Norullah Noori

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Norullah Noori is held in extrajudicial detention in the United States Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, in Cuba.[1]

Noori's Guantanamo detainee ID is 6. Intelligence analysts estimated he was born in 1967 in Shajoie, Afghanistan.[1]

Contents

[edit] Combatant Status Review Tribunal

Combatant Status Review Tribunals were held in a 3 x 6 meter trailer. The captive sat with his hands cuffed and feet shackled to a bolt in the floor. Three chairs were reserved for members of the press, but only 37 of the 574 Tribunals were observed.
Combatant Status Review Tribunals were held in a 3 x 6 meter trailer. The captive sat with his hands cuffed and feet shackled to a bolt in the floor.[2] Three chairs were reserved for members of the press, but only 37 of the 574 Tribunals were observed.[3]

Initially the Bush administration asserted that they could withhold all the protections of the Geneva Conventions to captives from the war on terror. This policy was challenged before the Judicial branch. Critics argued that the USA could not evade its obligation to conduct a competent tribunal to determine whether captives are, or are not, entitled to the protections of prisoner of war status.

Subsequently the Department of Defense instituted the Combatant Status Review Tribunals. The Tribunals, however, were not authorized to determine whether the captives were lawful combatants -- rather they were merely empowered to make a recommendation as to whether the captive had previously been correctly determined to match the Bush administration's definition of an enemy combatant.

[edit] Summary of Evidence memo

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Mullah Norullah Noori's Combatant Status Review Tribunal, on 08 August 2004.[4] The memo listed the following allegations against him:

a. The detainee is a member of the Taliban.
  1. The detainee traveled to Kabul to serve as a security guard for a Taliban official.
  2. He leater worked as a security guard for the governor of Jalalabad carrying a Kalashnikov [sic] rifle.
  3. In 2000 the detainee moved to Mazar-E Sharif [sic] where he was a member of a 10-12 man team who provided security to the Governor.
  4. He was armed with a Kalashnikov [sic] while on guard duty.
  5. The detainee served as the acting governor in Mazar-E Sharif [sic] for 8 to 9 months prior to his capture.
b. The detainee participated in military operations against the coalition.
  1. He was fighting on the front lines at Masar-E-Sharif [sic] as a Taliban fighter. As the front lines in Masar-E-Sharif fell, he moved with a moajority of the remaining fighters to Kunduz to reestablish the front lines.
  2. He participated in a meeting where Taliban leaders decided to surrender to the Northern Alliance.
  3. He was captured by Northern Alliance forces along with a Taliban leader and five Taliban soldiers.

[edit] Transcript

Noori chose to participate in his Combatant Status Review Tribunal.[5] On March 3, 2006, in response to a court order from Jed Rakoff the Department of Defense published a five page summarized transcript from his Combatant Status Review Tribunal.[6]

[edit] Testimony

Noori's acknowledged working for the Taliban - but just a foot soldier. Denied being a member of the Taliban.

On of the allegations against Noori was that he had served as the acting governor of Mazari Sharif. He explained that he was one of the governor's bodyguards, and that when the governor was away he was among the guards the governor left to guard his compound.

Noori claimed he didn’t fight during the Russian invasion, the Taliban occupation, or during the American occupation.

Noori attended two years of schooling, as a child, so he can read and write - unlike most men in his village, and this was the reason he was accorded the honorific "mullah".

[edit] Administrative Review Board hearing

Detainees who were determined to have been properly classified as "enemy combatants" were scheduled to have their dossier reviewed at annual Administrative Review Board hearings. The Administrative Review Boards weren't authorized to review whether a detainee qualified for POW status, and they weren't authorized to review whether a detainee should have been classified as an "enemy combatant".

They were authorized to consider whether a detainee should continue to be detained by the United States, because they continued to pose a threat -- or whether they could safely be repatriated to the custody of their home country, or whether they could be set free.

Noori chose to participate in his Administrative Review Board hearing.[7]

The factors for and against continuing to detain Noori were among the 121 that the Department of Defense released on March 3, 2006.[8]

[edit] The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment
  1. The detainee worked as a security guard for the governor of Jalalabad carrying a Kalashnikov rifle.
  2. In 2000 the detainee moved to Mazar-E-Sharif [sic] where he was a member of 1 10-12-man team who provided security to the Governor.
  3. The detainee served as the acting governor in Mazar-E-Sharif [sic] for 8 or 9 months prior to his capture.
b. Connections/Associations
  • The detainee traveled to Kabul to serve as a security guard for a Taliban official.
c. Other relevant data
  • The detainee participated in a meeting where Taliban leaders decided to surrender to the Northern Alliance.

[edit] The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. CSRT
  1. The detainee testified: "I needed to survive, so I did work with the government, which was at the time the Taliban government and I work with them and that's the only mistake I made if you want to call it that, or that's the only thing I did."
b. Exculpatory
  1. The detainee emphasized this was merely a civilian position and he had no real political responsibilities within the Taliban. Additionally, he had no interaction with the leaders in the Taliban.
  2. The detainee admitted his allegiance with the Taliban as he was fearful of standing against the current governing body in Afghanistan. [sic]
  3. The detainee does not know any of the al Qaeda members detained at Guantanamo. He cannot interact with the Arabs as he does not speak their language.

[edit] References

  1. ^ a b list of prisoners (.pdf), US Department of Defense, May 15, 2006
  2. ^ Inside the Guantánamo Bay hearings: Barbarian "Justice" dispensed by KGB-style "military tribunals", Financial Times, December 11, 2004
  3. ^ Annual Administrative Review Boards for Enemy Combatants Held at Guantanamo Attributable to Senior Defense Officials. United States Department of Defense (March 6, 2007). Retrieved on 2007-09-22.
  4. ^ OARDEC (08 August 2004). Summary of Evidence for Combatant Status Review Tribunal -- Noori, Mullah Norullah pages 7-8. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2008-03-01.
  5. ^ OARDEC (date redacted). Summarized Statement pages 35-38. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2008-04-20.
  6. ^ "US releases Guantanamo files", The Age, April 4, 2006. Retrieved on 2008-03-15. 
  7. ^ Summarized transcript (.pdf), from Norullah Noori's Administrative Review Board hearing - page 26
  8. ^ Factors for and against the continued detention (.pdf) of Norullah Noori Administrative Review Board - page 99