputes that those two were the primary causes of ending the war. Hell, the only dispute is which was *more* influental in causing the Japanese to surrender - advocates of the use of the bomb say it was the bombing, whereas criticis of the use of the bomb was it was the decelartion of war by hte USSR. Either way, my point stands -- those two events UNDENIABLY caused the Japanse to surrender. →Raul654 01:45, August 6, 2005 (UTC)

As I said, I am not debating if the two are primary causes or not. So you don't have to try to convince me. The problem is that there are respected people who dispute on this issue. We can't exclude arguments because they are, it seems to us, unreasonable. -- Taku 02:31, August 6, 2005 (UTC)

They may be respected people, but they're simply wrong on this issue. (In America, there are respected people who believe in creationism; they're wrong too. People can be justifiably respected for some things--and still be wrong about others.) It's not as if there were any reasonable doubt about this. The Emperor and his war cabinet (which was split 3-3) stayed up till 04:00 on the night of 9-10 August, ultimately deciding they had to surrender. Do you think they'd have been doing that without the shock effect of the events of the previous three days?
—wwoods 21:38, 6 August 2005 (UTC)
As I said above, "no rational person" disputes this. Please cite a single reputable source that claims otherwise (e.g, neither the atomic bombing nor the declaration of war by the USSR were the cause of Japan's surrender). I maintain that none exist. →Raul654 02:39, August 6, 2005 (UTC)

For example, ja:太平洋戦争 does not elaborate on the causes of Japan's surrender. -- 03:01, August 6, 2005 (UTC)

Um, the shortcomings on the Japanese Wikipedia do not justify making this article worse. And the objectivity of Japanese analysis of World War II is questionable at best "The Japanese presentation of the war to its children runs something like this: 'One day, for no reason we ever understood, the Americans started dropping atomic bombs on us.'" -- Stephen Ambrose. Nor have you yet answered my question by citing a single reputable source that claims that the Japanse surrendered for a reason other than the Soviets or the Atomic bomb →Raul654 03:22, August 6, 2005 (UTC)
shortcoming?? in what way? Of course, we might agree that the Japanese contributors in ja wikipedia are not rational people, but do we really? Also I didn't say there have to be a major cause behind the surrender besides the bombing and the Soviet's invasion. I said we don't have to venture in elaborating this issue. -- Taku 03:28, August 6, 2005 (UTC)
But when the facts are so clear, the refusal to connect the dots amounts to NPOV by omission.
—wwoods 21:38, 6 August 2005 (UTC)

How about this?

"当時の日本は、すでにノックアウト寸前の状態にあり、沖縄が占領された６月２３日に開かれた御前会議では、「戦争の終結についての研究と努力」がとり決められ、降伏のための具体策が考えられていた。アメリカの戦略爆撃調査団も、「日本は、原爆投下、ソ連の参戦、アメリカ軍の上陸がなくても、空襲によって１２月３１日以前に必ず降伏したであろう」という分析をしている。日本の降伏は、原爆が落とされる前から、すでに秒読みの状態にあったのである。" (日本の歴史 朝日新聞社)
I don't know if you speak Japanese, so I translated the above. If you do, please forgive me for making crude guess in your language ability.
"At that time, Japan was in the state of almost knock-out. On June 23, at gozenkaigi (the meeting by the Emperor and the leaders, a plan for the surrender was made and the procedures were being discussed. Indeed, an inspection team of strategic bombardment concludes that Japan would must surrender by December 31 without the atomic bombing, the Soviet's invasion and the US invasion of Japan due to the strategic bombing. In short, Japan's surrender was a matter of time even before the atomic bombing. (Japanese history by Asahi newspaper)

I think the argument is somehow biased but still we can reject it. -- Taku 03:48, August 6, 2005 (UTC)

