Operation Infatuate
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The city of Antwerp and its port had fallen to Dempsey's 2nd British Army in early September. However, Montgomery's attention was focused on securing the bridge crossing on the river Arnhem. - there was, therefore, no sense of priority in securing the approaches to Antwerp. The island had a formidable array of weaponry and was garrisoned by the Fifteenth German Army.
The First Canadian Army, under Crerar, was ordered by Montgomery to open the Antwerp area but he also had orders to capture Boulogne and Calais. His forces advanced north-west from Antwerp and attempted to approach Walcheren. They were held up at the entrance of the narrow isthmus which connected south Beveland to the mainland.
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[edit] Planning and preparations
On the 9/10/1944 Montgomery finally issued a directive giving priority to the clearing of the Scheldt. Some 10 days later the Canadians began attacking along the isthmus breaking into the Breskens pocket. By the end of the month the Germans had been cornered in Zeebrugge, surrendering on November 2. Both south and north Beveland had been virtually cleared and the time was right for the assault of Walcheren itself - Operation Infatuate was activated.
A three pronged assault was planned with Commandos landing at Westkapelle in the west of the island and at Flushing in the south. The Canadians were to cross by a water channel close to the causeway in the east. However, it soon became clear that the tidal flats around the water channel were virtually impassable leaving the Canadians with the exceedingly hazardous option of a direct assault along the well defended causeway - an exposed stretch about 30/40 yards wide and 1200/1500 yards long. The Canadians were to establish a bridgehead on the island through which the British 52nd Lowland Division would pass to continue the assault. Against much scepticism and opposition, General Simonds' plan to breach the island's dykes, and flood the interior, was adopted.
After the ill fated 'Market Garden' operation on October 20, No. 2 Dutch Troop of 10 IA (Inter-Allied) Commando moved to Brugge in Belgium and were incorporated under the command of No. 4 Brigade. They split up and were attached to other fighting units where, in the case of some officers and men, their native language skills helped Allied liaison with the local population, while others fought alongside their comrades in arms.
The three RM Commandos of No.4 SS Brigade, along with the No.4 (Belgian) and No.5 (Norwegian), troops of No.10 (IA) Commando, commanded by Peter Laycock, landed at Westkapelle on the western side of the island. No.4 Commando, with Nos.1 and 8 (French) troops under command, crossed from Breskens and attacked Flushing. In support were 155 Infantry brigade. The brigade had trained for this assault in the Ostend area during October.
The bombing of Walcheren in October by RAF Bomber Command had breached the dykes around the island and had turned it into a massive lagoon, rimmed by broken dykes. The Germans had installed such defences on the dykes to virtually turn them into a continuous fortification bristling with guns of every calibre. The Marines placed great reliance on Weasel and Buffalo LTs. The RM Commandos were to seize the shoulders of the gap in the dyke and then to fan out north and south to roll up the remainder of the German defences by linking up with the southern thrust. The RAF provided air support and the 79th Armoured Division provided wand naval gunfire support including Landing Craft Gun (Medium) and multiple-rocket launch systems. After some debate over the sea conditions the operation was planned for November 1. No.4 Commando landed at 0545 hours and the remainder at 1000 hours.
On the day of the assault a heavy mist over the Dutch and Belgian airfields limited RAF support for the actual landings, although the skies over Walcheren itself were clear. No.4 Commando, under Lt-Colonel Dawson DSO, had a problem in finding a suitable place to get ashore. Dawson sent a small reconnaissance party (known as Keepforce) ashore in two LCPs. They were followed by Nos.1 and 2 troops who secured the beachhead with minimal casualties and soon began to take prisoners. The main body came in at 0630 hours, but, by this time, the Germans were totally alert and opened heavy fire with machine guns and 20 mm cannon. Nevertheless the Marines got ashore with only two or three casualties, although, the LCA containing the heavier equipment including 3-inch (76 mm) mortars, hit a stake and sank some 20 yards (18 m) off shore. The mortars were successfully salvaged.
The marines now fought their way through the German strong-points. They were somewhat encumbered by the need to leave rearguards against infiltration. However, they were aided when the leading battalion of 155 Brigade began to land at 0830 hours despite having lost two LCAs to heavy fire from one of the coastal batteries. German prisoners were pressed into service unloading stores and supplies. A good proportion of the defenders of Walcheren were poor quality troops and many suffered from stomach complaints. Curiously the defence positions were well stocked with food and ammunition. By 1600 hours the Commandos had reached most of their objectives and they decided to consolidate as the day drew to a close.
