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The controversial Kansas-Nebraska Act, passed on May 30, 1854, increased the intensity of the national debate over the expansion of slavery and led to a chain of events that culminated in secession and the American Civil War. The Act created the territories of Kansas and Nebraska, opened new lands to settlement, and repealed the Missouri Compromise of 1820 that had prohibited slavery in the former Louisiana Territory north of the parallel 36°30' north, replacing it with the concept of popular sovereignty which allowed the settlers to decide whether or not to have slavery within those territories.
The Act was introduced in Congess in January 1854 by Democratic Senator Stephen A. Douglas of Illinois. The initial purpose of the Kansas-Nebraska Act was to create opportunities for a Mideastern Transcontinental Railroad. It was not problematic until popular sovereignty was written into the proposal. The new Republican Party, which formed in reaction against allowing slavery where it had been forbidden, emerged as the dominant force throughout the North. Opponents denounced the law as a concession to the Slave Power of the South.
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[edit] Background
Since early in the 1840s the topic of a transcontinental railroad was being discussed. While there were debates over the specifics, especially the route to be taken, there was a public consensus that such a railroad should be built by private interests financed by public land grants. In 1845 Stephen Douglas, serving in his first term in the United States House of Representatives, submitted an unsuccessful plan to formally organize the Nebraska Territory as the first step in building the railroad which would have its eastern terminal in Chicago. Railroad proposals would be submitted and debated in all subsequent sessions of Congress with cities such as Chicago, St. Louis, Quincy, Memphis, and New Orleans competing to be the jumping off point for the construction.[1]
Several proposals in late 1852 and early 1853 had strong support, but in the end they failed because of disputes over whether the railroad would follow a northern or a southern route. In early 1853 the House of Representatives passed a bill by an 107 to 49 vote that organized the Nebraska Territory in land west of Iowa and Missouri. In March the bill moved to the Senate Committee on Territories which was now headed by Senator Douglas. Missouri Senator David Atchison announced that he would only reluctantly support the Nebraska proposal as long as slaveholders were not banned from the new territory. While the bill was silent on this issue, slavery would have been prohibited under the terms of the Missouri Compromise. Other southern senators were not as flexible as Atchison. By a vote of 23 to 17 the Senate voted to table the motion with every senator from states south of Missouri voting for the tabling.[2]
During the senate adjournment the issues of the railroad and the repeal of the Missouri Compromise became entangled in Missouri politics as Atchison campaigned for reelection against the forces of Thomas Hart Benton. Atchison was maneuvered into choosing between antagonizing the state railroad interests or the state slaveholders. Finally Atchison took the position that he would rather see Nebraska “sink in hell” before he would allow it to be overrun by free-soilers[3].
In this era, congressmen generally found lodging in boarding houses when they were in the nation’s capital performing their legislative duties. Atchison shared lodgings on an F Street house shared by the leading southerners in Congess. Atchison himself was the Senate’s president pro tempore, and his housemates included Robert T. Hunter (chairman of the Finance Committee from Virginia), James Mason (chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee from Virginia), and Andrew P. Butler (chairman of the Judiciary Committee from South Carolina). When Congress reconvened on December 5, 1853, this group, termed the “F Street Mess”, along with Virginian William O. Goode, formed the nucleus that would insist on slaveholder equality in Nebraska. Douglas was aware of their opinions and their power and knew that he needed to address their concerns.[4]
Iowa’s Senator Augustus C. Dodge immediately reintroduced the same legislation to organize Nebraska that had stalled in the previous session, and it was referred to Douglas’ committee on December 14. Douglas, hoping to achieve the support of the southerners, publicly announced that the same principle that had been established in the Compromise of 1850 should apply in Nebraska. In the Compromise of 1850, Utah and New Mexico Territory had been organized without any restrictions on slavery, and many supporters of Douglas argued that this compromise had already superceded the Missouri Compromise. [5] These territories, however, unlike Nebraska, had never been part of the Louisiana and had never been subject to the Missouri Compromise.
