Musa Ali Said Al Said Al Umari

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Musa Bin Ali Bin Said Al Amri is a citizen of Saudi Arabia held in extrajudicial detention in the United States Guantanamo Bay detainment camps, in Cuba.[1] His Guantanamo detainee ID number is 196. JTF-GTMO analysts estimate he was born on July 26, 1978, in Arar, Saudi Arabia.

Contents

[edit] Identity

Captive 196 was identified inconsistently on different official Department of Defense documents:

  • Captive 196 was identified as Musa Ali Said Al Said Al Umari on the Summary of Evidence memo prepared for his Combatant Status Review Tribunal, on 28 September 2004, and on the Summary of Evidence memo prepared for his first annual Administrative Review Board.[2][3]
  • Captive 196 was identified as Musa Bin Ali Bin Said Al Amri on the Summary of Evidence memo prepared for his second annual Administrative Review Board, and on 3 March 2006 on the official list of 558 Guantanamo captives whose "enemy combatant" status was reconsidered, released on April 20, 2006.[4][5]
  • Captive 196 was identified as Abd Al Rahman Moaza Zafer Al Amri on the official list of 759 past and present Guantanamo captives, released on May 15, 2006.[1]
  • Captive 196 was identified as Musa Bin Ali Bin Said Al Amri Al Umari on four official lists of captives, released in September 2007.[6][7][8][9]

[edit] Combatant Status Review Tribunal

Combatant Status Review Tribunal notice read to a Guantanamo captive.
Combatant Status Review Tribunal notice read to a Guantanamo captive.

Initially the Bush administration asserted that they could withhold all the protections of the Geneva Conventions to captives from the war on terror. This policy was challenged before the Judicial branch. Critics argued that the USA could not evade its obligation to conduct a competent tribunals to determine whether captives are, or are not, entitled to the protections of prisoner of war status.

Subsequently the Department of Defense instituted the Combatant Status Review Tribunals. The Tribunals, however, were not authorized to determine whether the captives were lawful combatants -- rather they were merely empowered to make a recommendation as to whether the captive had previously been correctly determined to match the Bush administration's definition of an enemy combatant.

[edit] Summary of Evidence memo

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Musa Ali Said Al Said Al Umari's Combatant Status Review Tribunal, on 28 September 2004.[2] The memo listed the following allegations against him:

a. The detainee is associated with al Qaida and the Taliban:
  1. One of detainee's known aliases was on a list of captured al Qaida members that was discovered on a computer hard drive associated with suspected al Qaida.
  2. One of detainee's aliases was in another hard drive believed to belong to members of the suspected al Qaida cell involved with the October 2002 attack on US Marines in Faylaka Island.
  3. Detainee's name was recovered on a hard drive belonging to senior al Qaida operational planner Khalid Sheik Mohammed.
b. The detainee participated in military operations against the United States or its coalition partners.
  1. Detainee states that he traveled to Afghanistan at the end of March 2001, was issued a Kalishnikov rifle, and was assigned to a position called Suhail, which was about 700m from the front lines.
  2. While at the Suhail center, detainee dug trenches and laid barbed wire.

[edit] Transcript

There is no record that captive 196 participated in his Combatant Status Review Tribunal.

[edit] Administrative Review Board hearing

Detainees who were determined to have been properly classified as "enemy combatants" were scheduled to have their dossier reviewed at annual Administrative Review Board hearings. The Administrative Review Boards weren't authorized to review whether a detainee qualified for POW status, and they weren't authorized to review whether a detainee should have been classified as an "enemy combatant".

They were authorized to consider whether a detainee should continue to be detained by the United States, because they continued to pose a threat -- or whether they could safely be repatriated to the custody of their home country, or whether they could be set free.

[edit] First annual Administrative Review Board

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Musa Ali Said Al Said Al Umari first annual Administrative Review Board, on 6 April 2005.[3] The memo listed factors for and against his continued detention.