Brigadier Leicester's plan for the attack on Westkapelle called for three troops of No.41 (RM) Commando, under Lt-Colonel E C E Palmer RM, to land on the north shoulder of the gap blown in the dyke with the objective of clearing the area between there and the village of Westkapelle. The remainder of the Commando, along with the two No.10 (IA) Commando troops, would then come ashore in Weasels and Buffalos launched from LCTs. Their mission would be to clear Westkapelle and then move north. No.48 (RM) Commando, under Lt-Colonel J. L. Moulton DSO, would use the same methods but come ashore south of the gap. From there they would advance on Zoutelande some two miles (3 km) to the south. Finally No.47 (RM) Commando, under Lt-Colonel C.F. Phillips DSO, would land behind No.48 and drive on to meet up with No.4 Commando near Flushing.
The force sailed from Ostend at 0315 hours and by 0930 hours they were off the objective. The ships bombarded the German defences with everything at their disposal including the 15-inch (380 mm) guns of HMS Warspite, the guns of LCGs, the rockets of rocket LCTs and a squadron of rocket-firing Typhoons. The German defences held fire until the assault craft made for the shore. Several landing craft were hit including a rocket LCT which received a direct hit. Thirty landing craft from the Close Support Squadron were lost and over 300 men were killed in the action.
No.41 overran a pillbox in their path and pushed onto Westkapelle where they were met by a battery of four 150 mm guns. They were reduced with the help of some tanks and the Commando then moved north along the dyke.
No.48 also came up against a battery of 150 mm guns. The leading troop commander was killed and several men wounded in an attack on the position. Another attempt was met with intense mortar fire. Supporting fire was called in from the field batteries in the Breskens area together with Typhoon attacks. Following this action another troop went in under cover of smoke and reached the centre of the battery putting it out of action.
The next day No.4 Commando, together with 5 King's Own Scottish Borderers, continued with the battle for Flushing. No.5 (French) Troop were involved in an action against a strongpoint nicknamed Dover. One section of the troop gained the roof of a cinema and opened fire on the strongpoint with their PIAT. The other sections moved along the street and through back gardens. As the troop was preparing for the final assault, Typhoons attacked the enemy position. That afternoon the Troop resumed their advance and reached the corner overlooking their objective. One house remained occupied by the Germans and as they made for the strongpoint they suffered several casualties from the fire of No.5 Troop. No.1 Section was now by the Anti-Tank wall and firing PIAT bombs into the embrasures of the strongpoint at very short range. Corporal Lafont was on the point of breaching the strongpoint with a made-up charge at the ready when the German defenders surrendered.
No.48 (RM) Commando pushed on at first light and took Zouteland, meeting only light opposition. No.47 took over the advance but soon came up against a strong fortified position with an anti-tank ditch and huge Dragon's Teeth. The weather had closed in and no air support was available so they attacked supported only by artillery. They came under heavy mortar fire and suffered several casualties. The other half of the Commando having moved along the dyke were confronted by another 150 mm battery. Their approach was obstructed by pockets of resistance to the front of the battery which were not cleared until nightfall. The three Troops halted in front of the battery and repulsed a German counter-attack just after they had been replenished with much-needed food and ammunition.
Defensive stakes and mines embedded in the base of the dyke made it difficult for supply craft to land stores. By the third and fourth days the Commando were forced to 'endure' captured German rations. To the relief of all concerned supplies were parachuted in on the fifth day near Zouteland.
No.41 and No.10 Commandos reached Domburg on the morning of D+1 where they encountered strong resistance. That evening Brigadier Leicester ordered No.41, less one Troop, to assist No.47 in the south, leaving the Troops of No.10 and one of No.41 to finish mopping up Domburg. No.4 Commando was relieved by 155 Brigade and embarked on LVTs to assault two batteries, W3 and W4 situated north-west of Flushing. They had been fighting for 40 hours and needed a well earned rest. After landing in a gap in the dyke, about which little was known, Lt-Colonel Dawson asked Brigadier Leicester for a break of some 24 hours to rest his men. This was agreed but it was well after dark before the Commando was relieved by 155 brigade. In the event No.47 (RM) Commando overcame the opposition south of Zouteland later that day and linked up with No. 4 Commando. Meanwhile No.10 cleared Domburg with the Norwegians showing particular courage in the face of heavy opposition which cost them a number of casualties.
