User:North Shoreman/Sandbox

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Scott vs. Sandford
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued February 11 – 14, 1856 Reargued February 15 – 18, 1857 Decided March 6, 1857
Full case name: Dred Scott vs. John F. A. Sandford[1] Citations: 60 U.S. 393; 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393; 15 L. Ed. 691; 1856 WL 8721; 1857 U.S. LEXIS 472 Prior history: Judgment for defendants, C.C. Mo. Subsequent history: None
Holding
States do not have the right to claim an individual’s property that was fairly theirs in another state. Property cannot cease to exist as a result of changing jurisdiction. The majority decision held that Africans residing in America, whether free or slave, could not become United States citizens and the plaintiff therefore lacked the capacity to file a lawsuit. Furthermore, the parts of the Missouri Compromise creating free territories were unconstitutional because Congress had no authority to abolish slavery in federal territories. Judgment of Circuit Court for the District of Missouri reversed and dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Court membership
Chief Justice: Roger B. Taney Associate Justices: John McLean, James Moore Wayne, John Catron, Peter Vivian Daniel, Samuel Nelson, Robert C. Grier, Benjamin R. Curtis, John A. Campbell
Case opinions
Majority by: Taney Joined by: Wayne, Grier, Daniel, Campbell, Catron (each also writing separate concurrences) Concurrence by: Nelson Dissent by: Curtis Dissent by: McLean
Laws applied
U.S. Const. amend. V; Missouri Compromise
Superseded by
U.S. Const. amends. XIII, XIV

Dred Scott v. Sandford,^[1] 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856), also known as the Dred Scott Case, was a lawsuit, pivotal in the history of the United States, decided by the United States Supreme Court in 1857 that ruled that people of African descent, whether or not they were slaves, could never be citizens of the United States, and that Congress had no authority to prohibit slavery in federal territories. It was also ruled that slaves could not sue in court, and that slaves were private property, and, being private property, could not be taken away from their owners without due process. The decision for the court was written by Chief Justice Roger Taney.

The case originated as the Missouri state lawsuit of Dred Scott v. Emerson filed by Dred and Harriet Scott in 1846. The Scotts, while slaves, had resided with their owner in territories of the United States in which slavery was specifically prohibited. There was a body of legal precedents in both Missouri and other southern states that recognized the freedom of slaves under those circumstances. As part of the increasingly divisive political debate over slavery, the Missouri Supreme Court overrode the precedents and ruled against the Scotts on March 22, 1852.

Rather than appealing directly to the United States Supreme Court, the Scotts refiled the lawsuit in the federal circuit court in the case Dred Scott v. Sandford on November 2, 1853. This case did end up being appealed to the Supreme Court and on _______ 1857 a final decision was issued upholding the enslavement of Dred Scott.

The decision sided with border ruffians in the Bleeding Kansas dispute who were afraid a free Kansas would be a haven for runaway slaves from Missouri. It enraged abolitionists. The polarization of the slavery debate is considered to be one of many factors leading to the American Civil War.

The parts of this decision dealing with the citizenship and rights of African-Americans were explicitly nullified by the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution.

Contents 1 Background 1.1 Legal Precedents 1.2 Changing political environment 1.3 Scott’s travels 2 Scott v. Emerson 2.1 Trial court 2.2 Missouri politics and the court 2.3 Strader v. Graham 2.4 Missouri Supreme Court decision 3 Dred Scott v. Sandford 3.1 United States Circuit Court 3.2 Appeal to the United States Supreme Court 3.3 Arguments 3.4 Initial deliberation 3.5 President Buchanan intervenes 4 Decision 4.1 Presentation and publication of the decision 4.2 Taney's majority opinion 4.2.1 Negro citizenship 5 Consequences 6 Reaction 7 Scott's fate 8 Later references 9 See also 10 Notes 11 External links

[edit] Background

[edit] Legal Precedents

Until slavery became a volatile national issue in the late 1840s, courts and legislatures in both the North and South generally respected the laws of other states with respect to slavery. Southerners could travel through the free states with their slaves, comfortable in the belief that their property rights would not be disturbed. Southern courts would recognize the difference between traveling in the North and actually residing there and would free those slaves when they returned to the South. From 1824 to 1841 the Missouri Supreme Court followed the national trend and were receptive to suits by slaves who claimed their freedom based on having lived in a free state. An 1824 Missouri statute provided that the state would provide legal representation for any slave attempting to make such a case.^[2]

In November 1824 the Missouri Supreme Court set a strong precedent for later cases in Winny v. Whitesides. Phebe Whitesides had lived for three or four years in Illinois with her slave Winny. When they moved to Missouri Winny sued for her freedom. In granting that freedom, Justice George Tompkins, a strong opponent of slavery, rejected Whitesides’ argument that Congress had no authority to ban slavery in a United States territory. Tompkins ruled that Whitesides had illegally introduced slavery into a territory where it was prohibted and that the return to a slave state did not mean that Winny’s former status as a slave was reinstated. The basic issues that would apply to all future cases -- the legality of congressional prohibition of slavery in the territories, the emancipation of any slave residing in a free state or territory, and the immunity to re-enslavement upon return to a slave state -- were set in this case.^[3]

Later cases would further clarify the balance between slave and owner rights. In the 1828 case La Grange v. Chouteau the court ruled that simply because slaves were used for a few days in Illinois to unload a boat did not entitle them to freedom. In 1837 in Wilson v. Melvin, Edmund Melvin’s primary intent had been to move his slaves from Kentucky to Missouri, but he stopped for a month at his sons farm in Illinois where he allowed his slave, Wilson, to voluntarily hire himself out and chop wood for his son. Judge Tompkins, in freeing Wilson, ruled these actions had the effect of introducing slavery, "the evil which the State . . . seemed desirous to avoid," into a free state. In Ralph v. Duncan a slave was ordered free even though he hired himself out to an Illinois salt mine while his master remained in Missouri.^[4]

