Operation Searchlight

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Operation Searchlight
Part of Bangladesh Liberation War
Date March 26, 1971 - May 25, 1971.[1]
Location East Pakistan (now Bangladesh)
Result • Temporary Pakistani military occupation

• Severe Bengali civilian casualties
• Beginning of Bangladesh Liberation War
• Creation of Mukti Bahini
• Bengali refugees flee to India
• Launch of Operation Jackpot by Indian Army Eastern Command
• Eventual Indo-Pak War of 1971 and Birth of Bangladesh
Belligerents
Bengali units of Pakistan Armed Forces and civilian volunteers Pakistan Armed Forces
Commanders
Prime Minister Tajuddin Ahmed (April 17 - December 16)

Col(ret). M A G Osmani (April 10 - December 16)

"Operation Jackpot":
Lt. General Jagjit Singh Aurora
General Sam Manekshaw

 President General Yahya Khan

Lt. General Tikka Khan (March - September)
Lt. General A. A. K. Niazi
(April 11 - December 16)
Strength
Bengali Forces: ~6,000 Bengali soldiers from East Bengal Regiments[2]

Paramilitary Forces:
East Pakistan Rifles:~13,000 soldiers[3]
Civilian volunteers: unknown (usually unarmed)
Reinforcements: unknown number of unarmed ex-servicemen and civilians

 Pakistan Army: 14th Infantry Division, estimated 18,000+ soldiers,[4]

1 armored regiment (75 M-24 Chaffee Tanks). Paramilitary Forces: ~2,000 East Pakistan Rifles,[3] unknown number of Mujahids and Mizos. Reinforcements: The 9th and 16th Infantry divisions from West Pakistan
Pakistan Air Force: 20 F-86 Sabre, 3 T-33 trainers, 8 Helicopters, C-130 Heracles transport planes.

Pakistan Navy: 4 Gunboats and 1 Patrol Boat,[5] 1 Destroyer.[6]
Casualties and losses
Mukti Bahini: NA*, ~several thousand, ~4,000+[7] POWs. ~6,000 KIA and wounded[8] a few POWs.
Civilian death toll: estimated several thousands Bengali civilians.

Operation Searchlight was a planned military pacification carried out by the Pakistan Army to curb the Bengali nationalist movement in erstwhile East Pakistan in March of 1971.[9] Ordered by the government in West Pakistan, this was seen as the sequel to Operation Blitz which had been launched in November 1970.

The original plan envisioned taking control of the major cities on March 26, and then eliminating all opposition, political or military,[10] within one month. The prolonged Bengali resistance was not anticipated by Pakistani planners.[11]. The main phase of Operation Searchlight ended with the fall of the last major town in Bengali hands in mid May. The operation also began the 1971 Bangladesh atrocities. This systematic killings only served to enrage the Bengalis which ultimately resulted in the secession of East Pakistan later in the same year. The international media and reference books in English have published casualty figures which vary greatly: varying from 5,000–35,000 in Dhaka, and 200,000–3,000,000 for Bangladesh as a whole.[12][13]

The aftermath of the operation would continue, consequently launching the Indo-Pakistan War of 1971, which led to full fledged Indian retaliation augmented by the Mukti Bahini on Pakistani occupation forces in Bangladesh, resulting in Pakistan Army's unconditional surrender to the joint command of Indian Army and Mukti Bahini[14] on December 16, 1971.

Contents

[edit] Background

After the Awami League had won a decisive majority (capturing 167 out of 300 seats)in the 1970 parliamentary elections, the Bengali population expected a swift transfer of power to Awami League based on the Six Point Programme. When Yahya Khan, the President of Pakistan, postponed the national assembly meeting scheduled for March on February 28, 1971, things came to a boil in the then East Pakistan. Awami League, in response to the postponement, launched a program of non cooperation (Largely outlined in the March 7th rally by Awami League) which was so successful that the authority of Pakistan government became confined only to the cantonments and government institutions in East Pakistan.[15] Clashes between civilians and the Pakistani Army, and between Bengali and Bihari communities erupted and became commonplace. Yahya Khan flew to Dacca to hold talks with Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, leader of the Awami League in March, and was later joined by Bhutto in Dacca. Unwilling to transfer power to the Awami League (Fearing a transfer of power will erode the economic dominance of West Pakistan), or lose face by backing down in face of the non cooperation movement, the Pakistani generals decided on a military crackdown.[15]

[edit] The Operational Plan

[edit] The Planning Process

The plan was drawn up in March 1971 by Major General Khadim Hussain Raza, GOC 14th Division, and Major General Rao Farman Ali, as a result of a meeting between Pakistani army staff on the 22nd of February.[16] Senior Pakistani officers in East Pakistan who were unwilling to support any military attack on civilians, Lt. General Shahabzada Yakub Khan, GOC East Pakistan, and the governor Vice Admiral Ahsan, were relieved of their duties. Lt. Gen. Tikka Khan became the Governor and GOC of East Pakistan.

On March 17, General Khadim Hussain Raza was given the go ahead to plan for the crackdown via telephone by General Hamid, COS Pakistan Army. On the morning of March 18, General Raza and Major General Rao Farman Ali put the details to paper at the GOC's office at Dacca cantonment. The plan was written on a light blue office pad with a lead pencil by General Farman containing 16 paragraphs spread over 5 pages.