Yes, the war would have continued until Japan surrendered. But there's a huge difference between the war ending in mid-August and the war going on till December. Even without the atomic bombing, the Soviet's invasion and the US invasion of Japan, the latter would see far more Japanese dead, far more Chinese, Malayans, etc. dead, and a few more American dead.
—wwoods 21:38, 6 August 2005 (UTC)
My statement about the 'shortcomings on the Japanese wikipedia' was a reply to your statement that the Japanse article on the pacific war doesn't mention the reasons it ended. To me, this is a glaring omission. I see no reason to use the Japanese wikipedia's omissions to justify removing the same information from this article. One bad editing decision does not validate another.
Now, the source you cited was speculating on what would have happened (if the atomic bomb was not used, and if the USSR did not declare war, and if the US did not invade). However, what did happen was that the Japanese surrendered because of the double-whammy of having the USSR declare war on them and the atomic bombs being dropped on them. This is not my personal opinion - this is pretty much the consensus of *everybody*. How much it was one or the other is the subject of intense debate, but I know of *no one* who argues that it was neither. To quote our article Atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki -- Koichi Kido, one of Emperor Hirohito's closest advisors, stated: "We of the peace party were assisted by the atomic bomb in our endeavor to end the war." Hisatsune Sakomizu, the chief Cabinet secretary in 1945. called the bombing "a golden opportunity given by heaven for Japan to end the war." According to these historians and others, the pro-peace civilian leadership was able to use the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki to convince the military that no amount of courage, skill and fearless combat could help Japan against the power of atomic weapons. Akio Morita, founder of Sony and Japanese Naval officer during the war, also concludes that it was the atomic bomb and not conventional bombings from B-29s that convinced the Japanese military to agree to peace... Other Japanese sources have stated that the atomic bombings themselves were not the principal reason for capitulation. Instead, they contend, it was not the American atomic attacks on August 6 and August 9, but the swift and devastating Soviet victories on the mainland in the week following Stalin's August 8 declaration of war that forced the Japanese message of surrender on August 15, 1945. Certainly the fact of both enemies weighed into the decision, but it was more the fear of Soviet occupation that hastened imperialistic Japan's acceptance of defeat. So, with respect, unless you can come up with reputable source saying it is neither, I think the sentence should stay in. →Raul654 05:02, August 6, 2005 (UTC)
Please please no one has to convince me about how the bombing and the Soviet's played a role and why they have to be the primary causes behind Japan's surrender. It is not me who has a doubt. So providing me more evidence helps none. I understand you can't believe that ja article omitted the importance issue. But that is what the Japanese contributors are doing and I can assure that many Japanese people are in the same line. Also, please remember that I am not saying that there have to be reasons other than the bombing and the invasion that led Japan to surrender.
This analogy may be extreme, but you seem to suggest that we have to decide whether the God exists or not. You are mounting pieces of evidence why the existence of God is ridiculous. But the point is not if your argument is correct. If there is a controversy, why the one side is wrong. And, it is not the one side that believe the bombing and the Soviet's invasion and the other who doesn't. But it is one side that claims there must be clear reasons for Japan's surrender and the other side who doesn't. To put crudely simply, the former seem to be the American and the latter are the Japanese. We have to be asking why the Japanese contributors over there are making editorial decisions in the way they are doing. I don't think it is simply they are biased, incompetent. Everything doesn't have to be black or white. We need to respect the voices of those who think we don't have to be explicit about why Japan's surrender (I am not among them again.) -- Taku 22:44, August 6, 2005 (UTC)

I thought we might make a good use of a new article Surrender of Japan; I know you are knowledgeable, so I hope you Raul654 and many others can help sort this issue better. -- Taku 22:54, August 6, 2005 (UTC)

I see no reason for such an article. We do not have ANY article ANYWHERE on ANY nation's surrender. That article serves no purpose and should be deleted. →Raul654 04:04, August 11, 2005 (UTC)
But Japan's surrender is a controversial issue. Anyway, this talkpage is not about another article. -- Taku 04:11, August 11, 2005 (UTC)
As I said above, PLEASE CITE A SINGLE REPUTABLE SOURCE THAT CLAIMS JAPAN SURRENDERED FOR REASONS OTHER THAN THE ATOMIC BOMB AND/OR THE SOVIET ENTRY INTO THE WAR. You are making this "controversy" up. →Raul654 04:12, August 11, 2005 (UTC)

Did you read my above comment at all? -- Taku 10:42, August 11, 2005 (UTC)

