Operation Menu

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Operation Menu
Part of Vietnam War
Date 18 March 1969 to 28 May 1970
Location Eastern Cambodia
Result Intensification of Cambodian Civil War
Belligerents
United States Democratic Republic of Vietnam
National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam
v • d • e
Vietnam War
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Air operations
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Operation Menu was the codename of a covert U.S. Strategic Air Command (SAC) bombing campaign conducted in eastern Cambodia from 18 March 1969 until 26 May 1970, during the Vietnam War. The targets of these attacks were sanctuaries and Base Areas of the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) and forces of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NLF or derogatively, Viet Cong), which utilized them for resupply, training, and resting between campaigns across the border in the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam).

The operation was devised as a method of sending messages to the leadership of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) that the newly-installed administration of President Richard M. Nixon was serious about its continued support for the Saigon government while simultaneously serving as a shield for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Vietnam.

The campaign was devised and conducted in secrecy, since an aerial campaign against communist sanctuaries in "neutral" Cambodia would have created a political firestorm in the U.S. had it been carried out overtly. In the aftermath of the operation, details surrounding it became known by the United States Congress and by the American public, leading to dire consequences for the Nixon administration.

An official United States Air Force record of all American bombing activity over Indochina from 1964 to 1975 was recently declassified by President Clinton in the fall of 2000. The data reveals the true extent of the bombing of Cambodia, as well as Laos and Vietnam. According to the data, the Air Force began bombing the rural regions of Cambodia along its South Vietnam border in 1965 under the Johnson Administration. This is four years earlier than previously believed. The Menu bombings were an escalation of previous air attacks. Nixon authorized the use of long-range B-52 bombers to carpet bomb the region. Historians now classify the campaign as a mere fourteen month phase in an extensive series of secretive bombing raids that spanned a period of eleven years[1].

Contents

[edit] Background

For more details on Cambodian politics, see Cambodia under Sihanouk (1954-1970).
For more details on the PAVN logistical network, see Sihanouk Trail.

From the onset of hostilities in South Vietnam and the Kingdom of Laos in the early 1960s, Cambodia's Prince Norodom Sihanouk had maintained a delicate domestic and foreign policy balancing act. Convinced of the inevitable victory of the communists in Southeast Asia and concerned for the future existence of his nation, Sihanouk swung toward the left in the mid-1960s.[2]

In 1966 Sihanouk made an agreement with Chou En-lai of the People's Republic of China that would allow PAVN and NLF forces to establish Base Areas in Cambodia and to use the port of Sihanoukville for the delivery of military materiel.[3] The U.S., heavily involved in South Vietnam, was not eager to violate the neutrality of Cambodia, which had been guaranteed by the Geneva Accord of 1954. The neutrality of Cambodia, however, did not prevent President Lyndon B. Johnson from authorizing covert reconnaissance operations by the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam Studies and Observations Group beginning in 1967.[4] The mission of the highly-classified unit was to obtain intelligence on the Base Areas (Project Vesuvius) that would be presented to Sihanouk in hopes of changing his position.[5]

Meeting in Beijing: Mao Zedong (l), Prince Sihanouk (c), and North Vietnam's Le Duc Tho (r)
Meeting in Beijing: Mao Zedong (l), Prince Sihanouk (c), and North Vietnam's Le Duc Tho (r)

By late 1968, Sihanouk, under pressure from the political right at home and from the U.S., agreed to more normalized relations with the Americans.[6] In July 1968, he had agreed to reopen diplomatic relations and, in August, formed a Government of National Salvation under the pro-American General Lon Nol.[7] Newly-inaugurated President Richard M. Nixon, seeking any means by which to withdraw from Southeast Asia and obtain "peace with honor", saw an opening with which to give time & safety for the American withdrawal, and time to implement the new policy of Vietnamization. Before the diplomatic amenities with Sihanouk were even concluded, Nixon had decided to deal with the situation of PAVN troops and supply bases in Cambodia. He had already considered a naval blockade of the Cambodian coast, but was talked out of it by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), who believed that Sihanouk could still be convinced to agree to ground attacks against the Base Areas.[8]

