Talk:Omnipotence paradox

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Featured article star Omnipotence paradox is a featured article; it (or a previous version of it) has been identified as one of the best articles produced by the Wikipedia community. Even so, if you can update or improve it, please do.
Main Page trophy This article appeared on Wikipedia's Main Page as Today's featured article on January 9, 2006.
Cleanup Taskforce article This article has been improved by the Cleanup Taskforce to conform with a higher standard of quality. Please see its Cleanup Taskforce page for more details on this process, and possible ideas on how you can further improve this article!
This article is considered to fall outside the scope of the Version 0.5 test release, which is of limited size. It is now being held ready for a later version.
WikiProject Spoken Wikipedia The spoken word version of this revision (diff) of this article is part of WikiProject Spoken Wikipedia, an attempt to produce recordings of Wikipedia articles being read aloud. If you would like to participate, visit the project page, where you can join the project and find out how to contribute.

Before adding new material to this article, please be sure to read and understand wikipedia's no original research rule! Thanks, Sdedeo (tips) 18:16, 12 January 2006 (UTC)

Because of their length, older discussions on this page have been archived. If further archiving is necessary, see how to archive a talk page.

Previous discussions:

  • Archive01: Approximately August 2004 to 9 January 2006 (50 Kb)
  • Archive02: 9 January to 11 January 2006 (30 Kb)
  • Archive03: January to May 2006

Contents

[edit] Sound Recording?

William Morgan is supposed to be working on it, but it's been there for a good four months and Bill himself doesn't seem to have been on Wikipedia since the tag date (January 10th 06). I think the Sound Recording tag can be taken out now, right? fel64 22:29, 1 June 2006 (UTC)

Yes. I have now removed it. -- Etimbo ( Talk) 22:43, 22 December 2006 (UTC)

[edit] V0.5 Nomination fail for importance

In my opinion, the topic is not important enough to be taken into the V0.5, and the way the text is written is not appropriate for a general encyclopaedia. Habemus pampam 08:01, 27 June 2006 (UTC)

This stuff is hilarious. If someone asks me, "could the God of War" make a stone so big that even you could not lift it?" I would smite him down for being such a dumbass.--God Ω War 06:25, 13 July 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Can God Create a Stone that He Cannot Lift?

This question is more than 800 years old. In asking this question, the questioner had already assumed the existence of gravity because of the word “lift” in the question. What exactly is “lift”? My definition for “lift” is: Moving an object to the opposite direction of gravity. By definition, God created everything. Hence, God created gravity. Since God can create gravity, he can certainly make it disappear. So God can “lift” any stone. Put another way, this question could become: if God were to have an arm wrestling match between his left arm （gravity）and right arm (to “lift” the stone), which one would win? Both arms belong to God. This is not a contest; there is no winning or losing. Therefore this is a stupid question，not a paradox.

If God is omnipotent, God must be everything, everything must be God. There is nothing outside God, not even empty space, because God created space and time. The fact is, “Outside God” is an oxymoron: if there is God, then there will be no “outside”; if there is an “outside”, then there will be no God. There is no gravity “outside” God. God doesn’t live in a gravitational field. For an omnipotent God, there is no such concept as “lift”. “Lift” only exists in human experience. Gravity, like everything else, exists inside God. For an omnipotent God, there is no such concept as “stand”either, because there is no ground “outside” God. By the same token，for an omnipotent God, there are no such concepts as “breathe”，“eat”，“drink”，“excrete”, “wear clothes”, “walk”，“sit”, “lie down”. God doesn't have a body. All bodies have skin, skin is the boundary of the body. God doesn't have boundary. Therefore, God doesn't have a face，nor shape. An ant looks at you while you are talking, it could see your lips and tongue moving. The ant asks you: “How do you lift your lips and tongue?” You reply: “It is a stupid question.” A man sees that the Moon is moving, he asks God: “How do you lift the Moon?” God says: “It is a stupid question.” --Teng Wang 18:55, 21 July 2006 (UTC)

If god IS everything that has ever existed, how and why would such a....being..... have "created" everything that ever existed? If nothing preceded him or succeeded him and he already contains everything within himself, then the concept of creation is logically unnecessary. You say "God can make logical contradictions true?" In that case, his existence and non-existence can both be true and both be false. The concept of god is absurd. Credo quia absurdum est? I think the universe is absurd enough as it is without adding an extraordinary extra layer which itself needs to be explained. If god does not provide an explanation but further confusion, then the hypothesis is not only "dispensable", as Laplace put it, but deleterious. --Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 08:47, 24 August 2006 (UTC)
Plenty of absurd things exist. The universe is full of absurdities, and the fact that a hypothesis would be absurd or would make explanation harder isn't really much of a strike against the hypothesis. Credo quia absurdum est, might be going a little too far but res absurda credo is a pill I swallowed long ago, but then I'm a dialetheist. Bmorton3 14:11, 24 August 2006
When it is asserted (as it often is) that the hypothesis of the existence of a supreme being provides explanation and comfort that is otherwise unavailable and it turns out that such an hypothesis generates greater confusion and needs its own impossible explanation, then the hypothesis is certainly weakened. The problem of the absurdity of the universe is supposed to be alleviated by the existence of god. If the notion of god generates its own absurdities, then it does not provide neither the service of rational explanation nor alleviating the absurdities of the universe. However, I agree that an act of faith is necessary, whether classical logic holds or not. For what would be the meaning of "faith" if the existence of god could be logically or empirically proved. --Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 14:29, 24 August 2006 (UTC)
If the function of asserting the hypothesis of a supreme being, was to alleviate the absurdity of the universe, I agree that one would by hypothesizing in vain. This hypothesis won't do that work. All good hypotheses provide explanation and comfort on one front while providing additional questions and confusion on other fronts. In philosophy of science this is called "richness," and its the heart of the difference between an open research program and a degenerate one. The fact that hypothesizing a supreme being creates as much confusion as it settles, and raises more questions than it settles is not a mark against it, but for it, and is part and parcel with hypothesis in general.
If the hypothesis of a supreme being can't do any work at all for us, it is in trouble, but the fact that it can't make the universe less absurd, and that it raises more questions than it answers are neither marks against it, any more than they are marks against hypotheses like atoms or black holes. The faith and empirical proof bit is a dodge too. I have faith in my wife despite empirical evidence for her existence, and I could say similar things about other divinities that are easy to prove the existence of (say Julius Caesar or the Mississippi river, where it is the divinity of the entity which is disputed rather than the existence of it). I can rehearse all the arguments for the existence of a supreme being, and that isn't the same thing as faith, but you could still have faith even if you took the arguments to be persuasive. Proof does not demolish faith, although ala Kierkegaard is does demolish risk, which makes it difficult to demonstrate one's faith. Bmorton3 14:48, 24 August 2006 (UTC)
All good hypotheses provide explanation and comfort on one front while providing additional questions and confusion on other fronts. True. But that hypothesis of god exists does not explain anything that I can imagine any better that the hypothesis that there is only the universe and nothing supernatural phenomena (BTW; if it is supernatural how can it be a phenomenon in the first place. How can something that is not a part of nature, according to most versions, intelligibly interact with nature and its constituents). Since the hypothesis does not provide a positive function of explanation (what progress, what fruits, what new predictions has the hypothesis of god created for us over the last two thousand years??),then it is a superfluous hypothesis which should be eliminated by Occam's razor. --Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 15:16, 24 August 2006 (UTC)
And, of course, if god IS everything (this is not what omnipotence means, but pantheism), then he is all the evil, darkness and destruction that has ever existed, exists, and will ever exist in the universe. god IS the Holocaust and its executioners, for example. These things were done by god. Adolf Hitler is god. The next time someone tries to rape, torture and shred your wife, child or mother to pieces, just remember that it was god who, not only willed it, but WAS IT---the event itself. Please don't try to stop it from happening.--Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 09:04, 24 August 2006 (UTC)
Well if evil, darkness, and destruction exist rather than being lacks, as Plato and Plotinus and such argue. Pantheism doesn't require that God IS these things, only that these things are part or God, or that God is present in them (in the same way that you are not your liver). The Hindus and Neo-Pagans sometimes really do take this line, (and Jews often take the line that all bad things are from God take a look at the book of Job again sometime). Its hard for some people to swallow the line that rape and shoah are aspects of the Divine, but for others it is a kind of comfort, God dwells in even the most terrible things imaginable. Even the most terrible things have some degree of good otherwise they wouldn't exist. Also none of that would imply that we shouldn't attempt to stop terrible things, that's just strawmanning pantheism. Bmorton3 14:11, 24 August 2006 (UTC)

(edit-conflicted)

