Omar Mohammed Ali Al Rammah

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Omar Mohammed Ali Al Rammah is a citizen of Yemen is held in extrajudicial detention in the United States Guantanamo Bay detention camps, in Cuba.[1] His Guantanamo Internee Security Number is 1017. Joint Task Force Guantanamo counter-terrorism analysts estimate he was born in 1975.

Contents

[edit] Press reports

In the San Francisco Chronicle Kim Zetter profiled attorneys at Orrick, Herrington and Sutcliffe who had volunteered to defend Yemeni captives in Guantanamo.[2] The article identified an attorney named Diana Rutowski who was defending a 32 year old Yemeni named Zachariah al Baidany. The official list of captives lists five Yemenis estimated to have been born in 1975. One of the allegations against Al Rahham was that he was known by the alias "Zakaria" in Georgia.

[edit] Combatant Status Review Tribunal

Combatant Status Review Tribunals were held in a trailer the size of a large RV.  The captive sat on a plastic garden chair, with his hands and feet shackled to a bolt in the floor. Three chairs were reserved for members of the press, but only 37 of the 574 Tribunals were observed.       The neutrality of this section is disputed.  Please see the discussion on the talk page.(January 2008)Please do not remove this message until the dispute is resolved.
Combatant Status Review Tribunals were held in a trailer the size of a large RV. The captive sat on a plastic garden chair, with his hands and feet shackled to a bolt in the floor.[3][4] Three chairs were reserved for members of the press, but only 37 of the 574 Tribunals were observed.[5]

Initially the Bush Presidency asserted that they could withhold all the protections of the Geneva Conventions to captives from the war on terror. This policy was challenged before the Judicial branch. Critics argued that the USA could not evade its obligation to conduct competent tribunals to determine whether captives are, or are not, entitled to the protections of prisoner of war status.

Subsequently the Department of Defense instituted the Combatant Status Review Tribunals. The Tribunals, however, were not authorized to determine whether the captives were lawful combatants -- rather they were merely empowered to make a recommendation as to whether the captive had previously been correctly determined to match the Bush Presidency's definition of an enemy combatant.

[edit] Summary of Evidence memo

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Omar Mohammed Ali Al Rammah's Combatant Status Review Tribunal, on 21 December 2004.[6] The memo listed the following allegations against him:

A. The detainee is associated with al Qaida or the Taliban:
  1. The detainee admitted that he traveled to Georgia in 2001.
  2. The detainee admitted he received some paramilitary training in Georgia.
  3. The detainee received training on the semi-automatic handgun and automatic rifle at the home of a member of a group that supports Chechen rebels.
  4. The detainee traveled with a Moroccan passport that was stolen in Turkey.
  5. The detainee used the alias "Zakaria" in Georgia.
  6. The detainee was a trainer at al Farouq.
  7. The detainee was at Abu Malik's compound in Khalatsani, in the Pankisi Gorge in Georgia in 2002.
  8. Khalatsani is a stronghold of Parnoz Khangoshvili, an ethnic Chechen, who is a local criminal.
  9. The detainee was captured with two explosives [sic] detonators in his possession.

[edit] Transcript

There is no record that Omar Mohammed Ali Al Rammah participated in his Combatant Status Review Tribunal.

[edit] Administrative Review Board hearing

Hearing room where Guantanamo captive's annual Administrative Review Board hearings convened for captives whose Combatant Status Review Tribunal had already determined they were an "enemy combatant".
Hearing room where Guantanamo captive's annual Administrative Review Board hearings convened for captives whose Combatant Status Review Tribunal had already determined they were an "enemy combatant".[7]

Detainees who were determined to have been properly classified as "enemy combatants" were scheduled to have their dossier reviewed at annual Administrative Review Board hearings. The Administrative Review Boards weren't authorized to review whether a detainee qualified for POW status, and they weren't authorized to review whether a detainee should have been classified as an "enemy combatant".