Hamilton R. Gamble, who would be Missouri Chief Justice when that court made its final decision regarding Dred Scott, was involved as an attorney in several slave freedom cases decided by the state Supreme Court. In Marguerite v. Chouteau Gamble represented the slave Marguerite who was part black and part Native American. The case had arisen in 1806 in Louisiana Territory where, under Spanish law that applied to Marguerite’s mother, Indians could not be enslaved. In 1825, after losing her original lawsuit, Marguerite instituted a new suit under the 1824 Missouri law and Gamble was appointed to represent her. Marguerite eventually won her case in 1834 and the victory was affirmed in 1838 when an appeal by Chouteau to the United States Supreme Court was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.^[5]

In the 1836 case of Rachael v. Walker, Gamble represented the slave owner Walker who had purchased Rachael from an army officer, J. B. W. Stockton. Stockton and his wife kept Rachael as a household slave while they were posted to Fort Snelling in Iowa Territory and Fort Crawford in Michigan Territory. Gamble won the case in a lower court, but before the Supreme Court, realizing that precedents were against his client, he attempted to argue that an exception should be made since Stockton had taken her to free territory at the orders of the United States military. The court rejected this article and ordered a new trial. This case would seem to be very much on point for the Dred Scott case.^[6]

[edit] Changing political environment

In the 1840s the court's decisions would become increasingly proslavery and sectional. In 1846 the controversy erupted over the Wilmot Proviso and the 1848 national presidential election was the first one dominated by the issues of slavery. The issue was only temporarily calmed by the Compromise of 1850.^[7] Historian Donald Fehrenbacher analyzed the situation:

Slaveholders regarded the Wilmot Proviso as an outrageous attempt to deprive them of their rightful share in the spoils of conquest. More than that, they were becoming convinced that any congressional restriction on slavery in the territories was a judgment on the morality of the institution and therefore degrading to the South. Feeding their anger and fear were the increasing manifestations of of northern hostility in editorials, sermons, legislative resolutions, and fugitive slave ‘rescues’. Southern attitudes accordingly hardened into a grim defensiveness, and, by 1850, the public mood of the slaveholding states was uncongenial to suits for freedom.”^[8]

Missouri, with memories of the bitter and divisive debate over statehood and surrounded on three sides by free territory, was especially sensitive on these issues. Unlike most slave states, Missouri also had an “articulate antislavery minority” that served to increase slaveholder insecurity and anxiety. A the nation divided in the late 1840s, so did the state Democratic Party. Much of the party conflict centered on slavery moderate Thomas Hart Benton, a vocal opponent of South Carolina’s John C. Calhoun and the annexation of Texas. Early in 1849 the legislature passed the Jackson Resolutions which directed its two Senators to “act in conformity” with Calhoun’s program. The elections of 1850 left Benton Democrats as minority in the state legislature where they served as a balance between the proslavery Democrats and Whigs.^[9] This state political split would effect the ultimate decision in the state courts over Dred Scott.

[edit] Scott’s travels

Dred Scott was born enslaved around 1800 in Virginia. His owner was a small farmer, Peter Blow. Blow, with his wife Elizabeth, seven children, and six slaves, moved west -- first to Alabama as a planter and then around 1830 to St. Louis where he operated a boarding House called the Jefferson Hotel. Blow died on June 23, 1832 and sometime around then sold Scott to Dr. John Emerson,a surgeon in the U.S. Army. Beginning in 1834 Emerson, accompanied by Scott as his personal servant, served at Fort Armstrong in the free state of Illinois. In 1836, Emerson was relocated to Fort Snelling in Wisconsin Territory, now present day Minnesota, a free territory under the Missouri Compromise and the Wisconsin Enabling Act. At Fort Snelling Scott married Harriet Robinson, the slave of a federal Indian agent. Dr. Emerson acquired title to both Mrs. Scott and later the couple’s two daughters (two sons died in infancy).^[10]

Dr. Emerson was transferred to Fort Jessup, Louisiana in 1837 where he met and married Eliza Irene Sanford of St. Louis. In 1838 the Emersons with the Scotts returned to Fort Snelling until 1840 when Emerson took an assignment in Florida after first leaving his wife and slaves in St. Louis. In 1842 Emerson was honorably discharged from the army and reunited with his family in St. Louis. Emerson died on December 29, 1843. The court appointed Alexander Sanford, Eliza’s father, as executor of the will.^[11]

Dr. Emerson, for both health and business reasons (he had acquired land in Iowa Territory), made frequent requests to be transferred from one post to another. In October 1837, he was ordered to Jefferson barracks in St. Louis, Missouri. The Scotts were hired out and remained behind, but Emerson expected to send for them later. However as soon as he arrived in St. Louis he was ordered to relocate to Fort Jessup, Louisiana where he arrived on November 22. Here he met and married Eliza Irene Sanford of St. Louis. The Scotts were set for in the spring of 1838, but in September the Emersons and the Scotts were assigned back to Fort Snelling. This would constitute he second time when the Scotts were moved to territory where slavery was prohibited.^[12]

In the spring of 1840 Emerson Emerson was ordered to Florida where the Seminole War was ongoing. Mrs. Emerson only accompanied her husband as far as St. Louis where she moved to her father’s estate to await the doctor’s return. The Scotts went with Mrs. Emerson. In 1842 Emerson was honorably discharged from the army and reunited with his family in St. Louis. Emerson’s health declined precipitously and he died on December 29, 1843, hours after executing a will that left his entire estate to his wife. From late 1843 until 1846 the Scotts were on loan to Mrs. Emerson’s brother-in-law, Captain Henry Bainbridge. Scott returned to Fort Jessup with Bainbridge and later accompanied him to Texas when the Mexican War errupted.^[13]

Events leading to the US Civil War
Northwest Ordinance
Missouri Compromise
Nullification Crisis
Wilmot Proviso
Compromise of 1850
Kansas-Nebraska Act
"Bleeding Kansas"
Dred Scott Decision
Lincoln-Douglas Debates
John Brown's Raid
This box: view • talk • edit

By March 1846 the Scotts were back in St. Louis and hired out to a local man, Samuel Russell. According to Scott’s account given several years later to a newspaper, Scott tried to purchase the freedom of himself and his family, but Mrs. Emerson rejected the offer. On April 6, 1846 Dred and Harriet Scott filed a request in the St. Louis circuit court to bring a suit for freedom against Irene Emerson based on their residence in free territories. The judge authorized the suit.^[14]