(1) Just because you say there is a contorversy does not make it so. You have yet to provide ANY evidence that there is. (2) Just because the Japanese Wikipedia makes a stupid editing decision and omits reasons why Japan surrendered does not mean why have to make the stame mistaken. →Raul654 15:56, August 11, 2005 (UTC)
I fail to see how removing facts makes the article better. The fact is, chronologically, the surrender took place after the nuclear attacks, and the declaration of war by the Soviet union. Therefore, I am restoring this fact. Alphax τεχ 16:25, 11 August 2005 (UTC)
I appreciate that you Raul654 start to engage in the discussion.
(1) I don't think you are saying that there is no controversy on Japan's surrender whatsoever. Even you said that there is a debate whether the atomic bombings or the Soviet's invasion was more effective, in retrospect. And I don't think you believe that other factors play no role at all. For example, the other day I watched a NHK (Japanese media)'s TV program that essentially concludes that strategic bombing was a primary cause in forcing the Japanese to surrender.
Again, I am not disputing facts. (2) so it is pointless to discuss if the ja article is missing an important fact but why. Maybe because they are biased (which I concur) and stupid (which I don't concur). There is certainly no need to replicate the editorial decisions made over there in here, as the converse is the case too. But I thought that "this fact" can give us a hint. As Alphax points out, as a matter of fact, the surrender of Japan followed three events the two bombings and the Soviet's invasion. But the sentence in question is about Japan's surrender and the operation. It may be a bias that why Japan surrendered (along with when, how, and to whom) is unclear, but I think pretending it is clear is a bias as well.
I am not good at historical subtleties (heck, I study math :) So I need you to point out to me if my reasoning is flawed.
-- Taku 23:31, August 12, 2005 (UTC)
I still fail to see any merit behind your arguement for taking the sentence out. As you concede, it is 100% accurate, and it relates the important events (the atomic bombings and soviet entry into the war causing japan's surrender) which led to the cancellation of the operation. As alaphax says, the article is significantly worsened by removing that sentence. →Raul654 03:18, August 14, 2005 (UTC)
What is 100% accurate? The sentence in question? I have never showed any doubt on the accuracy. I am questioning its neutrality. -- Taku 03:26, August 14, 2005 (UTC)
Well that's nonsense. First, it's a simple statement of fact, there's nothing there to "spin" - the atomic bombs were dropped, the soviets declared war, and then Japan surrendered. You claim that this statement implies a causation, which I don't think it does, but let's assume for the moment that it does. Even if it does imply that japan surrendered because of the atomic bombs and soviet declaration of war, it's implying an undisputed historical fact. While you seem intent on ignoring the connection and pushing the Japanese-ultranationalist POV that denies it, you have yet to cite a reputable source that claims that there is no connection between those the first two events and the surrender. So here's a tiny, tiny list of sources that contradict the POV you are pushing
From George Feifer, The Battle of Okinawa - "The atomic killing can be justified only if the growing opposition to the war bythe Imperial household and eleements of the government and military were irrelavant because there were totally doomed to fail. And the evidence - althought it can never, by the nature of things, be wholly convincing - points in that direction. (420) ...Conservatively put, [the Battle of] Okinawa demonstrated the extreme unlikelihood of surrender by the Japanse who held the country in their grip, no matter what the odds against succesful defense. (423)" - in other words, the evidence seems fairly convincing that Japan had no intentions of surrendering without one final fight on Japan itself. Something obviously changed their minds.
"The Surpeme War council, up to the time the Atomic Bomb was dropped, did not believe Japan could be beaten by air attack alone.... [It] had proceeded with one plan of fighting a decisive battle at the landing point and was making every possible preparation to meet such a landing... until the Atomic Bomb was dropped.... at [which] point they decided it would be best to sue for peace" - Japanese Prime Minister Kantaro Suziki, December 1945
From Surrender of Japan, the statement by the emporeror to the cabinet telling them to sue for peace - There are those who say the key to national survival lies in a decisive battle in the homeland. The experiences of the past, however, show that there has always been a discrepancy between plans and performance. ... [He made some specific reference to the atomic bomb.]
On the other hand, in his new book "Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan", Japanese historian Tsuyoshi Hasegawa argues that Japan surrendered because of the Soviet declaration of war, not because of the Atomic bombs. [4]
Either way, every source above reaffirms implications you say that the statement has. →Raul654 01:44, August 25, 2005 (UTC)


Thanks for comment. I know I must appear rude to reinsert my edit, but since I needed you to tell me how my reasoning is wrong, if really so, I had to revert to get your attention. (I am not asking for an excuse but trying to explain myself.)
I have just come to realize why it so puzzled you that I want to remove undisputed facts. I think it's because we have sharply different views on NPOV; that is, what is NPOV and what appears to be NPOV. This talk may help explain this point. For a quite some time, in Japan I have been hearing a lot about how articles in wikipedia are biased. Many said that it is because articles are written by Americans and many oversea Chinese or Korean who speak English. The statement in question is exactly a kind of rhetoric that many Japanese would grumble about. This may be because the Japanese don't want to face the truth, or maybe because Americans would like to be clear about things like connections between events. In any event, this is simply so. This is why I cited a case in ja article. My intent, as I said above, was not to cite it as a reliable source. A Japanese excerpt I put is a similar case.
Now here comes NPOV question. What is NPOV? Not taking a particular side. Representing views of every party, not omitting facts or relevancy, describing points not advocating them. Forgive me reiterating points we all are aware of.
The problem I see is that what should we do when a statement appears to be non-NPOV even though it is NPOV in fact. This is the very difference between us, I think. For example, in Japan article, we adopted a language "Japan is one of the largest economies in the world along with US and EU", although I and others knew no reasonable person has ever stated anything other than "Japan is the second largest economy in the world". More examples can be found. For the case of this article, I felt that the sentence in question doesn't appears to be NPOV despite sources you can cite. This feeling cannot change because it's not about the question of factuality but how some people I know would react. The difference can be said: do we want to have articles that we find to be NPOV? or articles that we think readers would find to be NPOV?
Forgive me for putting such an off-topic talk. I just wanted to explain myself, not convince you to adopt my edit. (I know you probably didn't need this but still I love an explanation.) Now I, I think, see why we can't agree on this issue. -- Taku 11:53, August 26, 2005 (UTC)
That's a well thought out response, Taku. Here's what it boils down to - more informative articles are inherently better than less informative ones. Saying Japan is "one of the largest economies in the world" is not as informative as saying "Japan is the 2nd largest economy in the world". Both statements are neutral, but the first is vague and the second is specific (and thus better because it is more informative)
In this particular case, saying that "Japan surrendered and the invasion was cancelled" is less informative than saying "The Atomic bombs were dropped, the Soviets declared war, Japan surrendered, and the invasion was cancelled". The former statement omits critical information about what was going on in Japan at the time. Both statements are neutral (a non-neutral statement is one that reveals the author's biases; based on those sentences, you cannot tell what the author's biases are. Thus, they are neutral) but one is much more informative than the other. Thus, the second, by virtue of the fact that it is more informative, is better. Your position, that omitting this information improves the article, is (as you said) a puzzling one that is not shared by anyone here. I don't know if it's a cultural thing, but it's definitely not the way we prefer articles to be written. →Raul654 17:15, August 26, 2005 (UTC)