In the after-action report of the battle Captain J. Linzel of No 10 Commando stated.... This operation had more impact on me. The objective was to clear the seaway to Antwerp. We went to Belgium, where the Nr4 Troops Brigade and the No10 Commando were billeted. We were an attached unit of 14 men. We entered our LCT's Buffalo's amphibious vehicles to go to Walcheren where we experienced heavy German Artillery. Our vehicle got hit direct by a grenade, setting our flamethrowers and ammunition on fire. This was a chaos. Our burning Buffalo was pushed into the sea and I can remember that together with 10 other men I ended-up in another Buffalo and landed at Westkapelle. We experienced some serious fighting there and a lot of the Brigade were killed. It took us 3 days to capture the German dyke at Vlissingen, there were about 300 casements. Captain J. Linzel.
I was a telegraphist or 'sparker' in the Walcheren (Westkapelle) landing as part of a Forward Observation Unit for naval gunfire. Each unit consisted of an Artillery Captain known as the FOB (forward observer bombardment), his bombardier and three naval telegraphists carrying backpack radios. When the bombarding ships opened fire the FOB and his bombadier plotted the fall of the shot and calculated corrections which we transmitted by Morse code to the ships. We trained in an area about 9 miles east of Ostend since the extensive sand dunes and scrub-land were similar to parts of Walcheren. Our unit was housed in modern buildings in what may have been a holiday area.
We were attached to the Marine Commandos and trained with them. They were very professional and disciplined. On the eve of the operation, they paraded in the morning with their webbing scrubbed, then paraded later in the day with their webbing 'blancoed' to the correct shade of khaki! To cap it all they marched the nine miles to Ostend to embark when other units were carried in vehicles.
Our unit was allocated a small amphibious vehicle called a Weasel to disembark with our equipment onto the beach at Westkapelle. When we boarded our Landing Craft Tank (LCT) at Ostend we found the Weasels arranged in a line along each side of the tank deck with the much larger and heavier amphibious Buffalos in the centre line between them. The Buffalos were partially armoured and could carry several men and cargo. This particular arrangement of Weasels and Buffalos later proved to have life and death implications.
We sailed late in the day on October 31st 1944 to make the fairly short voyage to Walcheren. During the night there were rumours that we were passing enemy coastal batteries but I believe that the Canadians had put them out of action. In any event they gave us no trouble. We were due to land with a follow up wave and so were a mile or two behind the main assault craft and troops. However, any thoughts that this would make for a 'cushy' landing were soon dispelled.
We watched as LCG(L)s and LCG(M)s, fitted with guns, closed in to slog it out with the German coastal batteries ensconced in massive gun emplacements. It was a David and Goliath contest of massive proportions. The bold actions of the landing craft were designed to keep the German batteries busy while the Commandos made for the shore. Even from the distance it was easy to see that these little gun-ships were being pounded but they didn't falter. Their losses were, however, very heavy.
An LCT(R) rocket craft fired a salvo but it fell short amongst allied craft in forward positions. It looked like mayhem but I believe the losses, though bad, were less severe than they appeared to us. As we watched the flashes from the German batteries we felt disappointment, and a degree of frustration, that our usual air cover was not present. It later transpired that flights were delayed by fog over the airfields. Nevertheless fighter bombers did eventually join the fray by attacking the German defences.
All this time we were making slow but steady progress towards the shore at the back of a short line of landing craft. Our attention was grabbed when the craft ahead of us was bracketed and hit by shell fire. Soon shells fell abeam of us as our position, direction and speed were plotted by the enemy gunners. I began to climb back into our Weasel for protection and had one foot on the guard rail around the LCT when we were hit. The shell fell into the Buffalo parked alongside our Weasel. Sadly Canadian engineers with packs of explosives were inside.... and we had been chatting with them just a short time earlier. The resultant explosion was contained by the Buffalo which went up in a sheet of flame and saved our Weasel from the worst of the explosion. I was blown onto the catwalk which ran around the LCT. Some men jumped overboard and were carried away on the tide but were recovered by rescue craft.
I made my way to the stern of the craft where the bridge structure provided some shelter from the burning and exploding vehicle. Soon a Buffalo came alongside and took some of us ashore. We headed for the south side of the gap which had been blown in the sea walls (dykes). On shore vehicles were burning, filling the air with black smoke. Wreckage was strewn about all over the place.
Bomber Command had earlier breached the dykes and the interior of the island was flooded. Small areas of higher ground were sticking out of the water but Westkapelle village itself was badly inundated. The flooding on the southern side of the gap contained the fighting to a very narrow front only a few hundred yards wide. It was along this narrow strip of dry land that the Commandos faced massive gun emplacements and land mines.
