Navea Training Center
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A small post formally run by Saddam's Army that has since been occupied and operated by the U.S. military to train the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (later the Iraqi National Guard and then the New Iraqi Army). Throughout the course of Operation Iraqi Freedom the base (otherwise known as Camp Hit) has played host to several different units.
However it has only been recently, that any command has been in control of the posting long enough to make any headway. The surrounding populations and terrain have known an American military presence ever since the invasion in 2003, however the styles and constancy of that presence had widely varied. The Al-Anbar province had since the start of the war been secured primarily by Marine units, whom do to circumstance could not occupy as much space as might have been needed. These units of Marines could expect to do an average of six months in Iraq before redeploying stateside only to find them selves again overseas within the same year they had left. This particular area had not until 2006 seen any lasting presence of U.S. forces.
The status quo until that point had been a seemingly random and rag-tag rotation of soldiers unfamiliar with the local peculiarities, in and out of Hit. In February of 2006 an Army unit of roughly 600 troops was ordered to replace on an exhausted Marine regiment of nearly 1,000 marines that had been managing the area for nearly the last 180 days . The Army battalion would pick up where the marines had left off and continue to recruit and train locals from the Navea Training Center for the next 15 months in order to help the Iraqi's assume a greater role in securing there own country. Being a Sunni district in Al-Anbar, Hit was thus far historically non participatory and the challenges of operating in such a climate would soon take its toll.
Although things were by no means going well in Hit at that point, it then became possible to start achieving results in the area. Progress in surrounding cities like Ramadi helped to turn the tide against foreign extremest elements in the area. Thus allowing for greater degrees of cooperation with locals. The battalion of 1/6 INF. with the help of augmenting units from 1/36, were for the first time able to make the "learning curve" of adjusting to a new area and gain the tactical advantage.
It should be noted that all the while a policy of trying to achieve security by moving into an area, securing it and then moving to the next hot spot, did not achieve any results throughout the Anbar. Conversely once it was established that a lasting and albeit diminished presence was brought to bear, results soon materialized and the entire province was transformed. 
