Operation Black Buck

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During the Falklands War, Operations Black Buck 1 to Black Buck 7 was a series of seven extremely long-range ground attack missions by Royal Air Force Vulcan bombers planned against Argentine positions in the Falkland Islands. Of these seven, only five missions were flown.

Contents

[edit] Background

Vulcan over Ascension Island on 18 May 1982
Vulcan over Ascension Island on 18 May 1982

Without aircraft able to cover the long distance, activities in the South Atlantic would be down to the Royal Navy and the British Army. Plans were set in motion within the RAF to see if it could carry out any operations near the Falklands.

The nearest useable airfield for RAF operations to the Falklands was Ascension Island; a British territory but with an airfield, (the single-runway Wideawake airfield) operated by the US. Long range work was entirely dependent on the RAF's tanker fleet and so Handley Page Victor tankers would be transferred from RAF Marham to Ascension. The RAF tankers were capable of being refuelled in-flight which meant that it was possible to set-up relays of aircraft. The Avro Vulcan was the last of the British V-bombers in operational use for bombing but their squadrons were imminent for disbandment. Based in the UK and assigned to NATO for nuclear operations, neither air-to-air refuelling nor conventional bombing had been practised for several years.

At Marham the tanker force was set to planning refuelling operations to take one or more bombers to the Falklands and back. At RAF Waddington, the retraining of crews in conventional bombing and in flight refuelling was begun. Aircraft were selected based upon their engines; only those with the more powerful Bristol Olympus 301 engines were considered suitable. One of the hardest tasks was reinstating the refuelling system, which had been blocked off.

One Victor was converted into an improvised photo-reconnaissance aircraft. Victors arrived at Ascension on 18 April.

Three 22-year-old Vulcan B2s drawn from No. 44, 50 and No. 101 Squadron RAF were deployed to Wideawake airfield on Ascension Island. Squadron Leader Neil McDougall, Squadron Leader John Reeve and Flight Lieutenant Martin Withers captained the Vulcans.

To give improved electronic countermeasures (ECM) against Argentine defences which were known to include Tigercat missile and radar-controlled anti-aircraft guns, Dash 10 pods from Blackburn Buccaneer aircraft at RAF Honington were fitted on improvised pylons to the wings. To navigate across the featureless seas, inertial guidance systems were borrowed from VC-10s and two installed in each Vulcan.

The wet wings could contain 9,200 gal (41,823 litres), and based on estimates of their fuel need eleven Victor tankers, including two standby aircraft, were assigned to refuel the Vulcans before and after their attacks on the Falklands. The attacking Vulcan was refuelled five times on the outward journey and once on the return journey, using over 220,000 gallons of aviation fuel during the mission. Each aircraft carried either twenty-one 1,000-pound (450 kg) bombs or four Shrike anti-radar missiles[1] (Dash 10 pod) with three 1,000 gal (4,546 litres) auxiliary fuel tanks in the bomb bay. The bombs were intended to cause damage to Argentine installations, especially Port Stanley Airport; it was hoped that the attacks would cause the defenders to switch on defensive radars, which would then be targeted by the missiles. The lighter Shrike armed Vulcans could loiter in the area longer than the bomb armed Vulcans.

[edit] Missions

[edit] Black Buck One

XM607, the first Vulcan to participate in Black Buck
XM607, the first Vulcan to participate in Black Buck

The first surprise attack on the islands, on 30 April-1 May was aimed at the main runway at Stanley Airfield. Carrying twenty-one 1,000 lbs general-purpose bombs, the bomber was to fly across the line of the runway at about 35 degrees. The bomb release system was timed to drop sequentially from 10,000 ft so that at least one bomb would land on the runway[2].

For the mission, two Vulcans took off from RAF Ascension Island; XM598 was the lead with XM607 as the reserve. Shortly after take off, XM598, commanded by Squadron Leader John Reeve, suffered a pressurisation failure (a rubber seal on the "Direct Vision" side window had perished) and was forced to return to Ascension. XM607, captained by Flight Lieutenant Martin Withers, took over.

As well as XM598, one of the Victor tankers returned to Ascension with a faulty refuelling hose system and its place was taken by a reserve.

