Navigation paradox

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The Navigation paradox is that increased navigational precision may result in increased collision risk. In the case of ships and aircraft, the advent of Global Positioning System (GPS) navigation has enabled craft to follow navigational paths with such greater precision, (often on the order of plus or minus 30 feet), that absent better distribution of routes, coordination between neighboring craft and collision avoidance procedures, the likelihood of two craft occupying the same space on the shortest distance line between two navigational points has increased.

[edit] Research

Robert E. Machol[1]attributes the term "navigation paradox" to Peter G. Reich, writing in 1964[2], and 1966[3], who recognized that "in some cases (see below) increases in navigational precision increase collision risk." In the "below" explanation, Machol noted "that if vertical station-keeping is sloppy, then if longitudinal and lateral separation are lost, the planes will probably pass above and below each other. This is the ‘navigation paradox’ mentioned earlier."

Russ Paielli wrote a mid-air collision simulating computer model 500 sq mi centered on Denver, Colorado[4] In Table 3 Paielli[4] notes that aircraft cruising at random altitudes have five times fewer collisions than those obeying with only 25 ft RMS of vertical error discrete cruising altitude rule, such as the internationally required hemispherical cruising altitude rules. At the same vertical error, the prototype linear cruising altitude rule tested produced 33.8 fewer mid-air collisions than the hemispherical cruising altitude rules.

Paielli’s 2000 model corroborated an earlier 1997 model by Patlovany[5] showing in Figure 1 that zero altitude error by pilots obeying the hemispherical cruising altitude rules resulted in six times more mid-air collisions than random cruising altitude non compliance. Similarly, Patlovany’s computer model test of the Altimeter-Compass Cruising Altitude Rule (ACCAR) with zero piloting altitude error (a linear cruising altitude rule similar to the one recommended by Paielli), resulted in about 60% of the mid-air collisions counted from random altitude non compliance, or 10 times fewer collisions than the internationally accepted hemispherical cruising altitude rules. In other words, Patlovany’s ACCAR alternative and Paielli’s linear cruising altitude rule would reduce cruising midair collisions between 10 and 33 times, compared to the currently recognized, and internationally required, hemispherical cruising altitude rules, which institutionalize the navigation paradox on a world wide basis.

The ACCAR alternative to the hemispherical cruising altitude rules, if adopted in 1997, could have eliminated the navigation paradox at all altitudes, and could have saved 342 lives in over 30 midair collisions (up to November 2006) since the Risk Analysis proof that the current regulations multiply midair collision risk in direct proportion to pilot accuracy in compliance.[6] The Namibian collision in 1997, the Japanese near-miss in 2001, the German collision in 2002, and the Brazilian collision in 2006, are all examples where human or hardware errors doomed altitude-accurate pilots killed by the navigation paradox designed into the current cruising altitude rules. The current system as described by Paielli noted as examples that nuclear power plants and elevators are designed to be passively safe and fault tolerant. Reactivity control rods fall into the reactor to cause a shutdown on loss of electrical power, and elevator fall-arresting brakes are released by torque from support cable tension. The navigation paradox describes a midair collision safety system that by design cannot tolerate a single failure in human performance or electronic hardware.

[edit] References

  1. ^ Machol, Robert E., Interfaces 25:5, September-October 1995 (151-172), page 154.
  2. ^ Reich, Peter G., "A theory of safe separation standards for air traffic control," RAE Technical Reports Nos. 64041, 64042, 64043, Royal Aircraft Establishment, Farnborough, United Kingdom.
  3. ^ Reich, Peter G., "Analysis of long-range air traffic systems: Separation standards—I, II, and III," Journal of Navigation, Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 88-96; No. 2, pp. 169-176; No. 3, pp. 331-338.
  4. ^ a b Paielli, Russ A., "A Linear Altitude Rule for Safer and More Efficient Enroute Air Traffic," Air Traffic Control Quarterly, Vol. 8, No. 3, Fall 2000.
  5. ^ Patlovany, Robert W., "U.S. Aviation Regulations Increase Probability of Midair Collisions," Risk Analysis: An International Journal, April 1997, Volume 17, No. 2, Pages 237-248.
  6. ^ Patlovany, Robert, W., "Preventable Midair Collisions Since 26 June 1997 Request Denied for Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) 28996 Altimeter-Compass Cruising Altitude Rule (ACCAR)," Preventable Midair Collisions Since 26 June 1997 Request Denied for Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) 28996 Altimeter-Compass Cruising Altitude Rule (ACCAR)

[edit] See also