Talk:Naturalism (philosophy)

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[edit] What is naturalism?

Hi. I thought I'd put this at the top, because it seems like a fairly important criticism of the article. In the Oxford Companion of Philosophy, there is a suggestion that I feel quite confident about, that naturalism doesn't just exclude supernatural, but also things like non-natural values and universals. This is definetly the case for metaphysical naturalism. 'Naturalism' - everything being "natural", I would assume can have different meanings depending on ones use of 'natural' - such as supernatural, unnatural, or non-natural. I think that the article is somehow biased in this respect. I may change it in a day or so if I don't hear anything.

Sorry if changing it is wrong - is it best to wait for a discussion about these things - its really annoying me. Thanks —Preceding unsigned comment added by 86.142.2.148 (talk • contribs) 15:42, 9 July 2006

Changing is fine. It's part of the ethic of being bold at Wikipedia. --ScienceApologist 15:54, 9 July 2006 (UTC)
SA's right, but if you want the change to stick make sure that it's clearly understandable and, if possible, has a link or reference to a reliable source. I say this because I've no idea what "non-natural values and universals" are, and the article or linked articles will have to explain them to laymen like me. Posting the proposals on the talk page can allow others to help iron out any problems or misunderstandings, but certainly isn't required. Oh, and it may seem odd but it's often easier to find new comments at the foot of the page. Good luck, look forward to the clarifications. ..dave souza, talk 16:13, 9 July 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Merged info

This article contains material from the former methodological naturalism which now redirects here. Let's try to describe naturalism as a whole and not splinter into small separatist factions. The only bit that didn't make it over here was a discussion of Philip Johnson's appropriation of the term which is not notable from the standpoint that he is neither a scientist, a philosopher of science, nor an arbiter of what is a subject here at wikipedia. Joshuaschroeder 15:24, 6 September 2005 (UTC)

There are (at least) two versions of methodological naturalism The simpler version requires only that hypotheses generate predictions that can be (and are) tested. It does not restrict explanations to "natural" causes, i.e., it does not exclude a priori the supernatureal. W.V. Quine advocated this kind of naturalism:
"If I saw indirect explanatory benefit in positing sensibilia, possibilia, spirits, a Creator, I would joyfully accord them scientific status too, on a par with such avowedly scientific posits as quarks and black holes. (From Naturalism; or, Living within One's Means, Dialectica 49 (1990); also available in Quintessence, R.F. Gibson, editor)
The alternative version adds the restriction that hypotheses that postulate supernatural entities are forbidden. Barbara Forrest in Methodological Naturalism and Philosophical Naturalism: Clarifying the Connection (PDF) writes that she agrees with Paul Kurtz when he writes:
"First, naturalism is committed to a methodological principle within the context of scientific inquiry; i.e., all hypotheses and events are to be explained and tested by reference to natural causes and events. To introduce a supernatural or transcendental cause within science is to depart from naturalistic explanations. On this ground, to invoke an intelligent designer or creator is inadmissible. . . ."
The current article sometimes assumes one of these versions and sometimes the other. It is worthwhile clarifying the distinction, especially since religious criticisms of naturalism assume the second version is the relevant version and not the first.
I don't know how scientists are supposed to distinguish between natural and supernatural hypotheses. In practice, the supernatural seems to refer vaguely to mankind's religions and myths and not to some more explicit criteria. People have sought to test the validity of some supernatural claims, e.g., whether some houses have ghosts. People have also sought to measure the effectiveness of prayer. So far I know, no one has ever confirmed a supernatural hypothesis. But that does not mean that they never will or that they are forbidden to try. Ivar Y 00:50, 28 September 2005 (UTC)
Supernatural seems to refer to explanations that are external to the natural world. A supernatural hypothesis would necessarily have no evidence for it, only evidence against it (such as discovery of a natural cause). This makes belief in the supernatural external to science. Joshuaschroeder 13:10, 28 September 2005 (UTC)
This is a definition of supernatural that provides no guidance for scientists. The only way for scientists to determine whether some idea is supernatural (and, hence, forbidden) is to treat the idea as a potentially valid scientific hypothesis and see if there is some way to confirm it. If scientists can confirm it, then that idea is scientific even if that idea involves a god or a ghost or whatever. Put another way, scientists can confirm that some things are natural (even, potentially, a god). They have no way to confirm that some things are supernatural (as defined above).
The Catholic encyclopedia -- see External links -- says that God is supernatural because God created the natural world and, hence, must be above the natural. However, if God is the Creator, what prevented God from installing evidence in his creation that, in fact, He exists? Why can't God be both a supernatural being and a "natural cause"? When Phillip Johnson complains that scientists are wrong to arbitrarily reject ideas deemed supernatural (in particular, to reject Johnson's God), he has a point.
I'm suggesting that statements like the following need to be rewritten:
"Any method of inquiry or investigation or any procedure for gaining knowledge that limits itself to natural, physical, and material approaches and explanations can be described as naturalist."
"The first [i.e., methodological naturalism] refers only to the application of the scientific method to science that assumes that observable events in nature are explained only by natural causes."
If there is "no higher tribunal for truth than natural science," then the description of that tribunal should not suggest that science can lead only to ontological naturalism (i.e., atheism).
Thoughtful scientists don't reject the supernatural a priori. Rather, they require that hypotheses, whether natural or supernatural, be testable. Ivar Y 08:14, 29 September 2005 (UTC)
Just because the Catholic encyclopedia defines God as supernatural doesn't make a God that acts in the universe supernatural. That is, according to the definitions provided, if the evidence leads inexorably to a phenonmenon that can be called "God", this phenomenon will be a natural phenomenon. Joshuaschroeder 13:14, 29 September 2005 (UTC)
What do you mean by supernatural? Contradicting the "laws of nature"? Not accessible to science? Markus Schmaus
The latter definition. The former could be said to apply to certain physical paradoxes such as the GZK paradox or the Pioneer anomaly -- clearly not supernatural. Joshuaschroeder 13:30, 30 September 2005 (UTC)
I absolutely agree with Ivar Y. As I see it, the first version actually describes naturalism, a philosphy I would subscribe, while the second version is how opponents of naturalism try to describe it. In fact, the second definition only makes sense under the assumption, that the supernatural and natural are distinct, which is a supernaturalistic assumption.
Is the supernatural external to science? Well, by the definition of supernatural it is. There are various views of what supernatural is, but it mostly comes down to something which is not accessible for science. Scientific method on the other hand, doesn't refer to supernatural at all and all it does is to require hypotheses to be testable, that is they have consequences, which infulence myself, I might see them, I might feel them, they might kill me. So if the supernatural has any impact on myself, it is not external to science.
Proponents of the supernatural define it as not accessible for science, but simultaniously assume that it has an impact on life. They conclude that science is limited, as it has no access to some phenomena influencing our lifes. Please note, that this conclusion is not reached by looking at science and does not depend on what science actually is. In fact it is wrong as science does not know any such limitation and hence at least one of the assumption has to be wrong as well. But rather than accepting this, one of the proponents, Philip Johnson, tried to redefine science by calling it "methodological naturalism". Markus Schmaus 15:16, 29 September 2005 (UTC)
If "God" is not supernatural, then what is he? Apparently anything could be called natural if labeled as a "phenomenon". Sanjat312 8:07 December 2006