[edit] 2nd link

I restored the 2nd link to Battle of Okinawa because I felt the 1st link might be overlooked. The first link is in a section which some English speakers might skip over, because the section header is a Japanese term - one not generally familiar (at least to Americans). Uncle Ed 16:41, August 6, 2005 (UTC)

[edit] RfC discussion

Issue: continual reverts between two versions:

1) Following the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the Soviet declaration of war against Japan, the Japanese surrendered and the operation was cancelled.

and something along the lines of...

2) Following the August 15, 1945 surrender of Japan, the operation was canceled.

Comments:

  • since nobody else has commented from outside (apparently), i'll hold forth a bit here: i've looked at much of the discussion, and the article edit history. all involved in the edit war should have RfC'd long ago. my opinion is that the worst you can say about TakuyaMurata's edits (the 2nd version) is that they aren't well done grammatically, and sound like a non-native english speaker. if that's the only problem, the edit could've been smoothed over by somebody. on the other side, it's disingenuous to claim that the mentioning in the overview paragraph of the atomic bombings and the soviet declaration of war are mere chronological, benign facts. causation is implied in the syntax. are they the correct causes? they're obviously significant, but they aren't the only significant causes. i believe they're inserted, particularly in that location, as original analysis. it's unnecessary in the overview paragraph, and ascribing japanese ultranationalism (or the invented evil of "fact removal") to TakuyaMurata's edit attempts is, frankly, BS. my opinion is that the first version is wrong for more than one reason. first, it's not required in order to convey the necessary point in the overview, which is simply that the reason for operation downfall went away. second, it implies an official list of only 2 reasons for the japanese surrender. even were that the case, this isn't the article to get into it. my vote: use version 2 above, and don't use version 1 anywhere in the article without softening the implication that they were the causes of the japanese surrender. SaltyPig 02:45, 6 September 2005 (UTC)
    • my opinion is that the worst you can say about TakuyaMurata's edits (the 2nd version) is that they aren't well done grammatically - no, his version of that sentence was significantly less informative than the other.
    • but they aren't the only significant causes - wrong, as the many, many sources I have previously cited show.
    • second, it implies an official list of only 2 reasons for the japanese surrender. - Would you care to cite a document that says they surrendered for any other reason? I must have asked Taku a half dozen times to cite such a source. →Raul654 02:52, September 6, 2005 (UTC)
      • here's another reason: japan was getting its ass kicked. or one could argue another angle: what were the reasons they hadn't surrendered already? insane obstinacy comes to mind, which degrades the probability for rational analysis of behavior. more important, i think you're missing a crucial point here; nobody in the discussion so far (that i've seen anyway) is disputing that they are two great reasons. they're excellent! but they aren't appropriate to raise in the overview, and it's not appropriate to imply in any form that they are the only 2 significant causes. it appears to me (notice the "to me" part there) that through weasel wording, an opinion is being inserted unnecessarily into the overview of this article — an opinion which if it were stated overtly would require a setup such as "two probable major causes for the blah blah", or "noted historians assert blah blah", with citations. the attitude of some version 1 proponents reminds me somewhat of those who ascribe too much significance to somebody missing a pop fly in the 9th inning of an 11-2 baseball rout. "he lost the game!" they'll insist. nah, everything lost the game. more events than the last few are the cause. if the 2 events mentioned in version 1 had been the only bad that happened to japan, nobody can say if the government would have surrendered — they were that crazy. regardless: you don't like my comment? ignore it. i responded to an RfC, that's all. not here to play pretend article god. it's one comment, and i don't edit this article. the vociferousness with which you've clung to these 2 arbitrary reasons (to the exclusion of any other major factor) while another party simply says, "it's not right to pick out those 2 in isolation, and it's unnecessary for the article"... well, it makes me feel comfortable that i voted exactly right, though my vote is pretty much meaningless. if your life depended on it, you're telling me that you couldn't come up with one more significant reason in the overview? or two more? i'm not buying it. SaltyPig 03:34, 6 September 2005 (UTC)
  • but they aren't appropriate to raise in the overview - on the contrary, the events that caused this operation to be cancelled (the atomic bombings and the soviet declaration of war causing japan to surrender) are very relavant to this article and appropriate in the overview.
  • and it's not appropriate to imply in any form that they are the only 2 significant causes. - yes, it is most appropriate. Until you or Taku cites a source that claims they surrendered for a reason other than those two [which I maintain you will not find], it is *most* appropriate to make such a claim, because there is innumerable evidence to back it up [just look at some of my previous comments on this very talk page].
  • It's fairly clear from historical documentation that besides these two events, the major factors pressing the japanese to surrender were the destruction of their home islands caused by conventional bombing and mass starvation caused by the destruction of Japanese shipping at the hands of american submarines. "On the other hand, how it [Japan's surrender] was achieved strongly suggests that only the atomic bombs could have done it without years of "decisive battle" or mass starvation" - George Feifer, The Battle of Okinawa. So yes, given that I have the vast proponderence of evidence on my side, I feel very confident claiming that the atomic bomb and the soviet declaration of war were the causes of Japan's surrender.
  • Or, to put it another way, I could have said that Japan surrendered because of the Atomic bombs (alone) and most of the historical evidence would back me up. There are, however, a few reputable historians [a small but non-trivial percentage] who claim that it was more the result of the soviet declaration of war. So by including both (as I do here), I am being very conservative and including every reputable historian. You *can't* find someone else who offers a third opinion because they simply don't exist (please, go ahead and prove me wrong - find a reputable historian who claims it was for some other reason) →Raul654 04:26, September 6, 2005 (UTC)
