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Using What is Your World View?

  • Existentialism emphasizes human capability. There is no greater power interfering with life and thus it is up to us to make things happen. Sometimes considered a negative and depressing world view, your optimism towards human accomplishment is immense. Mankind is condemned to be free and must accept the responsibility.



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Modernist
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Cultural Creative
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Fundamentalist
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Contents

[edit] Welcome

Holland Nomen NescioGnothi seauton has smiled at you! Smiles promote WikiLove and hopefully this one has made your day better. Spread the WikiLove by smiling to someone else, whether it be someone you have had disagreements with in the past or a good friend. Smile to others by adding {{subst:smile}}, {{subst:smile2}} or {{subst:smile3}} to their talk pages. Happy editing!

Hello, User:XXXXX, and welcome to Wikipedia! Thank you for your contributions. I hope you like the place and decide to stay. Here are a few good links for newcomers:

I hope you enjoy editing here and being a Wikipedian! Please sign your name on talk pages using four tildes (~~~~); this will automatically produce your name and the date. If you need help, check out Wikipedia:Questions or place {{helpme}} on your talk page and someone will show up shortly to answer your questions. Again, welcome!  Holland Nomen NescioGnothi seauton 14:46, 18 May 2006 (UTC)


[edit] John Yoo

[edit] Zarqawi PSYOP program

Ahmad Fadeel al-Nazal al-Khalayleh
(Arabic: أحمد فضيل النزال الخلايله‎)
October 30, 1966 – June 7, 2006

Zarqawi killed in action
Place of birth Amman, Jordan
Place of death Baquba, Iraq
Allegiance Islamism
Years of service 1989–2006
Unit Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad
Al-Qaeda in Iraq
Battles/wars Iraqi insurgency

The Zarqawi PSYOP program refers to a US Psychological operations program, or propaganda campaign, exaggerating the importance of Al Zarqawi in Al Qaeda and the Iraq insurgency.[1]

The program was allegedly primarily aimed at, but not limited to, the "Iraqi and Arab media" along with the "U.S. Home Audience," which was part of a "broader propaganda campaign."[1][2][3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10]

One of the presented goals was to alienate local citizens from him by portraying him as a foreigner and key actor in the insurgency.[2] However, Sidney Blumenthal reported that, according to a "military source," this campaign ultimately revolved around "domestic political reasons."[3] While Jordanian political analyst Labib Kamhawi said

The bottom line is that America needs to create a serious public enemy who is not Iraqi so they can claim Iraqis aren't responsible for the resistance.[11]

Writing for UPI, Jennifer Schultz reported that terrorism expert Loretta Napoleoni stated that the US created a myth which resulted in those fabrications becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy.[12][13][14] While The Nation cited "a spy" that made an identical comment.[15] An article in The Independent concurred by commenting:

... according to British defence sources, the US campaign on Zarqawi eventually succeeded in creating its own reality. By elevating him from his position as one fighter among a mass of conflicting groups, the US campaign to "villainise Zarqawi" glamorised him with its enemy audience, making it easier for him to raise funds, to attract "unsponsored" foreign fighters, to make alliances with Sunni Iraqis and to score huge impact with his own media manoeuvres..[16]

[edit] Program

U.S. Army PSYOP Force structure
U.S. Army PSYOP Force structure

In October, 2004, The Telegraph and The Age reported that, according to a U.S. military intelligence agent, the U.S. was paying $10,000 to individuals in order to pass for fact the fiction and suppositions regarding Zarqawi.[17][18][19] The Boston Globe reported that "terrorist activity in Iraq and Jordan" by "a disparate array of terror groups and individual operatives" was often said to be caused by the "Zarqawi network."[11]

The Washington Post reported on April 10, 2006, that the role of Zarqawi was magnified by the Pentagon in a psychological operations campaign started in 2004. In the words of the Washington Post:

For the past two years, U.S. military leaders have been using Iraqi media and other outlets in Baghdad to publicize Zarqawi's role in the insurgency. The documents explicitly list the "U.S. Home Audience" as one of the targets of a broader propaganda campaign.[2]

The article goes on to explain that a slide created for a briefing by Army Gen. George W. Casey Jr,

describes the "home audience" as one of six major targets of the American side of the war.

Nevertheless, the slide did not specifically assert the program targeted U.S. citizens. Although other parts of the briefing did suggest it was directed at the U.S. media to alter the view of the war.