The Vulcan was over its normal maximum take-off weight - each carried, as well as extra equipment like the DASH 10 and a chemical toilet, a highly experienced Air to Air Refuelling Instructor (AARI) from the Victor tanker force who would fly the Vulcan during refuelling - and fuel usage was higher than expected. As a result of the fuel demand and problems in flight with refuelling, two of the Victors had to fly further south than planned, eating into their own reserves, and one of these the last Victor to refuel the Vulcan was past the last refuelling bracket before turning home. Both Victors would need tankers sent south to refuel them so they could reach Ascension.

XM607 made the final approach at around 300 ft above the sea. Before climbing to attack height the H2S radar was successfully locked onto to offset markers on the coast and bombing handed over to the control system. The attack was delivered around 4 am local time.

XM607 then climbed away form the airfield and headed nearly due north to a planned rendezvous with a Victor some way off the coast of Rio de Janeiro. As it passed the British Task Force it signalled "superfuse" indicating a successful attack. Its journey continued up within range of the South American coast to its rendezvous with a tanker. After contacting control with an update, the tanker was sent further south. To help bring the two planes together a Nimrod Maritime Reconnaissance aircraft was flown from Wideawake to the area. Without a in-flight refuelling system it was unable to loiter long. XM607 made the link and was able to return to Ascension.

Northwood received the superfuse message by 8:30 and the MoD shortly thereafter. The news of the bombing raid was reported on the BBC World Service before either the Vulcan or the last tanker arrived at Ascension.

The line of 21 bombs crossed the airfield and successfully cratered the runway with a single direct hit near the runway's mid point. However, it still remained operational for the Argentine C-130 Hercules transports. The bombs falling on either side of the runway caused slight damage to tented installations in the airfield perimeter[3]. This was due to the careful dispersal of equipment by the base commander.

The attack took the Argentinians (as well as the rest of the world) completely by surprise.

Withers was given the Distinguished Flying Cross for his part in the action. Tuxford who had piloted the last Victor to refuel XM607, received the Air Force Cross

[edit] Black Buck Two

During the night of 3 May-4 May, XM607 (flown by Sqn Ldr John Reeve and his crew of No 50 Squadron) flew a near identical mission to the first. This raid targeted the area at the western end of the runway. This was intended to prevent Argentinian engineers from extending the runway sufficiently to make it capable of accommodating high performance combat aircraft.

[edit] Black Buck Three

This mission, scheduled for 13 May, was scrubbed before take-off due to strong headwinds.

[edit] Black Buck Four

This mission, scheduled for 28 May, was also scrubbed, but only some 5 hours after the Vulcan had taken off. One of the supporting Victor aircraft, which were flying refuelling operations, suffered a failure of their hose-and-drogue refuelling unit, and the flight had to be recalled.

The mission had been due to be the first using American supplied AGM-45 Shrike Anti-Radar missiles, which were mounted to the Vulcans using improvised underwing pylons.

[edit] Black Buck Five

XM597, showing mission markings from its two Black Buck missions and Brazilian internment.
XM597, showing mission markings from its two Black Buck missions and Brazilian internment.

This mission, flown by Squadron Leader Neil McDougall and his crew from 50 Squadron, on May 31, was the first successful anti-radar mission equipped with AGM-45A Shrike missiles. The main target was a Westinghouse AN/TPS-43 long range 3D radar that the Argentine Air Force deployed during April to guard the airspace surrounding the Falklands. In order for the missiles to work the targeted radar had to transmit up until the missiles impacted. The first missile impacted 10 metres away from the target, causing minor blast damage to the wave-guide assembly, but not disabling the radar. [4] Fearing further attack, the Argentine operators used the simple counter-measure of turning their radar off. The AN/TPS-43 radar remained intact during the conflict.

[edit] Black Buck Six

This mission, again flown by Squadron Leader Neil McDougall in XM597, attacked and destroyed to a Skyguard radar fire-control radar of the army's 601 Anti-aircraft batallion on 3 June, killing 4 radar operators: an officer, a sergeant and two soldiers.[5]. On its return flight, the aircraft was forced to divert to Rio de Janeiro in Brazil after its in-flight refuelling probe broke. One of the missiles it was carrying was ditched into the ocean to reduce drag, but the other remained stuck on the pylon and could not be released. Sensitive documents containing classified information were jettisoned into the sea via the crew hatch, and a "Mayday" signal was sent. The aircraft was cleared to land by Brazilian authorities with less than 2,000 lbs of fuel remaining. This was insufficient to have completed a circuit of the airport.[6] The aircraft was interned for nine days, before the crew and aircraft were returned on June 11, after both had been treated well by the authorities. However, the remaining Shrike missile was confiscated and never returned.