[edit] Source needed

I removed the following from the page today because it did not have supporting documentation:

These groups have been known to argue that the philosophy is necessarily ontological and even a religion itself.

If you know of a source, please provide it and add this back into the page. Thanks. Swmeyer 13:34, 4 October 2005 (UTC)

[edit] ID=creationism

Regarding this change to this statement:

Common critics of naturalism are creationists who claim that their religious perspectives are not respected by the current practices and theories of science, including proponents of intelligent design who hold that there are phenomena that cannot be explained by "undirected processes" inherent to the naturalist conception of reality.

While it is possible to be a creationist and a proponent of ID, being one doesn't necessarily make you the other. Please consider this from one of ID's biggest critics, Ronald Numbers:

Except for the fact that both of them oppose evolution, they have nothing in common.

He discusses ID more here. --Swmeyer 19:41, 6 October 2005 (UTC)

ID is by definition creationism. This is a matter of simple logic, not perspective. ID proponents claim life is too complex and improbable to have arisen by chance. ID posits it was "designed" by a designer. Design as used in "intelligent design" is a euphemism for creationism. ID is thus by necessity a form of creationism. FeloniousMonk 20:13, 6 October 2005 (UTC)
FeloniousMonk, your conclusion follows because you define ID as creationism. Specifically, you say ID is a euphemism for creationism, therefore, ID is creationism. That's the crux of your logic, and it is an assumption, not an argument. ID proponents claim there are certain indicators found in biological data that indicate intelligent design that is beyond random mutation and natural selection. Creationism is focused on defending a literal reading of the Genesis account, usually including the creation of the earth by the Biblical God a few thousand years ago. Unlike creationism, intelligent design is agnostic regarding the source of design and has no commitment to defending Genesis, the Bible or any other sacred text, even though many proponents may have a theological belief in a Christian God. Instead, intelligent design theory is an effort to empirically detect through specification whether the "apparent design" in nature observed by biologists is genuine design (the product of an organizing intelligence) or is simply the product of chance and mechanical natural laws.
--Swmeyer 20:33, 6 October 2005 (UTC)
P.S. FeloniousMonk, if you have a response, please do so over on the intelligent design talk page.
Your confusion here is caused by your reliance on the narrow definition of creationism - a specific form of creationism, as found in the book of Genesis.
The general definition of creationism is merely the belief that humans, life, the Earth, and the universe were created by a supreme being or deity's supernatural intervention. ID is the assertion that life is the result of intervention of a designer. The two are not just consonant, but equivalent. FeloniousMonk 22:16, 6 October 2005 (UTC)


"Except for the fact that both of them oppose evolution, they have nothing in common." That's an odd statement. As FeloniousMonk says, they not only both oppose naturalistic accounts of the universe (not just evolution), they hold that the universe was formed and moulded by an intelligent, purposive being. --Mel Etitis (Μελ Ετητης) 14:04, 7 October 2005 (UTC)

The ruling on the Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District (2005) trial under judge John E. Jones III has analysed this in detail, and he concludes that "ID cannot uncouple itself from its creationist, and thus religious, antecedents." More detail earlier in his judgement. ...dave souza 00:14, 27 December 2005 (UTC)

[edit] Teleology and naturalism?

Hi! This is a good, clear article, which is impressive given the abstract nature of the topic. But coming in from the teleology article, this article seems a little too focused on the relationship to ID/creationism. If anybody could say more about other current schools of thought that have an issue with philosophical naturalism, I think that'd round out the article nicely. Thanks! --William Pietri 04:54, 11 October 2005 (UTC)

[edit] Naturalistic worldview

I'm redirecting Naturalistic worldview & Naturalistic world view to Bright. Naturalism doesn't seem to describe the obvious meaning of Naturalistic worldview, though you may disagree, so I mention it here. Likewise Atheism seems unsuitable for the redirect as it's more specific. --Singkong2005 12:39, 19 December 2005 (UTC)

[edit] "Scientific materialism"

Dave souza added "alteernate terms" to the introduction: This approach is also known as scientific materialism or as methodological materialism. To my knowledge, these terms are only used by Intelligent design proponents, and not by philosophers or scientists---that is, not by the practitioners of naturalism. The term is intended to be degrading by association with "materialist morality" and such "materialist" systems of government as the former USSR.

