Naserullah

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Naserullah is a citizen of Afghanistan, held in extrajudicial detention in the United States Guantanamo Bay detention camps, in Cuba.[1] Naserullah's Guantanamo detainee ID number is 967. American counter-terror analysts estimate he was born in 1980,in Helmand, Afghanistan.

Contents

[edit] Identity

The US Department of Defense was forced, by court order, to release the names of the captives taken in the "war on terror" who were held in Guantanamo. On April 20, 2006 they released a list of 558 names, nationalities and ID numbers, of all the captives whose status as "enemy combatants" had been reviewed by a Combatant Status Review Tribunal.[2] Twenty-five days later they released a list of 759 names, nationalities, ID numbers, dates of birth, and places of birth, of all captives who had been held in military custody in Guantanamo.[1] Guantanamo holds two Afghans named Nasrullah. Both men faced similar allegations:

Both men faced the allegations that they served as couriers for Taliban commanders:

  • One of the allegations captive 967 faced was: "The detainee was carrying messages for Taliban commanders when apprehended."
  • Two of the allegations against captive 886 state:
    • "The Detainee and a Taliban leader/commander traveled from Trin Kowl to Oruzgan, Afghanistan, to deliver a letter to a Taliban leader,"
    • "The letter was from Taliban leaders in hiding."

[edit] Combatant Status Review Tribunal

Combatant Status Review Tribunals were held in a trailer the size of a large RV. The captive sat on a plastic garden chair, with his hands and feet shackled to a bolt in the floor. Three chairs were reserved for members of the press, but only 37 of the 574 Tribunals were observed. The neutrality of this section is disputed. Please see the discussion on the talk page.(December 2007)Please do not remove this message until the dispute is resolved.
Combatant Status Review Tribunals were held in a trailer the size of a large RV. The captive sat on a plastic garden chair, with his hands and feet shackled to a bolt in the floor.[4][5] Three chairs were reserved for members of the press, but only 37 of the 574 Tribunals were observed.[6]
The neutrality of this section is disputed.
Please see the discussion on the talk page.(December 2007)
Please do not remove this message until the dispute is resolved.

Initially the Bush administration asserted that they could withhold all the protections of the Geneva Conventions to captives from the war on terror. This policy was challenged before the Judicial branch. Critics argued that the USA could not evade its obligation to conduct a competent tribunals to determine whether captives are, or are not, entitled to the protections of prisoner of war status.

Subsequently the Department of Defense instituted the Combatant Status Review Tribunals. The Tribunals, however, were not authorized to determine whether the captives were lawful combatants -- rather they were merely empowered to make a recommendation as to whether the captive had previously been correctly determined to match the Bush administration's definition of an enemy combatant.

[edit] Allegations

During the winter and spring of 2005 the Department of Defense complied with a Freedom of Information Act request, and released five files that contained 507 memoranda which each summarized the allegations against a single detainee. These memos, entitled "Summary of Evidence" were prepared for the detainee's Combatant Status Review Tribunals. The detainee's names and ID numbers were redacted from all but one of these memos, when they were first released in 2005. But some of them contain notations in pen. 169 of the memos bear a hand-written notation specifying the detainee's ID number. One of the memos had a notation specifying Naserullah's detainee ID.[7] The allegations Naserullah would have faced, during his Tribunal, were:

a. The detainee is associated with the Taliban:
  1. The detainee was carrying messages for Taliban commanders when apprehended.
b. The detainee participated in military operations against the United States and its coalition partners.
  1. The detainee suffered hearing loss when captured, which was caused by firing weapons.
  2. The detainee had knowledge of an early warning system used to alert of approaching U.S. or coalition forces.

[edit] Transcript

Naserullah chose to participate in his Combatant Status Review Tribunal.[8]

[edit] Response to the allegations

[edit] Response to Tribunal questions

[edit] Administrative Review Board hearing

Detainees who were determined to have been properly classified as "enemy combatants" were scheduled to have their dossier reviewed at annual Administrative Review Board hearings. The Administrative Review Boards weren't authorized to review whether a detainee qualified for POW status, and they weren't authorized to review whether a detainee should have been classified as an "enemy combatant".

They were authorized to consider whether a detainee should continue to be detained by the United States, because they continued to pose a threat -- or whether they could safely be repatriated to the custody of their home country, or whether they could be set free.