    • "strongly suggests" is POV. these aren't things that may be stated absolutely. bypassing my opinion for the proper resolution, why are you so resistant to even reshaping with inarguable, factual terms what you want in the article? it's not that hard to do, and it certainly isn't inarguable as it stands. i think you have other irons in this fire, but i'm not going to make it my big cause in life to figure out what they are. you could compromise and still have what you want, regardless of what i think the article should be. why haven't you? BTW, the relentless call for citations is a straw man -- one which i suspect you'd argue around just as relentlessly were citations provided. why do i suspect this? because you couldn't seriously expect me to go around digging up citations which you already know (if you're any kind of WWII geek) abound. i'm not going to waste time doing that, because a plausible result is that you'll do what people normally do with battling citations: argue they're not good enough (because you disagree with them, although the overt excuse would possibly be something using the phrase "reputable historian" as above). i know it's bad form to say "you're missing the point", but... could you step back for a moment at least and consider the remote possibility that it might be true? just might? there are more options than simply choosing version 1 or 2, though i prefer 2 alone. is there no value in what TakuyaMurata has said that you may recognize openly, even if you don't agree with all of it (i don't agree with much of TM's argument here myself)? why do you not seek another version that preserves the ideals of both sides, and follows wikipedia guidelines (which the current version does not)? i've hinted at one fix angle above. is history mathematics then? well, i think i screwed this up. i shouldn't have been so explicit and blunt, because i've obviously dug your heels in even further. i'm sorry for that. it's not the way wikipedia should work. i hope you'll step back, ignore ego, and look for a way to put the best of both versions in, without losing the truth or power of either. it's possible, and could be undertaken merely as a challenge, if for no other reason. i think this edit war has become something beyond the substance on the surface, and the article suffers because of it. [except for a small change, this was written before your last edit] SaltyPig 05:04, 6 September 2005 (UTC)
      • I will change my view on the matter when presented with evidence to the contrary - evidence which you and Taku have firmly refused to provide, despite repeated requests. In response, you claim that requesting evidence is a strawman - ha! Sorry, I don't play the well-I-believe-this-despite-all-the-evidence-to-the-contrary-so-my-position-deserves-equal-time nonsense mentality. I am resistant to compromising the terms of this article for the same reason - because your claims are simply bogus. If you'll notice, when arguing my points on this page, I have taken the time to repeatedly cite reputable historians to support my assertions. On the other hand, when you take away all the suppositions that you and Taku have presented, you have not made one single verifible claim. Your argument basically boils down to "well there might be some historian hiding in a cave somewhere who disagrees [who says Japan surrendered for a reason other than the Soviets and the Atomic Bomb]!". You say that "it certainly isn't inarguable as it stands", and when asked to present a single counterexample, you cannot. So bully I say. Your position is meritless. →Raul654 05:53, September 6, 2005 (UTC)
    • the key problem today (i.e., not between you and taku) is that you have mistaken me for an editor of the article with the responsibility to research what will likely be a hopeless task when presented to you. (i base those odds on your prior behavior here). the citation "challenge" (ludicrous) is a straw man because it has nothing to do with wikipedia policy/guidelines governing this situation. don't even begin to think that you're speaking with an "afraid to research" guy. this isn't my article; the only reason i responded to this was because i submitted an RfC, and it was suggested that submitters reply to at least one other RfC. i flipped through the list and gave this a shot. you don't like what i said? then i guess the RfC is moot, presuming, as it's fair to given the timeline, that nobody shows up supporting version 1 or compromise (not bastardization) and speaks better with you about this impasse. SaltyPig 06:37, 6 September 2005 (UTC)
That Japan would have surrendered eventually is nearly certain. To put it another way, the war would have continued until Japan surrendered or was destroyed. That Japan surrendered when it did because of the atomic bomb (and maybe also the Soviet attack) is also nearly certain, though for some reason that fact is controversial in some circles. Even Taku isn't disputing the cause_&_effect--"Please please no one has to convince me about how the bombing and the Soviet's played a role and why they have to be the primary causes behind Japan's surrender. It is not me who has a doubt." You may feel that that subject needs explication--and I concur. But we don't need it in this article, when we've got atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and surrender of Japan which cover the subject.
—wwoods 07:16, 6 September 2005 (UTC)
I disagree, since it is a cause and effect, it should be in the article. Some people simply wanting to alter history because some want to portray Japan in a better light then they were after the war. This is essentially whitewashing history. We are all in agreement that this operation was in fact canceled. In the article, the reason it was canceled should be stated.
There needs to be a consensus on this article rather then the multiple reverts that are happening. Whether there can be a compromise remains to be seen. It seems to me (unless I'm wrong) that the only debate is over the insertion of the reason why this was canceled. Can everyone agree on that or is there other points of contention? Davidpdx 9/28/05 14:14 (UTC)
It seems to me (unless I'm wrong) that the only debate is over the insertion of the reason why this was canceled. - the arguement pertained to the following sentence in the introduction: Following the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the Soviet declaration of war against Japan, Japan surrendered and the operation was cancelled.. Taku wanted to replace that sentence with " On August 15, 1945, the Japanese surrendered and the operation never took place." [5] The former version is what the article has settled on. →Raul654 14:32, 28 September 2005 (UTC)

