North Korea–United States relations

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United States-North Korea relations
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North Korea–United States relations developed primarily during the Korean War, but in recent years have been largely defined by the United States' suspicions regarding North Korea's nuclear programs and North Korea's desire to normalize relations with the U.S., tempered by a stated perception of an imminent U.S. attack.

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[edit] Background

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Propaganda showing a North Korean soldier destroying the U.S. Capitol
Propaganda showing a North Korean soldier destroying the U.S. Capitol

Although hostility between the two countries remains largely a product of Cold War politics, there were earlier conflicts and animosity between the US and Korea. In the mid-19th century Korea closed its borders to Western trade. In the General Sherman Incident, Korean forces attacked a US gunboat sent to negotiate a trade treaty and killed its crew, after it defied instructions from Korean officials. A US retribution attack, the Sinmiyangyo, followed.

Korea and the US ultimately established trade relations in 1882. Relations soured again when the US negotiated peace in the Russo-Japanese War. Japan persuaded the US to accept Korea as part of Japan's sphere of influence, and the US did not protest when Japan annexed Korea five years later. Korean nationalists unsuccessfully petitioned the US to support their cause at the Versailles Treaty conference under Woodrow Wilson's principle of national self-determination.

[edit] Relations during the U.S. occupation of South Korea, 1945-1948

The United Nations divided Korea after World War II along the 38th parallel, intending it as a temporary measure. However, the breakdown of relations between the US and USSR prevented a reunification. During the U.S. occupation of South Korea, relations between the U.S. and North Korea were conducted through the Soviet military government in the North. Because of North Korea's submission to Soviet pressures, and because of mass opposition to the lenient U.S. occupation of the mortal enemy Japan, North Koreans in this period denounced the United States and began to form a negative view of the U.S. However, several American ministers and missionaries remained active in this period, reminding Koreans, before they were uprooted by the communist regime, that American individuals could be very helpful to the cause of Korean independence.

[edit] Relations from formation of the DPRK to the Korean War, 1948-1950

On September 9, 1948, Kim Il-sung declared the Democratic People's Republic of Korea; he promptly received diplomatic recognition from the Soviet Union, but not the United States. The U.S. did not extend, and has never extended, diplomatic recognition to the DPRK. After 1948, the withdrawal of most American troops from the peninsula actually intensified Kim Il Sung's anti-American rhetoric, often asserting that the US was an imperialist successor to Japan, a view it still holds today. The United States maintains economic sanctions against the DPRK under the Trading with the Enemy Act.

[edit] Rollback: the U.S. occupation of North Korea, October-December 1950

North Koreans had their closest encounter with the United States during the US/UN occupation of North Korea in the two months after the Inchon landing. During this period, with help from the ROK Army, the United States military under the command of General Douglas MacArthur moved to set up a civil administration for North Korea in the wake of the presumed destruction of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. MacArthur planned to find North Korean generals, especially Kim Il Song, and try them as war criminals.

[edit] Relations from the end of the Korean War to the end of the Cold War

[edit] Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula

From January 1958 through 1991, the United States had nuclear weapons aimed at North Korea, peaking in number at some 950 warheads in 1967.[1]. Reports are that these have since been removed. The U.S. still maintains "the continuation of the extended deterrent offered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella".[2]

North Korea joined the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a non-nuclear weapons state in 1985, and North and South Korean talks begun in 1990 resulted in a 1992 Denuclearization Statement. However, US intelligence photos in early 1993 led the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to demand special inspection of the North's nuclear facilities, which prompted Kim Il Sung's March 1993 announcement of North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT.[3]A UN Security Council resolution in May 1993 urged North Korea to cooperate with the IAEA and to implement the 1992 North-South Denuclearization Statement. It also urged all member states to encourage North Korea to respond positively to this resolution and to facilitate a solution of the nuclear issue.