[edit] Congressional action
[edit] Introduction of the Nebraska bill
The bill was reported to the main body of the Senate on January 4, 1854. The bill had been significantly modified by Douglas, who had authored the New Mexico and Utah acts, to mirror the language from the Compromise of 1850. In the new bill the territory of Nebraska was extended north all the way to the forty-ninth parallel and any decisions on slavery would be made “when admitted as a state or states, the said territory, or any portion of the same, shall be received into the Union, with or without slavery, as their constitution may prescribe at the time of their admission.”[7] In a report accompanying the bill, Douglas’s committee wrote that the intent of the Utah and New Mexico acts:
...were intended to have a far more comprehensive and enduring effect than the mere adjustment of the difficulties arising out of the recent acquisition of Mexican territory. They were designed to establish certain great principles, which would not only furnish adequate remedies for existing evils, but, in all time to come, avoid the perils of a similar agitation, by withdrawing the question of slavery from the halls of Congress and the political arena, and committing it to the arbitrament of those who were immediately interested in, and alone responsible for its consequences.[8]
The report likens the situation in New Mexico and Utah with the situation in Nebraska. In the first instance, many had argued that slavery had previously been prohibited under Mexican law just as it was prohibited in Nebraska under the Missouri Compromise, even though some thought such a prohibition was unconstitutional. Just as the previous actions had not ruled on the validity of Mexican law on the acquired territory, the Nebraska bill was neither “affirming or repealing ... the Missouri act.” In other words, popular sovereignty was being established by ignoring, rather than addressing, the problem presented by the Missouri Compromise.[9]
Douglas’ attempt to finesse his way around the Missouri Compromise did not work. Archibald Dixon, a Kentucky Whig, believed that unless the Missouri Compromise was explicitly repealed, slaveholders would be reluctant to move to the new territory until slavery was actually approved by the settlers -- settlers who would most likely hold free-soil views. On January 16 Dixon surprised Douglas by introducing an amendment that would repeal the section of the Missouri Compromise prohibiting slavery above the 36°30' parallel. Douglas met privately with Dixon and in the end, despite his misgivings on northern reaction, agreed to accept Dixon’s arguments.[10] From a political standpoint, the Whig Party had been in decline in the South because the effectiveness with which the Democrats had hammered southern Whigs over slavery issues. The Whigs hoped that by seizing the initiative on this issue that they could be identified as the strongest defender of slavery.[11]
A similar amendment was offered in the House by Philip Phillips of Alabama. With the encouragement of the “F Street Mess”, Douglas met with them and Phillips to insure that the momentum for passing the bill remained with the Democratic Party. Towards this end they arranged to meet with President Franklin Pierce to insure that the issue would be seen as a test of party loyalty within the Democratic Party.[13]
[edit] Meeting with President Pierce
Pierce had barely mentioned Nebraska in his State of the Union message the previous month and was not enthusiastic about the implications of repealing the Missouri Compromise. Close advisors Senator Lewis Cass, a proponent of popular sovereignty as far back as 1848 as an alternative to the Wilmot Proviso, and Secretary of State William L. Marcy both advised Pierce that repeal would create serious political problems. On Saturday January 22 the full cabinet met, and only Secretary of War Jefferson Davis and Secretary of Navy James C. Dobbin supported repeal. Instead the president and cabinet submitted to Douglas an alternative plan that would have sought out a judicial ruling on the constitutionality of the Missouri Compromise. Both Pierce and Attorney General Caleb Cushing both believed that the Supreme Court would find it unconstitutional.[14]
Douglas’ committee met late that night. Douglas was agreeable tothe proposal but the Atchison group was not. Determined to offer the repeal to Congress that Monday but reluctant to act without Pierce’s commitment, Douglas arranged through Secretary Davis to meet with President Pierce on Sunday. Generally Pierce refrained from conducting any business on a Sunday. Douglas was accompanied at the meeting by Atchison, Hunter, Phillips, and John C. Breckinridge of Kentucky.[15]