General Farman wrote out the operational premises and conditions for success, while General Khadim dealt with the distribution of forces and particular tasks of the individual brigades and other units. It was assumed that the Bengali Army and other military units will revolt at the onset of operations.[17] To minimise that risk, it was suggested that all Bengali units under arms should be disarmed and the political leadership arrested during their meeting with the President, General Yahya Khan. No operational reserves were earmarked.

The handwritten plan was read out to General Hamid and Lt. General Tikka Khan on the 20th of March at the flag staff house. General Hamid objected to the immediate disarming of regular army Bengali units but approved the disarming of EPR, armed police and other para-military formations. Yahya Khan refused to sanction the arrest of Awami League leaders during a meeting with him, as the plan had proposed.[17]The amended plan was approved and the operational plan was distributed to various area commander on the 24th and the 25 March daytime, when a group of Pakistani Generals, accompanied by General Hamid, General Mittha, the Quartermaster General, and Col. Saadullah, Principal Staff Officer, visited the major garrisons via helicopter and personally briefed the various garrison commanders or senior West Pakistani officers on the operation.

Maj. Gen. Qamar Ali Mirza, and Brig. Harrison later arrived from West Pakistan to assist General Mittha for arranging the logistical details, mainly because the non cooperation program was hampering the food supply.[18]Secrecy was strictly maintained, only a few Lt. Colonels learned about the plan beforehand on a need to know basis. Although some Bengali officers had become suspicious of the all West Pakistani officer briefings, no one outside the briefings learned the details beforehand.

The Operation was to start on the night of 25 March, 1971 in Dacca, and other garrisons were to be alerted via phone about their zero hour to start their operations. General Farman Ali commanded the forces in Dhaka, while the rest of the province was commanded by General Khadim himself. Lt. General Tikka Khan and his staff was present in the 31st field command center, to supervise and support the command staff of the 14th division.

[edit] Major Components of the Plan

[edit] Operational Premises

As outlined by the Pakistani planners, the operation aimed to eliminate the Awami League apparatus and any civilians and personnel of the armed forces supporting the Awami League movement in defiance of Martial Law. Cunning, surprise, deception and speed was emphasised as crucial for success. Use of free and greater force was authorised. Search and assault of civilian areas and Hindu areas also were authorised.

[edit] Requirements for Success

1. The military will launch the operation simultaneously all across Bangladesh.
2. Maximum number of political and student leaders, and those among cultural organizations and teaching staff to be arrested.
3. Operation must achieve 100% success in Dhaka. Dhaka University would be occupied and searched.
4. Free and greater use of fire authorised for securing cantonmets.
5. All internal and international communications will be cut off including Telephones, TV, Radios, Telegraphs, transmitters.
6. All East Pakistani (Bengali) troops will be neutralised by sizing Kotes and ammunition.
7. To deceive the Awami League, Yahia Khan may pretend to continue the dialogue, even if Mr. Bhutto disagrees, agree to Awami League demands.

The designated areas of offensive operations under that plan were Dacca, Khulna, Chittagong, Comilla, Jessore, Rajshahi, Rangpur, Saidpur and Sylhet, areas where West Pakistani army units were concentrated. Pakistani Army and paramilitary elements in other areas in East Pakistan were to maintain control of their respective areas and await reinforcements. Once Dhaka had been secured, the 9th and 16th divisions from Pakistan were to be airlifted to Bangladesh as reinforcements. Cities with airfields (Chittagong, Syhlet, Jessore, Rangpur, Comilla) would be reinforced via C-130 airplanes or heliborne troops directly from Dhaka. Although the plan did not specify the time needed to subdue the province, it was assumded that after the arrest of the political leadership and disarming of the Bengali military and paramilitary units, the civilians would be terrorised into submitting to the martial law within a week.[19] Lt. Gen. Tikka Khan estimated that no resistance will remain after April 10th.[11]

[edit] Composition of Pakistan Armed Forces in East Pakistan

The Pakistan Army had only one division stationed in East Pakistan in February 1971: The 14th Infantry division. The division had 4 infantry brigades attached to it, instead of the normal 3 brigades. The 57th infantry brigade (Under Brig. Jahanzab Arbab) was stationed in Dacca, the 53rd (Brig. Iqbal Shafi) was in Comilla, the 23rd (Brig. Abdullah Khan Malik) in Rangpur and the 107th (Brig. S.M. Durrani) was in Jessore. Brig. Mazoomdar, a Bengali, was in command of the Chittagong area. Normally each brigade had 3 to 4 infantry battalions and a field artillery regiment attached to it in addition to various support troops. After the Pakistanis decided on military action, 2 additional infantry formations, the 13th Frontier Force and the 22nd Baluch, was flown to Dhaka from West Pakistan.

The four brigades had 12 infantry regiments (regimenmts normally had 915 soldiers each) containing purely West Pakistani personnel (Punjabi, Baluch, Pathan and Sindhi) before March 25, 1971. The army had 5 field artillery regiments, a light anti aircraft regiment, a commando battalion (the 3rd), all of which contained a majority of Pakistani personnel, in various East Pakistani bases. The only armoured regiment in East Pakistan, the 29th Cavalry, was a mixed unit. 20% of the East Pakistan Rifels (EPR) personnel were also made of West Pakistanis. The support elements of the various units and cantonments were of mixed nationality. The unit commanders and a majority of the officers were from West Pakistan.

