Operation Soberanía

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The Beagle Conflict
Main Article: Beagle conflict
1881–1970: Beagle Channel cartography
1971–1977: Beagle Channel Arbitration
1977–1978: Direct Negotiations
1978: Operation Soberanía
1979–1984: Papal Mediation
1984: Peace and Friendship Treaty of 1984
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In 1971 Chile and Argentina sent their boundary dispute to binding Beagle Channel Arbitration. On 22 May 1977 the Queen Elizabeth II announced the judgement which awarded the Picton, Nueva and Lennox islands to Chile. On 25 January 1978 Argentina rejected the decision and attempted to militarily coerce[1] Chile into negotiating a division of the islands that would produce a maritime boundary consistent with Argentine claims and began to challenge the Chilean commitment to defend the territory.

The Argentine military planned a operation with the codename "Operación Soberanía" (Operation Sovereignty). The date for the assault was fixed for 21 or 22 December 1978.

Chile had to oppose to a country which had twice as many inhabitants, a double so high per capita income and enormous geographical advantages, in order to defend its long and narrow territory.

Contents

[edit] The military imbalance

There was considerable international condemnation of the Chilean Military Regime's human rights record, a matter that the United States of America expressed concern over as well after Orlando Letelier's 1976 assassination in Washington D.C.. The United States banned the export of weapons to Chile through the Kennedy Amendment, later International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976. Also Germany[2], Austria[3] and the United Kingdom[4], the traditional supplier of the Chilean Armed Forces, did not supply weapons at Chile.

France, Germany, Austria and the USA continued the export of weapons to Argentina even during the critical phase of the Beagle conflict, as Argentina had already rejected the international binding Arbitral Award. In December 1978, when an outbreak of the war appeared unavoidable, the German shipbuilding and engineering works Blohm + Voss and the Argentine Junta agreed the building of four destroyers[5]. Also in 1978 France sold two Corvettes to Argentina, originally build for the Apartheid Regime in South Africa. The corvettes "Good Hope" and "Transvaal" could not be delivered because of the UN-Embargos. In Argentina they were renamed ARA Drummond and ARA Guerrico.

The United Kingdom delivered Type 42 destroyers to the Argentine Junta. On 19 September 1977 from Vickers Shipbuilding yard in Barrow-in-Furness sailed to Argentina the ARA Hércules (build and completed in UK) and on 28 November 1981 from Portsmouth the ARA Santísima Trinidad (1974) (build in Argentina, completed in UK).

The defence spending can give a review over the military imbalance[6]:

1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
Chile
defense spending* 487 566 713 951 1.128 949
percentage of the GNP 3.5 3.5 4.1 4.6 5.2
Argentina
defense spending* 2.702 2.225 2.339 2.641 2.126 2.241
percentage of the GNP 2.2 2.0 2.3 2.5 2.0


* Costs in Millons of USA Dollars 1979.

This numerical imbalance could be moderated by the following factors:

  • Chile used a higher portion of its Gross domestic product in defense
  • Defense implies fewer risks than attack
  • The intervention of the Argentine armed forces into the range of politics had diminish their vocational abilities[7].
  • The Andes mountain range is a natural and inaccessible barrier.

The Ambassador of the United States in Argentina (1978) Raúl Castro estimated the disposition of the Argentine military to the war with the following words:

"Ellos suponían que iban a invadir Chile, Santiago, especialmente. Les parecía algo muy fácil; una cuestión de cruzar la frontera y que los chilenos se iban a dar por vencidos. Y yo les decía: No, no, se equivocan. Ellos tienen una armada mejor que la de ustedes. Están bien armados, son muy fuertes"[8]

Augusto Pinochet foresaw a long and bloody war, a kind of partisan war:

"una guerra de montonera, matando todos los días, fusilando gente, tanto por parte de los argentinos como por nuestra parte, y al final, por cansancio, se habría llegado a la paz"[9]

[edit] The Argentine Plan

Argentine aircraft carrier ARA Veinticinco de Mayo (V-2)
Argentine aircraft carrier ARA Veinticinco de Mayo (V-2)

There are no public Argentine Official Documents oder Statements over the planning of the war of aggression against Chile[10], but there are so many personal testimony and by all ranks that one can't cast doubts on its existence.