[edit] Scott v. Emerson

[edit] Trial court

Missouri’s slave codes were modeled after those of Virginia and Kentucky. Under state law the suit was required to take the form of a claim for damages, alleging that the master engaged in assault and false imprisonment. If the alleged slave proved his case, then no actual damages would be awarded, but he would be declared free. At the time the case was filed there does appear to have been any political motivations or secret agendas since the precedents seemed clear and there was no point to be won by Scott, other than his freedom.^[15]

Mrs. Emerson filed a defense of not guilty on November 14, 1846, and the and case came to trial on June 30, 1847 with Judge Alexander Hamilton presiding. Scott was represented by several lawyers, but Samuel Mansfield Bay, a former Attorney General of Missouri was probably the lead. Emerson was represented by George W. Goode, a pro-slavery attorney from Virginia.^[16]

Scott had only to prove that he had resided on free soil and was now held as a slave by Mrs. Emerson. A problem developed because Scott’s primary witness was Samuel Russell, who testified that he hired the Scotts from Mrs. Emerson by paying the money to her father. However on cross examination it was brought out that Russell’s wife had made all the arrangements for the hiring, and Russell imself had only second hand knowledge of ownership. Since ownership of Scott by Emerson was not properly established, the jury ruled for the defendant. Scott was, in effect, returned to his master because he could not prove that she was his master.^[17]

Scott’s attorneys applied for a new trial and filed additional suits against Alexander Sanford, Samuel Russell, and Irene Emerson. On July 31 the judge ordered the cases consolidated, and Scotts proceeded with the original suit against Mrs. Emerson. On December 2, 1847 a retrial was granted, but Emerson’s attorney filed a “bill of exception” to the new trial and the case was transferred, on a “writ of error” to the Missouri Supreme Court.^[18]

Scott was now represented by the firm of Alexander P. Field and David N. Hall. Field was a prominent attorney and politician from Illinois who had begun his career as a proslavery leader in the illinois legislature. In April 1848 Judge William Scott heard the appeal and two months later dismissed the writ of error.^[19]

In 1847 the second Scott daughter, Lizzie, was born and her and Eliza’s futures were part of the trial. The Scotts continued to be hired out to the Russells, but on March 14, 1848 the court approved a motion by Emerson that the sheriff, rather than Mrs. Emerson, would be in charge of renting out the Scotts. Also in 1848 active control of Emerson’s affairs passed to John Sanford and two new attorneys, Hugh A. Garland and Lyyman D. Norris, were his representatives. The case did not come to trial until January 12, 1850, once more before Judge Hamilton.^[20] The defense’s prime argument was that because Emerson was under military orders the civil law against slavery did not apply. This argument ignored the precedent of Rachel v. Walker and ignored the fact that Emerson had left the slaves in the possession of a third party at Fort Snelling. The judge gave favorable jury instructions, and Scott, consistent with previous Missouri rulings, was declared to be a free man.^[21]

[edit] Missouri politics and the court

Emerson appealed to State Supreme Court, and briefs were filed in March 1850, but the final decision was not issued until 1852. During the time from when the original case in 1848 was lost by Scott on a technicality through 1852, the political situation in both Missouri and the nation was rapidly changing, to the detriment of Scott.^[22]

William B. Napton, one of the three justices on the Missouri Supreme Court which would hear the Scott case, was possibly the author of the anti-Benton Jackson Resolutions. A second justice, James H. Birch, was also a strong opponent of Benton. Historian Don Fehrenbacher wrote, “Both Napton and Birch were more than willing to to use their judicial power in the anti-Benton and proslavery interest. The Dred Scott case offered an opportunity to do so.” On October 25, 1850 Edward Bates learned from the third justice, John F. Ryland, that the intention of the other two was to overrule the judicial precedents and declare Scott a slave.^[23]

In the court’s debate over the decision, Birch wanted to declare the Missouri Compromise as unconstitutional, but Napton was not prepared to go that far. Ryland agreed to go along with declaring Scott a slave, and Napton was chosen to write the opinion. Napton procrastinated in writing the decision and there was a political backlash within the state against those opposed to Benton. Due to the recent approval of a new state constitution, supreme court justices were now elective rather than appointive, and in September 1851 both Napton and Birch were voted out of office. Ryland, who was closely associated with Benton, was returned to the court along with William R. Scott, an ardent proslavery Democrat, and Hamilton R. Gamble.^[24]

[edit] Strader v. Graham

In the meantime, in January 1851 the United States Supreme Court issued a decision in the case of Strader v. Graham. The Kentucky courts had ruled that a brief sojourn in Ohio had not resulted in freedom for some slave musicians. The defendant, who was charged with aiding the slaves’ escape to Canada, argued that the Northwest Ordinance had made them free. The unanimous Taney court decision was that the Ohio state constitution had overruled the Northwest Ordinance, and therefore there was no federal issue to be resolved under the Judiciary Act of 1789. On the issue of jurisdiction, Strader would not apply to Scott since from 1836 to 1840 the Missouri Compromise was in effect in Fort Snelling.^[25]

However Chief JusticeTaney, in announcing the decision, went beyond the strict jurisdictional issue. He opined that the slaves status after return to Kentucky “depended altogether upon the laws of that State and could not be influenced by the laws of Ohio.” He also addressed a hypothetical question and wrote, “The ordinance in question, if still in force could have no more operation than the laws of Ohio in the State of Kentucky.” If this portion of Taney’s opinion were applied in the Scott case, it did not necessarily mean that Scott would be re-enslaved, but it would make Missouri law the determining factor regarding Scott's ultimate freedom.^[26]

[edit] Missouri Supreme Court decision

As early as 1847 Justice Napton had said that it was poor policy for a slaveholding state to increase the number of free blacks “only to dissatisfy and corrupt those of their own race and color remaining in a state of servitude.” Taney’s decision in Strader, in Fehrenbacher’s opinion “gave a green light to judicial reaction in Missouri.” Justice Scott was assigned to write the opinion in the case. The original briefs were resubmitted, but Emerson’s attorneys added material that cited Strader as a precedent.^[27]

Despite the new make-up of the court, the decision was still to declare that Dred Scott was a slave. Justice Scott was assigned the task of writing the decision and, following the Strader decision, wrote, “Every state has the right of determining how far ...it will respect the laws of other States. Those laws have no intrinsic right to be enforced beyond the State for which they were enacted.”^[28] Addressing the current political situation as a factor in his decision, Justice Scott wrote:

Times are not now as they were when the former decisions on this subject were made. Since then not only individuals but States have been possessed with a dark and fell spirit in relation to slavery, whose gratification is sought in the pursuit of measures whose inevitable consequences must be the overthrow and destruction of our government. Under such circumstances it does not behoove the State of Missouri to show the least countenance to any measure which might gratify this spirit. She is willing to assume her full responsibility for the existence of slavery within her limits, nor does she seek to share or divide it with others. Although we may, for our own sakes, regret that the avarice and hard-heartedness of the progenitors of those who are now so sensitive on the subject, ever introduced the institution among us, yet we will not go to them to learn law, morality or religion on the subject.”^[29]

Justice Scott further wrote, “We are almost persuaded that the introduction of slavery amongst us was, in the providence of God, who makes the evil passions of men subservient to His own glory, a means of placing that unhappy race within the pale of civilized nations.”^[30]

Justice Gamble, relying on stare decisis, disagreed and wrote a dissent which said that he was not "any more at liberty to overturn them [previous state court decisions] than [he] would any other series of decisions by which the law upon any other question was settled." He said that the only thing making the court’s decision different here were "the temporary public excitements" that confused the legal issues for both sides. Despite these disturbances Gamble stated:

It is proper that the judicial mind, calm and self-balanced, should adhere to principles established when there was no feeling to disturb the view of the legal question upon which the rights of parties depend. . . . The cases here referred to are cases decided when the public mind was tranquil, and when the tribunals maintained in their decisions the principles which had always received the approbation of an enlightened public opinion. Times may have changed, public feeling may have changed, but principles have not and do not change; and, in my judgment, there can be no safe basis for judicial decisions, but in those principles which are immutable.”^[31]

The case was remanded back to the trial court for final action, but Judge Hamilton refused a motion to terminate the sheriff’s custody of the Scotts. No other official action was noted until a January 25, 1854 docket entry that the case was “continued by consent, awaiting decision of Supreme Court of the United States.”^[32]

[edit] Dred Scott v. Sandford

[edit] United States Circuit Court

The normal next step for Scott would have been an appeal to the United States Supreme Court. However, based on Strader v. Graham, there was every reason to believe that the court would refuse to hear the case, thereby letting the state decision stand. In fact, Taney would note in his final decision on Scott that if they had appealed the original case this is exactly how the court would have ruled. The final decision on how to proceed was not made by Scott’s attorneys of record from the Missouri case. David Hall died in early 1851 and Alexander Field moved to Louisiana, possibly even before the March 1851 decision. ^[33]

Sometime after June 1852 the Scotts were sold to Mrs. Emerson’s brother, John Sandford. Sandford had moved from St. Louis to New York but returned frequently to St. Louis on business. Sandford’s new attorney, Roswell M. Field, an antislavery advocate originally from Vermont, decided that, rather than appeal Scott v. Emerson, it would be better to utilize the diverse-citizenship clause (Article III Section 2 of the United States Constitution) that would allow Scott, a citizen of Missouri to sue Sandford, a citizen of New York, in the federal district court.^[34]

On November 2, 1853 Dred Scott v. Sandford was filed as an action of trespass in the United States circuit court for Missouri. The judge was Robert W. Wells, a former Virginian and former Attorney General for Missouri. In April 1854 Sanford’s attorney, still Hugh Garland, filed a plea of abatement which claimed that Scott was not a Missouri citizen “because he is a negro of African descent; his ancestors were of pure African blood and were brought into this country and sold as negro slaves.” Lacking citizenship, Scott would have no standing to file a federal suit under the diverse citizenship clause. Judge Wells rejected this argument and ruled that for purposes of Article III Section 2 nothing more than residence and the ability to own property was required to establish citizenship.^[35]

With the jurisdiction issue settled, the case was heard before a jury on May 15, 1854. Both sides had agreed to submit a joint document titled “Agreed Statement of Fact” that described Scott’s travels with Dr. Emerson, eliminating the need for any witnesses. Despite the fact that the Kansas-Nebraska Act was being debated vociferously in Congress during the trial and the constitutionality of the Missouri Compromise was a prominent part of that debate, the constitutionality issue was not raised by Sanford's attorney. Judge Wells instructed the jury that the law, based on both Strader v. Graham and the Missouri Supreme Court ruling in Scott v. Emerson, favored Sandford, and the jury responded accordingly by ruling against Scott.^[36]

[edit] Appeal to the United States Supreme Court

To this point, the case had drawn little attention either locally or nationally. However, with the need to appeal to the United States Supreme Court it was necessary to either raise funds for new attorneys or find an attorney who would donate his services. Towards the first end, a twelve page pamphlet dated July 4, 1854 was circulated to raise funds. In a section represented as Scott’s personal appeal, the pamphlet said:

The judge said that, according to these laws, While I was in Illinois and Wisconsin I was a free man - just as good as my master, - and that I had as much right to make a slave of a white man as a white man to make a slave of me. I was sorry nobody ever told me that while I was there. Yet, I was glad to hear the judge talk so, for I thought he would set me free. But, after a little while, the judge said that as soon as my master got me back this side of the line of Missouri, my right to be free was gone; and that I and my wife and my children became nothing but so many pieces of property. I thought it hard that white men should draw a line of their own on the face of the earth, on one side of which a black man was to become no man at all, and never say a word to the black man about it until they had got him on that side of the line. So, I appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States. I have no money to pay anybody at Washington to speak for me. My fellow-men, can any of you help me in my day of trial?^[37]

When little response was received to the pamphlet Field contacted Montgomery Blair in Washington. Blair had been a lawyer in St. Louis and a Benton supporter before relocating to the nation’s capital in 1853 where he quickly established a sound reputation, both socially and professionally. Field impressed on Blair, who had experience before the Supreme Court, the national significance of the case, and Blair agreed to take the case without charging a fee. Gamaliel Bailey, an abolitionist and editor of the National Era, agreed cover court costs and other expenses. The case of Dred Scott v. Sandford (Sanford’s name was misspelled and never corrected) was officially received by the Supreme Court on December 30, 1854. Because the filing was made so late in the current session, it was not scheduled for oral arguments until February 11, 1856. Blair would handle the case alone until late in the process when George Ticknor Curtis of Massachusetts joined him.^[38]