Dave souza also edited Materialism to jive with this link: Science uses a working assumption, sometimes known as methodological materialism, that observable events in nature are explained only by natural causes without assuming the existence or non-existence of the supernatural.

I would like to hear from long time contributors to this article if this is an acceptable edit. I am concerned that this is an attempt to create fact by making Wikipedia say it. I could be mistaken, so I'm asking for consensus before editing.

—Daelin 22:58, 26 December 2005 (UTC)

To clarify why I made the edits, these terms were linked as redirects to materialism, which appeared to support the "intelligent design" proponent's inaccurate portrayal of modern science as atheistic. It seemed to me that this page more accurately described the scientific position which they are contesting, and I redirected the links here. If the terms are only used by them, this should be stated in the mention of these terms both on this page and on the Materialism page. It may be relevant that on page 65 of his conclusions on Kitzmiller v. Dover Judge Jones says "Methodological naturalism is a “ground rule” of science today" and goes on to discuss ID quotes referring to "scientific materialism" and "materialism". I'll be grateful for more knowledgeable guidance on this. ....dave souza 00:04, 27 December 2005 (UTC)

Thank you for the clarification. That was very informative, and I'm sorry for the implication of misconduct. My understanding is that Discovery Institute (the ID think-tank) objects to methodical naturalism because they believe it leads to Materialism. I prefer your redirection, because it reflects the point of debate, rather than the implication. But, I can see it being debatable if Materialism were a better article. (Unfortunately the easiest path for improvement would be codependent articles.)

I'll consider making the changes. There's a contentious issue however: I feel it's necessary to explain why they use different terms, and it requires more than a little dissembling language to maintain NPOV on this. It is, after all, an intended ambiguity (at least at its genesis), and therefore a verbal fallacy. —Daelin 01:07, 27 December 2005 (UTC)

Perhaps a separate article devoted to the terms would be in order? I can see it being quite a bit longer than a stub, and it would be a good place to shunt some of this evolution–ID debate. —Daelin 01:16, 27 December 2005 (UTC)

I see separate articles did exist, and were pretty bad. Heh. This'll be a project. —Daelin 01:25, 27 December 2005 (UTC)

There's been a bit of a problem of POV splits with articles as offshoots of intelligent design, and I've come to accept that it's best to avoid separate articles on such ID usage as "unguided evolution" etc. ....dave souza 02:18, 27 December 2005 (UTC)

Perhaps. I've written a draft anyway. I imagine the introduction can be lifted into either article. —Daelin 03:37, 27 December 2005 (UTC)

[edit] Lead section

I rewrote the lead section.

First, it was inconsistent. The paragraph explaining that naturalism does not distinguish between the super- and the natural did distingish between them, which sounded as if naturalism would do so, too.

Second, it wasn't NPOV. "restricts itself" is judgmental.

I partly based it on the German version de:Naturalismus (Philosophie). Markus Schmaus 03:50, 17 January 2006 (UTC)

Clarification is welcome, but the rewrite lost the methodological approach explaining events without assuming the existence or non-existence of the supernatural, a basis of the scientific method which makes it compatible with religious faith. As the Kitzmiller case emphasises there is a movement seeking to introduce a theologically based science which would remove all naturalism, and they seek to portray the scientific method as atheistic. Methodological naturalism leaves room for a supernatural realm beyond science, and it's important that this be clear in the intro. ....dave souza 04:27, 17 January 2006 (UTC)
I at least removed the selfcontradictions from the first paragraph. I hope these changes are uncontroversial. Markus Schmaus 13:01, 17 January 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Methodological naturalism

The intelligent design movement currently defines methodological naturalism as follows.

A methodological principle that some scientists think ought to guide science. Methodological naturalism requires that scientists limit themselves to nauralistic or materialistic explanations when they seek to explain natural phenomena, objects, or processes. On this understanding of how science ought to work, explanations that invoke intelligent causes or the actions of intelligent agents do not qualify as scientific. International Society for Complexity Information and Design

According to naturalists they don't require science to limit itself to naturalistic explanations

But, does science as it’s currently practiced really presume naturalism? Does science invoke a metaphysical assumption about causes being strictly natural in order to conduct it’s inquiry? Do scientists start out by declaring their allegiance to naturalism and their rejection of the supernatural? It would seem not. The vast majority of scientific texts, papers, experiments, hypotheses, conjectures, and napkin scribblings make no mention of the natural/supernatural distinction. Scientists rarely, if ever, pronounce up front an allegiance to naturalism as a guiding philosophy when laying out their methodological presuppositions (if indeed that is their guiding philosophy, since many scientists are religious). Science operates without any a priori ontological commitment as to what sorts of entities exist. It need not make such claims in advance, and indeed to make them might very well bias inquiry. Science is, and should be, open to the existence of any entity which gains sufficient empirical, theoretical support in the course of scientific investigation and explanation. naturalism.org
Darwin, in his conclusion to The Origin of Species, allowed for the possibility that life was first "breathed into one or a few forms," which suggests a willingness to allow supernatural claims to be made. Nonetheless, he gathered and dissected the evidence available in the body of the work without invoking supernatural entities. This seems like a textbook case of methodological naturalism. One may cite an ultimate divine cause if one wishes, but scientific reasoning itself is not based on such claims.

In fact from the viewpoint of naturalism such a requirement would be superfluous. As it is impossible to explain anything by the supernatural.