[edit] operation downfall

It is surprising Japan expected the Americans to land almost exactly where Olympic put them. Even so, given Japan's plan for the defense of Kyushu, all she had was a thin crust that could never have withstood the American attack. The bulk of her defensive forces (kilometres inland) would never reach the beach; Rommel found it hard enough under Allied air, and Japanese forces were far less mobile to begin with. Moving "against whichever landing seemed to be the main effort" would therefore be impossible. See Skates.

These points aside, this is one of the best works on Downfall I have seen. --K D Faber

Scout1026 08:15, 27 November 2006 (UTC)Interesting - you seem to think that those forces inland were expected to 'reach the beach'. I believe that some were, but most would fight it out on Kyushu - but not necesarily on the beach. that is - much like Iwo Jima, Luzon, and Okinawa.

--Tom

[edit] kamikaze statistic

[...] "though in the Battle of Okinawa kamikazes had inflicted 1.78 fatalities/sortie" [...]

What does this mean? Obviously a kamikaze inflicted at least one fatality--on himself. That given, did an average kamikaze end up killing 1.78 other men, 0.78 men, or 2.78 men, total? Or does this refer to 1.78 ships perhaps sunk when an average sortie of kamikazes went a-hunting? Needs clarification. Doovinator 04:08, 9 December 2005 (UTC)