U.S.-North Korea talks began in June 1993 but with lack of progress in developing and implementing an agreement, North Koreans unloaded the core of a major nuclear reactor, which could have provided enough raw material for several nuclear weapons.[3] With tensions high, Kim Il Sung invited former U.S. President Jimmy Carter to act as an intermediary. President Bill Clinton accepted Carter's decision to accept the invitation, but Carter could only act as a private citizen not a government representative.[3] Carter managed to bring the two states to the negotiating table, with Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs Robert Gallucci representing the United States and North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok Ju representing his country.[3]

The negotiators successfully reached the U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework in October 1994:

  • North Korea agreed to freeze its existing plutonium enrichment program, to be monitored by the IAEA;
  • Both sides agreed to cooperate to replace North Korea's graphite-moderated reactors with light water reactor (LWR) power plants, to be

financed and supplied by an international consortium (later identified as the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization or KEDO) by a target date of 2003;

  • The United States and North Korea agreed to work together to store safely the spent fuel from the five-megawatt reactor and dispose of it in a safe manner that does not involve reprocessing in North Korea;
  • The United States agreed to provide shipments of heavy fuel oil to provide energy in the mean time;
  • The two sides agreed to move toward full normalization of political and economic relations;
  • Both sides agreed to work together for peace and security on a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula; and
  • Both sides agreed to work together to strengthen the international nuclear non-proliferation regime.

Historians Paul Lauren, Gordon Craig and Alexander George point out that the agreement suffered from a number of weaknesses. There was no specific schedule made for reciprocal moves, and the United States was granted a very long time to fulfil its obligations to replace the dangerous graphite-moderated reactors with LWRs.[3] Furthermore, no organization was chosen "to monitor compliance, to supervise implementation...or to make mid-course adjustments that migh become necessary."[3] Finally, other interested nations, like South Korea, China, and Japan, were not included in the negotiations.[3]

Soon after the agreement was signed, U.S. Congress control changed to the Republican Party, who did not support the agreement.[4] Some Republican Senators were strongly against the agreement, regarding it as appeasement[5][6].

In accordance with the terms of the Agreed Framework, North Korea decided to freeze its nuclear program and cooperate with United States and IAEA verification efforts, and in January 1995 the U.S. eased economic sanctions against North Korea. Initially U.S. Department of Defense emergency funds not under Congress control were used to fund the transitional oil supplies under the agreement [7], together with international funding. From 1996 Congress provided funding, though not always sufficient amounts [8]. Consequently some of the agreed transitional oil supplies were delivered late.[9] KEDO's first director, Stephen Bosworth, later commented "The Agreed Framework was a political orphan within two weeks after its signature". [10]

In January 1995, as called for in the Agreed Framework, the United States and North Korea negotiated a method to safely store the spent fuel from the five-megawatt reactor. According to this method, U.S. and North Korean operators would work together to can the spent fuel and store the canisters in the spent fuel pond. Actual canning began in 1995. In April 2000, canning of all accessible spent fuel rods and rod fragments was declared complete.

North Korea agreed to accept the decisions of KEDO, the financier and supplier of the LWRs, with respect to provision of the reactors. International funding for the LWR replacement power plants had to be sought. Formal invitations to bid were not issued until 1998, by which time the delays were infuriating North Korea. [14] In May 1998 North Korea warned it would restart nuclear research if the U.S. could not install the LWR.[11]KEDO subsequently identified Sinpo as the LWR project site, and a formal ground breaking was held on the site was on August 21, 1997,[12] In December 1999, KEDO and the (South) Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO) signed the Turnkey Contract (TKC), permitting full scale construction of the LWRs, but significant spending on the LWR project did not commence until 2000.[13]

In 1998, the United States identified an underground site in Kumchang-ni, which it suspected of being nuclear-related. In March 1999, North Korea agreed to grant the U.S. "satisfactory access" to the site.[14] In October 2000, during Special Envoy Jo Myong Rok's visit to Washington, and after two visits to the site by teams of U.S. experts, the U.S. announced in a Joint Communiqué with North Korea that U.S. concerns about the site had been resolved.

As called for in Dr. William Perry's official review of U.S. policy toward North Korea, the United States and North Korea launched new negotiations in May 2000 called the Agreed Framework Implementation Talks.

[edit] North Korea policy under George W. Bush

George W. Bush announced his opposition to the Agreed Framework during his Presidential candidacy. Following his inauguration in January 2001, the new Administration began a review of its policy toward North Korea. At the conclusion of that review, the Administration announced on June 6, 2001, that it had decided to pursue continued dialogue with North Korea on the full range of issues of concern to the Administration, including North Korea's conventional force posture, missile development and export programs, human rights practices, and humanitarian issues. As of that time, the Light Water Reactors (LWRs) promised in the Agreed Framework had not been delivered.[3] In 2002, the Administration asserted that North Korea was developing a uranium enrichment program for nuclear weapons purposes. U.S.-DPRK tensions mounted when Bush categorized North Korea as part of the "Axis of Evil" in his 2002 State of the Union address.