Well, I will grant you that pantheism may not be so simply characterized. But this was the position expressed by the previous commentator. That was the I was arguing against. My error was in mischaracterizing that position as pantheism, then. No intentional straw manning of pantheism. the argument the other commentator made was that God IS everything (of course this is ambiguous, but i take it to mean the IS of "identity" and not "compositionality"). I suggested that: if God is everything, every being, every even, already, then the concept of "creation" (bringing into being) is logically nonsensical (unless you are a dialetheist, of course, and nonsense and sense are indistinguishable it seems to me). I cannot agree that "even the most terrible things" have some degree of good. I will not argue against this theodicy, however. It is just something I reject based on personal experience. But, in any case, even if it did, the balance of good versus evil may be far outweighed by the evil. This is the pointless argument between pessimists and optimists. As Nietzsche put it somewhere, I cannot get outside of the universe and take a god's-eye view (or view from nowhere, in Nagel's term) and judge whether the universe has more good in it or bad in it. I can only look from my own tiny, inescapable perspective. And, finally, if you accept the sort of fatalism that results from the view described above (not necessarily from pantheism) then you really would be logically confused to act against evil. --Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 14:53, 24 August 2006 (UTC)
Ah lots of cool stuff here. 1) fair enough about the God IS everything stuff. 2) Dialetheism does NOT break down the distinction between sense and nonsense, but many people say "nonsense" when they mean "false." Ibble Glibble Bleeble remains a piece of nonsense, as does A if and only if, if and only if B (because of the repeated connectives). Dialetheism has no direct effect on which claims are or are not well-formed, which are sensical and which are nonsensical. What does happen is that reductio ad absurdum fails in some cases. It might even be that some claims about which claims are sensical and nonsensical are themselves dialetheia, I've got a paper on some plausible cases of that somewhere if you're interested. Dialetheism means that just because something is false, doesn't imply that it isn't also true (although on many pictures that is rare). In a fully consistent logic, absurd and nonsense are often confused even though they technically mean different things, but a paraconsistent logic the absurd and the nonsensical are quite different beasties. 3) We shan't fight theodicies them, I wasn't trying to convince you, merely to point out that some people find that theodicy comforting although others do not. 4) The balance of evil thing I will fight on. Even if the balance of evil where higher than the overall good for a particular universe, what would that prove? There would still be a motive to maximize the good of that universe, there would still be a motive to fight til Ragnarok's brink despite the doom. Any creator of that universe would still have created good as well as evil. Probably there would still even be particular goods unique to that universe which could not be realized in a less terrible universe. We can't get an outside view of our "eigenuniverse," (hee hee) but we can have an outside view of other possible worlds. Take a world W where we will stipulate that the evil it is clearly outweighs the good. What would follow from that? Bmorton3 15:17, 24 August 2006 (UTC)
No, I'm aware of the error I fell into about dialetheism. It's basically the view that contradictions do not lead to everything, if I understand correctly. You're correct: nonsense is about well-formedness and contradiction is about truth and falsity of the same claims. Still, it is considered a rather bizarre view with bizarre consequences by most logicians. I try to remain as open-minded as I can about such things: it often turns out that some new logic that is minimized or ridiculed winds up leading to extraordinary and valuable insights about something, somewhere. Fuzzy logic is a good example. Though it's generally considered defective in many ways, yet it has been of great use in robotics and other areas. On the last point, I'm mot even close to believing that from the existence of a great amount of evil in the universe, it follows that man should do nothing. I was saying that if you are a fatalist of a certain extreme type, who believes that God IS everything an everything is predestined with no becoming or change, then there seems to be no meaning in acting to prevent evil. My point about pessimism and optimism is just that there is no way to tell, one way or the other. It's on this sense that I don't really think the problem of evil has any relevance for the question of god's existence or non-existence. Your way of putting the case, in fact, in terms of possible world W which has M amount of evil and possible world M' which has a greater quantity of evil, shows that the possibilities are infinite in both directions. What does this mean? I don't know. But I cant see why world W would have been created by god, world W' not created by god because it contained less or more evil, etc.. Perhaps the problem of evil is irrelevant. Anyway, if there more evil a possible world rather than less, one should fight against it on moral and humanitarian grounds. Whether a belief in god aids someone in this process of striving to do the good will most likely be up to the individual case. I know belief helps my mother to be a more morally exceptional persons than she could otherwise be. My brother, who does not believe, is also morally exceptional but without any belief in God.--Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 15:49, 24 August 2006 (UTC)
We are in much agreement here. Dialetheism is still considered pretty bizarre among logicians from the western traditions, it has been a normal assumption in the Indian logical tradition for thousands of years, and I ain't confident which tradition represents "most logicians." The view that contradictions don't lead to everything is Paraconsistent Logic, it's a less extreme position that whether contradictions exist or not, they still shouldn't lead to triviality. It emerges out of mainstream worries about relevency requirements for the conditional, error-tolerant reasoning, etc. I don't think it is considered that bizarre anymore, even in the West. Dialetheism goes one step further and says, oh and some contradictions are actual, rather than just errors of reasoning. I also agree that different beliefs aid different people in becoming the morally best people they can be. The plurality of possible world thought experiment has a lot of weird effects for theodicies, especially the more of a modal realist one is. One possibility I'll mention (which I take to be the Gnostic line) is that God actualizes a wide variety of worlds some of which are far better than others on the belief that the best of all possible worlds is the sum of all possible worlds (or at least every world where there is a single drop of good to be realized). If so then God should realize every world from the best to the most foul, even though this actualizes lots of suffering too. Actual then becomes an indexical term much like "here" or "now." A modal non-realist (or a Catholic) isn't going to like this "pleroma" approach, but its quite natural for a modal realist. Bmorton3 20:03, 24 August 2006 (UTC)
I was pondering the possibiity of some such argument but in the other direction: if god is omnipotent, then he could actualize all possible worlds which comtain more happines, without corrsponsing suffereing, than this one. If he is omnibenevloent, then he would do so. So why doesn't he make the world woth greatest quanity of happnines the actual world. Anway, modal realists object that transworld identity either violates Leibniz law or requires weird entities such as modal parts and Lweis counterpart theory is truly odd (though very ingenous). I don't see why Catholics would object to the sort of approach you just described. --Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 10:17, 25 August 2006 (UTC)
Yeah it all comes down to many different picture of just what "benevolence" is supposed to be. Does it mean the being actualizes all worlds with any good at all? All worlds with more good than evil? All worlds with no evil at all? Only the best of all possible worlds? When do we think of a human as benevolent? When they refrain from any action with negative consequences? (I might call that fastidious, but not benevolent) When they do foul actions that nonetheless create more good than evil in the long run? (Like dutiful utilitarians). When they love all men? When they love all men equally? partially? When they are great Confucian sages? Heck there are a whole host of omnibenevolence paradoxes that are harder to fight than the omnipotence ones, even Plantinga the great defender of Catholic lines within Analytic traditions, basically gave up and said OK fine God is "morally perfect" but not really "omnibenevolent." Transworld identity isn't a problem for a picture of God in which God is prior to each of the worlds he creates. In fact I'm not certain why that would be a problem here. (Although people have complained that transworld identity problems sink my free-will account, I have to retreat to "relative identity" theory, but I'm enough of a Heraclitian to think that strict identity claims are never true anyway, so retreating to relative identity isn't much of a retreat.) Catholics don't like the Pleroma account, partially because of the links to Gnosticism in the early Church, but I've also never found Catholics particularly comfortable with the notion of God creating more than one world (even though they admit he could). Are there humans in the other worlds? Did the second person incarnate multiple times? Did he incarnate into non-human forms? Are there worlds where humans never fell? Are there whole worlds worth of fore-damned folk with no hope of salvation? My experience is that multiple worlds open a whole can of worms that gives most Christians the willies (although Mormons love exploring the possibilities). Bmorton3 14:52, 25 August 2006 (UTC)
I disagree with the article because it forgets that God (referring to Judeo-Christianity) can do all things that are "intrinsically possible." For example, God does not know "round circles", nor is he able to "sin" (for there is no darkness in Him), thus the entire argument rests on an inaccurate premise. This information will not be included within the article because the article merely explains the argument.--[[User:NWalters

torf|NWalterstorf]] 03:00, 22 August 2006 (UTC)

