Operation U-Go

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U Go offensive
Part of the Burma Campaign during World War II
Date March 1944 – June 1944
Location Manipur, India
Result Allied victory
Belligerents
Commanders
Strength
Indian XXXIII Corps, Indian IV Corps, RAF Third Tactical Air Force 5 Infantry Divisions
1 Tank Regiment
Casualties and losses
17,500 approx[citation needed] 55,000 approx[citation needed]
v • d • e
Burma Campaign
Japanese capture of Burma – Bilin River – Sittang Bridge – Pegu – Taukkyan – Toungoo – Shwedaung – Prome – Yenangyaung – Burma Campaign 1942-1943 – Chindits – Burma Campaign 1944 – U Go – Ngakyedauk – Imphal – Kohima – Burma Campaign 1944-1945 – Meiktila & Mandalay – Ramree Island – Dracula
v • d • e
South-East Asian Theatre
v • d • e
Pacific War
v • d • e
Campaigns of World War II

The U Go offensive, or Operation C (ウ号作戦), was the Japanese offensive in March 1944 launched against Empire forces in the North-East Indian region of Manipur. Aimed at the direction of the Brahmaputra valley, through the two towns of Imphal and Kohima, the offensive along with the overlapping Ha Go offensive was the last of the major Japanese offensives during World War II. The offensive culminated in Battles of Imphal and Kohima where the Japanese and their allies were first held and then pushed back.

Contents

[edit] Background

As the successful Malayan Campaign and later its campaign in Burma brought Japan to India's borders, the concept of advancing to the Indian border took its shape. India was important as the origin (from Assam) of the Ledo road which supplied Nationalist Chinese and American forces, as well as the supplies airlifted over the the hump.[1] Late in 1943, the Japanese command in Burma had been reorganised. General Iida was posted back to Japan and a new headquarters, Burma Area Army, was created under Lieutenant-General Masakasu Kawabe. One of its subordinate formations, responsible for the central part of the front facing Imphal and Assam, was 15th Army, whose new commander was Lieutenant-General Renya Mutaguchi. Mutaguchi was impressed by the apparent success of the Chindits and instinct was to mount an offensive against Imphal. He may have also been onfluenced by Subhas Chandra Bose, who led the Azad Hind and the Indian National Army. The idea that their western boundary would be controlled by a more friendly government was attractive.[2] It would also have been consistent with the idea that Japanese expansion into Asia was part of an effort to support Asian government of Asia and against western colonialism.[3][4]

The British forces in the region were now commanded by General William Slim whose 14th Army had been revitalised and brought back to effectiveness after earlier defeats and poor command. As with most major "British" formations, it was an "Empire" army, with important elements from west and southern Africa, India and Burma, as well as from Britain. They were supported by air units and were thus, at an important stage, to achieve a mass airlift into a threatened area.

[edit] Japanese plans

Mutaguchi's plans called for the capture of Imphal and Kohima by advancing towards the Brahmaputra River valley, sectioning the Allied supply lines to northern Burma and to the airfields supplying the Nationalist Chinese under Chiang Kai-shek over "The Hump". Mutaguchi's proposal was at first firmly rejected by the staff at Burma Area Army. However, Southern Expeditionary Army Group, the headquarters for all Japanese forces in South East Asia, were in favour of it. Kawabe's staff persuaded Southern Expeditionary Army Group that there were severe logistical risks with Mutaguchi's plan, only to find that the Japanese Imperial Army HQ in Tokyo now supported it.

The plans for the offensive directed three divisions from Kawabe's Burma Area Army to intiate a diversionary attack, the Ha Go offensive, at Arakan and cover the southern coast while another two divisions watched Stillwell and Chiang Kai Shek's forces in the north. This was also to create a ploy that the Offensive was to enter Bengal through Chittagong and be driven towards the Gangetic delta and Calcutta.

In the centre, three divisions from Mutaguchi's 15th army were push into Manipur to capture Imphal and Kohima, scattering British forces and forestalling any offensive movements against Burma.[5][6] The main Japanese thrust was to include:

  • The Japanese 15th Division under Lieutenant-General Masafumi Yamauchi was to approach and envelop Imphal from the northern approaches to the town.
  • The Japanese 33rd and 15th Divisions under Major-General Tsunoru Yamamoto (The Yamamoto force), was to attack the Indian 20th Infantry Division at Tamu, then attack Imphal from the east.