I don't have the book handy, but I'm reasonably sure it only counted the casualties on the ships, per plane.
Ah! Kamikaze#Effects says, "Approximately 2,800 Kamikaze attackers sunk 34 Navy ships, damaged 368 others, killed 4,900 sailors, and wounded over 4,800. "
4900/2800 = 1.75, which checks.
—wwoods 04:44, 9 December 2005 (UTC)
Thanks! Doovinator 05:42, 11 December 2005 (UTC)
Note also the par on Okinawa in Kamikaze, i.e.: "Suicide attacks by planes or boats at Okinawa sank or put out of action at least 30 US warships and at least three US merchant ships, along with some from other Allied forces. The attacks expended 1,465 planes..." That would tend to suggest that use of kamikazes was less productive in the last major battle before Downfall. Grant65 | Talk 12:21, 11 December 2005 (UTC)
Yes, and for obvious reasons. A US pilot (whose name escapes me at the moment) finally came up with the tactics to counter Kamikaze attacks, called the Big blue blanket Raul654 14:25, 11 December 2005 (UTC)
Here's your external link = Commander Jimmy Thatch, who developed the famous "Thatch Weave," a defensive formation used earlier in the war, came up with an idea he called the "big blue blanket" to keep the kamikazes away from the vulnerable ships of the U.S. fleet. Thatch, serving on Admiral Halsey's and Admiral McCain's staff as air operations officer, developed a plan that called for the constant presence of the blue-painted Hellcats and Corsairs over the fleet at all hours. He recommended larger combat air patrols (CAP) stationed farther away from the carriers, dawn to dusk fighter sweeps over Japanese airfields, the use of delayed action fuses on bombs dropped on runways to make repairs more difficult, a line of picket destroyers and destroyer escorts placed 50 or more miles from the main body of the fleet to provide earlier radar intercepts, and improved coordination between the fighter director officers on board the carriers. Utilizing these methods, Navy and Marine pilots, flying superior airplanes and using superior tactics, were able to knock down impressive numbers of suiciders and, coupled with the efforts of the ships' own crews and gunners, the U.S. fleet came to be known as the "fleet that came to stay." [6]

[edit] Numbers of Japanese

Back in July, SamMcGowan added

Japanese records obtained after the war indicate that these estimates were grossly exaggerated. Japanese Monograph 23 ("Air Defense of the Homeland") revealed that at the end of the war Japan only had 2,000 airplanes available for the defense of Japan,of which only some 500 were combat aircraft. Some 1,500 had been equipped for suicide missions. Postwar interrogations of the Japanese generals responsible for the defense of Kyushu revealed that only 800 aircraft, conventional as well as Kamikaze, were expected to be available to defend against the invasion and that they were expected to operate from airfields in Korea.

That's a lot lower than other estimates. Frank cites the SBS: 4,800 Japanese Army aircraft plus 5,900 Navy aircraft. "While the Strategic Bombing Survey numbers appear sound, there is conflicting evidence for numbers both higher and lower. An officer at Imperial General Headquarters charged with planning aircraft availability calculated that in July the Imperial Army had 6,355 aircraft and that this total would grow to 7,346 by October. On the other hand, an Imperial Navy officer reported the Imperial Navy had ... a total of 5,044, significantly below the Strategic Bombing Survey estimate."(Downfall, p.183)

As with other Allied intelligence estimates, postwar interrogation of Japanese generals responsible for the defense of Kyushu revealed that they were overestimated. Actual Japanese strength on the island was roughly 700,000 personnel, but less than half were combat troops, with the remainder consisting of support troops, naval trainees and the crews of Japanese ships that had been put out of action due to the lack of fuel.

That's not actually out of line with Allied estimates. "According to [the Military Intelligence Service's August 7] tally, 560,000 men, including 460,000 ground-combat troops, stood vigil on Kyushu. ... In the final revision of this estimate on August 20, the total on Kyushu reached 625,000 men and fourteen field divisions."(p.203)
—wwoods 23:34, 9 October 2006 (UTC)


83.249.74.35 added these bits again, and I've taken them out, again. At a minimum they belong in the section on Japanese plans, not Allied plans. But without some reason to believe them over numbers from other Japanese sources, I don't think they belong at all.
—wwoods 08:15, 2 November 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Reference to Shanghai, China as a US Navy-favored base

It's a small matter, but the ref to the above is slightly inaccurate, I believe, and can be corrected/verified by referring to the Downfall book by Frank. I believe the Navy argued (and lost as result of the conference in Hawaii of FDR, Mac and Nimitz) for a drive of Marianas - Formosa - China Coast. Mac advocated Morotai - Mindanao - Leyte - Luzon (with full liberation of the Philippines as a moral imperative).

This part of the strategy should be fleshed out a bit to give context.

My specific point above was that the navy wanted a 'lodgement' on the China Coast to serve as a basis for funneling support to the Chinese to fight the Japanese army on the mainland, and to act as a base for cutting off Japan further, and the conduct of further operations. It was never intended to take Shanghai, and in fact, if memory serves - it was in the vicinity of "Amoy".