When U.S.-DPRK direct dialogue resumed in October 2002, this uranium-enrichment program was high on the U.S. agenda. North Korean officials acknowledged to a U.S. delegation, headed by Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs James A. Kelly, the existence of the uranium enrichment program. Such a program violated North Korea's obligations under the NPT and its commitments in the 1992 North-South Denuclearization Declaration and the 1994 Agreed Framework. The U.S. side stated that North Korea would have to terminate the program before any further progress could be made in U.S.-DPRK relations. The U.S. side also claimed that if this program were verifiably eliminated, the U.S. would be prepared to work with DPRK on the development of a fundamentally new relationship. In November 2002, the members of KEDO agreed to suspend heavy fuel oil shipments to North Korea pending a resolution of the nuclear dispute.

In December 2002, Spanish troops boarded and detained a shipment of Scud missiles from North Korea destined for Yemen, at the United States' request. After two days, the United States released the ship to continue its shipment to Yemen. This further strained the relationship between the US and North Korea, with North Korea characterizing the boarding an "act of piracy".

In late 2002 and early 2003, North Korea terminated the freeze on its existing plutonium-based nuclear facilities, expelled IAEA inspectors and removed seals and monitoring equipment, quit the NPT, and resumed reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel to extract plutonium for weapons purposes. North Korea subsequently announced that it was taking these steps to provide itself with a deterrent force in the face of U.S. threats and the U.S.'s "hostile policy". Beginning in mid-2003, the North repeatedly claimed to have completed reprocessing of the spent fuel rods previously frozen at Yongbyon and lain cooperation with North Korea's neighbors, who have also expressed concern over the threat to regional stability and security they believe it poses. The Bush Administration's stated goal is the complete, verifiable, and irreversible elimination of North Korea's nuclear weapons program. North Korea's neighbors have joined the United States in supporting a nuclear weapons-free Korean Peninsula. U.S. actions, however, have been much more hostile to normalized relations with North Korea, and the administration continues to suggest regime change as a primary goal. The Bush administration has consistently resisted two-party talks with the DPRK. A September 2005 agreement took place only after the Chinese threatened to publicly accuse the U.S. of refusal to engage in negotiations.

In September 2005, immediately following the September 19 agreement, relations between the countries were further strained by US allegations of North Korean counterfeiting of American dollars. The US alleges that North Korea produces $15 million worth of 'supernotes'[15] every year, and has induced banks in Macau and elsewhere to end business with North Korea.[16] Such claims of counterfeiting date back to 1989, so the timing of the U.S. claims is suspect. Some experts doubt North Korea has the capacity to produce such notes, and U.S. financial auditors have been analyzing records seized from the Macau bank and have yet to make a formal charge. In 2007 it was reported that an audit by Ernst & Young had found no evidence that the bank had facilitated North Korean money-laundering.[17]

[edit] Six-party talks

Main article: Six-party talks

In early 2003 multilateral talks were proposed to be held among the six most relevant parties aimed at reaching a settlement through diplomatic means. North Korea initially opposed such a process, maintaining that the nuclear dispute was purely a bilateral matter between themselves and the United States. However, under pressure from its neighbors and with the active involvement of China, North Korea agreed to preliminary three-party talks with China and the United States in Beijing in April 2003.

After this meeting, North Korea then agreed to six-party talks, between the United States, North Korea, South Korea, China, Japan and Russia. The first round of talks were held in August 2003, with subsequent rounds being held at regular intervals. After 13 months of freezing talks between the fifth round's first and second phases, North Korea returned to the talks. This behavior was in retaliation for the US's action of freezing offshore North Korean bank accounts in Macau. In early 2005, US government told its East Asia allies that Pyongyang had exported nuclear material to Libya. This backfired when Asian allies discovered that US government had concealed the involvement of Pakistan; a key U.S. ally was the weapon's middle man. In March 2005, Condoleezza Rice had to travel to East Asia in an effort to repair the damage.

The third phase of the fifth round of talks held on 8 February 2007 concluded with a landmark action-for-action agreement. Goodwill by all sides has led to the US unfreezing all of the North Korean assets on March 19, 2007. [18]

[edit] 2006 nuclear test

Main article: 2006 North Korean nuclear test

U.S. intelligence agencies have confirmed that a test has occurred, but are presently looking into the situation.[19] Tony Snow, President George W. Bush’s White House Press Secretary, said that the United States would now go to the United Nations to determine “what our next steps should be in response to this very serious step.”[20] On Monday, October 9, 2006, President Bush stated in a televised speech that such a claim of a test is a "provocative act" and U.S condemns such acts. [21]President Bush stated that the United States is "committed to diplomacy" but will "continue to protect [America] and [America's] interests."