"for there is no darkness in Him". Then why does "Him" allow so much darkness in the world? --Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 08:50, 24 August 2006 (UTC)
C'mon you know several answers people have given to this one. Check problem of evil if you need reminders. Or do you want to fight the problem of evil again here on the talk pages? Bmorton3 14:11, 24 August 2006 (UTC)
Of course, the argument has gone on since the beginning of rational communication, probably. I don't want to rehearse the whole thing. My point was simply to respond to the almost-arrogant theological platitudes that have put forth on this page by several people. I did not intend to open up a new chapter and revolutionize the debate about the existence of god. You're very good at this stuff and you're a much, much, faster typist than I am. In another context, I might be able to hold my own. Here I'm almost certain to be edit-conflicted three times by the time I get one response in. Post!!--Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 15:04, 24 August 2006 (UTC)
HEHE, fair enough. Arrogant platitudes annoy me too. Just don't beat up too much on good hearted folk who are trying to work with platitudes in good faith. Some folk thrive on intellectual dispute and some on platitutes. Arguing intellectually against someone presenting an epigram is like boxing in art class. Bmorton3 20:03, 24 August 2006 (UTC)
Well, this IS a philosophy page and people seem to love to just throw out their opinions on here without any argument or reflection whatsoever. So I am often tempted to provoke them to justify themselves. I generallly do not beat up on the good-hearted folk who thrive on platitudes; its usually the other way around (espcially over here in Italy). I live a small, out-of-the-way village in which my cousin (a divorce lawyer) is considered to be a serious philospher and intellectual because he wrote a book (self-published) insisting that the strory of Genesis is literally true, Darwin was evil and so on. You do not argue with such people. You do not even dare to disgree!! You are an infidel and you are going to hell. I was declared that I didn't beleive in god to one of my cousins and she just looked at me as if I had declared that I had killed and eaten several realtives. LOL!! I'm roughed up with such platitues every day. Even the Pope, who knows better but is poltically astute, foments this kind of dangerous nonsense by distorting words like "relativism" to be identical with datheism, atehsim to be identical with degenearetion and evil and the death of Western civilization. If the center-left bring up the possibility of legalizing "civil unions" between non-married couple and homosexcuals, it is prooof that "relativism" is taking over. Cardinal Ruini will come out and declare that Catholics must follow their "conscience" (i.e. the dogmas and dictates of the Church) and combat the spread of the indisipus disease of unbelief and relativism. Give me a break. I rarely get to discuss this stuff in a serious, philosophical context.--Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 10:04, 25 August 2006 (UTC)
(reseting too many tabs) HA! Fair enough. Since I teach both philosophy and religion in Indiana, I'm used to my philosophy students roughing up the few good hearted religious types willing to brave a philosophy class, I can imagine that in the Italy the reverse problem is far more common. Philosophers and non-philosophers are sharing this wiki-location, and omniscience paradox and free will are places likely to get cross over where we need to work together. But yeah challange and provoke to think are good impulses. If you want to, next time your cousin annoys you on this stuff ask him in the most polite way you can, whether Genesis literally teaches that God made man before birds or birds before man, and then watch to see him reconcile Gen 1 and Gen 2. You are right you don't argue or disagree with people who are convinced they are right, there is no point. But as good old Socrates teaches, you can ask them polite questions designed to get them thinking, uncertain and and beginning to doubt. If you come on strong they'll bluster and shout, if you come on curious they often can't resist showing off. Or screw him and don't bother. All I'm saying is chat philosophy with people who are willing and able to chat back with you, or if you want to bother with interacting with religious folk, try to do so from within their framework, otherwise they'll just shrug you off, and you're wasting your time. And here in wiki-land try to share space with people while assuming good faith. I subscribe to a strong version of the Davidsonian principle of charity which says that I personally learn more when I assume the other guy is saying the smartest thing I can interpret them as saying, so it benefits ME to assume the best. Just like you did with the Pope, you could assume he's screwing up the philosophy, but instead you assumed he was playing politics. But of course I'm not as good at actually doing it when someone ticks me off ... Oh well. Bmorton3 14:33, 25 August 2006 (UTC)


We humans can know round circles, and even "square circles" Bmorton3 20:20, 22 August 2006 (UTC)

I have heavily edited the page, re-organizing and re-structuring things in terms of P. T. Geach's article on omnipotence. Bmorton3 20:20, 22 August 2006 (UTC)

I'm not sure what it means to "disagree with the article" since the article doesn't make an argument. Are you, NW, trying to say even acknowledging that people have historically discussed such a paradox is itself non-encyclopedia and silence on the subject would be better? --Christofurio 16:05, 23 August 2006 (UTC)
Interestingly though, Christofurio, the article is categorized as an "atheism"-related article. What is an "atheism-related" article? An article about Richard Dawkins might fall in that cat perhaps, but I thought this was a philosophy article. --Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 15:59, 24 August 2006 (UTC)
Lots of philosophy articles that might be taken as arguments against the existence of God get that tag, and I suppose the Omnipotence Paradox might be taken as an argument against the existence of God. Bmorton3 20:03, 24 August 2006 (UTC)

Hem,wikipedia is not a soapbox.I think that you are overwelmly in that fealed at this section.--Pixel ;-) 00:40, 17 September 2006 (UTC)

It isn't a soapbox, but it is an attempt to make the basic arguments on various sides availible and free to the public in as NPOV a way as possible. We present information about atheism, Christianity, Chad, Star Trek, First Order Logics, whatever. Atheism has as much right to have a WikiProject and categorize the pages they want to keep track of, as Philosophy, or Christianity, or Chad does. The Atheism folks haven't been helping much on this page recently, but they have in the past, and might do so again someday. At the moment the page cites far more Christian defenders of somekind of Omnipotent Being, than atheist opponents of it, but we do try to do both. Bmorton3 12:55, 18 September 2006 (UTC) Bmorton3 12:55, 18 September 2006 (UTC)

bmorton3&lacatocias how fascinating your interchange, my 1 query when infinite powers are assigned to a being and next impossible tasks demanded would not the wait be infinity? theodicy, dialetheism,multiple worlds,ahh.

GOD can create multiple universe in which there is one where he cannot lift the stone he makes, but in another he can... and so can do anything still.Jiohdi (talk) 16:01, 30 January 2008 (UTC)

[edit] Merge?

Should this article simply be merged with omnipotence?? or paradox or something? I've always been puzzled by this Featured Article about a single paradox...--Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 09:54, 27 August 2006 (UTC)

Nah there are lots of pages on individual paradoxes, there is a whole list of paradox pages, and the paradox main page is for explaining what paradoxes are, not exploring individual ones. We could maybe merge with omnipotence but both seem pretty healthy on their own to me.

[edit] Back from Italy

I see this article is undergoing a well-need overhaul. I see it still contains the opening-ish sentence 'The omnipotence paradox (also known as the paradox of the stone) is a paradox that arises when attempting to apply logic to the notion of an omnipotent being.'

There is something truly horrible about this. Can't quite put my finger on it. Is it the suggestion that paradoxes don't arise unless we 'apply logic'. Or is it the expression 'apply logic'. I automatically had the urge to put scare quotes around it. Dbuckner 21:01, 27 August 2006 (UTC)

First sentence. The omnipotence paradox (also known as the paradox of the stone) is a paradox that arises when attempting to apply logic to the notion of an omnipotent being.

The word 'logic' is surely superfluous. Do any paradoxes arise when we do not attempt to apply logic? And is it POV to imply that the paradox arises at all? The word 'paradox' occurs three times in the first sentence. The word 'stone' is used here, whereas below the word 'rock'.

'The paradox arises from the question of whether or not an omnipotent being is able to perform actions that would limit its own omnipotence, thus becoming non-omnipotent.'

Second sentence. The paradox arises from the question of whether or not an omnipotent being is able to perform actions that would limit its own omnipotence, thus becoming non-omnipotent.

Why is this a paradox? There is no paradox in the idea that an actually omnipotent being could make itself not omnipotent, and is thus potentially non-omnipotent.

Is there a source for the original formulation? Averroes is mentioned only once. What is the source? The version attributed to Averroes is the triangle one, not the 'stone' one. Where does the stone one come from?

I checked on Q25 of the Summa, which does not mention Averroes.

I could do some work around this, but, as Franco asks, is it worth doing a lot of work (and this needs a LOT of work) around a single paradox? Dbuckner 05:53, 28 August 2006 (UTC)

Many paradoxes emerge without applying logic, but if the phrase bugs ya, come up with a better one, BE BOLD. Economic "paradoxes" only need to be counter-intuitive, for example. Paradox is not a term limited to philosophical applications. Look at the Wikipedia definition of paradox there is nothing POV about claiming that a paradox arises, any more than saying that a puzzle or complexity arises. The omnipotent being making itself non-omnipotent is in fact one of the philosophical responses we mention, but trust me on this, many people do not see that way out at first. I don't know where the stone version is first made, and off hand I wouldn't be surprised if its origin is simply not known. Bmorton3 14:14, 28 August 2006 (UTC)

[edit] More delving

I did a little more delving. The expression 'Paradox of the Stone' goes back at least to an article by C. Wade Savage, in Philosophical Review 1967. I don't have a copy of this, but you can access the first page on JSTOR. An earlier article referred to is by Mavrodes, "Some puzzles concerning Omnipotence", Philosophical Review 1963.

Does the paradox exist in this form earlier than that? If not, then we need to resolve the confusion about whether this article is about 'The Paradox of the Stone', or whether about other omnipotence puzzles, such as whether God can create a triangle whose angles do not add up to the right amount &c.

This is an excellent point. I was unable to put my finger on it, but I suspected there was something basically wrong with the formulation "omnipotence paradox" as the title of this article. I had heard of the "paradox of the stone", and whenever I goodled the two terms, I would get many hits for "paradox of stome" but very few and very unspecific ones for "omniptence paradox. This article seems to treat primarily of the "stone paradox and only tangentially of the other related paradoxes of omnipotence. It's odd. This is also why I added "also known as "paradox of the stone" in the intro sentence. The title could be changed to either "paradox of the stone" or "onmiptence paradoxes". But, as Dbukcner points out, it has to be decided what exacly the article treats of.


There is also a characteristically good statement of the paradox by Peter Suber | here. Follow

.

If an entity has the power to make any law or do any act at any time, then can it limit its own power to act or make law? If it can, then it can't, and if it can't, then it can. If it can do any act at any time, then it can limit or destroy itself, because that is an act; but it cannot do so, because doing it means it cannot and could not do any act at any time.