Another slide in the briefing noted a "selective leak" to reporter Dexter Filkins, about a letter boasting of suicide attacks in Iraq and allegedly written by Zarqawi. He used that information for an article[20] in the New York Times.[5][10][16] Contacted by the Post Filkins commented he was skeptical at the time, and still is, about the document's authenticity.[2][5] The Independent alleged in February 2008:

There is very good reason to believe that that letter was a fake – and a significant one because there is equally good reason to believe that it was one product among many from a new machinery of propaganda which has been created by the United States and its allies since the terrorist attacks of September 2001.[16]

According to Sidney Blumenthal, in an article for Salon, a military source told him that, for ultimately "domestic political reasons," Donald Rumsfeld and the White House resisted degrading the dramatically inflated image of Zarqawi.[3]

Responding to the in the Post reported psychological operations aimed at Americans, Army Col. James A. Treadwell, commander of the U.S. military psyops unit in Iraq, but no longer present as the program was started, said that the US doesn't do that. Another officer commented in the Post that, although all material provided was in Arabic, the campaign probably influenced the view of the American press raising his profile. The Post continues that, according to an officer familiar with the case, this program was not related to another program which was linked to the Lincoln Group.[2][21]

By focusing on his terrorist activities and status as a foreigner the US tried to inflame Iraqi citizens against him.[2][10][4] Brig. Gen. Mark Kimmitt, the senior commander in charge, remarked, according to the Washington Post:

"The Zarqawi PSYOP program is the most successful information campaign to date."[2][5][10]

Regarding the influence of this program on Al Qaeda Jennifer Schultz reports the comments by terrorism expert Loretta Napoleoni:

The myth of al-Zarqawi, Napoleoni believes, helped usher in al-Qaida's "transformation from a small elitist vanguard to a mass movement."[13]

[edit] Rise to power

Main article: Abu Musab al-Zarqawi

According to articles in The Independent, Counterpunch, Newsweek, and Asia Times Online several incidents turned Abu Musab al-Zarqawi from an unknown and unimportant local Jordanian terrorist into a well-known voice of Al Qaeda in Iraq.[8][15][16][22] The Asia Times contends that in February 2003 he was practically unknown outside Jordan.[22][23] Loretta Napoleoni, a terrorism expert, and an article in Spiked also commented that prior to the invasion of Iraq his scope was limited to corrupt Arab regimes, most notably Jordan.[12][19] The Independent, Newsweek and the Asia Times continue by commenting that initially he was largely unconnected to Saddam Hussein, and not part of bin Laden's group. Eric Margolis, terrorism expert, concurs that he never was part of al Qaeda prior to the Iraq war.[24] The Christian Science Monitor reported that one of his operatives stated during interrogation that Zarqawi "is against Al Qaeda."[25]

President Bush first referred to him on October 7, 2002, in a nationally televised speech, by observing:

Some al-Q'aida leaders who fled Afghanistan, went to Iraq. These include one very senior al-Q'aida leader who received medical treatment in Baghdad this year, and who has been associated with planning for chemical and biological attacks.[15][16]

Following the allegation he was a link between Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda (used as casus belli[3][22][23][19][26][27]), by Colin Powell before the UN Security Council in 2003,[15][16] he became the embodiment of resistance against the US in the Muslim world. Afer invading Iraq documents were found that showed Hussein's security forces had in fact attempted to apprehend him, contradicting Powell's allegations.[26] Also the invasion of Iraq by the Bush administration became another boost for his popularity, which Michael Hirsch in Newsweek describes as:

the Iraq invasion gave Zarqawi a chance to blossom on his own as a jihadi.[22]

After the capture of Saddam Hussein the Bush administration accused him of being behind the continuing mishaps in Iraq, or, as Patrick Cockburn commented in an editorial for Counterpunch Newsletter:

"No sooner had Saddam Hussein been captured than the US spokesmen began to mention al-Zarqawi's name in every sentence."[8][26]

Articles in the Columbia Journalism Review, the Washington Post, Rolling Stone, Newsweek and Counterpunch Newsletter suggest his increased notoriety, as illustrated above, was the result of an orchestrated effort involving psychological operations.[2][10][22][8][28]

The Washington post cites Col. Derek Harvey who said at a meeting by the Army in Fort Leavenworth:

"Our own focus on Zarqawi has enlarged his caricature, if you will - made him more important than he really is, in some ways."[2][10]

Jane Arraf, CNN’s former Baghdad bureau chief, observed that there are discrepancies between what journalist encounter in Iraq “and a lot of the comments we see coming out of the administration and the Pentagon.” Commenting on this Daniel Schulman for Columbia Journalism Review said:

... it has become, in part, a contest over the framing of reality, and thus a hall of mirrors for the press.[28]

In the wake of his assasination, which had erroneously been reported several times before,[29][30] the U.S. military produced a video showing him to be the opposite of what the media previously advocated him to be.