The 16th infantry division in Queta, West Pakistan, was ordered to prepare to move to East Pakistan in mid February. To maintain secrecy, no major reinforcements were initially sent to the other garrisons before March 25.

Pakistan Air Force had 20 F-86 Saber Jets and 3 T-33 Trainers at the Dacca Airbase. The Army aviation wing had a squadron of helicopters posted in East Pakistan. C-130 Herucles planes were transferred to Dhaka for the operation from West Pakistan. Airfields were located in Chittagong, Comilla, Lalmonirhut near Rangpur, in Salutikor near Sylhet, in Jessore and Thakurgaon.

Pakistan Navy had 4 Gunboats (Rajshahi, Jessore, Comilla and Sylhet) a patrol boat (Balaghat) and the destroyer PNS Jahangir in East Pakistan. Another destroyer, PNS Babur would visit East Pakistan after the operation started. Major naval bases were in Dhaka, Chittagong and Mongla.

[edit] Pakistan Army Bengali Units in East Pakistan

There were 6 regular army Bengali infantry regiments present in East Pakistan in March 1971. The 1st East Bengal Regiment (EBR) was in Jessore attached to the 107th brigade. The 2nd EBR was in Joydevpur north of Dacca, attached to the 57th Brigade. The 3rd EBR was in Saidpur as part of the 23rd Brigade, and the 4th EBR was in Comilla with the 53rd Brigade. The 8th EBR was preparing to ship to West Pakistan and was at 75% strength in Chittagong. The East Bengal Regimental Center (EBRC) in Chittagong housed 2,000 Bengali troops including the newly raised 9th EBR. The 10th EBR, a training unit, was in Dacca cantonment with the 14th Division. Bengali officers commanded the 1st, 2nd and the 10th EBR. Commanding officers of the other units were Pakistani.

[edit] Other Bengali Forces

The East Pakistan Police was majority Bengali, with some Pakistani officers. East Pakistan Rifles (EPR), a 15,000 strong (80% Bengali)[20] force, was divided into 17 operational wings (each wing contained 3 to 7 companies of 150 men each) under 7 sectors (Dacca, Mymenshingh, Jessore, Rajshahi, Dinajpur, Sylhet and Chittagong) and was deployed around the country. EPR HQ and 2,500 EPR troops were posted in Dhaka. Majority of the EPR officers were from West Pakistan, serving on deputation from the regular army for 2/3 years.

[edit] Dispersion of Bengali Units before March 25

Denied permission by General Hamid to disarm the regular Bengali army units en masse before the crackdown, the Pakistani command employed other ploys to minimise the threat of these formations.

Brig. Mozoomdar was relieved of his post on the 24th of March, with Brig Ansari (West Pakistani) taking command of Chittagong area. Bengali units were sent out of the cantonments, or were broken into smaller units and deployed away from each other, and cut off from the main radio and wireless communication grid before or on the 25th of March. Bengali officers were sent on leave, or were posted away from command centers or units directly involved in the operation. In some cases, West Pakistani officers took over command of Bengali formations. Some Bengali soldiers were sent on leave, and some were disarmed on various pretexes whenever possible without raising alarm ("The Rape of Bangladesh", Anthony Mascarnehas, Viks Press, Delhi, 1983).

The 1st EBR (at 50% strength), was sent out of Jessore cantonment to Chaugacha near the border for winter training, where they stayed until March 29. Companies of the 2nd EBR was disbursed around areas outide Dacca and their radio communication net was shut off. 3rd EBR had its companies disbursed at Ghoraghat, and at Parvatipur outside the Saidpur cantonment. 4th EBR units were deployed between Brahmanbaria and Shamshernagar. Thus the possibility of organised resistance from the regular Bengali units on the 25th of March was minimised through a pre-planned well executed strategy. Only in Chittagong the regular army Bengali units stayed in their respective bases.

West Pakistani EPR troops were posted in the cities whenever possible, while Bengali EPR troops were sent to the border outposts. Most EPR units were away from the main action areas, and would need at least a day to reach the major cities. The EPR wireless net was shut off on the night of March 24 or 25th.

[edit] Operation: March 25/26 to April 10

This is a brief description of the units engaged and the result of the Pakistani military action from March 25 until April 10, when it was supposed to end. This only covers events in the areas that were the major focus of Operation Searchlight, not the Bengali resistance in whole of then East Pakistan. In some areas, Pakistani assault and mass murders started clashes with the Bengali forces on the 25th of March. In other areas, no clashes took place until as late as the 30th of March.

[edit] Dhaka

Pakistani Forces: In addition to the Eastern Command HQ, the headquarters of the 14th division and the 57th brigade were also located in Dacca cantonment. The regular army units present were: 18th and 32nd Punjab regiment, the 13th Frontier Force regiment, 22nd Baluch regiment, 43th Light Ack-Ack regiment, elements of the 3rd Commando Battalion, and the 31st Field Artillery Regiment. PAF personnel were stationed at the Tejgaon airport. Also, a squadron of at least 14 M24 Chaffee tanks from the 29th Cavalry regiment was stationed in Dhaka. In addition to these, support elements (Engineering, supply and medical units) of the 57th brigade, the 14th division and the Eastern Command HQ was located in Dacca.