Suber also draws in some wider implications of the paradox. And he sensibly comments "The idea of a sovereign or a deity is vague and requires much preliminary specification before the contours of the problem can come into relief.".

What to do? Is this article about the paradox of the Stone? Or about the family of paradoxes involving divine omnipotence? Is it worth being in WP at all? I think yes, because it's a good example of a standard objection to the existence of God, which still clearly exerts a hold on popular imagination. Any such article should therefore

1. Give a historical background to the problem. (Including sources for the 'stone' formulation, other instances of omnipotence paradoxes). 2. Contemporary responses to the paradox (Savage, Geach &c) 3. Contemporary relevance (Suber's article gives a sense of this) 4. Further reading

But this, repeat, is a LOT of work. Given the dire state of philosophy in WP, are there better things to do? Dbuckner 06:32, 28 August 2006 (UTC) --Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 08:02, 28 August 2006 (UTC)

Given the nonsense that IS in WP, I think the question about remaining in WP is obvious. Why not? It's WP, not SEP!! But this is a lot of work indeed, and I personally have few resources on this, except what people can point me to on the net. As usual, I shall do what I can to help, nevertheless. --Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 08:02, 28 August 2006 (UTC)
I'm prepared to put in some work. Presumably Brian is too. My preferred style of working, as you know, is not to rush in with spell and grammar checking (why do all that when the corrected words may be removed at any point in the process - leave that sort of stuff until last. Ditto footnotes - renumbering is an awful pain - collect the references in the talk page or somewhere and bang them in at the end). Logical way to work is, decide on the basics that go into the article - starting of course with the question of what the article is about in the first place, then build up from those bones. Dbuckner 11:58, 28 August 2006 (UTC)
I've downloaded the Latin of Summa Contra Gentiles, Book II. There is some more stuff there. Back later. Dbuckner 12:02, 28 August 2006 (UTC)
I am worried that a historical background to the problem consistutes OR, there was some background on the 13th century Averroist versions that was in the original FA version, but it seemed to be confusing Ibn Rushd with Parisians influenced by him, look at the condemnation of 1277 (art 17, for instance). I'll check Ps-D on Omnipotence. My intuition is that the paradox of the stone is far older than the 20th century, but I don't have evidence yet. Bmorton3 14:14, 28 August 2006 (UTC)
Hawking supposedly discusses the historical background in Brief History of Time, if it hasn't been stolen from your libraries check it, that's a good enough source for here. Pseudo-Dionysius discusses a version of the omnipotence paradox debated between Elymas the Magician and St. Paul in Acts 13:8, but it isn't the stone version. Bmorton3 14:21, 28 August 2006 (UTC)
I agree with BM3. It seems intuitively obvious that the "stone paradox" goes back...well, to the age of the stones, almost. But I don't see why we can't just leave it approx. the way it is now: one version of the omni pardox is the stone paradox: "Could being create stone....?" <ref>Savage...</ref> .This way we avoid having to make a specific historical commitment as well as Original Research. I don't have access to JSTOR, but the basic argument is right there on the from page!!--Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 14:35, 28 August 2006 (UTC)
Seems like it ought to be old. But I've read through II 25 of Contra Gentiles, and can't find any reference there. (The article in question is a list of all the things that God can't do – such as create a being identical to himself, destroy himself, commit sin &c). As you say, it ought to be old, but cannot find any source. Art 17. of the 1277 condemnations contains no direct reference. I've also looked in my collection of scholastic books, and also the big brown book in the hall, but without success. I like the new introduction by the way. Much better. I'll go on researching the background, you guys are doing a good job with the rewrite, I won't interfere. Dbuckner 16:20, 28 August 2006 (UTC)

[edit] What still needs to be done here??

I've address all the minor stuff abaout lists and the introductory sentences. I can find nothing on the history of this stuff. It seems to me that a few more refernces are needed and that's about it. The article is mcuh better than it was when it made FA in the first place and it now has in-line citations.--Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 15:06, 29 August 2006 (UTC)

I think we need to nail down the Hawking cite, the Ibn Rushd cite, and if we can find some history on the paradox of the stone add that but I think that is non-essential. Anything else? Bmorton3 15:10, 29 August 2006 (UTC)
Hmmm....very nice!! Now I can just burn a copy of it to DVD. [http://www.physics.metu.edu.tr/~fizikt/html/hawking/A_Brief_History_in_Time.html

A Brief History of Time online]...--Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 15:31, 29 August 2006 (UTC)

Crap it has lots of anthropic principle stuff and mentions God a lot but doesn't do the Omnipotence stuff at all. Maybe he did it somewhere else, or maybe he never did it at all. It doesn't even seem to support the citation we are using it for (which is probably about Brief History of Time, rather than IN Brief History of Time). Maybe we should just cut Hawkings and make the argument without attributing an originator. I hate tracking down other people's work with scant clues ... grr Bmorton3 15:56, 29 August 2006 (UTC)
Yeah, very disappointing. He does mention it!! He says somthing like "it's like the old paradox: can god create a stone that he cannot lift. Well, Augustine showed that time exists only inside the universe." And that's about it. LOL! Well, it's Wikipedia. A short time ago there was no policy on citations at all, so you can't really blame anyone either. Do what you think's best.--Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 16:31, 29 August 2006 (UTC)

I would have been surprised if Hawking had mentioned it. Most of these science books, once they stray outside their specific subject matter, rely on Wikipedia (joke).

I have to admit this is true, even though I am a naturalistic sort. Win a noble prize for some amazing but extremely specific contribution to the understanding of the three-dimensional issoconformational structute of the intergenomic anoalous mitochondria, and you can then publish books about the nature of consciouenss, the universe and life itself (title of a book by Francis Crick). But, then, it makes a great deal of--Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 07:42, 30 August 2006 (UTC) money.

Anyway, I did something positive and translated Aquinas CG 2.25, which is the list of things God can't do. This has interesting things like God can't make the angles of a triangle not equal to two right angles, God can't make the past not exist, can't create himself, can't destroy himself, can't make someone like himself and so on. No mention of stone or lapis or anything remotely similar. Given he was probably listing what other people have said on the subject, it seems unlikely that the stone example dates back this far.

I also translated some of Suarez Disputation 30 on the same subject. S. is much later and is also a valuable source in that he gives citations (unlike medieval writers who just say 'some people say that ...' - good job Wikipedia not around then, or they would have had Sandy to reckon with, also Tony who would have criticised their copious use of the word etiam). Anyway, Suarez doesn't mention stones either. I did a Google site search on all the Latin sites I know for 'lapis' and its derivatives. No luck so far. I'll keep on searching, as it kind of interests me now.

All for now. I thought you have done some splendid work here. Dbuckner 19:10, 29 August 2006 (UTC)

Grr I'm no longer convinced the Averroes stuff is correct. Oh he discusses the paradox of omnipotence alright, and has some very sophisticated things to say, he also claims that God can do anything that isn't logically impossible. He and Ghazali even fight over exactly what the difference between the logically impossible, the naturally impossible, and the habitually uncommon is. Tahafut al Tahafut 529-536 is all about this stuff. He uses a few concrete examples, God cannot make white identical to black, "since the negation of white is implied in the affirmation of black, the simultaneous affirmation and negation of white is impossible." (536) God cannot make a person be in two places at once, but could animate a corpse. The only web sources which support this claim reference and old version of this page, none of my secondary books on Ibn Rushd say anything about this triangle argument. WP, and the IEP don't mention it. But he wrote a lot, it could be a throwaway example in some book I haven't read. Bmorton3 21:02, 29 August 2006 (UTC)

The WP:Contact page claims that the book Contact attributes this doctrine to Ibn Rushd, maybe given all the atheists working on this page back in FA, that is where they got the claim. Contact doesn't use footnotes does it? Bmorton3 21:24, 29 August 2006 (UTC)

The triangle example does go back to Descartes and Kant, but this page, seems to have inadvertantly attributed it to Ibn Rushd, probably because someone screwed up reading Contact closely, grrrr, I hate spreading urban legends and disinformation accidently. Bmorton3 21:28, 29 August 2006 (UTC)