The definition of methodological naturalism as given by the intelligent design movement, is therefore not a form of naturalism but a form of supernaturalism. Markus Schmaus 23:51, 17 January 2006 (UTC)

P.S.: From the naturalistic viewpoint intelligent design is not wrong, because it's supernatural but because it has no explanationary power and is unproductive naturalism.org. Markus Schmaus 00:06, 18 January 2006 (UTC)

Excellent links which I'm still getting my head round. As you'll note, the ID definition claims that scientists are required to "limit themselves" to naturalism which their linked definition gives as "The philosophical worldview that the physical or natural world (or the space, time, matter, and energy that constitute nature) is all that exists. Naturalism denies the existence of any intelligence outside or beyond nature. " - in other words, ontological naturalism. The explanation from naturalism.org points out that science doesn't presume such naturalism. On the contrary, it makes a methodological search for natural explanations without presuming the existence or nonexistence of the supernatural. This leaves religion free to deal with the supernatural realm. However, if so-called supernatural phenomena are given a scientific explanation, they cease to be supernatural. The ID movement wants science to be subordinate to their theology, and falsely posits that things unexplained by science thus prove their "faith" position. As the Kitzmiller judgement puts it, "ID violates the centuries-old ground rules of science by invoking and permitting supernatural causation;... Since [the 17th century], science has been a discipline in which testability, rather than any ecclesiastical authority or philosophical coherence, has been the measure of a scientific idea’s worth". The judge says more, worth a read. The article isn't contradicted by these points, but could do with improvement and adding the links. ...dave souza 12:33, 18 January 2006 (UTC)
The German version gives the following definition of methodological naturalism.
Die explizit auf die Methode naturwissenschaftlicher Forschung bezogene Variante des philosophischen Naturalismus wird als methodologischer Naturalismus bezeichnet und in der Nachfolge von Sellars und Quine heute vor allem in der Tradition der englischsprachigen Analytischen Philosophie vertreten. Mit ihr kann die Unbestimmtheit des Naturbegriffs umgangen werden; sachlich läuft sie stattdessen auf einen szientistisch begründeten Naturalismus hinaus. Hier wird nach Geert Keil aus der metaphysischen These „Alles ist Natur” die methodologische These vom Erklärungsprivileg der Naturwissenschaften. Dieser Naturalismus folgt dem Scientia mensura-Satz, nach dem die Naturwissenschaft statt den Menschen, die sie betreiben, das "Maß aller Dinge" ist. "Die naturwissenschaftlichen Methoden sind der Königsweg zur Wahrheit, sie können überall angewandt werden und verschaffen Wissen über alles, worüber es überhaupt etwas zu wissen gibt. Dieser Naturalismus ist also kein Ismus der Natur mehr, sondern ein Ismus der Naturwissenschaften. Für diese Position gibt es noch einen anderen Ausdruck, nämlich Szientismus."
My translation:
The variant of philosophical naturalism which explicitly relates to the method of scientific research, is called methodological naturalism and, in succession of Sellars and Quine, is mainly hold by the anglophone analytical philosophy. With it the indefiniteness of the notion of nature can be circumvented; factually it instead amounts to a scientistically justified naturalism. According to Geert Keil the metaphysical thesis “Everything is nature” here becomes the methodological thesis of the privilege of explanation of the natural sciences. This naturalism follows the scientia mensura-statement, according to which science instead of the people practicing it is the “meassure of all things”. “The scientific method is the siler bullet of truth, it can be applied everywhere and provides knowledge about everything about which there is anything to know. This naturalism is no longer an ism of nature, but an ism of science. For this point of view, there is another term, namely scientism.”
Today, methodological naturalism is mainly used within the context of the intelligent design movement. So this definition should definitely be presented. But it should also be pointed out, that this definition assumes the supernatural and hence is not a form of naturalism and that science does not fit this definition. I do not know to what degree the alternate definition is used in anglophone philosophy, but I do know, that it makes a lot more sense than the definition by the intelligent design movement. Markus Schmaus 15:34, 18 January 2006 (UTC)

[edit] An argument against naturalism

Goethean added a section under scientific materialism which seems to be intended as a bunk on evolution as it was originally written. The paper actually says something a little different, so I've rewritten it in the paper's terms.

However, it took me a long time to find a way to do this. There are two reasons for this. First of all, most of the paper is devoted to something else--a description of "defeaters". Secondly, there are serious logical and epistemological problems with the arguments. For a superficial example, on page 9 he makes the forth part of his proof by cases, and it's an argument from incredulity fallacy on its face--it's a qualitative probabilistic argument. This is by far the most important part of that proof. It degrades into a wordy discussion which is basically about the fuzziness of certainty, and never makes a solid conclusion.

I've got a lot more I to say on the paper, but my point is that it's a bad source, and I don't think it belongs in the article. This is one out of thousands of works on naturalism, it does not represent a strong or persuasive theory, is not representative of a particular body of works, and I see no reason for giving it special merit. Without that paper, the section doesn't exist. —Daelin @ 2006–01–23 05:39Z

I agree that Platinga is not generally considered to be a good academic source on any subject in philosophy (or even religious studies, but that's another matter). I think removing this particlar bit is fine. We can keep the link to the paper in the references for people who are interested but this is probably an unnotable if predictable comment from Platinga. --ScienceApologist 06:35, 23 January 2006 (UTC)
Platinga, as you call him, is widely respected in just about all secular philosophy; your comment is inexplicable. His free will defense against the problem of evil is largely responsible for the paradigm shift to the evidential problem of evil in atheology he reinvigorated interest in the ontological argument, his work on modality is widely used and discussed, his contributions to the debate between actualism and possibilism is significant, his work on naturalism elicited peer-reviewed articles and an entire volume of criticism, he has made enormous contributions to the analysis of knowledge, and on and on. Three seconds of searching in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, the Web of Knowledge, or any other standard sources reveals this immediately. Any discussion of criticism against philosophical naturalism is impoverished without discussion of Plantinga's commentary. This is recognized in scholarship, and it seems to me that scholarship is a decent model for any article. Dextris Dei 17:34, 28 May 2006 (UTC)
It's always revealing when advocates cannot abide by the sight of arguments that run counter to their cherished assumptions. — goethean ॐ 16:41, 31 January 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Questions from Saek