On 30 January 1969, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Earl G. Wheeler had suggested to the president that he authorize the bombing of the Cambodian sanctuaries. He was seconded on 9 February by the American commander in Vietnam, General Creighton W. Abrams, who also submitted his proposal to bomb the Central Office of South Vietnam (COSVN), the elusive headquarters of PAVN/NLF southern operations, located somewhere in the Fishhook region of eastern Cambodia. On 22 February, during the period just following the Tet holidays, PAVN/NLF forces launched an offensive that seemed purposely aimed at inflicting U.S. casualties. Nixon became even more angered when the communists launched rocket and artillery attacks against Saigon, which he considered a violation of the "agreement" made when the U.S. halted the bombing of North Vietnam in November 1968.[9]

Nixon, who was enroute to Brussels for a meeting with North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) leaders, ordered his National Security Advisor, Dr. Henry Kissinger, to prepare for airstrikes against PAVN/NLF Base Areas in Cambodia as a reprisal. The bombings were to serve three purposes: they would signal to Hanoi Nixon's tenacity; they would disable PAVN's offensive capability to disrupt the American withdrawal and Vietnamization; and they would demonstrate American resolve, "that might pay dividends at the negotiating table in Paris."[10] He then cabled Colonel Alexander Haig, a National Security Council staff aide, to meet him in Brussels along with Colonel Raymond B. Sitton, a former Strategic Air Command officer on the JCS staff, to formulate a plan of action.[11]

By seeking advice from high administration officials, Nixon had delayed any quick response that could be explicitly linked to the provocation. He decided to respond to the next provocation and didn't have to wait long. On 14 March, communist forces once again attacked South Vietnam's urban areas and Nixon was ready.

[edit] Breakfast

Communist Base Areas
Communist Base Areas

The bombing began on the night of 18 March with a raid by 60 B-52 Stratofortress bombers, based at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam. The target was Base Area 353, the supposed location of COSVN in the Fishhook.[12] Although the aircrews were briefed that their mission was to take place in the South Vietnam, 48 of the bombers were diverted across the Cambodian border and dropped 2,400 tons of bombs.[13] The mission was designated Breakfast, after the morning Pentagon planning session at which it was devised.

Breakfast was so successful that General Abrams provided a list of 15 more known Base Areas for targeting.[14] During the next 14 months the operation continued. The five remaining missions that made up the operation and their targets were: Lunch (Base Area 609), Snack (Base Area 351), Dinner (Base Area 352), Supper (Base Area 740), and Dessert (Base Area 350). SAC flew 3,800 B-52 sorties against these targets, and dropped 108,823 tons of ordnance during the missions.[15] Due to the continued reference to gastronomic situations in the codenames, the entire series of missions was referred to as Operation Menu. Assessment of bomb damage to the targets was difficult to obtain, due to the covert nature of the operation. Instead of utilizing Air Force aircraft for the missions, SOG forward air controllers were tasked with obtaining intelligence on target damage.[16]

Nixon and Kissinger went to great lengths to keep the missions secret. The expansion of the American effort into "neutral" Cambodia was sure to cause serious debate in Congress, negative criticism in the media, and were sure to spark anti-war protests on American college campuses. In order to prevent this, an elaborate dual reporting system covering the missions had been formulated during the Brussels meeting between Nixon, Haig, and Colonel Sitton.