Bengali Forces: The 10th Bengal regiment was stationed in the Dacca cantonment. EPR HQ had 2,500 troops (The 13th, 15th and 16th wings plus the Dacca sector and EPR HQ wings) at Pilkhana and some companies were posted around the city. Rajarbag police line had at least 2,000 armed police. 2nd EBR was stationed in various locations north of the city. There was also some lightly armed Awami League volunteers in Dacca.

Course of Events: The Army had a 6 hour deadline to secure the city. The 13th FF maintained the security of the cantonment and the 43 light Ack Ack took over airport security during the operation. The 31st Field was deployed in Dacca and secured the northern part of the city. Pakistani Army quickly shut off all communication channels in Dacca before commencing the operation. The commandos easily captured Sheikh Mujibur Rahman at the beginning of the crackdown, but most of the Awami League senior leadership managed to evade capture and leave the city by the 27th of March.

The 10th Bengal was easily disarmed in the cantonment and later eliminated. Awami League volunteers had put up makeshift barricades in the streets, but these did not cause any significant delay to the Pakistani troop movements. The volunteers manning the barricades were the first civilians to be shot by the Pakistani troops.

The 22nd Baluch, stationed at the EPR HQ, suddenly attacked and subdued the disorganised resistance of the mostly disarmed EPR at Pilkhana after an all night battle. Contingents from the 18th and 32nd Punjab regiments assaulted the Dacca University area, subdued the light resistance from the AL volunteers, killed unarmed students present in the halls, and also murdered some professors, then moved on to attack the Hindu areas and the old town. The Police at Rajarbag, aided by AL volunteers, put up a stout resistance, but was eventually overcome and most were captured/scattered. Pakistani forces had used artillery and armour liberally, disregarding civilian safety altogether. The city was secured before dawn and a curfew was imposed.

Surviving EPR and police fled the city. Captured Bengali soldiers, EPR and Police personnel were either executed or imprisoned without trial. From March 26th to April 6th, in an Operation dubbed "GREAT FLY-IN"[21] PIA Boeings and C 130 Transports would fly the 9th and 16th division (5 Brigade Hqs, 16 infantry battalions) to Dacca,[22] and elements of these formations will be flown to various locations in East Pakistan to reinforce Pakistani garrisons.

The 2nd EBR, under Major Shafiullah, revolted on the 27th of March and regrouped at Mymensingh, to the north of Dacca, on the 30th of March. EPR 2nd wing and sector HQ wing had destroyed the Pakistani forces at Mymenshigh on the 28th of March. Maj. Shafiullah planned an attack on Dacca, but he canceled the plan on the 31st of March and joined the forces of Khaled Mosharraf in Comilla. Pakistani forces launched probing attacks toward Tangail and Mymensingh, which would not fall until the 15th of April, and also sent the newly arrived 27th brigade to attack the 2nd EBR positions near Bhairab Bazar.

[edit] Chittagong

Pakistani Forces: The only West Pakistani army unit in Chittagong was the 20th Baluch regiment (Commander: Lt. Col Fatami), minus its advance party. A company from the 31st Punjab and a company from the 3rd Commando battalion were also in the port city. These were supported by a section of 6 M24 Chaffee tanks from the 29 Cavalry. The Pakistani Navy (Under Commodore Mumtaz) and the PAF had an unknown number of personnel at the naval base and at the airport respectively. Also, some commandos were operating in civilian clothing in the city.[23] EPR had about 300 Pakistani troops in Chittagong EPR HQ. PNS Jahangir, a destroyer, and the gunboat PNS Rajshahi was also present in Chittagong. Lt Col. Abdul Aziz Sheikh (West Pakistani) commanded the EPR.

Bengali Forces: East Bengal Regimental Center (EBRC - Commanded by Lt. Col. Shaigri- Pakistani) housed 2,000 Bengali troops, including the newly raised 9th EBR. The 8th EBR (Lt. Col. Janjua, Pakistani) was at 50% strength stationed outside the cantonment. EPR had some 1,500 Bengali troops in the Chittagong area (600 in Chittagong city itself), with the 11th, 14th and the 17th wings (at Kaptai) and the sector HQ wing. Dampara police line housed a substantial police contingent. Some Bengali troops were employed to unload munitions from the MV Swat at the port.

Course of Events: The Pakistanis retained possession of the cantonment, the naval base and the airport throughout the operation. Naval personnel secured the "MV Swat" and arrested/executed all the Bengali troops staitioned to unload her. Communication networks were partially shut down before the attack. The 20th Baluch launched a surprise attack on the EBRC, killing/capturing more than 1,000 Bengali troops and scattering the rest. The 8th EBR (Under Major Ziaur Rahman) left the city after learning of this attack, and did not take part in the initial battles in Chittagong.

EPR troops, under Captain Rafiqul Islam, revolted (after learning of the crackdown in Dacca) and took control of parts of the city and held the areas until April 3. This is the only instance were Bengali units managed to launch a preemptive strike against the Pakistanis during the operation. They had managed to arrest all the Pakistani EPR soldiers (300-500) posted at the EPR HQ. Pakistani reinforcements coming from Comilla (Under Brig. Iqbal Shafi) were ambushed at Kumira, 12 miles north of the city by the EPR troops and held up for 4 days. By the 27th of March, most of Bengali troops outside Chittagong city had assembled near the Kalurghat bridge, away from the battle in the city, where Major Zia had set up command. The Kalurghat Radio station was used to declare the independence of Bangladesh on behalf of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, which operated until March 31, when it was silenced by air strikes.