User:Saek added this comment to the article:

I do not believe naturalism. Naturalism is basically believe that nothing is designed. Everything happens randomly.Self-inprovement. Nothing exsits outside the nature. Eveything made of matter. Nature is big chunk of matter. So, here is my questions. Where we come from? How can you say the people is perfect being even thou we do not have adams that we had in first place? How can physical matter so aware?I believe that there is something make things. There is something other than matter. Naturalism says that everything that happens in nature has cause something else in the natural order. Where is sonething else come from? It is seems like going circle and never end. Something happens and there something else that cause of something.... Who is making that cause? Is that naturally happens? So something happen from nothing? I know my discussion is not really discussion, but I want know that how they believe naturalism. Is this naturalism make sense? I do not think so. Naturalism modern scientis are having peroblem with some of naturalism's beliefs, like DNA. How is naturalist explain about it? Where in nature start? Where in nature come from? Naturalism is not make sense at all to me. I hope that someone will answer my questions.

I've moved it here to allow discussion, ...dave souza, talk 09:30, 6 February 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Criticism of links section

Just pointing at something that could use attention. I think the more-or-less "pro-/anti-/neutral" sectioning of links is a bit antagonistic. Anything supportive worth citing will also be critical. The "supportive links" are also all pretty poor, and seem to have mostly been added by people not logged in. The criticism links are mostly decent, though a few are self-defeating with even a superficial read.

[edit] Origins of Methodological Naturalism

While having a hunt for info about this subject which seems to be unmentioned (unmentionable?) on scientific method, came across this interesting discussion at The Panda's Thumb: On the Origins of Methodological Naturalism. One gem it includes is:

supernatural explanations are unconstrained, and without constraints, you cannot derive empirical expectations, which are what science relies on to proceed

Another useful link is ASA March 2006 - Re: Methodological Naturalism Hope to review what can be used to improve this article, am cautious about adding a link to a forum, ..dave souza, talk 08:38, 27 April 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Teleology and naturalism? (2)

As stated above, I too would like to see how other schools of thought relate to the apparent growth of the Naturalist movement in recent years. Like the creationists, I would suspect that there are others who suspect there may be underlying metaphysical constructs masquerading as science. One avenue may be that the scientfic method itself, in its reliance on objectivity and its use of peer review may not truly be a "higher standard" of proof than mere subjectivity (that which we all experience) and that such a method may not, when taken by itself, be effective in determining what constitutes reality.

Buddhism and other non-theistic religions may be a start.

[edit] Removed material

Material just removed from the intro paragraph put here for review: ... Kenosis 03:29, 16 June 2006 (UTC)

"According to Karl Popper, who rejected the approach as dogmatic in contrast to his own falsificationism, it is a different word for 'inductive theory of science'.[1]" 03:29, 16 June 2006 (UTC)
You removed not only that, but also my clarification on the origins of the dichotomy. You allege "significant factual inaccuracies". Would you please be more specific? I added this sentence primarily for the clarification that this is really just a different word for inductive theory of science, which is also known as logical empiricism; but I was careful not to imply that Popper was in support of this position. I cited a reputable source, something the entire article fails to provide. (Which makes the removal quite inappropriate: My perfectly verifiable source should be bad, while the whole article reads like simply being invented, citing not a single source for the basic concept? That's not very encouraging.) --Rtc 03:51, 16 June 2006 (UTC)
  • 1) The "criticism" doesn't belong in the introductory paragraph, cited or not (though I agree the article should be better verified and otherwise improved).
  • 2) Even after correction for factual accuracy, criticisms belongs in "criticisms". Alternately criticisms could reasonably be scheduled on a point by point basis with argument/counterargument by section.
  • 3) The addition of the material (emphasised in bold) that you added is not sufficiently relevant to include in the body text of the introduction, second paragraph: "Distinctions are made between two approaches by Paul de Vries at Wheaton College (a conservative evangelical school), the first being methodological naturalism or scientific naturalism, and the second ontological naturalism or metaphysical naturalism" That implies a potential POV to the distinction, and probably should not even be used in a footnote in order to present a proper NPOV perspective to the reader. ... Kenosis 06:06, 16 June 2006 (UTC)
  • 4) I don't have time to fully explain just how radically incorrect the sentence about Popper is, because the meanings have changed radically since Popper first wrote this. Moreover, Popper was arguing for emphasis on deductive reasoning (which kind of reasoning is today also considered part-and-parcel of methodological naturalism in large part as a result of Popper's efforts some 40-60 years ago), and arguing for falsifiability so other researchers could actually check theories and hypotheses to see whether they are correct or not. And, Popper did not refer to his own theory as falsificationism. That is a classification (and a very debatable one at that) used by others to describe the debate of the day. ... Kenosis 06:19, 16 June 2006 (UTC)
1) That does not justify a revert. Why didn't you simply put it there yourself and improve it?
2) So what are these alleged "significant factual inaccuracies"? Why are you not disclosing them? I can only make a rough guess about your claim, do you want to say that carefully interpreted, Popper is perfectly consistent with what is nowadays understood as 'methodological naturalism'?
3) "Distinctions are sometimes made between two approaches" is a WP:WEASEL statement. The policy states "Who says that? You? Me? When did they say it? How many people think that? What kind of people think that? Where are they? What kind of bias do they have? Why is this of any significance?" I added the who, the when and the kind of bias (and that "probably should not even be used in a footnote"? How come the policy requests that?). This should clearly improve the weasel statement. If it's not good enough for you, you can easily improve it further, but please don't revert.
4) "the meanings have changed radically since Popper first wrote this" and "which kind of reasoning is today also considered part-and-parcel of methodological naturalism" Who says that? Please name sources for your claims. This is just in the same way a WP:WEASEL statement.
I hope not only intellectual academics but also interested laymen may edit the Wikipedia articles. Please be more cooperative. --Rtc 06:45, 16 June 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Reorganisation

