Norman Cota

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Norman Cota
May 30, 1893(1893-05-30) – October 4, 1971 (aged 78)
Major General Norman Cota, United States Army
Place of birth	Chelsea, Massachusetts
Place of death	Wichita, Kansas
Allegiance	United States of America
Service/branch	United States Army
Years of service	1917–1946
Rank	Major General
Commands held	Assistant Division Commander, 29th Infantry Division 28th Infantry Division
Battles/wars	World War II
Awards	Distinguished Service Cross Silver Star Legion of Merit Bronze Star

Norman Daniel "Dutch" Cota (May 30, 1893 - October 4, 1971) was a U.S. General during World War II. Cota was heavily involved in the planning and execution of the invasion of France, codenamed Operation Neptune, and the subsequent Battle of Normandy.

Contents 1 Early career 2 Preparing to invade France 3 Omaha Beach 4 Hurtgen 5 Post-war 6 See also 7 References

[edit] Early career

Cota was born in Chelsea, Massachusetts and graduated from the United States Military Academy, at West Point, New York, in 1917. He was commissioned a Second Lieutenant of Infantry, and remained at the Academy as an Instructor (1918-20). He later had duty in Hawaii (1924-28) and graduated from the Command and General Staff School, at Fort Benning, Georgia, in 1931. He was an Instructor at the Infantry School (1932-33) and went on to graduate from the Army War College in 1936.

He was an Instructor at the Command and General Staff School (July 1938-Nov.1940). At the outbreak of World War II, he was the G-2 Officer (Intelligence) and then G-3 Officer (Plans and Training) of the 1st Infantry Division, in which he served from March 1941 until June 1942. In June, he was promoted to the division's Chief of Staff, a role he held until February 1943. In February 1943, he was promoted to the rank of Brigadier General and sent to the United Kingdom where he served as the United States adviser to the Combined Operations Division of the European Theater of Operations.

[edit] Preparing to invade France

Brigadier General Cota was Assistant Division commander of the 29th Infantry Division at Omaha Beach during the Battle of Normandy. During D-Day planning, he was opposed to daylight landings, believing pre-dawn landings would stand a better chance of success; he did not get his way.

Cota was not alone in his opposition to daylight landings. General Leonard T. Gerow, commander of the entire V Corps, and Admiral John L. Hall, Jr., commander of Amphibious Force "O" (the naval force responsible for delivery of the US 1st Infantry Division to the beach), both fought to change the Operation Overlord plan, pleading for a night time assault.

A year before the invasion, at the Conference on Landing Assaults, Cota made his argument in favor of striving for tactical surprise:

. . . It is granted that strategical surprise will be impossible to attain. Tactical surprise is another thing however... . tactical surprise is one of the most powerful factors in determining success. I therefore, favor the night landing. I do not believe the daylight assault can succeed.

However, the high command concluded that naval and air bombardment would effectively neutralize (at least) or eradicate (at best) the enemy opposition. This reliance on technology, rather than maneuver and surprise, was a salient characteristic of the American approach to amphibious operations. The British — lacking the industrial resources of the U.S. and inclined to fight limited engagements — historically had relied on surprise and flanking maneuver. The plan for Omaha, however, essentially called for hurling infantry directly into a prepared enemy position — a position that was enhanced by the concave shape of the beach (effectively promoting enemy crossfire into the "basin" of the concavity), by natural and man-made articles, by bad weather and other factors. The assumption was effectively that American technology would vitiate the need for surprise.

Most D-Day commanders assured their men that the Germans would be annihilated by the Allies' (principally American airpower) pre-invasion firepower, and that the defenders were in any case outnumbered, inexperienced and demoralized. All of these assessments were revoltingly inaccurate. On the afternoon of June 5 Cota gave one of the few accurate assessments to the soldiers of the 29th Infantry Division:

. . . The little discrepancies that we tried to correct [in the amphibious training center] are going to be magnified and are going to give way to incidents that you might at first view as chaotic. The air and naval bombardment and the artillery support are reassuring. But you're going to find confusion. The landing craft aren't going in on schedule and people are going to be landed in the wrong place. Some won't be landed at all. The enemy will [to some degree prevent] our gaining "lodgement." But we must improvise, carry on, not lose our heads.

While Cota had a far less sanguine view of the plan than did the higher command, even he underrated the extent of the near-catastrophe that awaited V Corps (commanded by General Gerow and composed of the 29th Infantry Division and the famous "Big Red One" 1st Infantry Division) on Omaha.

[edit] Omaha Beach

Cota landed with a part of the 116th Infantry Regiment of the 29th Division, in the second wave, approximately one hour after H-Hour, on the Omaha sector known as Dog White. His boat (an LCVP) was under heavy machine gun fire as well as mortar and light artillery fire; three soldiers (including most likely at least one officer) were killed immediately upon leading the disembarkation.

Cota was one of the highest ranking officers on the beach that day. He is famous for personally directing the attack, motivating the shell-shocked, pinned-down survivors into action, and opening one of the first vehicle exits off the beach. Two famous quotes are attributed to him during this time.

• In a meeting with Max Schneider, commander of the 5th Ranger Battalion, Cota asked “What outfit is this?” Someone yelled "5th Rangers!". To this, Cota replied “Well, goddamn it then, Rangers, lead the way!”. "Rangers lead the way" became the motto of the Rangers.

• He is also quoted as saying to his troops, "Gentlemen, we are being killed on the beaches. Let us go inland and be killed." Interestingly, in The Longest Day, Cota renders the similar encouragement that was, as the evidence best suggests, actually delivered by Colonel George A. Taylor: "There are only two kinds of people on this beach: those who are already dead and those who are going to die. Now let's get the hell out of here."

[edit] Hurtgen

Later, as the commander of the 28th Infantry Division, Major General Cota was involved in the Battle of Hurtgen Forest. He also reviewed and approved the death sentence handed down by a court martial on Eddie Slovik, the only U.S. soldier to be executed for desertion since the American Civil War. Cota is said to have approved the sentence because he was appalled by the bluntness of Slovik's confession.^{[citation needed]}

[edit] Post-war

Cota received the Distinguished Service Cross for his heroism on Omaha Beach. In 2004 a movement arose to have the Army reconsider upgrading Cota's decoration to the nation's highest award for bravery, the Medal of Honor.

Cota retired from the Army in 1946 at the rank of Major General. He died in Wichita, Kansas, on October 4, 1971 and is buried in the post cemetery at the United States Military Academy, West Point, New York.

The character of General Cota is played by the actor Robert Mitchum in the movie The Longest Day. Mitchum delivers the famous last line of the film, as Zanuck has Cota order a young soldier driving a jeep to "run me up that hill, son."

[edit] See also

• George A. Taylor

[edit] References

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