[edit] Black Buck Seven

The final Black Buck mission was against Argentine troop positions close to Stanley on 12 June, successfully cratering the eastern end of the airfield and causing widespread damage to airfield stores and facilities.[7] Since the bomb raid was conducted so late in the war the RAF wouldn't damage the runway further. After taking an overhaul, the runway was ready for Phantom FGR.2 operations following Brigade-General Menéndez' surrender. The first Phantoms from the Nº29 Squadron arrived on October 17 1982.[8]

[edit] Effect

The military success of Black Buck remains controversial to this day with some independent sources describing it as minimal[9], the damage to the airfield and radars being quickly repaired[10]. The runway continued to be used by Argentine C-130s until the end of the war and was also available for MB-339 Aermacchi jets[11] and Pucaras.[12] As a result of the controversy a number of common misconceptions exist about the raid.

Although commonly dismissed as British propaganda, Argentine sources confirm claims that Black Buck was initially responsible for the withdrawal of Mirage IIIEA from operations over the islands in order to protect the mainland.[13][14][15] This dissuasive effect was however watered down when British officials made clear that there wouldn't be strikes on air bases in Argentina.[16]

There are urban legends, that claim Argentine engineers building the runway plotted its position incorrectly on maps, leading to the British missing the runway. The runway at Port Stanley was in fact built by British engineers, replacing an earlier temporary strip constructed by LADE.

The purposes of the raid and its impact on the runway are also commonly misunderstood. British air power doctrine recognises that attacks against the operating surfaces of runways can have limited effect.[17] Planning for the raid called for a bomb run in a 35° cut across the runway, with the aim of placing at least one bomb on the runway and possibly two.[18] The main purpose in doing so was to prevent the use of the runway by fast jets, in this respect the raid was successful as the repair to the runway was botched and subsequently there were several near accidents.[18] However, it was realised at the time that the runway would likely remain open to use by C-130; the RAF routinely practises rough field take offs in their C-130.[19]

The Argentines left the runway covered with piles of earth during the day, leading to claims this caused British intelligence to surmise that repairs were still in progress and misleading the British as to the condition of the airfield and the success of their raids[20][21]. In fact, the British were well aware that C-130 flights continued to use the airfield[22] and attempted to interdict these flights leading to the loss of a C-130 on June 1,[23] which was not, however, engaged in any resupply mission.[24]

Another common misconception is that the Argentine forces made no attempt to use the airfield at Port Stanley as a base for high-performance jets. In early April, A-4Q Skyhawks of 3 Escuadrilla had flown Skyhawks in and out of the airfield.[18] Engineers of the Argentine army had added additional steel matting to extend the runway and were in the process of installing arrestor gear on the runway to enable short landings of combat aircraft.[18]

To the British, the raids achieved a number of non-material objectives. These included: demonstrating their willingness to defend British territories from forceful invasion, signalling British intent to recapture the Falklands and showing their ability to attack Argentine forces on the islands. It also demonstrated the possibility of escalating the conflict in future by striking industrial targets on the Argentinian mainland. Regardless of whether or not the British actually intended to pursue these options and escalate the conflict, the Argentinian leadership would have been fully aware of the implications.[25]

At the time, it was the longest bombing raid in history, covering over 4,000 nautical miles (7,000 km), all of which were conducted over the open sea. This record was not broken until an American B-52 flew from the USA to Iraq, and then returned to RAF Mildenhall in England during Operation Desert Storm in 1991, although a major difference between the two was that the B-52s benefited from forward pre-positioned tankers for their aerial refuelling.