Still, good article,

Tom

[edit] Alternate history

They got cut from the article a while ago, but the alternate history treatments of the invasions,

  • Westheimer, David, Lighter than a Feather. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1971. (Olympic)
  • Coppel, Alfred, The Burning Mountain. Harcourt Brace & Co, 1983. (Coronet)

are worth reading, for people interested in the subject. Particularly Westheimer's, which sparked my interest in the subject way back when. Apparently it was reissued as Death Is Lighter Than a Feather back in '95, but for a paperback it's very pricey; a library would be a better source.
—wwoods 01:41, 7 December 2006 (UTC)

Curiously, there seem to be not one but two new novels about the invasion of Japan coming out in May:

—wwoods 16:23, 9 March 2007 (UTC)

...and MacArthur's War specifically cites this article in its "Historical Notes"!
—wwoods 06:26, 26 June 2007 (UTC)
Recognition indeed... John Birmingham went one better, having Stalin(!) actually mention Wikipedia in his parodic alternate history Final Impact: "Stalin hammered the desk with his fist, once, making a water jug jump two centimeters off the polished walnut surface. '... I do not want to be quoted old Wikipedia articles about this new [B-52] bomber.'" (In Birmingham scenario, a 21st Century fleet finds itself in 1942 ... leading in a roundabout way to the Soviets getting the bomb and nuking Litzmannstadt and Tokyo.)
Usually novelists just plagiarise us ;-) Grant | Talk 07:59, 26 June 2007 (UTC)
SWEEEEEET :) Raul654 19:43, 28 June 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Indian Army

My recollection is that MacArthur didn't really want any non-American troops, and treated the Australians rather badly, for no reason. But I don't have a copy of Keegan. It could be.
—wwoods 02:51, 10 September 2007 (UTC)

For reasons best known to himself, in 1944 Doug even turned an offer of the Australian I Corps for the Philippines campaign, saying that he could use a single division. This was unacceptable to Australian leaders, no doubt remembering the ill-use of Australian Army divisions by British generals in WW1, not to mention the disasters in Greece and Malaya-Singapore during 1941-42. So no Australian ground forces took part in the Philippines. Grant | Talk 10:18, 11 September 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Proposed Soviet invasion of Japan in World War II

Does anyone know anything about this? We don't seem to have an article on it. Operation Downfall says: "Unbeknownst to the Americans, the Soviets were preparing to follow up their invasions of Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands with an invasion of the weakly defended island of Hokkaidō by the end of August, which would have put pressure on the Allies to do something sooner than November." No source is given, but there are some mentions of it on the web. Grant | Talk 10:18, 11 September 2007 (UTC)

What I know is what I read in Frank's Downfall which I've quoted here. Frank's source is David M. Glantz, "The Soviet Invasion of Japan," Quarterly Journal of Military History, vol. 7, no. 3, Spring 1995. Frank's description makes it sound like an invasion on a shoestring, but he thinks it had a good chance of success.
Google has much of Glantz's book, The Soviet Strategic Offensive in Manchuria, 1945: August Storm (2003), but it's missing most of Chapter 10, which covers "the Aborted Hokkaido Offensive".
—wwoods 18:26, 11 September 2007 (UTC)
Interesting, thanks w. Grant | Talk 15:04, 13 September 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Alternatives to Downfall?

Frank's book (cited frequently above) discusses whether, aside from the A-bombs, there were alternatives to an invasion, such as blockade. Does it seem worthwhile to add a section on whether an invasion was even necessary, again assuming the A-bombs hadn't been available? --Andersonblog 15:41, 4 October 2007 (UTC)

That would seem to be redundant with Debate over the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. If we were to add such a section, it must make it clear - as Frank's book does - that Japan was not going to surrender short of an invasion and a final decisive battle. (Not to mention that the food shortages of 1946-1949 would have been infinitely worse without American food shipments, and with the destruction of Japan's railroad system that would have preceeded an invasion) Raul654 15:48, 4 October 2007 (UTC)
Good call ... I've added a link to it under a "See also" section ... Happy Editing! —72.75.65.41 20:23, 4 October 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Redlinks

Is there any likelihood that the redlinks in the article will become articles soon? If not I propose that they be de-linked. Wikidudeman (talk) 02:28, 15 October 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Confusing sentence

In the section Allied reevaluation of Olympic - Air threat, there is a sentence "The Okinawa experience was bad — almost two fatalities and a similar number wounded per sortie — and Kyūshū was likely to be worse". Fatalities on which side? Whose sorties? Could somebody who knows reword this? Regards Davidelit (talk) 12:11, 10 May 2008 (UTC)

Allied casualties, from Japanese sorties. It wasn't clear from the context, which is all about the Japanese air threat to the Allied forces?
—WWoods (talk) 15:31, 10 May 2008 (UTC)