The Argentine Government planned to occupy the Nueva Island and the Horn Island and then, in a second phase, to stop or continue according to the Chilean reaction[11]. Argentina had drafted already a declaration of war.

An Argentine complaint in the UN Security Council, over a military occupation of the disputed islands by Chile, should precede the attack.

The Argentine Armed Forces expected 50.000[12] Argentine Troops dead or injured.

[edit] The time after the invasion

For the post war phase, the Argentine Navy had prepared the Instrucciones Políticas Particulares para la Zona Austral para la Etapa Posterior a la Ejecución de Actos de Soberanía en las Islas en Litigio[13]. They defined the new borderline, navigation rights for Chilean Ships, instruccions in case of confrontation with the Chilean Navy, injured, prisioners, etc.

[edit] Chilean Preparedness

Mine field in Tierra del Fuego in 2006.
Mine field in Tierra del Fuego in 2006.

The Chilean Military kept under surveillance the movements of the Argentine Fleet as well as the concentration areas of the Argentine Troops and was ready to stop the attack. There will not be a surprise effect. Chilean Troops were deployed along the border.

Chile planted mines in certain areas along its borders with Argentina, Bolivia and Peru[14] and dynamited some Anden-Pass[15].

The combat-ready Chilean Fleet sail on 22 December 1978 from the Fjords of the Hoste Island to frustrate the Argentine Landing. Rear Admiral Raúl López, Chief of the Chilean fleet, was silent over the topic whether he would wait or he would attack the enemy navy.

[edit] The abort of the operation

On the D-day, a severe storm impeded the Argentine Operations in the area. Meanwhile Pope John Paul II, alarmed by the situation, decided to act personally and informed both governments that he was sending his personal envoy, Cardinal Antonio Samoré, to both capitals. Six hours before Landing, the Argentine Fleet turned back and the Operation Soberanía was called off.

Whether the Argentine Infantry crossed the border to Chile or only stand by at the border waiting for the result of the naval combat, can't be established any more. Argentine Sources absolutely insist that they do it[16], but that would be inconsistent with the 2 phases plan.

[edit] Aftermath

The Chilean Commitment to defend his territory, the absolutely position of the USA that any military action would not be accepted and the Pope's announcement helped the Argentine junta to change their position and accept the mediation and the immediate cease of military operation.