Well in fact the triangle example goes back at least to Aquinas, as I've said. Who also mentions the black and white argument, without mentioning Averroes. Also the corpse example, also without mentioning Averroes. Can we infer that, although he normally mentions 'the commentator' by name, that here he isn't, but is nonetheless using his arguments. I take it you are looking at secondary sources? Is there a primary source for Averroes on this subject? Is there an expert in the field who we could email? Dbuckner 05:40, 30 August 2006 (UTC)
I found Tahafut al Tahafut by the way. Thanks for the tip, I didn't know this was on the net. But A. wrote lots of commentaries didn't he. I wonder if the example is there. I know there's a specific bit of Aristotle where the omnipotence thing crops up. I tried a bit of site searching for 'triangle' on muslimphilosophy but no luck. I'm certain the example is before Aquinas. Indeed, any scholastic example you find is usually some old chestnut going way back. Golden mountain, for example, which predates Meinong considerably. Dbuckner 05:58, 30 August 2006 (UTC)
"Cum principia quarundam scientiarum, ut logicae, geometriae et arithmeticae, sumantur ex solis principiis formalibus rerum, ex quibus essentia rei dependet, sequitur quod contraria horum principiorum Deus facere non possit: sicut quod genus non sit praedicabile de specie; vel quod lineae ductae a centro ad circumferentiam non sint aequales; aut quod triangulus rectilineus non habeat tres angulos aequales duobus rectis." Contra Gentiles, 2.25
Which I translate as folllows "Since the principles of certain sciences, such as logic, geometry and arithmetic are taken only from the formal principles of things, on which the essence of the thing depends, it follows that God could not make things contrary to these principles. For example, that a genus was not predicable of the species, or that lines drawn from the centre to the circumference were not equal, or that a triangle did not have three angles equal to two right angles." Dbuckner 11:33, 30 August 2006 (UTC)
An idea just struck me: do you think it would seem anti-Wikipedian if we just quoted the Latin version.--Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 11:47, 30 August 2006 (UTC)
From what I've been able to gather here: a) the triangle example IS mentioned in Aquinas. No explicit connection to Averroes has been found. I suggest that we should either ask an expert on Averroes (but this is an unlikely path) or just say something like "the triangle example,which goes back at least to Aquinas' Summa Contra Gentile (citation)...etc.. That would be fine, I think. b) There is something called WP:Contact which I've never heard of, but which may be useful. What the devil is it?--Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 07:51, 30 August 2006 (UTC)
Oh, I see. The Wiki article on the book Contact by Carl Sagan. Well, the warning is (used to be anyway) on the main page: please keep in mind that Wikipedia is known to contain unreliable information.LOL!!--Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 07:59, 30 August 2006 (UTC)
Aha right it goes to Aquinas, and it sure looks like its in a list of other examples being kicked around at the time, maybe it does go to Averroes, and it is just in one of the other works besides the Tahafut al-Tahafut (BTW I didn't know it was on the net, I went to my library and read the physical book in the sections that the secondaries had mentioned when discussing Averroes opinions of "What God can Do" that's why I couldn't do a text search or anything). He certainly discusses a lot of related stuff in other texts, so it could well be somewhere other than his dispute with Ghazali. I think we can cite the T al-T that Averroes discussed the Omnipotence Paradox, and cite Aquinas for the triangle example, as long as we phrase it that it might have been earlier. Bmorton3 15:30, 30 August 2006 (UTC)
I've done some more digging and someone told me Urban and Walton's collection The Power of God: Readings on Omnipotence and Evil? It has some excellent articles on this topic, including several efforts by contemporary logicians to translate and resolve the stone-lifting problem. It also includes excerpts from Anselm, Aquinas (including the one you cite), Peter Damian, et alii, on similar issues. However I don't have access to a library (except my own, which doesn't contain this one). Is there any chance you could find it, Brian? Dbuckner 07:25, 31 August 2006 (UTC)
Otherwise, I think Brian's suggestion is fine. I am still determined to locate an earlier source given, as I say, that Aquinas nearly always cites something 'kicking around'. Dbuckner 07:25, 31 August 2006 (UTC)
Yup we've got it I'll go get it later today Bmorton3 13:57, 31 August 2006 (UTC)
This book has jack-all to say about Averroes, in fact it has no non-Christians, except a brief Spinoza except. I might be able to find some stuff on the stone, though. The language Aquinas uses in the Summa Contra Gentiles, mirrors some stuff in Quaestiones Disputatae De Potentia Dei, and our Aquinas page claims its unknown which is earlier. But in QD De Potentia Dei, he makes the argument about what is geometrically or mathematically impossible without giving an example, and claims its one of 3 different kinds of impossibility that he has interpreted from Aristotle's metaphysics 5, 12 (and sure enough that is what Aristotle says about potency and possibility there, but his example is about the diagonal of a square being commensurate with a side of the square). Hey St. Peter Damian argues for God's ability to change the past! Frankfurt asserts in 1964 that the puzzle of the stone is "well-known" so it's probably earlier than Mavrodes' 1963 article. hmm, damn this book doesn't answer our questions and instead raises many more. Damn I argued that that was a good thing to Lacatosias the other day didn't I? Bmorton3 15:09, 31 August 2006 (UTC)
Augustine, much earlier, argues that God cannot destroy the past. "Anyone who says, 'If God is omnipotent, let him make what has happened not to have happened,' does not realize that he is saying, 'If God is omnipotent, let him make true things false insofar as they are true.'" (XXVI Contra Faustum cap. 5) Dbuckner 15:35, 31 August 2006 (UTC)
Yup, and St. Jerome, and Aquinas even Aristotle quoting Agathon agree (Ethics 6,2, 1139b 10), but St. Peter Damian argues the other side! Bmorton3 15:55, 31 August 2006 (UTC)
Sorry, wasn't reading carefully enough. St Peter Damian says God CAN change the past? What is the argument? This page is exerting a horrid fascination, when there are so much more 'important' things to do. Dbuckner 18:27, 31 August 2006 (UTC)
Well he's got about 6 pages, and lots of Bible quotes and lots of God is omnipotent afterall stuff, but the main argument seems to be 1) If every power is co-eternal with God then God is able to make it so that what was done, was not done, 2) But every power is co-eternal with God. 3)So ... Ok there's a bit where he talks about the status of the men before the flood, God created them, destroyed them, took away there future, but did not take away the fact that they had been. For Damien, these are seperate sentiments. Contrariwise, the "as regards the merits of the depraved men who were destroyed in these catastrophes" they tended towards non-being rather than being because of their refusal to cleave to God, and quoting Wisdom of Solomon 2:1f he says "For we are born from nothing; and we shall here after be as if we had never been" that is they will tend towards non-being to the extent of it being as if God had removed there past, as well as their present and future. He says "If what came about was evil, it was not something, but rather nothing. Furthermore, it ought to be said not to have been, because it did not have the wherewithal for existing since the Creator of all has not commanded it to exist."

"We can properly say that God can act in his invariable and most constant everlastingness that what had been done in our transient state of affairs was not done. So we say "Surely God CAN bring it about that Rome which was founded in ancient times, was not founded." The assertion "Surely he can do it" is said consistently in the present tense as far as the changeless eternity of the Omnipotent God is concerned; but with regards to us, where is continuous mobility and perpetual change, we more naturally say "he could have done so" as is customary." Because God does not change but we do, the power that God once had to bring it about that Rome not be founded, God still has and has in the present tense, to bring it about that Rome was not founded. Bmorton3 19:33, 31 August 2006 (UTC) God has power "over that which is made, and that which is not made"Since God is outside of time

Do think he would count as a 'lone crank' or does he represent a significant subculture. But then he's a Saint, I suppose. Any of those contributing to Wikipedia? Dbuckner 15:25, 2 September 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Irrelevant question

Why are Americans so damned obsessed with French and other so-called "continental" philosophy? Over here, it is generally considered nonsense in the universities and serious academic discussions rarely conentrate on nutjobs such as Foucault, Derrida, etc,.. This is truly bizarre. --Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 16:10, 31 August 2006 (UTC)

That, as you say, is an irrelevant question. Dbuckner 18:27, 31 August 2006 (UTC)

[edit] reversion of user SOuj1ro's edits

I have reverted the recent POV edits by So32 (or whatever the heck. I wish people would use real names around here). He thinks that Geach's distinction between various levels of omnipotence are not particularly convincing. Neither do I, but that's no reason to remove them from an encylopedia article. They are central to Peter Geach's discussion of the paradox of omnipotence. Geach's dicussions of these matters seem to be very influential in contemprpary philosophy of religion. Therefore, they should stay. Period.--Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 09:17, 1 September 2006 (UTC)