Taking on board Rtc's points, I've added sourced definitions and at the same time reorganised the article so that its structure is more in line with Metaphysical naturalism, and so that elements of history and criticism which were scattered in the article are put in their respective sections. The history could still do with expansion, and the many inline links I've left alone would be best converted into < ref > links, so it's work in progress. ..dave souza, talk 20:38, 17 June 2006 (UTC)

Well done. --Rtc 01:33, 19 June 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Epistemic or Justificatory Naturalism vs Methodological Naturalism

We're trying to be careful on the difference between metaphysical naturalism and something weaker, but I am worried that their is a seperate distinction between Justificatory Naturalism and Methodological Naturalism, and thus that methodological naturalism is a slightly stricter position that the page implies.

lets try this

  • Justificatory Naturalism = Justificatory support for all claims must be natural rather than supernatural (whatever that distinction is), thus if inference to the best explanation is part of the justification then the explanation must be non-supernatural
  • Methodological Naturalism = the method of inquiry or investigation limits itself to the natural, physical and material.

To see the difference consider a researcher who prays and sacrifices a chicken to Damballa (or any other more clearly supernatural method) asking for guidance in hypothesis formation, then dreams that perhaps the molecule he is studying has such and such structure. Then the researcher does lots of nice verifiable experimentation to test the hypothesis and published an account with no supernaturalistic overtones. I take it that this is an example of Justificatory Naturalism, nothing in the justificatory structure of the researchers case turns on the sacrificed chicken, nonetheless it is NOT methodological naturalism, because praying and sacrificing was part of the method of hypothesis formation.

Now instead imagine that researcher forms the hypothesis naturally, but during the experiment is worried that some of the samples may become contaminated, so he uses a supernaturalistic method to try to prevent sample contaimination, during testing it becomes clear that the samples weren't contaminated in the way the researcher feared. That still looks like justificatory but not methodological naturalism to me.

Now imagine that a our Ab'orisha scientist is told that he is required by the scientific method to refrain from supernaturalist methods at all stages of the process, not just in the justificatory part, he is allowed to beleive in the orisha, but not to enact his beleif. That would be scientific atheism not in the orthodox sense, of requiring belief in atheism, but in the orthopractic sense of requiring the practice of atheism scientifically. Any attempt at prayer, or any other supernaturalistic method anywhere along the way make you not a methodological naturalist, but many scientists of many religions DO use supernatural methods, just not in the justificatory part of the project.

The kind of naturalism that the scientific method requires is vastly less than methodological naturalism in the sense presented here. 14:17, 21 July 2006 (UTC)

Sorry, I couldn't follow that without re-formatting your text. --Uncle Ed 17:34, 8 August 2006 (UTC)

[edit] How bizarre

Just browsing through. Are 11 separate references (making up more than half the total references for the whole article) really necessary for the statement "Many modern philosophers of science" in the third paragraph of the intro? (As of this verion) Is it a typo, broken refs, something else? It looks strange. --Easter Monkey 16:29, 8 August 2006 (UTC)

It's a hangover from that statement being strongly challenged, and when finding justification for the statement I came across a lot of rather useful looking references which I added, thinking that they might also come in useful elsewhere in revising the article. In the event one did: have now tried grouping the others, which looks tidier in the intro line. Will try to review the usefulness of the refs, but recall that many seemed of interest. Comment? ..dave souza, talk 18:07, 8 August 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Unsourced essay

At 05:12, 26 September 2006, 70.27.195.105 added this to the lead, as well as incorrectly claiming that "science is "without theism", which is the definition of atheism" – it isn't in Chambers Dictionary.

A simple and effective argument against traditional supernaturalism is one of logic and definition. By the very definition of the terms "universe" and "natural", one must conclude that any event that occurs in our universe must by definition be natural, if for nothing else (for argument sake), then for the very reason that it is occuring in our universe. Spacetime, matter and energy are all "our universe" and do not exist "outside" it. Thus, if an event can be observed, or experienced, or felt etc. by an observer who is him/herself "the universe" (read: "part of"), it must occur in spacetime, and must include matter and/or energy, thus it must be natural. Both the event and the observer would have to be extra-universal to make supernaturalism possible, only one of these being true is not enough. If events were somehow able to exist in our universe but be extra-universal, then the observer could not experience them for the simple reason that the observer is "natural". Similarily, if the observer was somehow able to experience extra-universal events, there would be nothing for him/her to experience as such events cannot exist due to those pesky laws of nature (ever put a red ant in a black anthill?). Simply put, supernaturalism fails on both counts, the event and the observer. Not only can events not exist if they are not part of the universe, the observer, being "the universe" as is everything else, cannot possibly experience in any way or form, something that is not "the universe". Since science has no authority on events "not" in our universe, the term "supernatural" has no meaning. It follows then that any event observed and deemed "supernatural" by an observer is either a psychological and not "real" event, one that only the subject senses, or a natural event not understood by the observer. Examples of the latter are abundant in history. Many events deemed supernatural at one time slowly became natural once understood, or declared myths once analyzed with modern tools and knowledge.

Despite this, an alarmingly high chunk of the total population is convinced of the real existance of supernatural events, regardless of lack of evidence, regardless of how many times one of these events is proven either to be a hoax or a genuine natural event, and most importantly regardless of the logical fallacy of the belief, as explained above. Furthermore, people are very quick to define something supernatural, as if it gains something by being defined this way, rather then described as an "unknown" with no connotations.