[edit] See also

[edit] References

  1. ^ During a summit in Puerto Montt in February 1978 President of Argentina Jorge Videla threatened: «… las negociaciones directas constituyen la única vía pacífica para solucionar el conflicto …» (See General Juan E. Gugliamelli: "Cuestión del Beagle. Negociación directa o diálogo de armas", (Spanish Language) compiled from articles in magazin "Estrategia", Buenos Aires Nr:49/50, January-Frebuary 1978)
  2. ^ See Der Spiegel on 6 March 1978: «… seit 1974 verhalf Bonn zudem den Streitkräften fast aller südamerikanischen Meeresanrainer (Ausnahme: Chile) zu stärkerer Seetüchtigkeit…»
  3. ^ See Historia general de las Relaciones Exteriores de la República Argentina by Andrés Cisneros y Carlos Escudé in cema: «… en el mismo mes de junio de 1981, la Argentina adquirió 57 tanques austríacos, operación que generó los recelos del lado chileno, pues en 1980 el mismo país proveedor de esos tanques les negó a los militares trasandinos la compra de 100 unidades …»
  4. ^ the relations between Chile and UK has been seriously damaged by the Sheila Cassidy affair, the use of British made planes during the Coup d'État and the violations of human rights by the Pinochet regime. The UK refused to deliver the spare parts for the Hawker Hunter planes of the Chilean Air Force.
  5. ^ See "Wie geschmiert - Rüstungsproduktion und Waffenhandel im Raum Hamburg" Kriegsschiffe für Argentinien (German Language)
  6. ^ See Distribución de capacidades en el Cono Sur, Sabrina Melidoni, Buenos Aires, 2006 (p. 45).(Spanish Language)
  7. ^ See interview with General Martin Balza, Commander-in-Chief of the Argentine Army, in the newspaper La Tercera, Chile, 21 December 2003: «… La incursión en los gobiernos de facto de 1955 y fundamentalmente la dictadura de 1976 habían alejado a las Fuerzas Armadas del profesionalismo que todos deseábamos …»
  8. ^ Siehe Interview mit Raúl Castro in Clarín, Argentinien, vom Sonntag 20. Dezember 1998.
  9. ^ Interview with María Eugenia Oyarzún in Augusto Pinochet, diálogos con su historia, 1999
  10. ^ See Clarín Buenos Aires, Argentina, 20 December 1998 ... la mediación del papa Juan Pablo II fue providencial para la Argentina: no sólo evitó una guerra de agresión contra Chile ....
    See Clarín, Argentina, 20 December 1998: "De hecho, Chile no iba a ser el país atacante. Lo tenía todo: las islas y más aún. Era el generalato argentino el que auspiciaba el estallido.".
    See La Nación, Argentina 12 August 1996: "Se tomó, por tanto, la decisión de invadir a Chile y se puso en marcha el reloj de la cuenta regresiva.".
    See pages 242 and 243 from "Argentina in the twentieth Century" or "Breve Historia Contemporanea de la Argentina", Luis Alberto Romero, 1994, Pennsilvania State University Press or Fondo de Cultura Economica, ISBN 0-271-02191-8 or ISBN 0-271-02192-6: "The aggression against Chile ...".
    See Pacho O'Donnell, "Historias Argentinas", 1. Edicion, Buenos Aires, Sudamerica, 2006 ISBN 950-07-2749-8, Chapter: Se necesita una guerra (page 315).
    See Interview with Pio Laghi, Nuntius in Argentina in 1978, Clarín 20 December 1998:"El ministro de Economía, Martínez de Hoz, y el jefe del Ejército, general Viola, que no querían que estallara el conflicto, me informaron en una cena diplomática que se había tomado la decisión de desencadenar la guerra" .
    See Robert Pastor, US-national security advisor, to the Argentine Junta: "Si ustedes toman una sola roca, por minúscula que sea, el gobierno de los Estados Unidos y sus aliados de la OTAN los van a calificar de agresores. Le pediría que transmitiera este mensaje con claridad absoluta a Buenos Aires. El presidente Carter está al tanto de nuestra conversación..." La Nación, Argentina, 21 December 2003
    See "En su lógica" Río Negro 5 September 2005: "Ahí, Argentina rompió reglas y apuró la guerra con el país vecino.".
    Siehe Interview with Sergio Onofre Jarpa, Ambassador Chile's in Argentina in 1978, La Tercera, Chile: "Había una campaña muy odiosa contra Chile a través de la prensa y los medios de comunicación, que demostraba cuál era la actitud del oficialismo.".
    See "Cartas desde el abismo" Clarín, Argentina, 20 Dezember 1998: "el drama que se estaba por abatir sobre la Argentina y Chile en 1978, impulsado por el afán belicista de los halcones del régimen militar argentino".
    See Interview with General es:Reynaldo Bignone in Clarín, Argentina, 20 December 1998:"Si hay tipos que pensaban que no había otra solución que la cachetada, allá ellos.". "Cachetada" ("a slap in the face") is Euphemism für Aggression war.
    See Interview of Augusto Pinochet with María Eugenia Oyarzún in "Augusto Pinochet: Diálogos con su historia", Editorial Sudamericana, Santiago, Chile, 1999. (S. 127): "Usted comprenderá que uno llega a estos grados pensando los pro y los contra de las cosas. Una guerra significa una detención o retroceso para un país de a lo menos 20 años. Hay que comenzar de nuevo. ¡No quiero guerra yo!; por lo demás, nosotros no habríamos peleado por ambiciones expansionistas sino defendiendo lo que teníamos, nada más. Ello, a pesar de que en el otro lado había deseos de agresión y vientos de guerra"
  11. ^ See Alejandro Luis Corbacho, Predicting the Probability of War During Brinkmanship Crises: The Beagle and the Malvinas Conflicts
  12. ^ See spanish newspaper El País on 25 January 1984 here
  13. ^ See article "El belicismo de los dictadores" in Clarin, Argentina, 20 December 1998
  14. ^ See Landmine Monitor Chile
  15. ^ See Newspaper El Centro, Chile, 1 November 2004 (Spanish Language)
  16. ^ See El belicismo de los dictadores in Clarín, Argentina, 20 December 1998: «… Yo de esto hablé una vez con un teniente coronel que era jefe de un regimiento en la cordillera y que cuenta que sus patrullas cruzaron la frontera y entraron en Chile …»