Douglas and Atchison first met alone with Pierce before the whole group convened. Pierce was persuaded to support repeal, and, at Douglas’ insistence, Pierce provided a written draft asserting that the Missouri Compromise had been made inoperative by the principles of the Compromise of 1850. Later Pierce informed his cabinet who concurred in the change of direction.[16]
[edit] Debate in Congress
On January 23 the rewritten bill was reintroduced in the Senate. In addition to the changes regarding repeal of the Missouri Compromise, Nebraska was now divided into two territories, Kansas and Nebraska, with the division coming at the thirty-seventh parallel. The division was the result of concerns expressed by settlers already in Nebraska as well as the Senators from Iowa who were concerned with the location of the territories seat of government if the large territory was created. Existing language which affirmed the application of all other laws of the United States would apply in the new territory was supplemented by the language agreed on with President Pierce that read, “except the eighth section of the act preparatory to the admission of Missouri into the Union, approved March 6, 1820, which was superseded by the legislation of 1850, commonly called the compromise measures, and is declared inoperative.” Identical legislation would also be introduced shortly in the House.[17]
Historian Allan Nevins wrote that now “two interconnected battles began to rage, one in Congress and one in the country at large: each fought with a pertinacity, bitterness, and rancor unknown even in Wilmot Proviso days.” In Congress, the freesoilers were at a distinct disadvantage. The Democrats held large majorities in each house and Stephen Douglas, “a ferocious fighter, the fiercest, most ruthless, and most unscrupulous that Congress had perhaps ever known” led a tightly disciplined party. It was in the nation at large that the opponents of Nebraska hoped to achieve a moral victory. The New York Times, which had earlier supported President Pierce, predicted that this would be the final straw for northern supporters of the slavery forces and would “create a deep-seated, intense, and ineradicable hatred of the institution which will crush its political power, at all hazzards, and at any cost.[18]
The day after the bill was reintroduced, two Ohioans, Representative Joshua Giddings and Senator Salmon P. Chase, published a free soil response titled, “Appeal ofthe Independent Democrats in Congress to the People of the United States.” The Appeal stated:
We arraign this bill as a gross violation of a sacred pledge; as a criminal betrayal of precious rights; as part and parcel of an atrocious plot to exclude from a vasr unoccupied region immigrants from the Old World and free laborers from our own States, and convert it into a dreary region of despotism,inhabited by masters and slaves.[19]
Douglas took the Appeal personally and responded in Congress when the debate was opened on January 30 before a full house and packed gallery. Douglas biographer Robert W. Johanssen described part of the speech:
Douglas charged the authors of the “Appeal”, whom he referred to throughout as the “Abolitionist confederates,” with having perpetrated a “base falsehood” in their protest. He expressed his own sense of betrayal, recalling that Chase, “with a smiling face and the appearance of friendship,” had appealed for a postponement of debate on the ground that he had not yet familiarized himself with he bill. “Little did I suppose at the time that I granted that act of courtesy,” Douglas remarked, that Chase and his compatriots had published a document “in which they arraigned me as having been guilty of a criminal betrayal of my trust,” of bad faith, and of plotting against the cause of free government. Whle other Senators were attending divine worship, they had been “assembled in a secret conclave,” devoting the Sabbath to their own conspiratorial and deceitful purposes.[20]
The debate would continue for four months. Douglas was the man leader for the bill while Chase, William Seward of New York, and Charles Sumner of Massachusetts led the opposition. The New York Tribune wrote on March 2 that, “The unanimous sentiment of the North is indignant resistance. ... The whole population are full of it. The feeling in 1848 was far inferior to this in strength and universality.”[21]