It can be argued that theism encourages belief without evidence, however there is still a fundamental difference between religion and supernaturalism, as religion generally focuses on faith, which is furthermore very specific (such as faith in God). One does not have "faith" when it comes to supernaturalism, so it is likely there is another independent reason for the willingness, indeed need, to believe into the unseen (often this belief is considered as a negative even by the very religion this person practices, yet it changes nothing). In fact, there are theists who hold no supernatural beliefs whatsoever, short of the belief in their diety, while there are atheists who believe in everything except the one Abrahamic diety (the genuinity of these beliefs is in question, as these people clearly have an agenda and are anti-Christian for various, usually humanistic, reasons). The key interest in the persuit of this answer is to determine when the need for blind faith arose in humans, as it clearly isn't the default, and furthermore determine whether it was natural selection that is responsible for its dominance in humans.

This obviously doesn't belong in the intro which should be concise as WP:LEAD, and appears to be completely unsuitable for Wikipedia: this article describes the philosophy set out by reliable sources rather than introducing a new argument and contravening Wikipedia:No original research..dave souza, talk 08:37, 26 September 2006 (UTC)

[edit] I suggest a Rename

Since this article mainly deals with methodological naturalism and the methodological issues, I presume changing the name to "Methodological naturalism" would be more desirable. Canadianism 05:46, 30 September 2006 (UTC)

I've mixed feelings about this: problems arose at one time because those claiming that science is materialist were directing links the wrong way, and as it is now people clicking on the link come to this page which explains the various names and positions, compares them and then expands on the methodological variety. If we move this article, then the whole intro has still to appear at Naturalism (philosophy) to provide effective disambiguation of a complex problem, and avoid people looking for "naturalism" being redirected to a surprising title. A new "Methodological naturalism" article would still have to explain these various positions, so we'd effectively end up with duplication covering the same ground. ..dave souza, talk 15:59, 3 October 2006 (UTC)

[edit] where to begin

I believe this article requires cleanup to reach the objective wikipedia standard. Too many statements are unsupported, and statements such as "many philosophers of science" and "some proponents" tend to cloud an already complicated issue by lending credibility and authority to ideas that are not academically established. This article contains too much original analysis and argument, and not enough published scholarship. For example, the given definitions of terms are to be found in which reviewed journals? My understanding is that materialism has a strict Berkeleyian definition, and that the modernisation of those ideas is termed physicalism. From where do these other terms arise, such as methodological materialism? —Preceding unsigned comment added by Zazizoma (talk • contribs) 18:28, 26 November 2006

Thank you for your suggestion! When you feel an article needs improvement, please feel free to make those changes. Wikipedia is a wiki, so anyone can edit almost any article by simply following the Edit this page link at the top. You don't even need to log in (although there are many reasons why you might want to). The Wikipedia community encourages you to be bold in updating pages. Don't worry too much about making honest mistakes — they're likely to be found and corrected quickly. If you're not sure how editing works, check out how to edit a page, or use the sandbox to try out your editing skills. New contributors are always welcome. .. dave souza, talk 10:11, 12 December 2006 (UTC)
By the way, your vague understandings seem to be unsupported by references, and the questions as to the source of the term "methodological naturalism" and the meaning of "many" are covered by the sources cited under [1] and [2]. Improvements will be welcome, but this tag indicates your failure to study the article rather than any constructive effort to improve it, so I'll remove the tag. .. dave souza, talk 10:19, 12 December 2006 (UTC)

I changed the diambiguation page. As such I think both articles are wrong headed. I suggest leading out the arguments page until someone reads something written by someone with some qualifications ;)

[edit] Removed section

I've removed the following section, and am placing it here for future reference. Some of the material may be relevant to metaphysical naturalism, but it has little or no relationship to this article. ... Kenosis 00:45, 26 June 2007 (UTC)

== Naturalism and philosophy of mind ==
There is currently some dispute over whether naturalism rules out certain areas of philosophy altogether, such as semantics, ethics, aesthetics, or excludes the use of mentalistic vocabulary ("believes", "thinks") in philosophy of mind. Quine avoided most of these topics, but some recent thinkers have argued that even though (according to them) mentalistic descriptions and value judgements cannot be systematically translated into physicalistic descriptions, they also do not need to presuppose the existence of anything other than physical phenomena.
Donald Davidson, for example, has argued that individual mental states can (must, in fact) be identical with individual brain states, even though a given kind of mental state (belief in materialism) might not be systematically identified with a given kind of brain state (a particular pattern of neural firings): the former weakly "supervenes" upon the latter. The implication is that naturalism can leave non-physical vocabulary intact where the use of that vocabulary can be explained naturalistically; McDowell has dubbed this level of discourse "second nature".
Craig DeLancey (DeLancey 2002)[2] [3] cricizes the view advocated by Donald Davidson as not being able to properly explain the role of emotions. According to DeLancey:

In contemporary philosophy of mind, almost everyone pledges allegiance to naturalism; yet we are in the ironic position that there is a widespread reaction to naturalism in contemporary analytic philosophy, often apparently motivated by the belief that naturalism is an impoverished approach to mind. This is ironic because the offered alternatives are usually stupefyingly simplistic, the most common being that all of mind and action can be explained by generic concepts of belief and desire {...} it is hard to overestimate the harm that this notion has done to moral psychology, action theory, and other aspects of the philosophy of mind.

DeLancy also states that

{...} since many researchers in the philosophy and science of mind see emotions as something to be tacked onto a theory of mind after cognition is explained, the failure to explain emotions is hardly surprising.