They were authorized to consider whether a detainee should continue to be detained by the United States, because they continued to pose a threat -- or whether they could safely be repatriated to the custody of their home country, or whether they could be set free.

[edit] First annual Administrative Review Board

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Omar Mohammed Ali Al Rammah's first annual Administrative Review Board, on 16 September 2005.[8] The memo listed factors for and against his continued detention.

[edit] The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. COmmitment
  1. One year before the detainee was arrested, his uncle convinced him to dedicate himself to Islam. His uncle scared him by telling him about heaven and hell. He attended various mosques after that.
  2. After the detainee's religious awakening, the detainee performed Dawa for three months in Sanaa, Yemen. He attended the Dawa mosques in Sanaa and Hededa as well at [sic] the al Hada and Bar mosques.
  3. During Ramada of 2001 a Chechen named Solieman took the detainee to the house of Hamza Ghulaiev in Omalo, Georgia. Solieman took the detainee there after learning he was interested in becoming involved in the plight of Chechens.
  4. After watching a film that depicted Muslims in Chechnya being killed by Russian troops, the detainee decided he wanted to go to Chechnya and fight against the Russians.
b. Training
  1. The detainee was at Ghulaiev's house in Omalo, Georgia on three occasions for weapons training. The first time the detainee was at the house Ghulaiev provided him with training on handguns. AK-47 and an unknown type of small crew-served weapon. This training was done for thirty minutes per day over a three-day period.
  2. The detainee received weapons training at the al Khair Camp, a private training camp in Qargha [sic] .
  3. The detainee trained in al Qaida camps in Afghanistan and was fighting in Chechnya prior to September 11, 2001.
c. Connections/Associations
  1. The detainee was believed to have been a member of Abu Malik's Jamaat, while in Pankisi Gorge.
  2. The detainee was a member of a suicide paratrooper unit that was known as a "Kamikaze unit", under the leadership of Shamil Basayev and Ibn al Khattab.
  3. After the detainee received training in Afghanistan, he went to Georgia by way of Istanbul, Turkey. While in Georgia he fought in Chechnya with Ibn al Khattab.
  4. The detainee witnessed the ambush that killed Ibn al Khattab.
d. Other Relevant Data
  1. The detainee was fine before he began practicing Islam. His problems began afterwards. He did stop dealing drugs and chasing women after his religious awakening, but since then it has caused him problems and he no longer wants to follow Islam.
  2. The detainee traveled from Sanaa, Yemen to Turkey and then on to Georgia to conduct Dawa using a legitimate passport in his true name. He traveled at the suggestion of his uncle, Abdul Rahman, using 10,000 United States dollars in cash, which his uncle gave to him.
  3. The detainee spent a month at Wadi [sic] Valley receiving teaching on how to give support to Chechnya refugees and then traveled to Wadi Esefahan.
  4. The detainee began Dawa there, but fell ill and was transported by helicopter back to Wadi Bankish where he was treated and recovered in a week. Once he recovered, he returned to Dawa.
  5. The detainee was captured in a violent road ambush by Georgia Security Forces in Duisi, Georgia on 28 April 2002.
  6. The detainee was captured with two explosive detonators in his possession.

[edit] The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a.

The detainee denied ever being in Afghanistan or ever hearing of al Qaida until he was a prisoner here.

b.

The detainee said he had nothing against Americans.

c.

The detainee insists he never heard the word terrorism and never heard of al Qaida before his arrest.

[edit] Second annual Administrative Review Board

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Omar Mohammed Ali Al-Rammah's second annual Administrative Review Board, on 26 May 2006.[9] The memo listed factors for and against his continued detention.