[edit] System

First, the number of individuals who had complete knowledge of the operation was kept to a bare minimum. All communications concerning the missions was split along two paths - one route was overt, ordering typical B-52 missions that were to take place within South Vietnam near the Cambodian border - the second route was covert, utilizing back-channel messages between commanders ordering the classified missions. For example: General Abrams would request a Menu strike. His request went to Admiral John McCain, the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Command (CINCPAC), in Honolulu. McCain forwarded it to the Joint Chiefs in Washington, who, after reviewing it, passed it on to Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird (who might consult with the president). The Joint Chiefs then passed the command for the strike to General Bruce K. Holloway, Commander of SAC, who then notified Lieutenant General Alvin C. Gillem, Commander of the 3rd Air Division on Guam.[17]

 During this time Air Force Major Hal Knight was supervising an MSQ-77 Combat Skyspot radar site at Bien Hoa airbase, RVN. "Skyspot" was a radar-controlled bombing system which directed B-52 strikes to targets in Vietnam. Each day a courier plane would arrive from SAC's Advanced Echelon Office at Ton Son Nhut Air Base near Saigon. Knight was given a revised list of target coordinates for the next day's missions. That evening, the coordinates were fed into targeting computers and then relayed to the aircraft as they came on station. Only the pilots and navigators of the aircraft (who had been personally briefed by General Gillem and sworn to secrecy) knew of the true location of the targets.[18] The bombers then flew on to their targets and delivered their payloads.

  After the airstrikes Knight gathered the mission paperwork, computer tapes etc, destroying them in an incinerator. He then called a special phone number in Saigon and reported that "The ball game is over."[19] The aircrews filled out routine reports of hours flown, fuel burned, and ordnance dropped. This dual system maintained secrecy and provided Air Force logisticians and personnel administrators with information that they needed to replace air crews or aircraft and replenish stocks of fuel and munitions.[20]

[edit] Exposure

Although Sihanouk was not informed by the U.S. about the operation, he did remain quiet about the illegal bombing of his country. His silent acquiescence may have been prompted by a desire to see PAVN/NLF forces out of Cambodia, since he himself was precluded from pressing them too hard.[21] After the event, it was claimed by Nixon and Kissinger that Sihanouk had given his tacit approval for the raids, but this claim has since been disproved.[22] On 9 May 1969, an inaccurate article by military reporter William Beecher describing the bombing was run in the New York Times. Beecher claimed that an unnamed source within the administration had provided the information. Nixon was furious when he heard the news and ordered Dr. Kissinger to obtain the assistance of FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover and discover the source of the leak.[23] Hoover suspected Kissinger's own NSC aide, Mortin Halperin, of the deed and so informed Kissinger. Halperin's phone was then illegally tapped for 21 months.[24] This was the first in a series of illegal surveillance activities authorized by Nixon in the name of national security. The administration was relieved when no other significant press reports concerning the operation appeared.

By the summer, five members of the United States Congress had been informed of the operation. They were: Senators John C. Stennis (MS) and Richard B. Russell, Jr. (GA) and Representatives Lucius Mendel Rivers (SC), Gerald R. Ford (MI), and Leslie C. Arends (IL). Arends and Ford were leaders of the Republican minority and the other three were Democrats on either the Armed Services or Appropriations committees.

For those in Washington who were cognizant of the Menu raids, the silence of one participant came as a surprise. The Hanoi government made no protest concerning the bombings. It neither denounced the raids for propaganda purposes, nor, according to Dr. Kissinger, did its negotiators "raise the matter during formal or secret negotiations."[25] North Vietnam had no wish to either void Cambodia's neutrality or to acknowledge the presence of their forces there.

[edit] Revelations

For more details on the improprieties of the Nixon administration, see Watergate Scandal.