He proposes the hierarchical naturalistic view of mind stating that:

{...} certain capabilities are seen as more fundamental to autonomy, and are likely to be required by other (hence, dependent) capabilities. In particular, many of our affective capabilities, and also our capabilities underlying motor control and its integration with perception (capabilities that are likely highly integrated with affect), are more fundamental than, and can and often do operate independently of, the kinds of capabilities that are typically taken to constitute highcognition; and in turn many cognitive abilities make use of, and may require, these other subcognitive abilities. Instead of a top-down, highly cognitive view of mind, in which language is seen as the fundamental mental capability that enables autonomy and intelligence, a proper appreciation for the role of affects in our lives reveals that we must start with a bottom-up, embodied view of mind in which motor control and its integration with perception, along with our affective capabilities, are the fundamental features of autonomy, upon which intelligence must be built. Equivalently, I argue that explaining a general conception of autonomy, and not cognition, should be the primary goal of the philosophy of mind.

... 00:45, 26 June 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Inaccurate Newton reference

I'm new to editing articles, and so I'm going to post a criticism here before taking the liberty of editing. Perhaps bad wikettiquette, but I'd rather err on the side of caution.

The article suggests that Newton's famous "hypotheses non fingo" quote was written in response to a question about the role of God. This is mistaken. That quote comes from the General Scholia to the Second Edition of the Principia, and was written concerning Newton's unwillingness to posit a hypothetical mechanism to explain gravitational attraction. The author is, perhaps, confusing this with Laplace's response, "I have no need of that hypothesis", to Napoleon's question as to what role God played in HIS physics.

Newton was actually quite the supernaturalist, and thought that God was continually working acts of Providence, if not outright miracles, to keep the planets in their orbits. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Steven Horst (talk • contribs) 19:44, 16 October 2007 (UTC)

[edit] New First Sentence

I have been bothered by the previous first sentence of this article and, therefore, changed it.

The previous first sentence was:

"Naturalism is any of several philosophical stances, typically those descended from materialism and pragmatism, that do not distinguish the supernatural (including strange entities like non-natural values, and universals as they are commonly conceived) from nature."

This is too broad and too vague. Religious fundamentalists, for example, could claim to be naturalists because they believe that the supernatural is real and, therefore, cannot be distinguished from nature. People who believe in witchcraft could make similar claims. The references to materialism and to pragmatism help a little. However, these terms do not define boundaries and a reader who seeks information about naturalism shouldn't have to go to another article to find out what naturalism means. Ivar Y (talk) 06:54, 26 January 2008 (UTC)

[edit] moving section and renaming it

I have moved the section titled "Definition of Methodological Naturalism" to the bottom and renamed it to "Methodological Naturalism vs. Metaphysical Naturalism". I was fairly confused when the first heading seemed like it was trying to resolve a dispute up front. I think the article should start off with a general treatment of the term itself, and then go into more details about sub-groupings or derivative forms and their distinctions. Let me know if you think otherwise. —Memotype::T 07:26, 11 February 2008 (UTC)

[edit] Reference to Schafersman?

I just had a look at the Schafersman article that is linked to. It seems a bit dodgy. There's much better stuff on naturalism and especially on methodological naturalism. If anyone's interested in changing it, have a look at the stanford encyclopedia of philosophy online. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 124.170.66.151 (talk) 12:04, 15 April 2008 (UTC)

[edit] Bias

This is a very biased article. It presents methodological naturalism as being anti-religion, when it is the central dogma of science. It makes no real mention of the science perspective of the topic. In the court case Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School Board:

While supernatural explanations may be important and have merit, they are not part of science. (3:103 (Miller); 9:19-20 (Haught)). This self-imposed convention of science, which limits inquiry to testable, natural explanations about the natural world, is referred to by philosophers as “methodological naturalism” and is sometimes known as the scientific method. (5:23, 29-30 (Pennock)). Methodological naturalism is a “ground rule” of science today which requires scientists to seek explanations in the world around us based upon what we can observe, test, replicate, and verify. (1:59-64, 2:41-43 (Miller); 5:8, 23-30 (Pennock)). As the National Academy of Sciences (hereinafter “NAS”) was recognized by experts for both parties as the “most prestigious” scientific association in this country, we will accordingly cite to its opinion where appropriate. (1:94, 160-61 (Miller); 14:72 (Alters); 37:31 (Minnich)). NAS is in agreement that science is limited to empirical, observable and ultimately testable data: “Science is a particular way of knowing about the world. In science, explanations are restricted to those that can be inferred from the confirmable data – the results obtained through observations and experiments that can be substantiated by other scientists. Anything that can be observed or measured is amenable to scientific investigation. Explanations that cannot be based upon empirical evidence are not part of science.”(P-649 at 27).

Dolphinrider16 (talk) 20:14, 27 April 2008 (UTC)

Are you reading the same article I'm reading? Because it makes clear the distinction between methodological and metaphysical naturalism here:

This makes the methodological assumption that observable effects in nature are best explainable only by natural causes. This is often contrasted with the approach known as ontological naturalism or metaphysical naturalism, which refers to the metaphysical belief that the natural world (including the universe) is all that exists, and therefore nothing supernatural exists.

And it makes plain that methodological naturalism is not anti-religion:

Naturalism of this sort says nothing about the existence or nonexistence of the supernatural which by this definition is beyond natural testing.

MN rules out recourse to the supernatural, not the supernatural per se--Aunt Entropy (talk) 20:40, 27 April 2008 (UTC).

What did the nominator find biased about the introduction? Or relevant about the law quote? I see nothing here and vote to remove the neutraility tag. Jok2000 (talk) 20:52, 27 April 2008 (UTC)
Done. I see nothing to back the claims. Aunt Entropy (talk) 01:03, 28 April 2008 (UTC)