[edit] The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. COmmitment
  1. One year before the detainee was arrested, his uncle convinced him to dedicate himself to Islam. His uncle scared him by telling him about heaven and hell. The detainee attended various mosques after that.
  2. The detainee performed Dawa for three months in Sanaa, Yemen after his religious awakening. The detainee attended the Dawa mosques in Sanaa and Hededa as well as the al Hada and B'ar mosques.
  3. The detainee decided he wanted to go to Chechnya and fight against the Russians after watching a film that depicted Muslims in Chechnya being killed by Russian troops.
b. Training
  1. The detainee was was present in Omalo, Georgia on three occasions for weapons training. The first time, the detainee was provided with training on handguns, Kalashnikov rifles [sic] , and an unknown type of small crew-served weapon. This training was done for thirty minutes per day over a three-day period.
  2. The detainee received weapons training at the al Khair Camp, a private training camp in Qargha, Afghanistan [sic] .
  3. The detainee trained in al Qaida camps in Afghanistan and was fighting in Chechnya prior to September 11, 2001.
c. Connections/Associations
  1. The detainee was believed to have been a member of Abu Malik's Jamaat, while in Pankisi Gorge.
  2. The detainee was a member of a suicide paratrooper unit that was known as a "Kamikaze unit".
  3. The detainee witnessed the ambush that killed Khattab [sic] .
d. Other Relevant Data
  1. The detainee was fine before he began practicing Islam. His problems began afterwards. He did stop dealing drugs and chasing women after his religious awakening, but since then it has caused him problems and he no longer wants to follow Islam.
  2. The detainee traveled from Sanaa, Yemen to Turkey and then on to Georgia to conduct Dawa using a legitimate passport in his true name. The detainee traveled at the suggestion of his uncle using 10,000 United States dollars in cash, which his uncle gave to him.
  3. The detainee spent a month at Wadi [sic] Valley receiving teaching on how to give support to Chechnya refugees and then traveled to Wadi Esefahan.
  4. The detainee began Dawa there, but fell ill. The detainee was transported by helicopter back to Wadi Bankish where he was treated and recovered in a week. The detainee returned to Dawa once he recovered.
  5. The detainee was captured in a violent road ambush by Georgia Security Forces in Duisi, Georgia on 28 April 2002.
  6. The detainee was captured with two explosive detonators in his possession.

[edit] The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a.

The detainee denied ever being in Afghanistan or ever hearing of al Qaida until he was a prisoner here.

b.

The detainee said he had nothing against Americans.

c.

The detainee insists he never heard the word terrorism and never heard of al Qaida before his arrest.

[edit] References

  1. ^ OARDEC (May 15, 2006). List of Individuals Detained by the Department of Defense at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba from January 2002 through May 15, 2006. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-09-29.
  2. ^ Kim Zetter. "The Ultimate Legal Challenge", San Francisco Chronicle, June 10, 2007, pp. CM - 19. Retrieved on 2008-01-08. 
  3. ^ Guantánamo Prisoners Getting Their Day, but Hardly in Court, New York Times, November 11, 2004 - mirror
  4. ^ Inside the Guantánamo Bay hearings: Barbarian "Justice" dispensed by KGB-style "military tribunals", Financial Times, December 11, 2004
  5. ^ Annual Administrative Review Boards for Enemy Combatants Held at Guantanamo Attributable to Senior Defense Officials. United States Department of Defense (March 6, 2007). Retrieved on 2007-09-22.
  6. ^ OARDEC (21 December 2004). Summary of Evidence for Combatant Status Review Tribunal -- Al Rammah, Omar Mohammed Ali page 25. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2008-01-08.
  7. ^ Spc Timothy Book. "Review process unprecedented", JTF-GTMO Public Affairs Office, Friday March 10, 2006, pp. pg 1. Retrieved on 2007-10-10. 
  8. ^ OARDEC (16 September 2005). Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Al Rammah, Omar Mohammed Ali pages 42-44. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2008-01-05.
  9. ^ OARDEC (26 May 2006). Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Al-Rammah, Omar Mohammed Ali pages 25-27. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2008-01-05.