Sanford, for his part, had secured the services of two of the most prominent attorneys in the nation. The first, Henry S. Geyer, was the Senator from Missouri who had successfully defeated Benton for the seat. The other, Reverdy Johnson, was a former Maryland Senator, a United States Attorney General under Zachary Taylor, and one of the leading constitutional law attornies in the country. The decision of these two attorneys to become involved strongly indicated that the political ramifications of the case were starting to be realized.^[39]

The Supreme Court that would hear the case was headed by Chief Justice, Roger Taney, who had been appointed by Andrew Jackson in 1835. Although prior to his appointment Taney was considered a strong Jackson partisan, he generally “had won high praise for his lucid opinions and effective leadership of the Court.”^[40] Historian Kenneth Stampp, who notes Taney’s “proslavery proclivities” as reflected in the Strader “dictum” authored by Taney, characterizes the other eight members of “a highly political Court” as follows:

Three of the southern associate justices -- James M. Wayne of Georgia, John Catron of Tennessee, and John a Campbell of Alabama -- were firm defenders of southern rights. The fourth, Peter V. Daniel of Virginia, was a proslavery zealot, a judicial fire-eater, who refused to tread on northern soil and hoped that every southern man would be “prepared for any extremity” to resist a northern attempt to exclude slavery from the territories. Of the two northern Democrats, Samuel Nelson of New York was reluctant to have the Court involve itself in the politics of slavery expansion; but Robert C. Grier of Pennsylvania was as closely tied to the southern wing of the Democratic part as his friend James Buchanan. Benjamin R. Curtis of Massachusetts, the conservative Whig justice, was in bad repute among Republicans of his state for his readiness to enforce the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, but he shared their belief in the power of Congress to prohibit slavery in the territories. Justice John McLean of Ohio, a former Jacksonian Democrat, now a Republican, was deeply involved in party politics. He had sought the presidential nomination in 1856 and still hoped for one in 1860, when he would be seventy-five years old.^[41]

[edit] Arguments

On February 7, 1856 Montgomery Blair filed a ten page brief with the Supreme Court that concentrated on two issues. First he argued, relying on Justice Gamble’s dissent in Scott v. Emerson, that Scott should be declared free under Missouri judicial precedents because of his residence in territories and the state of Illinois where slavery was prohibited. The balance of the brief argued in support of the court’s ruling against Sanford’s plea of abatement contesting whether Scott, as a black man, was a citizen of Missouri. Even though this last issue had been won at the lower level, Blair assumed, correctly, that the issue would be raised again before the Supreme Court.^[42]

Geyer and Johnson either did not submit written briefs or the documents have not been preserved. Newspaper accounts indicate they argued both that Scott was not a citizen and that the Missouri Compromise’s prohibition of slavery in an United States territory was unconstitutional. The oral arguments began on February 11 and covered four days. Blair opened the arguments, followed by Geyer and Johnson, with Blair then allowed to make a final argument.^[43]

After the arguments were heard,the Court conferred twice in February and four more times in early April. On May 12 the court ordered the case reargued with special attention to be directed at whether the plea in abatement was properly before the court and if it was, whether a Negro have a right as a citizen to file suit in a federal court. It has been speculated by Lincoln (in his House Divided speech)and others that this delay was to avoid a proslavery decision before the 1856 elections that would hurt democrats in the North, but there is no actual proof of that.^[44]

By the time the case was reargued on December 15, events in Kansas as well as President Pierce’s public comments, had made it clear that the case was important. Many hoped that the court’s decision would serve as a final solution to the territorial problem. The new hearings drew large audiences which included other judges, lawyers, and members of Congress. At this point George T. Curtis joined Blair to make the constitutional argument for prohibiting slavery in the territories. The court heard twelve hours of argument over four days following the same pattern as before. Blair made most of the argument for Scott with Curtis speaking only for an hour on the final day.^[45]

On the issue of citizenship, Blair presented “a mass of evidence” indicating that blacks had exercised the rights of citizenship in many states and showed that even some Missouri laws referred to them as citizens. He showed that when the fourth Article of Confederation, which provided that all “free inhabitants” of each state were entitled to the privileges and immunity of the “free citizens” of every other state, was approved that efforts to exclude non-whites was specifically rejected by a vote of eight to two. Blair also differentiated between “civil rights” and “political functions” -- arguing that some activities such as voting, serving on juries, and holding public office could be denied to some without excluding the limited individuals from other aspects of citizenship. Blair’s argument for a type of limited citizenship for blacks was the basis for the original denial by Judge Wells of the original plea of abatement.^[46]

Geyer countered by arguing that a party claiming citizenship had to establish both state and national citizenship. He argued that citizens were either born as citizens or naturalized under procedures that only Congress could establish. Scott had been born a slave and no act by Congress had allowed him to become a United States citizen. Not only did Scott’s temporary residences not grant him citizenship but, according to Geyer, neither would “a deed of manumission or other discharge from bondage.” Reverdy Johnson added little to the debate on issues but spoke directly to a defense of slavery which he said “promises to exist through all time, so far as human vision can discover.” He argued that “the extension of Slavery on the continent is the only thing which will preserve the constitutional freedom we now enjoy.”^[47]

On the issue of whether Scott’s time in free territory had served to emancipate him, Geyer argued that Emerson had been a sojourner while serving in the military and laws applying to residents were inapplicable. He also reiterated the Strader position that once Scott was returned to Missouri it was Missouri law rather than Illinois law that determined whether he was a slave. Blair countered by demonstrating that Emerson had not established legal residence anywhere else in the country while in the military. He also denied that the Strader decision was relevant since it had only addressed the jurisdictional issue in refusing to review the Kentucky court’s decision -- it had not ruled on the legal accuracy of its determination.^[48]

Both sides addressed the constitutionality of Congressional actions to restrict slavery in the territories. Fehrenbacher summarizes this portion of the debate:

In challenging congressional power over slavery in the territories, counsel for Sanford were forced to rely heavily on theoretical assertion, since the weight of precedent and established practice was against them. Scott’s lawyers, for the same reason, were more disposed to recite the historical record. The argument of Geyer and Johnson rested largely upon a narrow interpretation of the territory clause and a broad appeal to the principle of state equality. in response, Blair and Curtis maintained that broad construction of the territory clause had been intended by the framers of the Constitution, implemented repeatedly by Congress, confirmed by the Supreme Court, and accepted virtually without question by the American people for half a century.^[49]

[edit] Initial deliberation

The five southern judges on the Supreme Court did constitute a majority. Historian William Freehling describes four of them (excluding Justice Daniels):

If the Supreme Court’s controlling majority had been proslavery ultras and/or disunionists, they would have betrayed the presidents who had nominated them. Southern Democrats commanded the Court in 1857 because the Democratic Party, with its southern power base, had won five of the previous seven presidential elections. The Democracy’s presidents had aspired to stop extremists, North and South, from smashing their party and their Union. Andrew Jackson, father of this Democratic Party statecraft, had appointed three of the five Southern Democrats who ruled the Court in 1857. He had chosen southern moderates who shared his antiabolitionist, antidisunionist position.^[50]

When the court met for the first time on February 15, 1857^[51], the southern justices were prepared to declare the Missouri Compromise unconstitutional, but they were reluctant to do so without the support of their northern colleagues. Justices Curtis and McLean were prepared to free Scott, so the Southerners needed to gain the support of Justices Grier and Nelson. Both Grier and Nelson, however, saw any decision that would forbid Congress to restrict slavery in the territories as “wildly provocative” to the North. Unable to obtain their support, which would have produced a sweeping “asectional verdict”, the court decided to allow Justice Nelson to write a narrow decision that would uphold Scott’s enslavement, but avoid the issues of Negro citizenship or congressional authority. ^[52]

[edit] President Buchanan intervenes

This compromise did not last.^[53] On February 3, 1857 President-elect James Buchanan wrote to his friend Justice Catron, asking whether the case would be decided before his inauguration on March 4. Buchanan hoped the decision would quell unrest in the country over the slavery issue by issuing a decision that put the future of slavery beyond the realm of political debate.^[54]

The Court, however, changed direction and decided to address, at the suggestion of Justice Wayne (probably with the support of the Chief Justice), the “thornier problems” presented by the case. Since this change of mind again raised the specter of a 5-4 sectional decision, Catron in letters to Buchanan on February 19 and 23 informed him of the new plan and urged him to pressure fellow Pennsylvanian Justice Grier to join the majority.^[55] On February 23 Grier wrote to Buchanan:

I am anxious that it should not appear that the line of latitude should mark the line of division in the court. I feel also that the opinion of the majority will fail of much of its effect if founded on clashing and inconsistent arguments. On conversation with the chief justice, I have agreed to concur with him. Brother Wayne and myself will also use our endeavors to get brothers Daniel and Campbell and Catron to do the same. ... But I fear some rather extreme views may be thrown out by some of our southern brethren. There will therefore be six, if not seven (perhaps Nelson will remain neutral), who will decide the compromise law of 1820 to be of non-effect. But the opinions will not be delivered before Friday the 6th of March [the date of Buchanan’s inauguration was March 4]. We will not let any others of our brethren know anything about the cause of our anxiety to produce this result, and though contrary to our usual practice, we have thought due to you to state to you in candor and confidence the real state of the matter.^[56]

At his inauguration Buchanan refers to the issue of slavery in the territories. After first stating that the issue is “of but little practical importance”, Buchanan said:

Besides, it is a judicial question, which legitimately belongs to the Supreme Court of the United States, before which it is now pending and will, it is understood, be speedily and finally settled. To their decision, in common with all good citizens, I shall cheerfully submit, whatever this may be.^[57]

Prior to his address, Buchanan and Taney, who as Chief Justice would administer the oath of office, were seen by the crowd quietly conferring. When the decision was announced two days later, anti-slavery proponents alleged that this was when Taney informed Buchanan of what the Court would decide. It was only years later that the truth of the Grier and Catron correspondence would be revealed.^[58]

[edit] Decision

[edit] Presentation and publication of the decision

The ruling of the Court was presented orally on March 6 and March 7, 1857. Chief Justice Taney led off the first day with a two hour reading of his decision, followed by Justices Nelson and Catron reading their brief concurring opinions. Justices McLean and Curtis read their dissenting opinions the next day, while the other concurring justices simply filed their opinions. Justices McLean and Curtis released their opinions immediately to the press while Taney held his opinion back for further revision. In the initial public reaction to the decision, the public had only an Associated press summary of Taney’s presentation to compare with the two complete dissenting opinions.^[59]

Rumors began to circulate that Taney, rather than merely fine tuning his decision, was making extensive revisions in the text. This especially concerned Justice Curtis who had designed his dissent as a direct rebuttal of many of the points Taney had earlier made. On April 2, believing that Taney had already filed his opinion with the clerk, Curtis requested a copy. Finding this was not the case, he requested a copy as soon as it was received. The clerk told Curtis that Taney had ordered him pecifically not to comply, and between April 28 and June 20 a series of heated letters were exchanged between Curtis and Taney.^[60] Taney replied to a direct request from Curtis by writing:

It would would seem from your letter to me that you suppose you are entitled to demand it as a right, being one of the members of the tribunal. This would undoubtedly be the case if you wished it to aid you in the discharge of your official duties. But I understood you wished it to aid you in the discharge of your official duties. But I understood you as not desiring or intending it for that purpose. On the contrary, you announced from the Bench that you regarded this opinion as extrajudicial -- and not binding upon you or anyone else.^[61]

Curtis, in response, charged Taney with violating Supreme Court Rule 25, which was adopted in 1834 and required prompt delivery of all opinions immediately after delivery to the clerk for recording. As a member of the Court, Curtis felt it was his duty to review the opinion that, according to some reports, had been “materially altered” since March 6. Taney responded that Curtis’ purpose was to “impair [the Court’s] authority and discredit it as a judicial decision”, argued that Curtis’ decision to promptly release to the press his own dissent had been improper, and denied that his final written decision, published at the end of May, contained any “historical fact, or principle, or point of law” not included in his March 6 presentation.^[62] When the opinion was released, Curtis compared it to his own recollections and felt that at least eighteen pages had been added and argued that it was clear that much of the new text was addressed specifically to issues raised in Curtis’ and McLean’s dissents.^[63]

[edit] Taney's majority opinion

[edit] Negro citizenship

The Court first had to decide whether it had jurisdiction. Article III, Section 2, Clause 1 of the U.S. Constitution provides that "the judicial Power shall extend… to Controversies… between Citizens of different States…" The Court first held that Scott was not a "citizen of a state" within the meaning of the United States Constitution, as that term was understood at the time the Constitution was adopted, and therefore not able to bring suit in federal court. Furthermore, whether a person is a citizen of a state, for Article III purposes, was strictly a federal question. This meant that although any state could confer state citizenship on an individual for purposes of state law, no state could confer state citizenship on an individual for purposes of Article III. In other words, the federal courts did not have to look to who a state conferred citizenship when interpreting the words "citizen of… a state" in the federal Constitution. Rather, it was the federal courts who were to determine who was a citizen of a state for Article III purposes.