The Pakistani force ambushed at Kumira made contact with the Pakistani troops in Chittagong on the 29th of March. Using artillery, naval guns and airstrikes, Pakistani troops took effective control of the city by April 3rd, and by April 6th,[24] all Bengali troops had left the city to regroup at 2 areas, at Kalurghat (1,000+ Bengali troops of the EPR and EBR), and at Kumira to north of the city, thus cutting the Chittagong-Comilla highway link. By the 10h of April, Pakistani troops were poised to launch a three pronged coordinated attack to drive the Bengali troops from their positions.

[edit] Comilla

Pakistani Forces: 53rd Brigade HQ (Brig. Iqbal Shafi) was located in Comilla, which contained with 24th Frontier Force regiment (Lt. Col. Shahpur Khan), 3rd Commando Battalion minus elements, the 53rd Field Artillery Regiment, 2 120 mm Mortar batteries, the 40th Field ambulance troops and Engineering company troops were also in Comilla cantonment.

Bengali Forces: 4th EBR (Lt. Col. Khijir Hayat - Pakistani) was concentrated in Brahmanbaria, 50 miles to the north of Comilla. Support and supply troops were in Comilla cantonment. EPR 1st wing HQ was in Comilla and units were posted around Akhaura to the north east of the city.

Course of Events: The Pakistanis easily arrasted and imprisoned/executed all Bengali troops in Comilla cantonment, then wiped out the police in Comilla city on the 26th of March. The EPR HQ wing was warned and most EPR personnel managed to escape the slaughter. A convoy of 80 to 100 vehicles bearing the 24th FF, the mortar batteries, commando troops and the engineers started for Chittagong after Comilla was secured. This column was ambushed by the EPR 12 miles from Chittagong on the 26th of March evening. 4th EBR foiled a plot to disarm their Bengali officers, and under Maj. Khaled Musharraf, revolted on the 27th of March. They took over areas immediately north and south of Comilla with the aid of EPR troops and civilian volunteers. 3rd Commando battalion attacked and eliminated the 4th EBR rear party in the cantinment on the 29th of March.

Pakistanis maintained control of the city and the airfield throughout the operation. By April 10th, Bengali troops still controlloed major cities in Comilla, Noakhali and Syhlet. Pakistani 27th, 313rd, and 117th Brigades were attacking these positions.

[edit] Sylhet

Pakistani Forces: The 31st Punjab regiment minus 1 company was in located Syhlet. This unit was attached to the 53rd brigade.

Bengali Forces Sector EPR troops, EPR 3rd and 12th wings were stationed in and around Syhlet. EPR sector HQ was in Sylhet city itself. There was also some police personnel in the city.

Course of Events: The Pakistanis maintained control of the airfield and the cantonment throughout the operation. There were sporadic clashes around the city, which the Pakistanis abonduned on April 7th to take up position in the airfield. They would remain surrounded until mid April by Bengali forces when the Pakistanis, reinforced via air transport by the 313th brigade, counterattacked. Major C.R. Dutta commanded the Bengali forces, with Major Shafiullah comannding in the area between the commands of C.R. Dutta and Khaled Musharraf in Comilla.

[edit] Jessore

Pakistani Forces: The 107th Brigade HQ was in Jessore. It had the 26th Baluch regiment, the 27th Baluch regiment minus a company, elements of the 22nd FF, the 55th Field Artillery Regiment and elements of the 24th Field Artillery Regiment and various support and supply formations attached to the brigade.

Bengali Forces: The 1st EBR (Lt. Col. Rezaul Jalil - Bengali) was in winter training away from the cantonment. The unit was at 50% strength, as it ws preparing to move to West Pakistan. Other than support and supply troops in the cantonment, there was armed police in the city. EPR sector HQ was located nearby. 7th Field ambulence was in the cantonment.

Course of Events: No clashes took place in Jessore cantonment or city during March 25-27th. 1st EBR returned to the cantonment on the 29th of March, unaware of the crackdown in Dhaka. When ordered to disarm, this unit revolted, and lost more than 50% of it's present strength before breaking out of the cantonment. Pakistanis maintained full control of the airfield, and the cantonment without any problems. After clashes with sector EPR troops Pakistani troops left the city. Jessore cantonment and airfield (used to receive reinforcements via air from April 6th) would be surrounded by Bengali forces made up of EPR troops and Bengali volunteers until early April. Efforts to break out of Jessore or receive supplies from Khulna were foiled by Bengali forces. By the 10th of April, this scenario had not changed.

[edit] Khulna

Pakistani Forces: The 22 Frontier Force regiment (75% strength) was posted in Khulna, attached to the 107th brigade.

Bengali Forces: 5th EPR wing HQ and Police and Bengali civilian volunteers. Most EPR companies were posted outside Khulna city.

Course of Events: Pakistani forces maintained their positions throughout the operation, arresting the Bengali EPR personnel in Khulna on the 25th of March. EPR forces sporadically attacked, without gaining any ground. Pakisani efforts to reinforce Jessore from Khulna failed.

[edit] Khushtia

Pakistani Forces: A Company from the 27th Baluch.