[edit] US psychological operations

Further information: Psychological operations (United States) and  Psychological warfare

The US military defines psychological operations, or PSYOP, as:

planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence the emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals.[31]

The Smith-Mundt Act, adopted in 1948, explicitly forbids information and psychological operations aimed at the US public.[32][33][28] Nevertheless, the current easy access to news and information from around the globe, makes it difficult to guarantee PSYOP programs do not reach the US public. Or, in the words of Army Col. James A. Treadwell, who commanded the U.S. military psyops unit in Iraq in 2003, in the Washington Post:

There's always going to be a certain amount of bleed-over with the global information environment.[2]

Agence France Presse reported on U.S. propaganda campaigns that:

The Pentagon acknowledged in a newly declassified document that the US public is increasingly exposed to propaganda disseminated overseas in psychological operations. [34]

US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has approved that document, which is called "Information Operations Roadmap." [28][34] The document acknowledges the Smith-Mundt Act, but fails to offer any way of limiting the effect PSYOP programs have on domestic audiences.[32][33][35]

Several incidents in 2003 were documented by Sam Gardiner, a sixty-four-year-old retired Air Force colonel, which he saw as information-warfare campaigns that were intended for "foreign populations and the American public." Truth from These Podia,[36] as the treatise was called, reported that the way the Iraq war was fought resembled a political campaign, stressing the message instead of the truth.[28] The International Crisis Group reported that Zarqawi’s group, and three other groups of in Iraq, were disseminating propaganda in a sophisticated manner.[28]

Although the Information Operations Roadmap does not specifically mention the Zarqawi PSYOP program it does show the general dilemma psychological operations pose regarding the effect they potentially have on the US public.[34] The Asheville Global Report does comment on Zarqawi and contends that the

"military's propaganda program apparently spilled over into the US media."[26]

In April 2008 The New York Times revealed that the "military analysts" used by news organisations in the US to comment on the War on Terror had, and continue to have, ties to the Pentagon. This conflict of interest was, and still is not, disclosed to the general public who are under the impression these commentators are independently t.