[edit] Resolution
The debate in the Senate concluded on March 4, 1854 when Stephen Douglas, beginning near midnight on March 3, made a five and a half hour speech. The final vote in favor of passage was 37 to 14. Free state senators voted 14 to 12 in favor while slave state senators overwhelmingly supported the bill, 23 to 2.[23]
[edit] Lincoln-Douglas Debate
Act orchestrator Stephen Douglas and private citizen Abraham Lincoln aired their disagreement over the Kansas-Nebraska Act in three public speeches during September and October 1854.[1] The most comprehensive argument against the Act, the "Peoria Speech", was given by Lincoln in Peoria, Illinois, on October 16. [2] He and Douglas both spoke to the large audience, Douglas first and Lincoln in response two hours later. Lincoln's three hour speech [3], transcribed after the fact by Lincoln himself, presented thorough moral, legal and economic arguments against slavery, and set the stage for Lincoln’s political future[4]
[edit] Results
Historian Michael Morrison describes the impact of the Kansas-Nebraska Act on the off year elections of 1854-55 n the North:
In Pennsylvania, the Democratic governor, who had won by eight thousand votes in 1851, lost by thirty-seven thousand in 1854. Twenty-one anti-Nebraska representatives were sent to Congress as opposed to four Douglas supporters. Every congressional district in Ohio and all but two in Indiana sent Nebraska opponents to Congress. In New England the Democracy was completely vanquished. Every New York Democrat who voted for the bill was defeated. Anti-Nebraska candidates carried every congressional district in Maine. In Pierce’s New Hampshire, John P. Hale, his bête noire was returned to the Senate. In all, only seven of the forty-four northern Democrats who voted for the Nebraska bill saved their seats. From 1854 to 1855 the northern Democracy saved but twenty-five of ninety-one seats. By contrast, it lost only four of sixty-seven in the slave states.[24]
The Kansas-Nebraska Act divided the nation and pointed it toward civil war. The act itself virtually nullified the Missouri Compromise of 1820 and the Compromise of 1850. The turmoil over the act split both the Democratic and Know Nothing parties and gave rise to the Republican Party, which split the United States into two major political parties- North (Republican) and South (Democratic).
Eventually a new anti-slavery state constitution was drawn up. On January 29, 1861, Kansas was admitted to the Union as a free state. Nebraska was admitted to the Union as a state after the Civil War in 1867.
[edit] See also
[edit] Notes
- ^ Potter p. 146-149
- ^ Potter p. 150-152
- ^ Potter p. 154-155
- ^ Freehling pp. 550-551. Johanssen p. 407
- ^ Johannsen p. 402-403
- ^ Holt p. 145
- ^ Johanssen pp. 405
- ^ Johanssen p. 406
- ^ Johanssen p. 406
- ^ Nevins p. 95-96
- ^ Cooper p. 350
- ^ Nevins p. 139
- ^ Johanssen p. 412-413. Cooper pp. 350-351
- ^ Potter p. 161. Johanssen pp. 413-414
- ^ Potter p. 161. Johanssen p. 414
- ^ Johanssen p. 414-415
- ^ Johanssen pp. 415-417
- ^ Nevins p. 111
- ^ Nevins pp. 111-112. Johanssen p. 418
- ^ Johanssen p. 420
- ^ Nevins p. 121
- ^ Nevins p. 144
- ^ Potter p. 165. The vote occurred at 3:30 a.m. and many senators, including Houston, had retired for the night. Estimates on what the vote might have been with all still in attendance vary from 40-20 to 42-18. Nevins p. 145
- ^ Morrison p. 155
[edit] References
- Freehling, William W. The Road toDsunion: Secessionists at Bay 1776-1854. (1990) ISBN 0-19-505814-3
- Johannsen. Robert W. Stephen A. Douglas (1973) ISBN 0-19-501620-3
- Morrison, Michael. Slavery and the American West: The Eclipse of Manifest Destiny and the Coming of the Civil War (1997) online edition
- Nevins, Allan. Ordeal of the Union. vol 2 (1947)
- Nichols, Roy F. “The Kansas-Nebraska Act: A Century of Historiography.” Mississippi Valley Historical Review 43 (September 1956): 187-212. Online at JSTOR at most academic libraries.
- Potter, David M. The Impending Crisis, 1848-1861 (1976), Pulitzer prize winning scholarly history.
- SenGupta, Gunja. “Bleeding Kansas: A Review Essay.” Kansas History 24 (Winter 2001/2002): 318-341.
- Holt, Michael. "The Political Crisis of the 1850s." (1978)
[edit] External links
- An annotated bibliography
- Kansas-Nebraska Act and related resources at the Library of Congress
- Printer-friendly transcript of the act