If you wanted to use a different set of types of omnipotence (and cite them) that would be fine, especially if we synched up with the main Omnipotence page, but you need some discussion of the different kinds of attribution of powerfulness, to explain the differences between Descartes, Aquinas, Mavrodes, Geach, etc. Bmorton3 13:35, 1 September 2006 (UTC)
Ah....I think that's what I just said.--Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 13:45, 1 September 2006 (UTC)
User:Lacatosias - The username would be S0uj1r0. It's in the article's edit history, the FAR page, and as such, I would think not all too difficult to keep track of. I'm not going to simply revert, but the edits were not POV. I'll admit to not having read Geach's treatise on the subject, so perhaps you have the edge here. However, it's not that I disagree with any of his definitions, but rather that I think they may be excessively complicated for use in this article, and his relation to the subject is not well-established in this article, or even in the article on Geach himself. Also, I made a number of other minor structural improvements unrelated to Geach entirely that you reverted without apparent concern. Perhaps you can review these and integrate some of them, as User:Bmorton3 has done a bit of, if they seem beneficial.
User:Bmorton3 - You state on the FAR page, "There are lots of easy things that 2 requires but 3 doesn't. This is the heart of Mavrodes' argument." Perhaps if either George Mavrodes (whose article contains nothing more than "George I. Mavrodes is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Michigan and author of Belief in God: A Study in the Epistemology of Religion.") or his support for points 3 and 4 are to be considered of any importance, perhaps he deserves somewhat more than the two-sentence summation given in the article. Furthermore, without the example you gave on the FAR page, the distinction between "logically consistent" and a "logically consistent state of affairs" in Geach's points 3 and 2, respectively, is unclear. You also state, "Anselm argues that God is omnipotent despite the omnipotence paradox because omnipotent only means almighty, not something stronger. Geach argues that God isn't omnipotent, because of the omnipotence paradox, but that God is something else very close, namely "almighty." Would it be possible to expand on this to make each of their arguments clear in article itself? Between Geach, Mavrodes, Anselm, Aquinas (especially Aquinas), and Descartes, I think it becomes quite easy for confusion to result about who is putting forth or supporting which arguments. Since the average user of Wikipedia cannot be expected to have read all of the sources cited for each philosopher (and if they had, it can reasonably be expected that they wouldn't be turning to Wikipedia for their information), the article could certainly stand to be more clear in this regard. You say to "Look at Cowan's 1964 objection" and "Cowan proves the difference between the two as a theorem", yet he is mentioned only once at the top of the article in passing, with "Some philosophers, such as J. L Cowan, see this paradox as a reason to reject the possibility of any absolutely omnipotent entity", and cited as a reference at the bottom. Without even an article on this person, it's impossible to ascertain any sense of his authority on the subject despite the simple fact that he wrote a book on it. Again, as with Mavrodes, Cowan's points can't be taken into account if they're not brought up, and the support he lends to any claim is empty if he has no established weight on the subject. If he does have such weight, then please establish it. --S0uj1r0 03:44, 2 September 2006 (UTC)
Yeah those are all good points and I'll see if I can work on then tuesday. I had thought the 2 vs 3 bit was clear without all the rigamarole but I guess it isn't. I had tried to say very brief things in each of the Geach definitions to deflect these problems, but I guess we need to tackle them head on instead, sigh. Bmorton3 13:25, 4 September 2006 (UTC)
OK I tried to clarify some of the distinctions. I'm afraid I can't do anything with your worries about Mavrodes or Cowan's "authority," whatever authority they have is from the arguments they make, which are too detailed for here. There is no remedy, any page here can be no more than an outline and introduction to the debate, with citations mentioning where to go for more information. If you beleive that the support someone lends is empty if they have no established weight on a subject, then you have no motive to listen to me or anyone else on WP. I'm tired of wasting time on this article, let it rise of fall as it will, DO better if you can establish some "weight" on the subject. But I think and hope that I have addressed some of your other concerns. Bmorton3 14:36, 5 September 2006 (UTC)
The fellow is a complete newbie (not intended as an insult in any way). The point of putting in the names of philosphers, scientists and so on (with citations to the sources of article thet have written, etc) is to avoid accusations of using weasel langauge (some people, most people, etc..). Ths article originally DID NOT do that. It was chock full of such weasel terms. According to WP:Weasel policy, all that is needed is a verifiable citation. It says absoltely NIL about establishing the authority of J Fredereick Colangelli. In fact, as I undseraynd it, one can even cite one's own publcished work, as long as it is from a serious acaemic jurnal. etc.. What you ask goes beyoing even general academic starndars for citations. The source is given, it is verifibale, it is reputable and yet someone want a full article on J.L. Cowan exaplaing his importance. Worse yet, you want someone to explain on the text of THIS article who Cowan is and what his importance is. You've got a lot to learn about Wikipedia!!! A LOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOT to learn. most article still do NOT HAVY ANY citations.--Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 15:14, 5 September 2006 (UTC)
Hi, Lacatosias. I fully the understand the necessity of avoiding weasel words, but the style guide isn't quite as decisive in dealing with them as you're portraying it to be. It only states, "If a source for the opinion is cited, the readers can decide for themselves how they feel about the source's reliability." It does not say "all that is needed is a verifiable citation", as you've asserted. I agree that "Cowan argues" is superior to "some people argue", and I understand why it's not reasonable to explain in great detail who Cowan is. However, a simple sentence or clause would do to give the reader a point of reference; namedropping little-known philosophers is not a substitute for cogent argumentation. Furthermore, the claims I'm making are prescriptive, not descriptive as yours are. I know that most Wikipedia articles still remain entirely uncited. That doesn't mean that they shouldn't be improved upon. This has nothing to do with learning "about Wikipedia" or the ways that many articles fall by the wayside. This is a claim about how this article should be written and structured. My intent is only to improve the soundness of the claims in the article and do some copyediting. I'm not looking to make sweeping changes, go on a crusade, or step on anyone's toes. I first became interested in the topic when this article became a Featured Article and ended up on the front page. That was months and months ago, and I've been around for quite some time; I'm not as much as newbie as you seem to think - I just don't always log in when making edits. In any case, this isn't about Wikipedia as a whole, and it isn't about me; it's about this article. I simply believe that the section on Geach's points is a bit sloppy, sprawling, and disorganized, and in the process of cleaning it up, I decided that the article might be improved by simply removing the separate section and integrating it a little with the rest of the inline text. Obviously some editors disagreed with me, and I'm fine with that. That's why I didn't try to make a revert war out of it, and that's why I'm trying to clear things up here. If we can focus on making the article more presentable and addressing positive elements of change, not bickering about policy without necessity, things will move along a lot more productively. Thanks for your consideration. --S0uj1r0 20:00, 6 September 2006 (UTC)
Did my alterations to the definitions section satisfy you, or do you have further suggestions for its improvement? As far as I know Cowan's only claim to fame is having published an article in Analysis in 1965, which was anthologized as an important part of the debate in 1978, which frankly is more than I've pulled off, so I don't think adding anything about Cowan or Mavrodes will help here. Here, Cowan argues that ... is the best we can do, unless you've got a better suggestion. I don't think I namedrop him except in the lead paragraph (where name dropping IS appropriate because its just introducing things) and ft 16 (where the point is only that lots of different approaches have been tried, so a list of obscure philosophers should work fine). If you know a more famous philosopher who has used the paradox of omnipotence to argue against the existence of an absolutely omnipotent being, we could replace the section in the lead. I guess we could use Ethan Allen, if you'd prefer. An earlier version used Spinoza which is fair, but just barely; the cite where he uses the problem to argue against an absolutely omnipotent being is pretty unclear, and I thought a clear but obscure philosopher would be better. Bmorton3 20:21, 6 September 2006 (UTC)
I agree with Franco's revert, but the points made by Mr S0uj1r0 seem cogently argued & deserving of consideration. The idea that "the average user of Wikipedia cannot be expected to have read all of the sources cited for each philosopher (and if they had, it can reasonably be expected that they wouldn't be turning to Wikipedia for their information)" is particularly compelling. Mr S0uj1r0, do you have an account and a name? I too hate strange unreadable user ID's. I go by Dean, btw. Dbuckner 15:30, 2 September 2006 (UTC)
Thanks for your consideration. And as for the username, I see where you're coming from now. My name's Jordan, if it's more convenient. ^^ --S0uj1r0 18:09, 2 September 2006 (UTC)

[edit] FAR passed

Congratulations, folks. Good work on this one. --Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 16:44, 20 September 2006 (UTC)

PS: Lots of good links to texts which I don't have to pay for, too!! HOHO!!--Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 17:04, 20 September 2006 (UTC)


[edit] "Stone paradox" is flawed

I have never seen anyone notice how flawed the so called "stone paradox" is ("Can an omnipotent being create a stone it cannot lift?"). It treats a twofold task as one: first, a supposed omnipotent being (God, if you will) is asked to create a stone it cannot lift; and then, it is asked to lift it. I see no paradox for an omnipotent being creating a stone it cannot lift, when asked to do that, and then lifting it, when asked to do that instead. This, of course, does not solve the paradox of omnipotence. Far better examples of challenges for omnipotence are questions put out (if my memory does not fail me) by Thomas Aquinas: can an omnipotent being create another omnipotent being like itself, or can it even create a being more powerful than itself? I am not aware how Aquinas (or whoever it was) answered these questions, but I suppose his answer was negative, albeit very complex, and probably not very convincing for anyone who is not convinced about the negative answer to begin with, like Aquinas had to be, being a Christian, and a leading Catholic philosopher at that. - Thomas Helsingiensis, 20 December, 2006.

[edit] Omnipotence Paradox does not involve any logical impossibility at all


Unlike the square-triangle or squared-circle examples which are most certainly illogical, I believe that the God and rock example of this paradox is not illogical at all.

Let us forget about omnipotence, supernatural and supreme beings and come to earth. A man can build (create) a ship which he himself cannot lift it. This statement is not non-sense. It is right, it is meaningful, it is logical and it is possible. Let us apply this idea (a reality) to the concept of God's omnipotence. What is illogical in the statement- "Can God create a rock which he himself cannot lift it?"? We are not talking about God creating another God but considering the power of omnipotence, we are talking about a very simple task that is possible even by a temporal being (remember man creating a ship).

