Operation Gibraltar

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Operation Gibraltar
Part of Indo-Pakistani War of 1965
Pakistani infiltrated areas marked in dark green. Infiltration was mainly near the border of Pakistan held Kashmir and in the Vale of Kashmir close to the de facto border.
Date August 1965 Location Jammu and Kashmir, India Result Detection and expulsion of the Pakistani intruders by Indian troops. Minor territorial gains by India. Second War over Kashmir begins.
Belligerents
Pakistani insurgents	Indian Security Forces
Strength
5,000 - 40,000	Unknown
Casualties and losses
4,000[1][2] - 8,000[3]	Unknown

Operation Gibraltar was the name given to the failed plan by Pakistan to infiltrate the disputed Jammu and Kashmir region in north-western India and start a rebellion against Indian control. Launched in August 1965, Pakistan Army soldiers and guerrillas, disguised as locals, entered Jammu and Kashmir from Pakistan with the intention of fomenting an insurgency among Kashmiri Muslims. However, the strategy went awry from the outset as it was not well-coordinated and the infiltrators were soon found. The debacle was followed by an Indian counterattack that resulted in the 1965 War.

The operation was a significant one as it sparked a large scale military engagement between the two neighbours, the first since the Indo-Pakistani War of 1947. Its success, as envisaged by its Pakistani planners, could have given Pakistan control over a unified Kashmir; something that Pakistan desired to achieve at the earliest opportunity. However, the plan misfired and triggered a war (the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965) where Pakistan was put on the defensive.

[edit] Background

Following the First Kashmir War which saw India gaining the majority of the disputed area of Kashmir, Pakistan sought an opportunity to win back the areas lost. The opening came after the Sino-Indian War in 1962 where India lost to China and as a result the Indian Military was undergoing massive changes both in personnel and equipment. During this period, despite being numerically smaller than the Indian Military, Pakistan's armed forces had a qualitative edge in air power and armour over India,^[4] which Pakistan sought to utilise before India completed its defence build-up. The Rann of Kutch episode in the summer of 1965, where Indian and Pakistani forces clashed, resulted in some positives for the Pakistani Army. Moreover, in December 1963, the disappearance of a holy relic^[5] from the Hazratbal shrine in Srinagar, created turmoil and intense Islamic feeling among muslims in the valley, which was viewed by Pakistan as ideal for revolt.^[6] These factors bolstered the Pakistani command's thinking: that the use of covert methods followed by the threat of an all out war would force a resolution in Kashmir.^[7][8][9] Assuming that a weakened Indian Military would not respond, Pakistan chose to send in "mujahideens" and Pakistan Army regulars into Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir.

The original plan for the Operation, codenamed Gibraltar, was prepared as early as the 1950s; however it seemed appropriate to push this plan forward given the scenario. Backed by then foreign minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and others, the aim was an "attack by infiltration" by a specially trained irregular force of some 40,000 men, highly motivated and well armed. It was reasoned that the conflict could be confined only to Kashmir. In the words of retired Pakistani General Akhtar Hussain Malik, the aims were "to defreeze the Kashmir problem, weaken Indian resolve, and bring India to the conference table without provoking general war."^[10] As a result, groundwork and intelligence gathering for execution of the plan was laid by launching "Operation Nusrat", the purpose of which was to locate gaps in the Cease Fire Line (CFL) that were to serve as entry points for the mujahideen, and to gauge the response of the Indian army and the local population.^[11]

[edit] Execution of plan

Despite initial reservations by the President of Pakistan Ayub Khan, the operation was set in motion. In the first week of August 1965, (some sources put it at 24 July)^[12] Pakistani troops, members of the SSG commandos and irregulars began to cross the Cease Fire Line dividing Indian- and Pakistani-held Kashmir. Several columns were to occupy key heights around the Kashmir valley and encourage a general revolt, which would be followed by direct combat by Pakistani troops. According to Indian sources as many as 30,000^[13] - 40,000 men had crossed the line, while Pakistani sources put it at 5,000 -7,000 only.^[14] These troops — called "Gibraltar Force" — were given different code names, mostly after historically significant Muslim rulers.^[13] The operation's name, Gibraltar, itself was chosen for the Islamic connotations.^[15] The 8th century Umayyad conquest of Hispania was launched from Gibraltar, a situation not unlike that Pakistan envisaged for Indian Kashmir, i.e. conquest of Kashmir from Operation Gibraltar. The areas chosen were mainly on the de facto Cease Fire line as well as in the populous Kashmir Valley.