For four years Menu remained unknown to Congress, the media, and the American public. That situation changed in December 1972, when Major Knight wrote a letter to Senator William Proxmire (D, WI), asking for "clarification" as to U.S. policy on the bombing of Cambodia. Knight, who had become concerned over the legality of his actions, had complained to his superior officer, Colonel David Patterson. He then received several bad efficiency reports, which ruined his career, and he had been discharged from the Air Force.[26]

Air Force General George S. Brown, the man who dropped the bombshell on the Senate Armed Services Committee
Air Force General George S. Brown, the man who dropped the bombshell on the Senate Armed Services Committee

Proxmire's further questioning led to hearings of the Senate Armed Services Committee, which eventually demanded that the Department of Defense turn over all records of U.S. air operations in Cambodia. When they arrived, the records did not even mention the Menu strikes. The committee was not convinced and the investigation continued. Less than two weeks later, it opened hearings on the nomination of General George S. Brown for the position of chief of staff of the Air Force. As commander of the Seventh Air Force in South Vietnam, Brown had been privy to Menu and disclosed as much to the committee.

For the next eight days the committee listened to the testimony of administration officials and the Joint Chiefs, who tried to justify their actions. The committee uncovered excuses and deceptions that were perhaps more alarming than those occurring simultaneously in the Watergate hearings.[27] The Menu revelations raised "fundamental questions as to military discipline and honesty, of civilian control over the military, and of Congressional effectiveness."[28] It was basically agreed, both by Congress and concerned military officers, that the deception employed during Menu went beyond covertness. According to Air Force historian Captain Earl H. Tilford: "Deception to fool the enemy was one thing, but lying to Congress and key members of the government, including the chief of staff of the Air Force and the secretary of the Air Force, was something else."[29]

[edit] Aftermath

For more details on military operations, see Cambodian Civil War.
For more details on the U.S. bombing campaign in Cambodia, see Operation Freedom Deal.

The Constitutional issues raised at the hearings became less important when the House Judiciary Committee voted (21-12) against including the administration's falsification of records concerning Menu in the articles of impeachment leveled against President Nixon.[30] One of the key issues that prevented congressional inclusion was the embarrassing fact that five key members of both political parties had been privy to the information and had neither said nor done anything about it.

The result of the attacks themselves are still debated among participants and historians. As for preventing further North Vietnamese offensives, they failed. In May 1969, PAVN/NLF launched an offensive similar in size to that of the mini-Tet offensive of the previous year. It certainly cost North Vietnam the effort and manpower to disperse and camouflage their Cambodian sanctuaries to prevent losses to further air attack. President Nixon claimed the raids were a success, since air power alone had to provide a shield for withdrawal and Vietnamization. They certainly emboldened Nixon to launch the Cambodian Campaign of 1970.[31]

There was no doubt that they also helped set Cambodia on the road to an abyss of violence that Sihanouk had worked for ten years to avoid.[32] While out of the country on 18 March 1970, the prince was deposed by the National Assembly and replaced by Lon Nol. The Nixon administration, although thoroughly aware of the weakness of Lon Nol's forces and loath to commit American military force to the new conflict in any form other than air power, announced its support of the newly-proclaimed Khmer Republic.[33] Cambodia, like neighboring Laos, would be sacrificed in order to buy time for the Republic of Vietnam.[34]