[edit] Bibliography

  • Beagle Channel Arbitration between the Republic of Argentina and the Republic of Chile, Report and Decision of the Court of Arbitration
  • Mark Laudy: The Vatican Mediation of the Beagle Channel Dispute: Crisis Intervention and Forum Building in Words Over War of Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict.
  • Alejandro Luis Corbacho: Predicting the Probability of War During Brinkmanship Crises: The Beagle and the Malvinas Conflicts, Universidad del CEMA, Argentina, Documento de Trabajo No. 244, September 2003, Spanish Language
  • Karin Oellers-Frahm: Der Schiedsspruch in der Beagle-Kanal-Streitigkeit, Berichte und Urkunden: Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht, German Language
  • Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Chile: Relaciones Chileno-Argentinas, La controversia del Beagle. Genf 1979, English and Spanish Language
  • Andrea Wagner: Der argentinisch-chilenische Konflikt um den Beagle-Kanal. Ein Beitrag zu den Methoden friedlicher Streiterledigung. Verlag Peter Lang, Frankfurt a.M. 1992, ISBN 3-631-43590-8, German Language
  • Karl Hernekamp: Der argentinisch-chilenisch Grenzstreit am Beagle-Kanal. Institut für Iberoamerika-Kunde, Hamburg 1980, German Language
  • Andrés Cisneros y Carlos Escudé, "Historia general de las Relaciones Exteriores de la República Argentina", Las relaciones con Chile, Cema, Argentina, Buenos Aires. Spanish Language
  • Annegret I. Haffa: Beagle-Konflikt und Falkland (Malwinen)-Krieg. Zur Außenpolitik der Argentinischen Militarregierung 1976-1983. Weltforum Verlag, München/Köln/London 1987, ISBN 3-8039-0348-3, German Language
  • Isaac F. Rojas und Arturo Medrano: Argentina en el Atlántico Chile en el Pacífico. Editorial Nemont, Buenos Aires, Argentina, 1979, in spanischer Sprache.
  • Isaac F. Rojas, La Argentina en el Beagle y Atlántico sur 1. Parte. Editorial Diagraf, Buenos Aires, Argentina, Spanish Language
  • Carlos Escudé und Andrés Cisneros: Historia general de las relaciones exteriores de la República Argentina (here), in spanischer Sprache.
  • Fabio Vio Valdivieso: La mediación de su S.S. el Papa Juan Pablo II, Editorial Aconcagua, Santiago de Chile, 1984, Spanish Language
  • Alberto Marín Madrid: El arbitraje del Beagle y la actitud argentina. 1984, Editorial Moisés Garrido Urrea, id = A-1374-84 XIII, Spanisch Language
  • Luis Alberto Romero, Argentina in the twentieth Century. Pennsilvania State University Press, translated by James P. Brennan, 1994, ISBN 0-271-02191-8
  • Divisionsgeneral (a.D.) Juan E. Gugliamelli: Cuestión del Beagle. Negociación directa o diálogo de armas (Trans.:The Beagle-Question, direct Negotiations or Dialog of the Weapons), in Spanish Language. (Book compiled from articles of Argentine Magazin "Estrategia", Buenos Aires Nr:49/50, enero-febrero 1978, erschienen sind.
  • General Martín Antonio Balza und Mariano Grondona: Dejo Constancia: memorias de un general argentino. Editorial Planeta, Buenos Aires 2001, ISBN 9504908136, Spanish Language
  • Francisco Bulnes Serrano und Patricia Arancibia Clavel: La Escuadra En Acción. Chile, Editorial Grijalbo, 2004, ISBN 9562582116, Spanish Language

[edit] External links


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