Bengali Forces: EPR 4th Wing, armed Police and Bengali volunteers.

Course of Events: The Pakistani company took control of the town on march 26th. EPR trops, under the command of Maj. Abu Osman Chowdhury, were joined by police and civilian volunteers, and wiped out the Pakistani troops by the 30th of March. Kusthia would remain under Bengali control until April 16th.[22]

[edit] Rajshahi

Pakistani Forces: The 25th Punjab regiment (Lt. Col. Shafqat Baluch) minus 1 company, attached to the 23rd brigade. Pakistani EPR troops from EPR sector HQ.

Bengali Forces: EPR 6th at Nababganj to the west and 7th wing at Naogaon to the north of Rajshahi, EPR sector HQ troops at Rajshahi, police and Bengali volunteers.

Course of Events: The 25th Punjab sent a company to Pabana to the east to take control of that town. 25th Punjab drove the police out of the city on the 27th of March. Pakistani EPR troops relocated to the cantonment of the same day. Bengali EPR troops and Bengali volunteers under Maj. Nazmul Huq would surround the Pakistanis in the cantonment on the 28th of March, taking over most of the city and inflicting severe casualties. The Pakistani company at Pubna was wiped out by March 29. Rajshahi woul remain in Bengali hands until April 15th.[22]

[edit] Rangpur-Saidpur

Pakistani Forces: HQ of the 23rd Brigade was at Rangpur. A small cantonment was located at Saidpur, to the west of Rangpur. Most of the 26th FF, and the 29th Cavalry (55 Tanks, 50% Bengali personnel) was at Rangpur. A company of the 26th FF was stationed at Dinajpur. 23rd Field was stationed in Saidpur with a detachment posted in Bogura. Both cantonments had support and supply units stationed in their premises.

Bengali Forces: 3rd EBR HQ was in Saidpur, with 2 companies in Ghoraghat and 1 in Parvatipur, south west and south east of Rangpur respectively. 3 EPR wings were stationed at Thakurgaon (9th Wing), Dinajpur (8th Wing and sector HQ) and Rangpur (10th Wing).

Course of Events: Pakistani troops attacked the EPR sector HQ and took over Rangpur on the 26th of March after most EPR troops left for Lalmanirhut. 3rd EBR elements and Bengali troops were attacked at Saidpur on the 31st of March, and survivors joined the EPR at Dinajpur. The 26th FF had attacked the EPR at Dinajpur on the 28th but were driven out by the 31st of March. Thakurgaon was freed by the EPR 8th wing on the 28th of March.Bengali personnel of 29th cavalry were disarmed and arrested after the 31st of March and executed. Bengali troops took control of Bogura on the 28th of March, Pakistani survivors fled to Rangpur.

Pakistani forces maintained control of Saidpur and Rangpur throughout the operation. Heliborne forces from Dhaka reinforced these bases.[25], and an attack was launched to retake Lalmonirhut on April 1st, which fell on April 4th. This enabled C 130 Heracles planes to fly in further reinforcements. Pakistani forces spread ot from Saidpur to the west, north and south, and by April 10th, had retaken some of the minor towns in Bengali hands.

[edit] Aftermath

By the dawn of 10th of April, Pakistani forces had gained control of Dhaka, Rangpur - Saidpur, Comilla, Chittagong, and Khulna. Their forces had lost/abandoned Rajshahi, Sylhet, Pabna, Dinajpur, Mymenshing and Kushtia. The vital airfields and all the cantonments remained under Pakistani control, while the rest of the province was unoccupied. By using their superiority of weapons and command of air ruthlessly with little regard for safety of civilians and often targeting civilian areas to spread terror, the Pakistani army began to fan out of their bases and take over the province. By late April, all the major cities had fallen, by mid May all major towns had been captured and by mid June the battered remnant of Bengali fighters had been driven across the border. The Bengali restance, suffering from a lack of trained men, proper logistics and coordination, lost the conventional battle against the Pakistan forces.

[edit] Temporary Pakistani Occupation

Lt. General A.A.K Niazi was posted as GOC East Pakistan Command on April 11th, 1971, while Tikka Khan was retained as the governor of the province. General Khadim Raza was relieved from the command of 14th division, while General Farman continued to serve as advisor on civilian affiars to the governor.

The Pakistan Army in East Pakistan, after being reinforced by "Operation GREAT FLYIN", was reorganised to run the counter insurgency operation. The 9th division (HQ Jessore, Maj. Gen. Shaukat Riza commanding) was given the 57th (HQ in Jhenida) and 107th (HQ in Jessore) brigades for controlling Kushtia, Jessore, Khulna, Faridpur, Barisal and Patuakhali districts. The 16th Division (HQ Natore, Maj. Gen. Nazar Hussain Shah commanding) was given the 23rd (HQ Rangpur), 205th (HQ Bogura) and 34th (HQ Nator) brigades and was to control Dinajpur, Rangpur, Bogura, Pabna and Rajshahi districts. The 14th division (HQ Dacca, Maj. Gen. Rahim Khan) controlled the rest of the province with the 27th (HQ Mymenshingh), 313rd (HQ Sylhet), 117th (HQ Comilla) and the 53rd (HQ Chittagong) brigade.