[edit] See also


[edit] References

  1. ^ a b Zarqawi used in US propaganda blitz By Thomas Ricks, The Sydney Morning Herald, April 11, 2006
  2. ^ a b c d e f g h i j Military Plays Up Role of Zarqawi - Jordanian Painted As Foreign Threat To Iraq's Stability By Thomas E. Ricks, The Washington Post, April 10, 2006
  3. ^ a b c d "Mission Accomplished" in a business suit - Ignoring U.S. intelligence, Bush inflated Zarqawi, then made a pointless trip to Iraq to pose as a heroic dragon slayer. It doesn't work anymore by Sidney Blumenthal, Salon, June 15, 2006
  4. ^ a b Was There a Legal Basis for His Assassination? The Story Behind Zarqawi's Death by Jennifer van Bergen, CounterPunch, June 12, 2006
  5. ^ a b c d A U.S. 'Propaganda' Program, al-Zarqawi, and 'The New York Times' By Greg Mitchell, Editor & Publisher, April 10, 2006
  6. ^ US military plays up role of Zarqawi by Greg White, Asheville Global Report, April 13-20, 2006
  7. ^ Who was Abu Musab al Zarqawi? by Michel Chossudovsky, Global Research, June 09, 2006,
  8. ^ a b c d America Put Him in the Big Time The Short, Strange Career of Abu Masab al-Zarqawi by Patrick Cockburn, Counterpunch, June 9, 2006
  9. ^ Who is behind "Al Qaeda in Iraq"? Pentagon acknowledges fabricating a "Zarqawi Legend" by Michel Chossudovsky, GlobalResearch, April 18, 2006
  10. ^ a b c d e f Hyping Zarqawi by Tim Dickinson, Rolling Stone, April 12, 2006
  11. ^ a b Zarqawi's Role in Iraq Overstated, Analysts Say by Thanassis Cambanis, the Boston Globe, November 1, 2004
  12. ^ a b Claim: US Created al-Zarqawi Myth By Jennifer Schultz, UPI, November 10, 2005
  13. ^ a b Profile of a Killer By Loretta Napoleoni, Foreign affairs
  14. ^ The Myth of Zarqawi by Loretta Napoleoni, November 11, 2005
  15. ^ a b c d The Uses and Abuses of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi - The Liberal media By Eric Alterman, The Nation, July 10, 2006
  16. ^ a b c d e f How the spooks took over the news - In his controversial new book, Nick Davies argues that shadowy intelligence agencies are pumping out black propaganda to manipulate public opinion – and that the media simply swallow it wholesale, The Independent, February 11, 2008
  17. ^ How US fuelled myth of Zarqawi the mastermind By Adrian Blomfield, Telegraph, October 4, 2004
  18. ^ Doubt over Zarqawi's role as ringleader By Adrian Blomfield, The Age, October 2, 2004
  19. ^ a b c Blowing up Zarqawi - How the coalition transformed a failed fringe fanatic into The World’s Most Dangerous Terrorist by Brendan O'Neill, [[Spiked[[, October 5, 2004
  20. ^ U.S. Says Files Seek Qaeda Aid in Iraq Conflict By DEXTER FILKINS, New York Times, February 9, 2004
  21. ^ A 2003 Pentagon directive appears to bar a military program that pays Iraqi media to print favorable stories by Mark Mazzetti, Los Angeles Times, January 27th, 2006
  22. ^ a b c d e The Myth of Al Qaeda Before 9/11, Osama bin Laden’s group was small and fractious. How Washington helped to build it into a global threat By Michael Hirsh, Newsweek, June 30, 2006
  23. ^ a b Zarqawi - Bush's man for all seasons By Pepe Escobar, Asia Times Online, October 15, 2005
  24. ^ Zarqawi: From street thug to symbol of holy war by Sarah Challands, CTV.ca, June 12, 2006
  25. ^ The rise and fall of Ansar al-Islam By Scott Peterson, The Christian Science Monitor, October 16, 2003
  26. ^ a b c d Questions linger over Zarqawi's death by Eamon Martin, Asheville Global Report, June 15 - 21, 2006
  27. ^ Pentagon PSYOP: "Terror Mastermind" Abu Musab Al Zarqawi is "Incompetent" by Michel Chossudovsky, GlobalResearch, May 15, 2006
  28. ^ a b c d e f Mind Games By Daniel Schulman, Columbia Journalism Review at Columbia University's Graduate School of Journalism
  29. ^ Zarqawi killed in Iraq? Balaji Reddy, India Daily, October 16, 2004
  30. ^ Leaflet Says Extremist Al-Zarqawi Killed By LEE KEATH, The Associated Press, March 4, 2004
  31. ^ Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations Joint Publication 3-53, 5 September 2003 PDF
  32. ^ a b Rumsfeld's Roadmap to Propaganda - Secret Pentagon "roadmap" calls for "boundaries" between "information operations" abroad and at home but provides no actual limits as long as US doesn't "target" Americans by National Security Archive, January 26, 2006
  33. ^ a b Operations as a core competency by Christopher J. Lamb, senior fellow in the Institute for National Security Studies at the National Defense University and has been Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Resources and Plans.HTML version
  34. ^ a b c US Propaganda Aimed at Foreigners Reaches US Public: Pentagon Document by Agence France Presse, January 27, 2006
  35. ^ US plans to 'fight the net' revealed By Adam Brookes, BBC, January 27, 2006
  36. ^ Truth from These Podia - Summary of a Study of Strategic Influence, Perception Management, Strategic Information Warfare and Strategic Psychological Operations in Gulf II by Sam Gardiner, Colonel, USAF (Retired),October 8, 2003, [PDF]

[[Category:Psychological warfare]] [[Category:Propaganda]] [[Category:Counter-terrorism]] [[Category:Anti-terrorism policy of the United States]] [[Category:George W. Bush administration controversies]] [[Category:2003 Iraq conflict]] [[Category:Iraqi insurgency| ]]

[edit] Iraq resolution

[edit] Contents

The resolution cited many factors to justify the use of military force against Iraq:

  • Iraq's noncompliance with the conditions of the 1991 cease fire, including interference with weapons inspectors.
(Despite this statement and subsequent comments by the Bush administration, weapon inspectors were given access to the alleged weapon factories at the time. Continuing the inspections was made impossible by the U.S. led invasion of Iraq which forced the U.N. inspectors out while ignoring their requests for more time.)[1]
  • Iraq's alleged weapons of mass destruction, and programs to develop such weapons, posed a "threat to the national security of the United States and international peace and security in the Persian Gulf region."
(A statement that was not supported by the available evidence at the time.)[2][3]
  • Iraq's "brutal repression of its civilian population."
(This is not a valid casus belli with the laws of war and prohibition of a war of aggression in mind.)[4][5]
  • Iraq's "capability and willingness to use weapons of mass destruction against other nations and its own people"
(The available evidence at the time showed there probably were no WMD's in Iraq.)[2][3]
  • Iraq's hostility towards the United States as demonstrated by the 1993 assassination attempt of former President George H. W. Bush, and firing on coalition aircraft enforcing the no-fly zones following the 1991 Gulf War. -
-(Legal scholars contend this is not a valid casus belli with the laws of war and prohibition of a war of aggression in mind.)[5]
  • Members of al-Qaeda were "known to be in Iraq."
(Those alleged contacts were in areas outside of Saddam Hussein's control and therefor cannot be evidence of them meeting him, and as such this is not a valid casus belli under the laws of war and with the definition of war of aggression in mind.)'[2][6][5]
  • Iraq's "continu[ing] to aid and harbor other international terrorist organizations," including anti-United States terrorist organizations.
(A loose interpretation of the available evidence to validate the continuing suggestion Iraq was involved in 9/11, an allegation for which no evidence exists.)[2][6][7]
  • The efforts by the Congress and the President to fight the 9/11 terrorists and those who aided or harbored them.
(The available evidence showed no "working relationship" between Iraq and the people behind the September 11, 2001 attacks)[2][6]
  • The authorization by the Constitution and the Congress for the President to fight anti-United States terrorism
  • Citing the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998, the resolution reiterated that it should be the policy of the United States to remove the Saddam Hussein regime and promote a democratic replacement.
(Under international law, this point is not a valid casus belli, and as such attacking Iraq would constitute a war of aggression.)[5]

The Resolution required President Bush's diplomatic efforts at the UN Security Council to "obtain prompt and decisive action by the Security Council to ensure that Iraq abandons its strategy of delay, evasion, and noncompliance and promptly and strictly complies with all relevant Security Council resolutions." It authorized the United States to use military force to "defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq; and enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions regarding Iraq." UN members commented it is not up to one member state to interpret and enforce UN resolutions. Subsequently Kofi Anan remarked that these arguments do not constitute the legal requirements set forth in the laws of war prohibiting wars of aggression.

[edit] Criticism

[edit] Weapons of Mass Destruction and Al-Qaeda

Further information: Iraq and weapons of mass destruction, Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda, Downing Street memo, Bush-Blair memo, and Legitimacy of the 2003 invasion of Iraq

The arguments put forward for the invasion of Iraq[8] — such as the continued possession and development of weapons of previously used mass destruction and active links to al Qaeda — have been found to be false, according to all official reports.[9][10] A report by the Defense Department in 2007 conclusively stated the claimed working relationship with Al Qaeda did not exist. Or, as the Washington Post described it:

"the intelligence community's prewar consensus [was] that the Iraqi government and al-Qaeda figures had only limited contacts, and ... that reports of deeper links were based on dubious or unconfirmed information."[11]

The Bush administration advocated that this was due to failure by the intelligence community. However, it has become clear that, prior to the invasion, these arguments had already been widely disputed,[12] which had purportedly been reported to the U.S. administration. An in-depth investigation into the nature of these discrepancies by the Senate Intelligence Committee has been frustrated. Or, as a New York Times editorial states:

Mr. Roberts (chairman of the Senate panel) tried to kill the investigation entirely, and after the Democrats forced him to proceed, he set rules that seem a lot like the recipe for a whitewash.[13]

Sceptics argue that the administration knowingly distorted intelligence reports or ignored contrary information in constructing their case for the war.[14][15] The Downing Street memo and the Bush-Blair memo are used to substantiate that allegation.[16] Congressional Democrats sponsored both a request for documents and a resolution of inquiry.[17] A report by the Washington Post on April 12, 2006, corroborates that view. It states that the Bush administration advocated that two small trailers which had been found in Iraq were "biological laboratories," despite the fact that U.S. intelligence officials possessed evidence to the contrary at that time.

"The three-page field report and a 122-page final report published three weeks later were stamped "secret" and shelved. Meanwhile, for nearly a year, administration and intelligence officials continued to publicly assert that the trailers were weapons factories."[18]

[edit] U.N. Charter

Further information: Legitimacy of the 2003 invasion of Iraq and UN Charter

The UN Charter prohibits any war unless it is out of self-defense or when it is sanctioned by the UN security council. If these requirements are not met international law calls it a war of aggression. Because of Article VI of the U.S. Constitution, Senate-ratified treaties such as the U.N. Charter are "the supreme Law of the Land." John Conyers, Robert Parry and Marjorie Cohn– professor at Thomas Jefferson School of Law, executive vice president of the National Lawyers Guild, and the U.S. representative to the executive committee of the American Association of Jurists – assert that the Iraq war was not a war in self-defense but a war of aggression contrary to the U.N. Charter (a crime against peace) and therefore a war crime.[19] Also, Kofi Annan called the war in Iraq a violation of the UN Charter and therefore "illegal." A war of aggression refers to any war not initiated out of self-defence or sanctioned by the UN.[20]