[edit] Notes

  1. ^ "armed with four Shrikes for another attack against the Falklands." page 67 in Peter R. March: The Vulcan Story, 2006, Sutton Publishing/'Vulcan to the Sky' trust, ISBN 0-7509-4399-8
  2. ^ "In the conventional bombing role, the Vulcan carried up to three clips of seven bombs each. The 'iron' bombs were sequenced to drop singly from each clip in order front, centre and rear, repeating the sequence seven times", page 52 in Peter R. March: The Vulcan Story, 2006, Sutton Publishing/'Vulcan to the Sky' trust, ISBN 0-7509-4399-8
  3. ^ "Little material damage had been caused by the raids, despite the immense tanker effort and expense to mount them. However, the 1 May attack had been a spectacular opening to the British recapture effort and a warning that - even though the Port Stanley runway was swiftly repaired - basing combat aircraft there would be unwise." page 69 in Peter R. March: The Vulcan Story, 2006, Sutton Publishing/'Vulcan to the Sky' trust, ISBN 0-7509-4399-8
  4. ^ Vulcan history at thunder-and-lightnings.co.uk
  5. ^ www.thunder-and-lightnings.co.uk
  6. ^ Operation Black Buck
  7. ^ [1] The Falkland Islands, A history of the 1982 conflict, Battles of the Falklands Conflict, Operation Black Buck - 1st May to 12 June 1982
  8. ^ www.conflictomalvinas.com.ar
  9. ^ Offensive Air Operations Of The Falklands War - USMC
  10. ^ "And what was achieved? A crater in the runway that was filled in within twenty-four hours, and possibly a 30 mm gun radar knocked out" (Sharkey Ward: Sea Harrier over the Falklands, 1992, Cassell Military Paperbacks, ISBN 0-304-35542-9)
  11. ^ Max Hastings:"The Battle for the Falklands" on page 203 in the San Carlos chapter (21st May):"Meanwhile, a single Aeromacchi[sic] - almost certainly the first Fleet Air Arm[sic] (Argentine COAN) reconnaissance aircraft flying from Port Stanley - attacked the...."
  12. ^ FAA Chronology: 10 June entry
  13. ^ [2] "As a result of these heavy losses...it was decided to pull the Mirage III's back to the mainland to stand alert for a possible Vulcan attack."
  14. ^ [3] "Finally, the bombing raids caused the Argentines to fear an air attack on the mainland, causing them to retain some Mirage aircraft and Roland missiles for defense."
  15. ^ [4] La familia Mirage, Aeroespacio, Fuerza Aerea Argentina, ISSN 0001-9127, "Los M III debían defender el territorio continental argentino de posibles ataques de los bombarderos Vulcan de la RAF, brindar escolta a los cazabombarderos de la FAA, e impedir los ataques de aviones de la Royal Navy y de la RAF sobre las Malvinas." ("The M III would defend the Argentine mainland against possible attacks by Vulcan bombers from the RAF, providing escort of fighter bombers to the FAA, and to prevent attacks by aircraft of the Royal Navy and RAF on the Falklands.")
  16. ^ [5]"Unfortunately the British Secretary of State for Defense announced sometime later that Britain would not bomb targets on the Argentine mainland. This statement was undoubtedly welcomed by the Argentine military command because it permitted the very limited number of Roland SAM's to be deployed around the airfield at Stanley."
  17. ^ "Attacks on operating surfaces can close airfields, but because operating surfaces can be repaired, the effects of such attacks can only be temporary" Royal Air Force Air Power Doctrine, AP 3000 2nd Edition, 1993
  18. ^ a b c d White, Rowland, Vulcan 607, Bantam Press, London, 2006 ISBN 0593 053915
  19. ^ [6] Air Power Under Pressure, Interview of the Chief of the Air Staff by Richard Gardner, Editor of Aerospace International "indeed, during the last troop rotation in Afghanistan the C130 force flew some 350 sorties into the gravel strip at Camp Bastion in Helmand Province."
  20. ^ Offensive Air Operations Of The Falklands War - USMC
  21. ^ http://www.britains-smallwars.com/Falklands/vulcan.htm The Avro Vulcan and the Black Buck raids
  22. ^ Morgan, David, Hostile Skies, Orion Books Limited, London, 2006, ISBN 978-0-7538-2199-2
  23. ^ Ward, Sharkey,'Sea Harrier Over The Falklands: A Maverick at War, Phoenix; New Ed edition, London, 2007, ISBN 978-0304355426
  24. ^ Britain Small Wars, 1º June entry
  25. ^ Freedman, Lawrence, The Official History of the Falklands Campaign, Volume II, p.286, Routledge, Abingdon, UK, ISBN 0-415-41911-5

[edit] References


[edit] External links

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