E.P.C.A.F (East Pakistan Civil Armed Force) was organized to replace the EPR. Commanded by Maj. Gen. Jamshed, this force contained 17 combat wings, 7 sector wings (Sector Hqs at Dacca, Mymeshingh, Jessore, Rajshahi, Dinajpur, Comilla and Chittagong), totalling an estimated 20,000 personnel (West Pakistanies and Biharis), serving under the command of Pakistani army officers. The force was deployed to patrol the border, maintain internal security and support army operations.

Razakars and Shanti Committees were formed to support the army occupation. Mostly recruited from Bengalis and ex EPR servicemen, estimated 40,000 Razakers (against a target of 100,000 recruits) of mixed effectiveness was eventually fielded. Al-Badr and Al-Shams, formed by Jaamat-i-Islami, contributed another 5,000 members each. Pakistan also deployed hundreds of West Pakistani civilians and 5,000 police to support the occupation.

[edit] Creation of Mukti Bahini

The initial resistance, which started on March 26th, was without any central command structure. Senior Bengali army officers then met at Teliapara in Sylhet, and selected Col. (ret) M.A.G Osmani as commander of Bengali armed forces on April 10th. On April 11th he designated four sector commanders: Major Zia for the Chittagong area, Major Khaled Mussarraf for Comilla, Major Shafiullah for Sylhet and Major Abu Osman Chowdhury as commander for Jessore area. The Bangladesh government in exile was formed by the Awami League leadership on April 17 at Meherpur in Kushtia, which confirmed Col. Osmani as commander of Mukti Bahini (Regular armed forces and insurgents) under the authority of Prime Minister Tajuddin Ahmed. Bangladesh Forces Headquarters were set up in Kolkata (Calcutta) with Col. MAG Osmani as commander in chief, Lt. Col. MA Rab as Chief of Staff (based in Agartala, Tripura), and Group Captain AR Khandker as deputy Chief of Staff.

The Bengali resistance, after being driven out of Bangladesh, began reorganizing to focus on Irregular Warfare.

[edit] Bengali Refugees in India

A few thousand people sought refuge during April/May, mostly the resistance. However, as Pakistani army operations spread throughout the province, refugees fleeing to India increased. Ultimately approximately 10 million people would leave East Pakistan, and about 6.7 million will be housed in 825 refugee camps. An estimated 7.3 million will be in West Bengal, and 1.5 million will be in Tripura. The rest were in mainly in Assam and Bihar. The temporary presence of this large foreign population created economic (the cost of feeding, housing and medical care), social (tensions between locals and refugees) and national security (arms falling in the hands of Mizo and Naga rebels) concerns for India.

[edit] Bengali Civillian Casualties

The killings which began on 25 March 1971 and sparked the Bangladesh Liberation War and also led to the deaths of at least 26,000 people as admitted by Pakistan on one hand (by the Hamoodur Rahman Commission)[26] and 3,000,000 by Bangladesh on the other hand, (From 1972 to 1975 the first post-war prime minister of Bangladesh, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, mentioned on several occasions that at least three million died).[27].[28][29] After the defeat of the Pakistan Army, there was a call to try nearly 200 POWs for war crimes, but none of the soldiers or officers involved were tried for war crimes. In some areas Bengali civilians had killed Biharis, and abandoned houses were looted by Bengalis and Biharis alike.

[edit] Evaluation and Importance

  • The Pakistani army was able to maintain operational security for the most part before the start of the operation. They also moved 2 whole infantry divisions (the 9th and the 16th) to Bangladesh in a span of 4 weeks through air after March 26. Given the fact that flights over India were banned at the time, this was by no means a small logistical feat.
  • The disorganized initial resistance of Bengali units was crushed by mid June, and the country was under Pakistani control. As the insurgent activity slacked off in July, civilians returned to work and trade resumed, Pakistanis could claim the country was almost "normal". On the surface, Operation Searchlight had achieved most of its goals.
  • The Pakistanis had failed to capture the Awami League political leaders during the operation, which was a crucial part of the plan. The political leadership moved to India, and using their networks and popular support in Bangladesh, effectively organized the insurgency.
  • The survival of the Awami league political apperatus meant that the Indians had a structured organization to channel aid through, which eliminated the chance of various resistance groups competing for their support. Also, as elected members of parliament, The Awami League could claim to be the legitimate representatives of the people, thus enhancing their credibility in international circles. The Bengali army officers worked under the civilian leaders, so there was no serious struggle for power in the resistance. While the civilian leadership ran the administration and coordinated logistics, the army personnel fought the war and trained the freedom fighters.
  • Pakistani planners had assumed that if the political leadership was captured, the Bengali armed units disarmed, and the civilians sufficiently terrorized, after a month no organized resistance would remain in East Pakistan. Their assumptions were proven wrong in the long run. The political leadership escaped to organize the resistance and lobby for international support, Bengali soldiers formed the core of the armed resistance, and civilians, despite the terror campaign, supported the insurgency with logistics, intelligence and volunteers for the irregular warfare.
  • There was no backup plan. Anticipating a relatively quick success, Pakistani planners did not plan for a long irregular war or the eventual Indian involvement. This proved to be their undoing in the long run. Firstly, Pakistan had no regular troops to spare after stationing 4 divisions in Bangladesh by November 1971. They needed to maintain parity with the Indian army in the west. Also, with the EPR and police defecting, a large number of para military units were needed to police the country. Siddique Salik estimated that Pakistan needed at least 250,000 to 300,000 troops, but even after organizing the Razakars (estimated strength 40,000), Pakistan could field only 150,000 (45,000 regular army, rest paramilitary units) soldiers in Bangladesh.