Around this time one of our FOBs and his sparker were wounded by a mortar bomb. The Medical Officer (M.O) was treating them in the crater when a second bomb killed them all. This disproved the old adage about two bombs not falling on the same spot.
That first night enemy star shells lit up the landing area. Shortly after a Buffalo evacuating casualties made its way across the beach and ran over a mine. It immediately blew up. I will forever remember the desperate cries for help from within. The driver and his mate jumped out burning as they ran to the sea. It was a truly hellish scene made all the worse by the bright flames glowing in the darkness.
Naval supporting fire was good. Our units were able to direct the fire of heavy ships such as the Warspite and the Monitors Erebus and Roberts. The fighting is documented elsewhere but I would like to comment on the spirited manner in which the Commandos took on the massive German emplacements with comparatively light weapons.
When we reached Zouteland, a little village down the coast from Westkapelle, we could clearly see the damage we had caused. Compared to Caen it was nothing but to the local population the devastation caused by 15 inch shells was frightening. Despite this the inhabitants were wonderfully welcoming and some of the women wore traditional dress. One Dutchman watched the landing in progress despite the obvious dangers!
Our side on the south of the gap was cleared in a few days and having reached the gap before Flushing our part in the assault was over. We spent some uncomfortable days in a hollow scooped out in the sand with a roof of corrugated iron sheets to keep us dry and relatively safe. Just a few yards away the medics had piled up corpses wrapped in corrugated cardboard bound with string. They were stacked, I have to say, in criss-cross fashion like firewood. It made me think of the cheapness of human life in war conditions. Some German prisoners were nearby in a crater surrounded by barbed wire. They had little shelter and food and they were distinctly unhappy. In reality their conditions were not very different from our own.
After eight days an LCM took us off the island. The vagaries of war had one more unpleasant surprise for us. The voyage back to Ostend passed through an exceptionally violent storm. The skipper feared for the safety of his vessel and most of the troops were violently ill. I stayed on deck and remember one soldier lying face down on the very edge of the craft gradually sliding overboard and apparently not caring. I grabbed his webbing and pulled him back inboard.
As we approached Ostend an air raid was in progress with flak sailing into the sky. The skipper and his bridge party failed to notice a destroyer signalling an Aldiss lamp challenge to 'unknown vessel.' Luckily we understood Morse code and alerted the bridge party. The destroyer might well have opened fire as our craft bore some resemblance to a high speed German motor boat.
Our first night ashore was spent in a German barracks decorated with murals of Storm Troopers. They bore little resemblance to the dejected prisoners occupying the crater on Walcheren! Finally back to the training area and the large dormitory we had occupied there. It was sad to see many beds stripped down because their former occupants would not be returning. Sad also to find that many of our possessions had gone missing in our absence.
I sometimes wonder why, in my recollections, D-Day seemed more exciting and important than Walcheren. Perhaps the reasons are self evident. Walcheren was a landing in bleak November on the shores of the North Sea. It was a necessary and important operation in its own right but D-Day was, in the mind of a young impressionable soldier, the battle to liberate Europe.
[edit] The Calgary Highlanders (by Lt William J Smith) - personal recollections.
I served as a Lieut. Rifle Platoon Leader, 9 Platoon, "D" Company of the Calgary Highlanders - a replacement for my predecessor, Lt. Stewart, who was killed on the Causeway right at its entrance on to the Island.
It was a battered, depleted Platoon I took over. They had been in hard fighting right from the time the push to clear the Scheldt estuary first started. I was saddled with a legacy of nine "ghosts," - men who should have been with me but were absent and unaccounted for. I was ordered to find out from the survivors where and when these missing men had last been seen, and in what circumstances. I was able to report very few facts and those I could were painful. When I went up to join the Highlanders I was accompanied by two other 'new' lieutenants, also replacing casualties of the assault on Walcheren. Their names were Brown, and Doakes, as I remember. We were along the southern edge of what became known as The 'Nijmegen Salient' which the Allies established as a fall-back from the Arnhem failure. There in early December, outside Groesbeek, on the edge of the Reichswald Forest, I was wounded on patrol. Brown was killed, shot in the kidneys by a sniper, and Doakes died of Diphtheria in a hospital somewhere in Holland.
