Operation Protea
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Operation Protea was a military operation during the South African Border War and Angolan Civil War in which South African Defence Forces (SADF) destroyed a number SWAPO bases in Angola. During the operation, which took place from August 23 to September 4, 1981, up to 5,000 SADF soldiers occupied Cunene province, Angola.[1]
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[edit] Targets
Operation Protea was launched on 23 August 1981. Its objectives were to destroy the South-West Africa People's Organisations (SWAPO) command and training center at Xangongo as well as to destroy its logistic bases at Xangongo and Ongiva.
Xangongo, located at was the headquarters of SWAPO's "north-western front" from where it directed SWAPO units operating primarily in the Kaokoland and in western and central Ovamboland. There were also other SWAPO bases, which were used as supply depots and training bases for SWAPO recruits, sited to the south and southeast of the town.
Ongiva, a town located less than fifty kilometers north of the Angola-South-West Africa border at , was an important SWAPO logistical and personnel centre which supported operations in central and eastern Ovamboland and in the Kavangoland.
Both Xangongo and Ongiva were key bases in supporting SWAPO's war effort in South-West Africa, because of their location close to its border. Their destruction would undermine SWAPO's ability to conduct operations in their “north-western front” and also have a psychological impact by reinforcing the message of Operation Reindeer to SWAPO that it longer had the luxury of sanctuaries in southern Angola.
[edit] Attack
[edit] Xangongo
As a result of the lessons learned from Operation Reindeer, SWAPO had moved its bases closer to those of FAPLA (the Angolan governing party MPLA’s military wing) to discourage attacks by the South African forces. By the time of Operation Protea, this strategy was so far advanced that SWAPO’s logistical system had become entwined with that of FAPLA, especially in the area of Angola west of Ongiva. Although SWAPO's base strategy did not stop South African attacks, the South African forces went out of their way not to involve FAPLA in the fight.
A three-pronged mechanized force of Ratel Infantry Fighting Vehicles, Buffel Armoured Personnel Carriers and Eland Armoured Cars advanced on Xangongo from Ruacana, Oshakati and Ondangwa. Part of their mission was to isolate the town to prevent possible Cuban and FAPLA reinforcements in Humbe and PeuPeu from coming to the aid of their compatriots in Xangongo. The rest of the force attacked the SWAPO complex in and around the town.
The mixed SWAPO-FAPLA force had applied some more lessons learned during Operation Reindeer, and was consequently sited in well-prepared defensive systems consisting of trenches, bunkers and even dug-in tanks. Several fierce battles were fought between the South African and the integrated SWAPO/FAPLA force, which came to resemble a conventional war rather than a normal small-unit counter-insurgency operation.
The South African forces achieved considerable surprise in two aspects. Firstly, the SWAPO/FAPLA forces did not expect a South African attack in such a heavily defended region as, in addition to the SWAPO and FAPLA units in Xangongo, there were an estimated 23,000 FAPLA and 7,500 Cuban soldiers in the city of Lubango capable of moving south to aid the defenders of Xangongo. Secondly, SWAPO estimated that any South African attack would come from the south and established their defences to face in that direction. However, the South Africans attacked from the flanks and rear while feinting a frontal assault, which enabled them to quickly overpower the SWAPO/FAPLA defenders of Xangongo. The South African assault was thus successful and the surviving communist forces fled into the thick bush just outside the town.
A propaganda and intelligence coup was scored by the South African forces when they found the personal possessions and official documents left behind by a group of thirty Russian advisors along with seven women and a number of children. This incontrovertibly confirmed the growing involvement of the USSR in this conflict.
After securing their first objective, the main body of the South African force then moved southeast towards their second target – the town of Ongiva.
[edit] Ongiva
After brushing aside an attempt by FAPLA to stop their advance at Mongua, the South African forces reached Ongiva on 26 August 1981 and attacked the combined SWAPO/FAPLA forces dug in around the town. While the South Africans did not again have the element of surprise due to their earlier attack on Xangongo, they nevertheless attacked this complex from the rear as well and after two days of fighting, Ongiva also fell to them.
First hand account from an SAI member: Mechanised forces attracted anti-aircraft and SAM fire from the NE bunkers of the airport and withdrew. Mirages were directed to bomb those positions and then 3 SAI Platoons were deployed to eliminate them. The infantry entered the airport unchallenged from the east, then turned NW along the runway. At the NE corner, they came under fire from 300 FAPLA soldiers. Two platoons were pinned down in crosssfire from the east and north and the third platoon was clear on the west side of the road that runs west of the runway. Two SADF men were killed. All anti-aircraft positions were eliminated. As FAPLA soldiers fled over the road, the 'free' SADF platoon killed them in vast numbers. The road was well above the level of the surrounding ground and those fleeing realised their mistake only when it was too late.
Once the AA was eliminated, SAI withdrew under heavy automatic weapon fire. The Ratels then moved swiftly through the FAPLA positions cleaning out all opposition.
There were also a number of Russian military advisors present at Ongiva. However, unlike their compatriots at Xangongo, a number of Soviet officers were killed and Warrant Officer Second Class Nikolai Feodorovich Pestretsov was captured. Pestretsov was a military advisor attached to FAPLA's 11th Brigade at Ongiva,
[edit] Aftermath
Not only did Operation Protea provide proof of direct Soviet involvement with SWAPO, but it also enabled the South African forces to seize about 4,000 tons of military hardware valued at over USD 200 million. In addition to enormous quantities of small arms and ammunition, it also included items as tanks, armoured vehicles, anti-aircraft guns, trucks and other logistical vehicles. At least 1,000 members of SWAPO and FAPLA were killed during the operation. Thirty-eight prisoners were captured, including ten SWAPO members. In contrast, the South Africans lost only ten men.[citation needed]
The presence of tanks and armoured personnel carriers proved conclusively that SWAPO intended to progress from the guerrilla to the mobile warfare stage in its war in South-West Africa and South Africa thus felt that its operation was fully justified.
It is thought that SWAPO's military timetable was severely set back by Operation Protea and that it took the organisation at least a year to recover from it. In addition, the defeats had driven the organisation even further north away from the South-West African border.
However, the end of Operation Protea did not signal the end the South African activity against SWAPO in southern Angola as Operation Protea was quickly followed up by another attack, Operation Daisy.
[edit] See also
[edit] References
- ^ Manning, Susan A. (1999). Modern Dance, Negro Dance: Race in Motion, 17.