Naserullah chose to participate in his Administrative Review Board hearing.[3]

Guantanamo counter-terror analysts compiled factors for and against the continued detention of each of the captives who remained in detention in December 2005, with the exception of ten captives who were to face charges before a military commission, and the remaining captives from the 38 who had been determined, by their Combatant Status Review Tribunals, not to have been "enemy combatants" after all. The "Summary of Evidence" memo that contained these factors always broke the factors into those that "favor continued detention", and those that "favor release or transfer". The factors that favor continued detention were always broken down into subcategories, like "Intent", "Training", "Commitment". The factors listed in each subcategory were always numbered. Most transcripts recorded the categories and subcategories. Most transcripts recorded the factor's numbering. But Rahmatullah's transcript doesn't.

[edit] Factors for and against continued detention:

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for every captive for whom an Administrative Review Board hearing was convened, summarizing the "factors" for and against their continued detention. Those factors were always broken down under two headings: "The following primary factors favor continued detention"; and "The following primary factors favor release or transfer". The factors favoring continued detention were further subdivided under sub-headings like: "Training"; "Intent"; "Commitment"; "Associations". And the factors under those sub-headings were sequentionally numbered.

Te Summary of Evidence memo was always read out, in its entirety, at the beginning of the hearing. Most captives were offered an opportunity to hear the factors read out, one at a time, so they would have an opportunity to respond to each in turn.

Some captive's transcript recorded the factors, and the captive's responses, but did not record the headings, sub-headings or sequential numbering.

  • The detainee was captured outside Lejay Village, Bughran District [sic] , Helmand Province, based on suspicion of belonging to a group that had just fired on U.S. Forces.
  • There were indications that the group cached their weapons, maneuvered down a mountain, entered a taxi or mounted motorcycles and proceeded to a checkpoint. The detainee, along with others, was captured at that checkpoint.
  • The detainee, and those with whom he was captured, suffered from hearing loss. It is assessed that the hearing loss was due to their firing activity.
  • The detainee was captured with about 14,500 Pakistani funds, and had multiple documents in his possession, including letters addressed to mid-level Taliban commanders.
  • The detainee denies that he knew any of the other occupants of the vehicle from which he was captured.
  • The detainee displays deception when providing information relative to his capture.
  • The detainee said that after September 11, 2001, he worked for the Helmand Government as a security guard at the Helmand Airport.
  • The detainee was identified as being a trained bodyguard for a known leader of Taliban fighters.
  • This Taliban leaders had a group of about 40 fighters, one of who [sic] acted as a spy, and collected information on U.S. and coalition forces in Kandahar, Helmand and Oruzghan.
  • The detainee was captured with an individual who operated an intelligence collection network in support of a former Taliban Chief of Intelligence.
  • The detainee was captured with an individual who was scheduled to meet with other Taliban leaders to discuss an upcoming jihad against the coalition and the Afghan Transitional Authority.
  • The detainee was captured with an individual who organized a meeting of senior Taliban officials to discuss military operations against the Afghan Interim Administration.
  • The detainee is also know as Mula Nasrullah Akhund.
  • The detainee was captured carrying records of payments made by Mula Nasrullah Akhund to Mula Saheb.
  • Mula Saheb had been identified as a long time Taliban member and fighter.
  • The detainee claims he never fired a weapon at U.S. forces.
  • The detainee claims he was given the documents which were in his possession at the time of capture. He was unaware they were addressed to [sic] Taliban commander and did not know the person who gave him the documents.
  • The detainee denied that he had any connection to the Taliban government, or that he passed documents from [sic] them.
  • The detainee states he would like to return to his country of origin, where he would continue to support the U.S..

[edit] Response to the factors

[edit] Response to Board questions

[edit] References

  1. ^ a b c d list of prisoners (.pdf), US Department of Defense, May 15, 2006
  2. ^ a b c list of prisoners (.pdf), US Department of Defense, April 20, 2006
  3. ^ a b Summarized transcript (.pdf), from Naserullah's Administrative Review Board hearing - pages 75-82
  4. ^ Guantánamo Prisoners Getting Their Day, but Hardly in Court, New York Times, November 11, 2004 - mirror
  5. ^ Inside the Guantánamo Bay hearings: Barbarian "Justice" dispensed by KGB-style "military tribunals", Financial Times, December 11, 2004
  6. ^ Annual Administrative Review Boards for Enemy Combatants Held at Guantanamo Attributable to Senior Defense Officials. United States Department of Defense (March 6, 2007). Retrieved on 2007-09-22.
  7. ^ Summary of Evidence memo (.pdf) prepared for Naserullah's Combatant Status Review Tribunal - November 16, 2004 - page 114
  8. ^ Summarized transcripts (.pdf), from Naserullah's Combatant Status Review Tribunal - pages 70-79