Sojourning at Aldershot, awaiting orders to return to the Continent, was a friend from the Highlanders who had been wounded on the Causeway before I had caught up to him. He recounted to me that his Company ("A") had lost all their Officers. The causeway was 30 yards wide, about 1 mile long, straight and barren. Facing the 5th Brigade were dug-in fixed-fire machine guns and Oerlikon Rapid-firing 20mm Anti- Aircraft Cannons, the belts of which carried cartridges in a fixed order of 1 armour-piercing shell, 1 high explosive shell and 1 tracer. The troops of the 5th Brigade had no advance knowledge of this lethal mix but they soon knew what they were facing! It took a high calibre of men to run the gauntlet of the withering fire in such an exposed situation. It's not surprising that the Infantryman's unofficial motto was 'It aint our business to die for our country; our job is to make the other guy die for his country!'
He, with his men, had moved about six-hundred yards off the Causeway onto the Island when they were pinned down. It had been decided that the 5th Brigade was done for and would be replaced. Accordingly, at dawn of the 1st (or 2nd?) November an artillery barrage was to be laid on, behind which their exchange with the Maisonneuves would be carried out. It is difficult for those who have not experienced the chaos and confusion of war to appreciate that in a battle the situation changes by the minute. They had no radio or telephonic communication and runners often did not make it through. The big shots directing the operation did not know how far forward the Highlanders had fought their way onto the island and the barrage came down BEHIND them! They had to retire through the "protective" barrage to rendezvous with their replacements. It was winter and the Highlanders were wearing their greatcoats. In the semi-darkness of the dawn, the advancing Maisonneuve mistook the retiring Highlanders as a German attack. One of the men I took into my unit later told me that as he was emerging from the smoke of the barrage, he found himself facing troops with fixed bayonets attacking him! There it was; darkness, smoke, language differences, troops in unexpected places. In a split second he had to decide: is it going to be him or me? Him! So he opened up with his Sten gun. Canadians killing Canadians!
Life had to go on, and so did the war. When these men, all volunteers, were signing-up they did so for 'the duration.' There was no resigning or quitting; you were in it until you were dead, crippled, or until, in some unforeseeable future event, the war was won (or lost!) There was one slim chance of an out - if you had been wounded three times you could elect to go home to Canada for thirty days; but who could have stood the thought of coming back to Europe? Nobody!... so nobody I knew took advantage of this option.
It is painful to study the big military picture leading up to the very desperate frontal assault on Walcheren by the 2nd Division's 5th Brigade, primarily the Regiment de Maisonneuve and the Calgary Highlanders. Painful because it seems clear that its purpose was diversionary: to draw onto themselves enemy forces and fire which otherwise would have been available to the German 70th Infantry Division to oppose the landings by the British 52nd Lowland Division and various British Commando Units.
As the storming of the Sloe Causeway got stuck the diversionary operation "Mallard" was carried out, crossing the Sloe by wading and storm boats. Here (photo opposite) you see German POWs and wounded brought back. Storm boats can be seen in the background.
To gain access to the Port of Antwerp was essential to the further success of Shaef operations and as the Brigadier said (at an "O" Group meeting of all senior officers of the 5th Brigade, who were questioning General Simonds' determination to proceed with such an obviously difficult and potentially costly operation) the risk had been thoroughly evaluated, and in view of the larger military picture, had been considered acceptable. I have seen figures which show Highlander casualties as 63, of which 17 were killed.
The Dutch people recently showed their sincere gratitude for what the Canadian Army did for them. At an anniversary commemoration service for the Walcheren action the King (or Crown Prince) of Holland spoke these gracious words: 'Thank you Canada! Thank you Canadians, from the bottom of our hearts!'
[edit] The outcome
Nos. 4, 47, 48 Commandos then concentrated at Zouteland and a two-day pause ensued while they re-supplied. The remaining enemy resistance was concentrated in the area north-west of Dombug. Nos.4 and 48 Commando set off on foot, although they used LVs to cross the gap at Westkapelle, in order to reinforce No.10 and No.41. While No. 41 assaulted the last remaining battery, W19, No.4 cleared the Overduin woods and pushed on to Vrouwenpolder opposite North Beveland. No.48 remained in reserve, This phase of the operation began on November 8.
At 0815 four Germans approached the Allied troops to ask for a surrender of all remaining German troops in the area. After some negotiation 40,000 Germans surrendered and for them the war was over. No.4 SS Brigade had lost 103 killed, 325 wounded and 68 missing during eight days of fighting. By the end of November after a massive minesweeping operation of the Scheldt, the first cargoes were being unloaded at Antwerp.
[edit] Organization of forces
Full details of the opposing forces are provided below courtesy of Mr J N Houterman, Middelburg, Walcheren. Source is the Dutch language book on the liberation of Walcheren.
This article compliments of www.combinedops.com