A different thought: A man can kill himself. This is again logical and possible. Can God kill himself? This is not absurd. For those who claim that the action 'killing' does not apply to something which is formless, let me paraphrase it, "Can God cease to exist?". Its a different issue whether 'he will not' or 'he should not'. But whether 'he can' or 'he cannot' should be answerable. This is easy if we try to understand the statement- Buddha WILL not lie, but he CAN. May be God WILL not do something which can question his own qualities. But CAN he?

For those who claim that there is nothing called unliftable:

Let us assume that a being has a key which will open all locks in this world. Agreed that the term 'unlockable' has no meaning in such a case. Similarly , let us assume that God has a key (say X) which opens all locks. The term 'unlockable' is again meaningless. (Note: The word/action "unlock" however is still meaningful). The paradox will again surface as shown below:

Can God create another key (say Y) which cannot open a lock, despite having a key (X) which opens all locks? (please note that this statement does not contain the notion himself which is significantly causing the confusion in the God-rock paradox)

A. If he CAN create Y (which cannot open a lock), then the term 'unlockable' has a meaning. If the term unlockable exists, then the key X does not exist. ie God cannot have a key like key X. Since he cannot have a key X, which opens all doors, he is not omnipotent.

B. If he CANNOT create Y (which cannot open a lock) , then he is not omnipotent.

Santhoshxtra 08:28, 24 November 2006 (UTC)


Assume that all keys were five cylender Yale Locks. These can be opened using a simple tool owned by all locksmiths, which, since it opens a lock, must be a key. If I were to make a key for one specific lock, but that lock were not in existance, I would ahve a key which is not in fact capalbe of opening anything, even though it is a key and perfectly trivial to make. Since a person can do this, so can God, so God is not proven to be not Omnipotent. (It would be impossilbe to prove that he is omnipotent by this line of argument, only that no argument against it is logical.) |333173|3|_||3

—The preceding unsigned comment was added by 150.101.102.188 (talk) 04:21, 29 March 2007 (UTC).

[edit] Apparent claim to have solved the paradox in article

The last paragraph of "Other versions...". From "This is patently..". This seems like someone wrting THE TRUTH and POV but I don't know enough philosphy to be sure.A Geek Tragedy 13:09, 29 November 2006 (UTC)

[edit] "Unlockabilities"

I confess I cannot wholly follow Santhoshxtra's reasoning about keys - why, it does not take God to create a key which cannot open any lock in the world: any human is capable to make a key that bad. And I cannot see any contradiction in simultaneous existence of a key which opens all locks and another which does not open any. But thank you, Santhoshxtra, for another counter-example to omnipotence: "Can an omnipotent being kill/annihilate itself?" That was brilliant. - Thomas Helsingiensis, November 29, 2006.

GOD did try to kill himself and developed multiple personality syndrome as the result...here we all areJiohdi 18:28, 1 June 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Folks who are still interested in the history

The stone paradox can be found in Lucretius "De Rerum Natura". I lost the page and the quote, however, and my copy is from collection of Latin texts with no index. I just happened upon it by pure happenstance while scanning through some old used books on the shelf. I don't feel like going through the damned thing again. So look there, if you are intersted in hisrorical origins. --Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 10:44, 3 December 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Invalid Question

"This question is representative of the type of paradoxes atheists use in attempts to prove that God cannot exist. It works like this. God is supposed to be omnipotent. If He is omnipotent, then He can create a rock so big that He can't pick it up. If He cannot make a rock like this, then He is not omnipotent. If He can make a rock so big He can't pick it up, then He isn't omnipotent either. Either way demonstrates that God cannot do something. Therefore God is not omnipotent. Therefore God does not exist.

Is this logical? A little. However, the problem is that this bit of logic omits some crucial information, therefore, it's conclusion is inaccurate.

What the above "paradox" lacks is vital information concerning God's nature. His omnipotence is not something independent of His nature. It is part of His nature. God has a nature and His attributes operate within that nature, as does anything and everything else.

For example, I have human nature. I can run. But, I cannot outrun a lion. My nature simply does not permit it. My ability to run is connected to my nature and I cannot violate it. So too with God. His omnipotence is connected to His nature since being omnipotent is part of what He is. Omnipotence, then, must be consistent with what He is and not with what He is not since His omnipotence is not an entity to itself. Therefore, God can only do those things that are consistent with His nature. He cannot lie because it is against His nature to do so. Not being able to lie does not mean He is not God or that He is not all powerful. Also, He cannot cease to be God. Since He is in all places at all times, if He stopped existing then He wouldn't be in all places at all time. Therefore, He cannot cease to exist without violating His own nature.

The point is that God cannot do something that is a violation of His own existence and nature. Therefore, He cannot make a rock so big he can't pick up, or make something bigger than Himself, etc. But, not being able to do this does not mean He is not God nor that He is not omnipotent. Omnipotence is not the ability to do anything conceivable, but the ability to do anything consistent with His nature and consistent with His desire within the realm of His unlimited and universal power which we do not possess. This does not mean He can violate His own nature. If He did something inconsistent with His nature, then He would be self contradictory. If God were self contradictory, He would not be true. Likewise, if He did something that violated his nature, like make a rock so big He can't pick it up, He would also not be true since that would be a self contradiction. Since truth is not self contradictory, as neither is God, if He were not true, then He would not be God. But God is true and not self contradictory, therefore, God cannot do something that violates His own nature.

Another way to look at it is realize that in order for God to make something so big He couldn't pick it up, He would have to make a rock bigger than Himself. Since He is infinite in size, He would have to make something that would be bigger than Himself. Since it is His nature to be the biggest thing in existence because He created all things, He cannot violate His own nature by making a rock that is larger than He.

Also, since a rock, by definition, is not infinitely big, then it isn't logically possible to make a rock, something that is finite in size, be infinite in size (no longer a rock) since only God is infinite in size. At dictionary.com, a rock is defined as a "Relatively hard, naturally formed mineral or petrified matter; stone. a) A relatively small piece or fragment of such material. b) A relatively large body of such material, as a cliff or peak. c) A naturally formed aggregate of mineral matter constituting a significant part of the earth's crust." A rock, by definition is not infinitely large. So, to say that the rock must be so big that God cannot pick it up is to say that the rock is no longer a rock.

What the critics are asking is that God become self contradictory as a proof He doesn't exist. Their assertion is illogical from the start. So what they are doing is trying to get God to be illogical. They want to use illogic to prove God doesn't exist instead of logic. It doesn't work and the "paradox" is self-refuting and invalid.

[edit] Logical Invalidation...

Some may consider this a Buddhist or Zen answer, however...

We are considering a being who can create a stone out of nothing, and then assuming that we leave the God unchanged, ignoring the fact that it is, indeed, a God. If this God creates a stone, what is to then stop the God from creating a body to inhabit? While then inhabiting that body, the nature of that body, as created by the God, may be that the God within cannot move or lift the stone.

From a Christian perspective, one might phrase it as follows:

If God, in the Beginning, created a stone, for instance, fifteen times taller than the physical adult incarnation of Jesus, then while God had supposedly manifested Himself as Jesus, using no supernatural abilities, Jesus would have been unable to, at a certain point in his life, move/lift that stone. In the Manger, definitely. When Jesus was 12, most likely. And maybe even later in life, unless He picked up a lot of tricks from His carpenter upbringing.

--Ayelis 17:52, 29 January 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Metaphysical assumption with "stone" problem?

For me, much of the "stone" issue (and some related paradoxes) involves an interesting but unprovable assumption that I feel originates in our language more than anything else. The assumption is this: for every object X (such as a rock), there exists a sort of intangible "Who's Who" list of all the beings and entities able and unable to perform action Y (such as lifting) on X. This is to say, not only is it impossible for Koko the gorilla to lift Mount Augustus (sometimes considered the "world's biggest rock"[1]), but Koko's inability is in itself a feature or aspect of Augustus, like its color, vegetation, and, of course, size.

To me, saying this is an easy trap to fall into, but still basically irrelevant (and if that's so, there is no paradox — God makes a mountain of however many tons he likes, then, being infinitely strong, lifts it — the "impossibility" having never been present "within" the mountain to begin with.) Has this confusion/objection been raised before, perhaps in different phrasing? And if so, how do those who contend that it is still a paradox respond? (Note that I still believe there are plenty of other inescapable omnipotence paradoxes — can God make a square triangle? This one in particular strikes me for this reason). —Lenoxus 23:38, 14 February 2007 (UTC)

It's entirely possible my viewpoint on this is too simplistic, but...

There are three possible solutions for this:

1. Just because God can make a stone he can't lift, doesn't mean he will. As long as such a stone does not exist He retains His omnipotence.

2. The very idea of 'omnipotence' in this definition doesn't exist, after all it's inconceivable that any being could ever make a stone he can't lift, and then lift it. In that case, God is 'as omnipotent as is logically possible'

But this is in my opinion by far the best conclusion:

3. God made the material that makes up stones, the humans that came up with the word stone, the minds those humans used to do that, the very idea of a 'stone', the very idea of 'weight', etc. In a mere instant He could make the idea of a 'stone' lose existence, much like he could do with humans. As such, to an omnipotent God a 'stone that cannot be lifted' is, quite simply, a ridiculous attempt of the humans he made to question Him. This may be hard to grasp, but when you think about it like that the whole question becomes moot. Anyway, if you can't understand that then just be satisfied with the other two solutions.