Thus, whether Missouri recognized Scott as a citizen was irrelevant. Taney summed up,

"Consequently, no State, since the adoption of the Constitution, can by naturalizing an alien invest him with the rights and privileges secured to a citizen of a State under the Federal Government, although, so far as the State alone was concerned, he would undoubtedly be entitled to the rights of a citizen, and clothed with all the rights and immunities which the Constitution and laws of the State attached to that character."

This meant that

"no State can, by any act or law of its own, passed since the adoption of the Constitution, introduce a new member into the political community created by the Constitution of the United States."

The only relevant question, therefore, was whether, at the time the Constitution was ratified, Scott could have been considered a citizen of any state within the meaning of Article III. According to the Court, the drafters of the Constitution had viewed all African-Americans as

"beings of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with the white race, either in social or political relations, and so far inferior that they had no rights which the white man was bound to respect."

The Court also presented a parade of horribles, describing the feared results of granting Mr. Scott's petition:

"It would give to persons of the negro race, …the right to enter every other State whenever they pleased, …the full liberty of speech in public and in private upon all subjects upon which its own citizens might speak; to hold public meetings upon political affairs, and to keep and carry arms wherever they went."

Scott was not a citizen of Missouri, and the federal courts therefore lacked jurisdiction to hear the dispute.

Despite the conclusion that the Court lacked jurisdiction, however, it went on to hold that Scott was not a free man, even though he had resided for a time in Minnesota, because the provisions of the Missouri Compromise declaring it to be free territory were beyond Congress's power to enact. The Court rested its decision on the ground that Congress's power to acquire territories and create governments within those territories was limited, and that the Fifth Amendment barred any law that would deprive a slaveholder of his property, such as his slaves, because he had brought them into a free territory. The Court went on to state — although the issue was not before the Court — that the territorial legislatures had no power to ban slavery.

This was only the second time that the Supreme Court had found an act of Congress to be unconstitutional. (The first time was 54 years earlier in Marbury v. Madison). Curtis, in dissent, attacked that part of the Court's decision as obiter dicta, on the ground that once the Court determined that it did not have jurisdiction to hear Scott's case its only recourse was to dismiss the action, not to pass judgment on the merits of his claims. The dissents by Curtis and McLean also attacked the Court's overturning of the Missouri Compromise on its merits, noting both that it was not necessary to decide the question, and also that none of the Framers of the Constitution had ever objected on constitutional grounds to the United States Congress' adoption of the antislavery provisions of the Northwest Ordinance passed by the Continental Congress, or the subsequent acts that barred slavery north of 36°30'. Nor, these justices argued, was there any Constitutional basis for the claim that African-Americans could not be citizens. At the time of the ratification of the Constitution, black men could vote in ten of the thirteen states. This made them citizens not only of their states but of the United States.

[edit] Consequences

The decision was a culmination of what many at that time considered a push to expand slavery. The expansion of the territories and resulting admission of new states meant that the longstanding Missouri Compromise would cause the loss of political power in the North as many of the new states would be admitted as slave states. Thus, Democratic party politicians sought repeal of the Missouri Compromise and were finally successful in 1854 with the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act, which naturally ended the "compromise." This act permitted each newly admitted state south of the 40th parallel to decide whether to be a slave state or free state. Now, with Dred Scott, the Supreme Court under Taney sought to permit the unhindered expansion of slavery into the territories.

Although Taney believed that the decision would settle the slavery question once and for all, it produced the opposite result. It strengthened the opposition to slavery in the North, divided the Democratic Party on sectional lines, encouraged secessionist elements among Southern supporters of slavery to make even bolder demands, and strengthened the Republican Party.

[edit] Reaction

The reaction to the decision from opponents of slavery was fierce. The Albany Evening Journal combined two themes in denouncing the decision as both an offense to the principles of liberty on which the nation was founded and a victory for the Slave Power over the free states:

The three hundred and forty-seven thousand five hundred and twenty-five Slaveholders in the Republic, accomplished day before yesterday a great success — as shallow men estimate success. They converted the Supreme Court of Law and Equity of the United States of America into a propagandist of human Slavery. Fatal day for a judiciary made reputable throughout the world, and reliable to all in this nation, by the learning and the virtues of Jay, Rutledge, Ellsworth, Marshall and Story!

The conspiracy is nearly completed. The Legislation of the Republic is in the hands of this handful of Slaveholders. The United States Senate assures it to them. The Executive power of the Government is theirs. Buchanan took the oath of fealty to them on the steps of the Capitol last Wednesday. The body which gives the supreme law of the land, has just acceded to their demands, and dared to declare that under the charter of the Nation, men of African descent are not citizens of the United States and can not be — that the Ordinance of 1787 was void — that human Slavery is not a local thing, but pursues its victims to free soil, clings to them wherever they go, and returns with them — that the American Congress has no power to prevent the enslavement of men in the National Territories — that the inhabitants themselves of the Territories have no power to exclude human bondage from their midst — and that men of color can not be suitors for justice in the Courts of the United States!

That editorial ended on a martial note:

…All who love Republican institutions and who hate Aristocracy, compact yourselves together for the struggle which threatens your liberty and will test your manhood!