[edit] References

[edit] Notes

  1. ^ The Walrus >> Bombing Cambodia >> Bombs Over Cambodia >> History
  2. ^ Arnold Issacs, Gordon Hardy, MacAlister Brown, et al, Pawns of War. Boston: Boston Publishing Company, 1987, p. 83.
  3. ^ Issacs, Hardy, & Brown, p. 85.
  4. ^ Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Command History 1967, Annex F, Saigon, 1968, p. 4..
  5. ^ Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Command History 1968 Annex F, Saigon, 1969, p. 27.
  6. ^ Issacs, Hardy, & Brown, p. 88
  7. ^ Issacs, Hardy, and Brown, p. 90.
  8. ^ Bernard C. Nalty, Air War Over South Vietnam. Washington DC: Air Force History and Museums Program, 2000, p. 127.
  9. ^ Nalty, p. 128. Even revisionist historian Lewis Sorley admits that Hanoi "repeatedly and vociferously denied that any such understanding existed." Lewis Sorley, A Better War. New York: Harvest Books, 1999, pgs. 107-108.
  10. ^ Nalty, p. 129.
  11. ^ John Morocco, Operation Menu. Boston: Boston Publishing Company, 1988, p. 136.
  12. ^ William Shawcross, Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon, and the Destruction of Cambodia. New York: Washington Square press, 1979, pps. 23-24.
  13. ^ John Morocco, Rain of Fire: Air War, 1969-1973. Boston: Boston Publishing Company, 1985, p. 13.
  14. ^ Morocco, Rain of Fire, p. 13.
  15. ^ Morocco, Rain of Fire, p. 13.
  16. ^ SOG provided 70 percent of the bomb damage intelligence gathered during the Menu missions. Morocco, Operation Menu, pgs. 131-132.
  17. ^ This chain of command system is covered in Nalty, p. 130.
  18. ^ Morocco, Rain of Fire, p. 14. See also William C. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports. Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, 1976, p. 389.
  19. ^ Morocco, Rain of Fire, p. 14.
  20. ^ Nalty, p. 131.
  21. ^ Isaacs, Hardy, & Brown, p. 89.
  22. ^ Shawcross, pps. 68-71 & 93-94.
  23. ^ Morocco, Rain of Fire, p. 14.
  24. ^ Morocco, Operation Menu, p. 141.
  25. ^ Nalty, p. 132.
  26. ^ Shawcross, p. 287.
  27. ^ U.S. Senate, Hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee. Bombing in Cambodia. United States Senate, 93rd Cong, 1st sess. Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1973.
  28. ^ Shawcross, p. 287.
  29. ^ Earl H. Tilford, Setup: What the Air Force did in Vietnam and Why. Maxwell Air Force Base AL: Air University Press, 1991, p. 196.
  30. ^ War in the Shadows, p. 149.
  31. ^ John M. Shaw, The Cambodian Campaign. Lawrence KS: University of Kansas Press, 2005, pgs. 13-40.
  32. ^ Issacs, Hardy, & Brown, pgs. 92-100, 106-112.
  33. ^ Shawcross, pgs. 181-182 & 194. See also Issacs, Hardy, & Brown, p. 98.
  34. ^ Shaw, pgs. 163-164. Henry Kissinger's advice to the first commander of the U.S. military aid mission to Cambodia, Col. Jonathan Ladd, was revealing: "Don't think about victory. Just keep it going." Shawcross, p. 139.

[edit] Sources

[edit] Unpublished government documents

  • Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Command History 1967, Annex F, Saigon, 1968.
  • Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Command History 1968, Annex F, Saigon, 1969.

[edit] Published government documents

  • Head, William H. War from Above the Clouds: B-52 Operations during the Second Indochina War and the Effects of the Air War on Theory and Doctrine. Maxwell Air Force Base AL: Air University Press, 2002.
  • Nalty, Bernard C. Air War over South Vietnam, 1968-1975. Washington DC: Air Force Museums and History Program, 2000.
  • Tilford, Earl H. Setup: What the Air force did in Vietnam and Why. Maxwell Air Force Base AL: Air University Press, 1991.

[edit] Memoirs

  • Westmoreland, William C. A Soldier Reports. New York: Doubleday, 1976.

[edit] Secondary accounts

  • Issacs, Arnold, Gordon Hardy, MacAlister Brown, et al, Pawns of War: Cambodia and Laos. Boston: Boston Publishing Company, 1987.
  • Morocco, John, Operation Menu in War in the Shadows. Boston: Boston Publishing Company, 1988.
  • Morocco, John, Rain of Fire: Air War, 1969-1973. Boston: Boston Publishing Company, 1985.
  • Shaw, John M. The Cambodian Campaign: The 1970 Offensive and America's Vietnam War. Lawrence KS: University of Kansas Press, 2005.
  • Shawcross, William, Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon, and the Destruction of Cambodia. New York: Washington Square Books, 1979.
  • Sorley, Lewis, A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America's Last Years in Vietnam. New York: Harvest Books, 1999.
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