The eventual strain of combating the insurgency caused Pakistan to attack India on the 3rd of December, 1971, in a vain hope that by militarily defeating India they can stop Indian support for Bangladesh Mukti Bahini. This directly led to the Indo-Pakistan War of 1971 and the liberation of Bangladesh by the 16th of December.

[edit] References

  1. ^ Salik, Siddiq, Witness to Surrender, p90, ISBN 984-05-1373-7
  2. ^ Shafiullah, Maj. Gen. K.M., Bangladesh at War, p33 ISBN 984-401-322-4
  3. ^ a b Islam, Major Rafiqul, A Tale of Millions, p66, ISBN 984-412-033-0
  4. ^ Qureshi, Maj. Gen. Kakeem Arshad, The 1971 Indo-Pak War: A Soldier’s Narrative, p20, Oxford University Press ISBN 0-19-579778-7
  5. ^ Salik, Siddiq, Witness to Surrender, p135
  6. ^ Shafiullah, Maj. Gen. K.M., Bangladesh at War, p135 ISBN 984-401-322-4
  7. ^ Hamdoor Rahman Commission Report, Chapter IV, paragraph II
  8. ^ Islam, Major Rafiqul, A Tale of Millions, p274, ISBN 984-412-033-0
  9. ^ Sarmila Bose Anatomy of Violence: Analysis of Civil War in East Pakistan in 1971: Military Action: Operation Searchlight Economic and Political Weekly Special Articles, October 8, 2005
  10. ^ Salik, Siddiq, Witness To Surrender, p63, p228-9 id = ISBN 9-840-51373-7
  11. ^ a b Pakistan Defence Journal, 1977, Vol 2, p2-3
  12. ^ Matthew White's Death Tolls for the Major Wars and Atrocities of the Twentieth Century
  13. ^ Virtual Bangladesh : History : The Bangali Genocide, 1971
  14. ^ Salik, Siddiq, Witness To Surrender, p235, Text of Surrender Document ISBN 9-840-51373-7
  15. ^ a b Salik, Siddiq, Witness To Surrender, p48-51 id = ISBN 9-840-51373-7
  16. ^ Islam, Major Rafiqul, A Tale of Millions, p 57, ISBN 9-844-12033-0
  17. ^ a b Witness to Surrender, Salik, Siddiq, p63-64 ISBN 9-840-51373-7
  18. ^ Shafiullah, Maj. Gen. K.M., Bangladesh at War, p27, ISBN 9-844-01322-4
  19. ^ Islam, Major Rafiqul, A Tale of Millions, p57 ISBN 9-844-12033-0
  20. ^ Shafiullah, Maj. Gen. K.M., Bangladesh at War p69 ISBN 9-844-01322-4
  21. ^ Salik, Siddiq, Witness To Surrender, p87 id = ISBN 9-840-51373-7
  22. ^ a b c Salik, Siddiq, Witness To Surrender, p90 id = ISBN 9-840-51373-7
  23. ^ Islam, Major Rafiqul, A Tale of Millions, p61 ISBN 9-844-12033-0
  24. ^ Salik, Siddiq, Witness To Surrender, p86 id = ISBN 9-840-51373-7
  25. ^ Qureshi, Maj. Ge. Hakeem Arshad, The 1971 Indo-Pak War: a Soldier's Narrative, p55 id = ISBN 0-19-579778-7
  26. ^ Hamoodur Rahman Commission, Chapter 2, Paragraph 33
  27. ^ "3 MILLION Slaughtered Sheik MUJIB Charges 'Greatest Massacre'" The Portsmouth Herald, Monday, January 17, 1972, Portsmouth, New Hampshire
  28. ^ Y C Rossiter Carriculum as Destiny: Forging National Identity in India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh(PDF) 2003, Page 174 footnote 261
  29. ^ F. Hossain Genocide 1971 Correspondence with the Guinness Book of Records on the number of dead

[edit] Sources

  • Salik, Siddiq (1997). Witness to Surrender. ISBN 9-840-51374-5. 
  • Jacob, Lt. Gen. JFR (2004). Surrender at Dacca: Birth of A Nation. The University Press Limited. ISBN 9-840-51532-2. 
  • Qureshi, Maj. Gen. Hakeem Arshad (2003). The Indo Pak War of 1971: A Soldiers Narrative. Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-579778-7. 
  • Islam, Major Rafiqul (2006). A Tale of Millions. Ananna. ISBN 9-844-12033-0. 
  • Shafiullah, Maj. Gen. K.M (2006). Bangladesh at War. Agamee Prakshani. ISBN 9-844-01322-4. 
  • Rahman, Md. Khalilur (2006). Muktijuddhay Nou-Abhijan. Shahittha Prakash. ISBN 9-844-65449-1. 
  • Mukul, M. R. Akthar (2004). AMI Bijoy Dekhechi. Sagar Publishers. ISBN 9-844-5200-5. 

[edit] Further reading

v • d • e
Liberation of Bangladesh
History and events
Bangladesh
Pakistan
India

[edit] External links

v • d • e
Military of Pakistan
Joint Services
Army
Air Force
Navy
Wars
Languages