Many abolitionists and some supporters of slavery believed that Taney was prepared to rule, as soon as the issue was presented in a subsequent case, that the states had no power to prohibit slavery within their borders and that state laws providing for the emancipation of slaves brought into their territory or forbidding the institution of slavery were likewise unconstitutional. Abraham Lincoln stressed this danger during his famous "House Divided" speech at Springfield, Illinois, on June 16, 1858:

Put this and that together, and we have another nice little niche, which we may, ere long, see filled with another Supreme Court decision, declaring that the Constitution of the United States does not permit a State to exclude slavery from its limits. …We shall lie down pleasantly dreaming that the people of Missouri are on the verge of making their State free, and we shall awake to the reality instead, that the Supreme Court has made Illinois a slave State.

That fear of the "next" Dred Scott decision shocked many in the North who had been content to accept slavery as long as it was confined within its present borders.

It also put the Northern Democrats, such as Stephen A. Douglas, in a difficult position. The Northern wing of the Democratic Party had supported the Kansas–Nebraska Act of 1854 under the banner of "popular sovereignty," arguing that even if Congress did not bar the expansion of slavery into those territories, the residents of those territories could prohibit it by territorial legislation. The Dred Scott decision squarely stated that they could not — even though, strictly speaking, that issue was not before the Court.

Douglas attempted to overcome that obstacle, without challenging the Court's decision directly, by his Freeport Doctrine. Douglas insisted that, even if a territory could not bar slavery outright, the institution could not take root without local police regulations to protect it.

While this doctrine may have allayed Northern Democrats' fears, it was wholly unacceptable to Southern Democrats, who reached a different conclusion from the same premise. As they argued, if hostile territorial governments could obstruct their right to bring their slaves into a territory by refusing to protect that right, then Congress must intervene to pass a federal slave code for all the territories. They often coupled this with threats to secede if Congress did not comply.

At the same time, Democrats characterized Republicans as lawless rebels, provoking disunion by their unwillingness to accept the Supreme Court's decision as the law of the land. Many Northern opponents of slavery had offered a legalistic argument for refusing to recognize the Dred Scott decision as binding. As they noted, the Court's decision began with the proposition that the federal courts did not have jurisdiction to hear Scott's case because he was not a citizen of the State of Missouri. Therefore, so the opponents argued, the remainder of the decision concerning the Missouri Compromise was unnecessary (i.e., beyond the Court's power to decide) and invalid (i.e., obiter dictum). Douglas attacked this position in the Lincoln–Douglas debates:

Mr. Lincoln goes for a warfare upon the Supreme Court of the United States, because of their judicial decision in the Dred Scott case. I yield obedience to the decisions in that court—to the final determination of the highest judicial tribunal known to our constitution.

Southern supporters of slavery went further, claiming that the decision was essential to the preservation of the union. As the Richmond Enquirer stated:

Thus has a politico-legal question, involving others of deep import, been decided emphatically in favor of the advocates and supporters of the Constitution and the Union, the equality of the States and the rights of the South, in contradistinction to and in repudiation of the diabolical doctrines inculcated by factionists and fanatics; and that too by a tribunal of jurists, as learned, impartial and unprejudiced as perhaps the world has ever seen. A prize, for which the athletes of the nation have often wrestled in the halls of Congress, has been awarded at last, by the proper umpire, to those who have justly won it. The "nation" has achieved a triumph, "sectionalism" has been rebuked, and abolitionism has been staggered and stunned. Another supporting pillar has been added to our institutions; the assailants of the South and enemies of the Union have been driven from their "point d'appui"; a patriotic principle has been pronounced; a great, national, conservative, union saving sentiment has been proclaimed.

But while some supporters of slavery treated the decision as a vindication of their rights within the union, others treated it as merely a step to spreading slavery throughout the nation, as the Republicans claimed. Convinced that any restrictions on their right to own slaves and to take them anywhere they chose were unlawful, they boasted that the coming decade would see slave auctions on Boston Common. These Southern radicals were ready to split the Democratic Party and — as events showed — the nation on that principle.

Frederick Douglass, a prominent African-American abolitionist who thought the decision unconstitutional and the Chief Justice's reasoning inapposite to the founders' vision, recognized that political conflict could not be avoided. "The highest authority has spoken. The voice of the Supreme Court has gone out over the troubled waves of the National Conscience. But my hopes were never brighter than now. I have no fear that the National Conscience will be put to sleep by such an open, glaring, and scandalous issue of lies."

[edit] Scott's fate

The sons of Peter Blow, Scott's first owner, purchased emancipation for Scott and his family on May 26, 1857. Scott died six months later of tuberculosis on November 7, 1857.

[edit] Later references

Please help improve this section by expanding it. Further information might be found on the talk page or at requests for expansion.

Justice John Marshall Harlan was the lone dissenting vote in the 1896 Supreme Court Plessy v. Ferguson which legalized racial segregation and created the concept of “separate but equal.” In his dissent Harlan wrote that the majority’s opinion would “prove to be quite as pernicious as the decision made by this tribunal in the Dred Scott case.”^[64]

Charles Evans Hughes, writing on the history of the Supreme Court in 1927 before his appointment as Chief Justice, described the Dred Scott case as a "self-inflicted wound" from which it took the Court at least a generation to recover.^[65][66]

In Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992)—which upheld Roe's central holding that abortion is constitutionally protected—Justice Scalia, joined by three other justices who wanted to reverse Roe, made this comparison to Dred Scott:

[D]red Scott...rested upon the concept of "substantive due process" that the Court praises and employs today. Indeed, Dred Scott was very possibly the first application of substantive due process in the Supreme Court, the original precedent for...Roe v. Wade. [1]

[edit] See also

• Timeline of the American Civil Rights Movement
• List of United States Supreme Court cases, volume 60

[edit] Notes

[edit] External links

• "Dred Scott v. Sandford" on Wikisource.
• Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857) - full text with links to cited Supreme Court opinions, the U.S. Constitution, U.S. Code, and C.F.R.
• Summary of the case from OYEZ
• "Dred Scott decision." Encyclopædia Britannica. 2006. Encyclopædia Britannica Online. 17 Dec. 2006. www.yowebsite.com
• Dred Scott Decision: The Lawsuit That Started The Civil War article by Gregory J. Wallance
• Jefferson National Expansion Memorial, National Park Service
• Commemorative Events at Jefferson National Expansion Memorial for the 150th Anniversary of Dred Scott v. Sandford
• Infography about the Dred Scott Case