[edit] Steps towards normalization

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The February 13, 2007 agreement in the Six Party Talks – among the United States, the two Koreas, Japan, China, and Russia – not only illuminated a path toward a denuclearized Korean peninsula. It also outlined steps toward the normalization of political relations with Pyongyang, a replacement of the Korean War armistice with a peace treaty, and the building of a regional peace structure for Northeast Asia.[22]

In exchange for substantial fuel aid, North Korea agreed to shut down the Yongbyon nuclear facility. The United States also agreed to begin discussions on normalization of relations with North Korea, and to begin the process of removing North Korea from its list of state sponsors of terrorism.[23][24][25] Implementation of this agreement has been successful so far, with US Chief Negotiator Christopher Hill saying North Korea has adhered to its commitments. The sixth round of talks commencing on March 19, 2007, discussed the future of the North Korean nuclear weapons program.

[edit] U.S. Navy rescue of North Korean ship: the Mogadishu encounter

On November 4, 2007, a North Korean merchant vessel was attacked by Somali pirates off the coast of Mogadishu who forced their way aboard, posing as guards. [26]; As U.S. Navy ships patrolling the waters moved to respond, the 22 North Korean seamen fought the eight Somali pirates in hand-to-hand combat.[27] With aid from the crew of the U.S.S. James E. Williams and a helicopter, the ship was freed, and permission was given to the U.S. crew to treat the medically wounded crew and pirates. This resulted in favorable comments from U.S. envoy in Beijing, Christopher Hill [28], as well as an exceedingly rare pro-U.S. statement in the North Korean press.[29]. The favorable result of the incident occurred at an important moment, as the North Koreans moved to implement the February 13 agreement with the acquiescence of the Bush administration[30], and the December 19, 2007 elections loom in South Korea, with the North Koreans taking pains to emphasize a more moderate policy.

[edit] See also

[edit] References

  1. ^ Hans M. Kristensen (September 28, 2005). A history of U.S. Nuclear Weapons in South Korea. Federation of American Scientists. Retrieved on 2007-01-19.
  2. ^ Jin Dae-woong (October 10, 2006). Questions still remain over 'enhanced' nuclear umbrella.
  3. ^ a b c d e f g h Paul Lauren, Gordon Craig and Alexander George. "Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Challenges of Our Time," Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007
  4. ^ Sense of Congress Resolution
  5. ^ [1]
  6. ^ [2]
  7. ^ [3]
  8. ^ [4]
  9. ^ [5]
  10. ^ [6]
  11. ^ [7]
  12. ^ [8]
  13. ^ [9]
  14. ^ Bill Clinton (November 10, 1999). Presidential Letter to Congress on Weapons of Mass Destruction. Retrieved on 2007-03-05.
  15. ^ [10]
  16. ^ [11][12]
  17. ^ [13]
  18. ^ http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/Engnews/20070319/630000000020070319113120E2.html
  19. ^ U.S. Agencies Looking Into N. Korea Test. Retrieved on 2006-10-09.
  20. ^ Test follows warning from U.N.. Retrieved on 2006-10-09.
  21. ^ President Bush's transcript on reported nuclear test. Retrieved on 2006-10-09.
  22. ^ Suzy Kim and John Feffer, "Hardliners Target Détente with North Korea," Foreign Policy in Focus, 11 February 2008, accessed 13 February 2008.
  23. ^ Initial Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China website]] (2007-02-13). Retrieved on 2007-02-13.
  24. ^ "Rice hails N Korea nuclear deal", BBC News, 2007-02-13. Retrieved on 2007-02-13. 
  25. ^ Scanlon, Charles. "The end of a long confrontation?", BBC News, 2007-02-13. Retrieved on 2007-02-13. 
  26. ^ Daily NK - Well-trained North Korean Crew Members Knock Down Pirates
  27. ^ Purefoy, Christian. "Crew wins deadly pirate battle off Somalia", CNN, October 30, 2007. 
  28. ^ U.S. Navy challenges pirates off Somalia - Africa - MSNBC.com
  29. ^ A Hallmark Card of Sorts From Kim Jong-il - The Lede - Breaking News - New York Times Blog
  30. ^ NK Nuclear Disablement on Pace: Rice

[edit] External links

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