The plan was multi-pronged. Infiltrators would mingle with the local populace and incite them to rebellion. Meanwhile guerrilla warfare would commence, destroying bridges, tunnels and highways, harassing enemy communications, logistic installations and headquarters as well as attacking airfields,^[16] with a view to create the conditions of an "armed insurrection" in Kashmir — leading to a national uprising against Indian rule. It was assumed that India would neither counter-attack,^[17] nor involve itself in another full-scale war, and the liberation of Kashmir would rapidly follow.

[edit] Indian retaliation

A declassified US State Department telegram that confirms the existence of hundreds of infiltrators in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir.

Despite such a well-planned operation, the intruders were detected by Indian forces in Kashmir. With the exception of four districts which did revolt, the local Kashmiris did not cooperate as expected. Instead, they conveyed news of the planned insurgency to the local authorities and turned the infiltrators in. The Mujahids attempted to artificially create a sense of revolt by carrying out guerilla attacks, but to no avail. Gibraltar Force was soon facing attacks from the Indian Army who moved in immediately to secure the border. The majority of the infiltrators were captured by the Indian troops, although some managed to escape. India accused the Pakistani government of sending and aiding the seditionists, and although Pakistan denied any complicity,^[18][13] it was soon proved that the foreigners were all of Pakistani origin. In fact several of them were found to be officers in the Pakistan Army, with the UNMOGIP Chief, General Nimmo also confirming Pakistan's involvement.^[18]

Indian soldiers hoisting the national flag atop a peak in the Haji Pir pass, which was captured soon after the infiltrators were discovered.

India swiftly launched counter attacks across the cease fire line, attacking the Pakistan divisions in Azad Kashmir that had provided cover for the infiltrators. As a result, many of these posts fell to Indian attacks resulting in minor territorial gains for India. On August 15, India scored a major victory after a prolonged artillery barrage. Their success in countering Pakistani plans proved to be a morale booster for Indian troops, coming exactly on India's independence day. Fighting continued until the end of the month, as vital pockets like Haji Pir pass — which was the logistical supply route of the infiltrators^[19] — and other nearby areas were also brought under Indian control.

The Indian offensive resulted in panic among Pakistan troops, who urgently launched Operation Grand Slam to contain the situation since there was no contingency planned in case of Gibraltar's failure. This however resulted in more problems for Pakistan, as India countered by crossing the international border further south in the Punjab, starting the war of 1965.

[edit] Reasons for failure

While the covert infiltration was a complete failure that ultimately led to the Second Kashmir War, military analysts have differed on whether the plan itself was flawed. Some have held that the plan was well-conceived but was let down by poor execution, but almost all Pakistani and neutral analysts have maintained that the entire operation was "a clumsy attempt"^[20] and doomed to collapse. According to then Chief of the Pakistan Air Force, Air Marshal Nur Khan, there was little coordination amongst the military services on the impending operation.^[21] Pakistani author Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema notes that Musa Khan, Pakistan's Chief of the Army Staff, was reportedly so confident that the plan would succeed and conflict would be localized to Kashmir that he did not inform the Air Force, as he believed the operation would not require any major air action.^[12] Many senior Pakistani military officers and political leaders were unaware of the impending crisis, thus surprising not only India, but also Pakistan itself. Furthermore, few people in Kashmir were really interested in revolting against India, a fact largely ignored while planning.^[22]

Colonel SG Mehdi, the SSG commander, cited the above reasons as well as a few others (such as logistical problems and a confusion of classic guerrilla operations with commando raids) as to why the operation would fail even before its launch. He also added that many SSG officers were unsure of the means and uncertain of the end.^[23] Initially, Pakistan's Chief of Army Staff Musa Khan opposed Gibraltar on the grounds that if the operation was a non-starter, then Pakistan would not be able to defeat India in the ensuing war. Many senior officials also were against the plan, as a failure could lead to an all-out war with India, which many wanted to avoid.^[2] The resulting war of 1965 had a negative impact both on Pakistan and on India.^[24][25][26]

[edit] See also

• Indo-Pakistan Wars
• Kargil War

[edit] Notes

[edit] References

• Brigadier Shaukat Qadir of PAF on Operation Gibraltar: Battle that never was - Hosted on Rediff.com
• Grand Slam — A Battle of Lost Opportunities by Major (Retd.) Agha Humayun Amin, Defence Journal (Pakistan), September 2000
• Hassan Abbas (2004). Pakistan's Drift Into Extremism: Allah, The Army, And America's War On Terror. M.E. Sharpe. ISBN 0-7656-1497-9. 
• Mohammad Musa Khan (1983). My Version: India-Pakistan War 1965. Wajidalis. 
• Encarta

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