Operational warfare
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Operational warfare is, within warfare and military doctrine, the level of command which coordinates the minute details of tactics with the overarching goals of strategy. A common synonym is operational art.
The operational level is at a scale bigger than one where line of sight and the time of day are important, and smaller than the strategic level, where production and politics are considerations. Formations are of the operational level if they are able to conduct operations on their own, and are of sufficient size to be directly handled or have a significant impact at the strategic level. This concept was pioneered by the German army prior to and during the Second World War.
Mikhail Tukhachevsky of the Soviet Armed Forces began to develop the concept sometime between 1925 and 1929. The term was not widely used in the West before the end of the Cold War, where it was viewed as analogous to the expression "medium term" (rather than short or long term). In part it was popularised by its use in computer games, such as The Operational Art of War (Norm Koger).
What constitutes the operational level has changed with the size and function of armies. During the Second World War and Cold War, an operational-level formation was typically a corps or army. With the increase in combat power of individual units during the cold war and post-Cold War era, the fighting power of relatively small formations is today as great as that wielded by a much larger formation in the past. Because of this the brigade of approximately six-thousand men has emerged among some militaries (notably the United States Army) as an operational-level formation.
[edit] Role of operations in battle
Operational warfare functions to implement the overall strategy of an armed force by giving direction to tactical forces and providing them with the support needed to do their job. Operational formations contain sufficient assets to perform most or all military roles. They have logistics, medical, armor, infantry, artillery and often air arms independent from the overall military force and hence are fully capable of independent operation.
The tactical forces of the lowest level of operational units perform actual engagement of the enemy and the commanders of these units are responsible for determining how best to perform this task. Tactical decisions such as where entrenchments will be placed on defense and the formations that attacking units will move in are determined at this level. The lowest operational units define the immediate objectives of these tactical units within their zones of command coordinating the offensive and defensive actions of the units as well as planning and applying supporting artillery fire as needed to accomplish those actions. Higher level operational units such as divisions and corps will support the lower level operational units with logistics and medical supplies, and have more extensive artillery and air support assets at their disposal. These supporting fires are concentrated at the higher level in order that their striking power can be used where it is needed most. In addition these forces may order lower level fire support to be applied at particularly important targets, through the technique known as Time on Target.
Toward the end of the Cold War, the United States Army developed the doctrine known as AirLand Battle which formalized U.S. operational doctrine around the concept of mobile warfare. This doctrine sought to create a coherent and integrated practice of all aspects of operational warfare from logistics to maneuver and the use of artillery and air support.
[edit] References
- Simpkin, Richard E. Race to the Swift: Thoughts on Twenty-First Century Warfare. Brassey's, 2000.
[edit] Sources
- Simpkin, Richard E, Deep battle: The brainchild of Marshal Tuchachevskii, Brassey's Defence Publishers, London, 1987
- Glantz, D.M., Soviet military operational art: In pursuit of deep battle, Frank Cass, London, 1989
- Simpkin, Richard E. Race to the Swift: Thoughts on Twenty-First Century Warfare. Brassey's, 2000.