[edit] Ha Go

The diversionary Japanese attack in Arakan began on February 5 with the 55th Division under Tohutaro Sakurai Force infiltrating through the line held by the Indian 7th Division. The force moved north undetected towards the small town of Taung Bazaar from where they swung west and south, to successfully attack the Headquarters of 7th Division on February 6. The Sakurai force further advanced towards the rear of the 7th division at Sinzweya. One battalion, the Kubo Force, crossed the Mayu to set ambushes on the coastal road by which Indian 5th Division was supplied. Another, the Doi force captured the railway tunnels areato launch raids and diversions from this strong position. However, the Japanese offensive ultimately failed to achieve its objectives as a small air-supplied contingent of service troops of XV Corps, supported by tanks, held its small administrative area in the Battle of the Admin Box before troops from 5th Division broke through the Ngakyedauk Pass to relieve the defenders. The ill-supplied and starving Japanese forces were forced to withdraw. Ultimately, Kawabe's forces had failed to capture and destroy Messervy's forces.[7]

[edit] U Go

[edit] Imphal

On March 6, the main U Go offensive began as Mutaguchi's three divisions crossed the Chindwin to enter Manipur. In the centre, Mutaguchi's 15th Army was to be the decisive factor in the Manipur Basin. As the battle progressed Mutaguchi's 31st Division engaged the commonwealth forces at Kohima, while the 15th Division was detailed to move down Kohima road to the North-west of Imphal. [8] The main force detailed to engage Imphal,the 33rd Division (the Yamamoto Force led by Yamamoto Tsunoru), however, was to approach from the south-east via the Tamu Road that had been built by the Commonwealth forces earlier.

In the opening phases, the 33rd Division attacked and cut off the Indian 17th Division at Tamu.[8]However, 15th division was delayed by the Chin guerrilas, allowing the Indian 20th Division under Major-General Douglas Gracey to withdrew safely. The 17th division was ultimately able to breakthrough and reach Imphal by the first week of April.

Meanwhile, Imphal had been left vulnerable to the Japanese 15th Division, while the 31st division moved towards Kohima. The 31st Division had also blocked the main road south of Kohima by the start of April, cutting off IV Corps. However, with the Ha Go offensive petering out slowly, William Slim was able to airlift the battle-hardened Indian 5th Infantry Division along with its artillery and transport, by air from Arakan to the Central Front, completing the move in eleven days. Two of the three brigades went to Imphal, and their leading troops were in action on 3 April.

On the Japanese left flank, the INA's Subhas Brigade, led by Col. Shah Nawaz Khan, reached the edge of the Chin Hills below Tiddim and Fort White at the end of March. From this position, the 2nd Battalion sent companies to relieve Japanese forces at Falam and to Hakha, from where in turn, Khan's forces sent out patrols and laid ambushes for the Chin guerrilas under the command of a British officer, taking a number of prisoners. In the middle of May, a force under Khan's Adjutant, Mahboob "Boobie" Ahmed, attacked and captured the hilltop fortress of Klang Klang.[9] The 3rd Battalion meanwhile moved to Fort White-Tongzang area in anticipation of the destruction of Cowan's division, which would allow it to receive volunteers.

[edit] Kohima

The battle of Kohima took place in two stages. From April 3 to April 16, the Japanese attempted to capture Kohima ridge, a feature which dominated the road by which the major British and Indian troops at Imphal were supplied. At this point, the small British force at Kohima was relieved, and from April 18 to June 22, British and Indian reinforcements counter-attacked to drive the Japanese from the positions they had captured. The battle ended on June 22 when British and Indian troops from Kohima and Imphal met at Milestone 109, ending the siege of Imphal.

[edit] Retreat

When he realised that none of his formations were obeying his orders for a renewed attack, Mutaguchi finally ordered the offensive to be broken off on 3 July. After ignoring army orders for several weeks, Sato was removed from command of Japanese 31st Division early in July. The entire Imphal offensive was broken off at the same time.

The Japanese, reduced in many cases to a rabble, fell back to the Chindwin river, abandoning their artillery, transport, and soldiers too sick to walk.

[edit] Impact

The defeat at Kohima and Imphal was the largest defeat to that date in Japanese history.The British and Indian forces had lost around 4,000 men, dead, missing and wounded. The Japanese suffered 55,000 casualties, including 13,500 dead. Most of these losses were the result of starvation, disease and exhaustion. By contrast, the Allies suffered 17,500 casualties. Both Kawabe and Mutaguchi were relieved of command.

[edit] References

  • Fay, Peter W. (1993), The Forgotten Army: India's Armed Struggle for Independence, 1942-1945., Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press., ISBN 0472083422.
  • Lebra, Joyce C. (1977), Japanese trained armies in South-East Asia, New York, Columbia University Press, ISBN 0231039956.

[edit] Notes

  1. ^ Lebra 1977, p. 20
  2. ^ Lebra 1977, p. 20
  3. ^ Freedom Depends on Nippon Victory. The Syonan Sinbun, 26 January 1943
  4. ^ Lebra 1977, p. 20
  5. ^ Fay 1993, p. 281
  6. ^ Fay 1993, p. 265
  7. ^ Fay 1993, p. 264
  8. ^ a b Fay 1993, p. 284
  9. ^ Fay 1993, p. 286,287

[edit] Further reading