Whoa, I lost track of this page. Anyway, yeah, those are excellent points, and I admit I like all three, if for different reasons. The first one is a neat cop-out irony, indicating that omnipotence exists until it is tested, which reminds me of Uri Geller's powers. The second is fun if you like logic games, and if you interpret the paradox as a put-down against God him/herself and not fundamentally the idea of omnipotence, and then act like the guy needs defending (he's trying as hard as he can in this limited world, honest!). The third is definitely the most closely related to my way of looking at it; God's powers include setting the definitions in the first place (and "stone he cannot lift" is just a human definition, not God's), altough it does have a bit of overlap with the "just plain logically impossible" argument. \sim Lenoxus " * " 02:39, 26 March 2007 (UTC)
Jerry. God, are you omnipotent?
God. Of course. Audience murmurs assent.
Jerry. But can you make a square triang---
God: Let there be yrreJ.
God: Has anyone here heard of somebody called "Jerry"? Audience murmurs "no" in confusion.
God: Am I omnipotent?
Audience: Of course!
8^) 70.15.116.59 (talk) 18:48, 24 January 2008 (UTC)

[edit] Simple Solution

If God were to make the stone out of all the matter in existance, then He would not be able to lift it, because to lift a body requires at least one other body to be in existance, since to lift is defined as to move against the net Gravitational force. His omnipotence is not violated, because the problem lies not in his abilities but rather in the definition of the problem. God could no more lift the stone than kill, because the action is in both cases meaningless. If he were to make more matter 9so that it is possible to increase the rock's gravitational potential energy), the stone would lack the crucial property of containing all the matter in the Universe. (posted by |333173|3|_||3 on 29/03/07) —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 150.101.102.188 (talk) 07:15, 29 March 2007 (UTC).

[edit] Alter Logic

I don't see mention of the idea omnipotence includes the ability to alter logic itself. In which case an omnipotent being could create a rock he could not lift. He could also lift it. The premise this paradox is built on, a fallacy can't happen, is questionable when talking about omnipotence.

[edit] "Philosophical responses" first paragraph "original research"

I'm pretty sure the first paragraph under “Philosophical responses” (the one tagged “original research?”) is indeed (bad) original research and should be taken out. The “helpful” restatement alters the content of the original paradox to create the self-contradicting formulation that the author then tries to apply to the original.

The restatement makes “disability” innate and not something achieved through ability as in the original paradox. A restatement that preserves the content of the original would be for example “Can total ability achieve disability?”. If we take this and contrast it with "Does total ability include disability?" from the article, we can see that the second is self contradicting due to the law of identity. The contradiction arises because “total ability” is held to be inclusive of “disability”. But the first does not contain this contradiction since “total ability” and “disability” are not simultaneous. —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 75.70.76.166 (talk) 06:53, 17 April 2007 (UTC).

[edit] merge?

This is very similar to the "paradox of the stone" article. Any thoughts on merging them? Seldon1 14:24, 21 May 2007 (UTC)

[edit] zen

how did any being including the supposed omnipontent one, figure out that he was infact omnipontent? Jiohdi 18:30, 1 June 2007 (UTC)

Probably it's not one of those things you need to ask about. Yasha80.43.71.196 00:53, 30 June 2007 (UTC)

[edit] "Gödelian" variant

I might pose a "Gödelian" variant of the "rock so heavy God can't lift".

"God cannot prove this sentence true."

Proof: Suppose the sentence was false. Since it is impossible for anyone to prove a falsehood, it therefore follows that it is impossible for God to prove the sentence either. Therefore, if the sentence is false, it is true. But, if it is true, no such contradiction eventuates. Thus, the sentence is true, and its truth is provable by anyone who is not God.

Thus, there are actions which it is logically possible for me to do, but not logically possible for God to do. If I a mere mortal can do something, but God can't, that would suggest God is not immortal, no?

I can do something God can't do, I can prove this sentence true.

[edit] maimonides

I am surprised that this article (a featured article!) does not mention Maimonides who dealt with this question before any of the other mentioned. He said (Guide for the Perplexed Part I chapter 75)

"Thus we, Monotheists, do not consider it a defect in God, that He does not combine two opposites in one object, nor do we test His omnipotence by the accomplishment of any similar impossibility."

This is very similar to Thomas Aquinas which is not surprising since he based some of his philosophy on him. Jon513 16:36, 14 August 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Sufficient Omnipotence

Obviously, the trouble starts when one asserts that God can do absolutely everything there is that can be done. Logical analysis does not support this assertion (can God sin?, etc.) and, from a Biblical perspective, it is not a necessary assertion. For God to be who the Bible claims He is, He only needs to be sufficiently omnipotent, not absolutely omnipotent. To meet the Biblical definition of who God is, God only needs to be powerful enough to get done what He thinks needs to be done. And why would He think He needed to make a stone so heavy that He couldn't lift it - or think He needed to engage in any other illogical activity? So, the paradox exists only for those who wish to engage in nonsensical thinking. More on this line of thought can be found in Wikipedia at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Omnipotent

Can God do anything He wants to? If yes, would that not be sufficient omnipotence? So what if He maybe doesn't want to make a stone so heavy that He cannot lift it? That still leaves Him way more powerful than I am - which I think is ultimately the point?? I think the idea of "sufficient omnipotence" is sort of contained in Peter Geach's Points 3 & 4 on the main page, but a) I think my statement at the top of this paragraph is way more understandable than Geach's Points 3 & 4 are to the layman, and b) my point about "sufficient omnipotence" allows that God can maybe make a stone so heavy He can't lift it (or any other "illogical" action), but that He might choose to not do this. Geach's Points 3 & 4 on the main page seem to allow that God can do what is logically possible. My point accepts the idea that God can maybe do what is logically impossible (to us) but allows Him to choose not to do it. I may have missed it, but I didn't see this idea explicitly addressed on the main page - unless the term "essentially omnipotent" allows for doing what is logically impossible to us. Does anyone know if someone has explored this idea more fully in books or journal articles?

Finally, what is the signifigance of God making a stone that is so heavy He cannot lift it? Should He choose to make such a stone, is He then constrained in some way by the the weight of the stone or His inability to lift it? Hardly. So long as God retains the power to shatter a stone and carry it off in pieces and then reassemble it and make it like new, it will actually never be possible for Him to make a stone that is so heavy He cannot lift it. That is, there is always more than one way to skin a cat or solve a problem - and it makes no sense for us to presume that we know what they all are. Because of this, our perceptions of the limits to God's powers probably don't match His perceptions. What appear to be paradoxes to us are perhaps not paradoxes at all - just manifestations of our own lack of knowledge. Martin Luther spoke to this issue. See Point 19 here: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theology_of_the_Cross

"That person does not deserve to be called a theologian who looks upon the invisible things of God as though they were clearly perceptible in those things which have actually happened."

It is a "well duh!" kind of statement: there is more to the God defined by the Bible than what we can comprehend or perceive.

Richard 25 Aug 2007 —Preceding unsigned comment added by 66.251.119.138 (talk) 17:19, August 26, 2007 (UTC)

It all boils down to whether God can superceed certain atandards of logic. Is God writer or scrpipt in some sense. And if he is simply script are we subject to infinte regress. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 75.70.79.27 (talk) 07:31, 5 September 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Jargon

"It is similar to asking a perfect pither with a perfect defence behind him to not be able to record an out" .... HUH? And in English? I'm guessing its sporting or legal jargon? Really, whatever that is supposed to mean and to be making clear, it needs rephrasing. 84.13.13.154 (talk) 19:54, 22 November 2007 (UTC)

[edit] ZFC

The article likens the omnipotence paradox to Russell's paradox. Has anyone adapted ZFC to provide an answer?

Also, the existence of two omnipotent beings would seem to invoke this paradox - can either defeat the other?

I am surprised that no one suggests simply that it is in the nature of an omnipotent being not to exist in contradiction with itself, not by impotence but simply by choice, as it chooses to remain omnipotent and presumably has access to the knowledge to avoid any need for contradiction. There must be something like that in the old literature because Asimov wrote a short story where God wasn't allowed to contradict himself. 70.15.116.59 (talk) 03:16, 18 January 2008 (UTC)

[edit] Still a FA?

This article looks like it has a non-standard lead and (by recent standards) a fairly short reference list. Its limitation to Western Christian culture is also likely a sign of lack of comprehensiveness. It seems like it's bound to end up in featured article review fairly soon unless something can be done for it, but I'll leave it to someone else to pull the trigger. 70.15.116.59 (talk) 03:21, 18 January 2008 (UTC)

[edit] "Language and Omnipotence"

Good article, could use some work though. I'm especially concerned with the phrase "propositions which no doubt came as a shock to judges, lawyers, members of the clergy, guidance counselors, mothers and fathers the world over." I'd like to see a citation for that. Additionally, it seems innappropiate and unencyclopedic. Just a thought. FluxFuser (talk) 01:15, 5 February 2008 (UTC)