[edit] The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment
  1. The detainee saw papers with fatwas issued by Sheiks on bulletin boards around the city and in the mosques. The fatwas called for Saudi Arabian citizens to travel to Afghanistan and help the Taliban.
  2. A man who had fought with the Taliban in Afghanistan told detainee about fighting on the front and information about how to get to Afghanistan.
  3. That man provided detainee approximately 8,000 [[Saudi Riyal}Riyals]] to take to Afghanistan. In addition, the detainee took approximately 4,000 Riyals of his own money.
b. Training
  1. The detainee went with Mohammed Abdul Razzaq to a Taliban center called Umar al Saif, located on the outskirts of Kabul.
  2. Abdul Razzaq ((Mohammed)), a Saudi Arabian national living in Pakistan, facilitated travel through Pakistan to Afghanistan.
  3. Umar al Saif was identified as reserve camp. Activities at this camp included small arms training, medical care and guard duty.
c. Connection/Association
  1. The detainee stayed at a Taliban house a few minutes from the Pakistan/Afghanistan border with five Afghans. One of the Afghans, Mohammed Abdul Razzaq, told the detainee that if he wanted to meet up with other Arabs, the detainee could either go to Kandahar or Kabul. The detainee had heard about the Kabul front, so he decided to go there.
  2. The detainee stayed at a Taliban house in a small village outside of Kabul.
  3. The detainee spent about two weeks at the Umar al Saif Center, then was moved to a supply center called Said. He spent about a month and a half, loading trucks and supplies.
  4. One of detainee’s known aliases was on a list of captured al Qaida members that was discovered on a computer hard drive associated with suspected al Qaida.
  5. One of detainee’s aliases was in another hard drive believed to belong to members of the suspected al Qaida cell involved with the October 2002 attack, on US Marines in Faylaka Island.
  6. Detainee’s name was recovered on a hard drive belonging to a senior al Qaida operational planner, Khalid Sheik Mohammed.
d. Intent
  1. During the detainee’s travel from Qatar to Afghanistan, he told another passenger that he was going to Afghanistan to fight with the Taliban.
  2. Detainee states that he traveled to Afghanistan at the end of March 2001, was issued a Kalashnikov rifle, and was assigned to a position called Suhail about 700m from the frontlines.
  3. While at the Suhail center, detainee dug trenches and laid barbed wire.
  4. The detainee fought on the Bagram frontline.
  5. The detainee retreated to Jalalabad with other Taliban fighters. They traveled through the mountains for about 20 days and eventually came to the Pakistan border where they turned in their weapons.

[edit] The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a.

The detainee stated that while in Afghanistan, he never participated in any military actions or affiliations of any type with the Taliban. He knows no one who is or has claimed to be with al Qaida, nor has anyone ever asked him to join the Taliban or al Qaida.
b.

The detainee stated that his only activities, while he was in Afghanistan, were to visit local mosques and teach the Koran.
c.

The detainee had initially provided the story that he fought with the Taliban. He did this because Pakistani authorities informed him, that if he told the truth about performing missionary work with the Jamaat Tabligh, the Saudi delegation would not help him.
d.

The detainee is willing to return to Saudi Arabia and forget about the bad times he had while confined. He would try not to have bad feelings against the United States.

[edit] Transcript

Captive 196 did not attend his first annual Board hearing.[10] He did prepare a written statement, which his Assisting Military Officer read into the record. The two page summarized transcript the Department of Defense released does not record captive 196's statement. It does not include a summary of his written statement. While other captives' written statements were attached to their transcripts the Department of Defense did not attach captive 196's written statement.

[edit] Second annual Administrative Review Board

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Musa Bin Ali Bin Said Al Amri's second annual Administrative Review Board, on 3 March 2006.[4] The memo listed factors for and against his continued detention.

[edit] The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment
  1. The detainee stated that he heard about Afghanistan from newspapers, the internet, and from his friends. The detainee said he saw papers with fatwas issued by sheikhs on bulletin boards around the city and in the mosques. The fatwas called for Saudi citizens to travel to Afghanistan and help the Taliban with money or service. Several famous sheikhs were issuing these fatwas.
  2. After two weeks in Kabul, the detainee was moved about five kilometers north to a supply center. Once at the Said Center [sic] , the detainee spent about a month and a half loading trucks and supplies. The detainee was upset about having to wait so long to get to the front and complained on numerous occasions. An Egyptian who was in charge of sending fighters to the front told the detainee that they did not need any fighters at the front at the time. After a month and a half, the detainee was issued a Kalashnikov and sent to the front lines.
  3. The detainee was positioned about two to three kilometers east of the Bagram airport. The detainee said it was a new position about 700 meters from the front lines. There were eight other individuals with the detainee at this position. While at this position, the group dug trenches and laid barbwire. The detainee said the defenses were well planned out and painstakingly prepared. The detainee was at this position for no longer than two and a half months. During the time the detainee was there he never fired his weapon and never came under attack. The detainee said mortars occasionally shelled the forces to the front of his position.
  4. The detainee received the order to retreat when the Northern Alliance had broken through the lines at another location due to air bombing. The detainee was told that the Northern Alliance had broken through and set up position behind them. The detainee retreated to the southeast and headed to Kabul.
  5. The Taliban fighters headed for Kabul from a road on the east side of the city but met up with many Taliban fighters coming from Kabul who told them the city had already fallen. Upon hearing this, the detainee headed for Jalalabad. Once they arrived in Jalalabad, the detainee stayed at a house for two days. The detainee did not know who owned the house.
  6. The detainee and other fighters then decided to try to get out of Afghanistan through Pakistan. They started out on foot, but found out there were roadblocks manned by the Northern Alliance on the road ahead. An Afghan guided them into the mountains.
  7. The detainee and other fighters traveled through the mountains for about 20 days and eventually came to the Pakistani border. They turned in their weapons at the border. The detainee thought he was going to be handed over to the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Pakistan, but instead was detained and sent to Kandahar.
b. Connections/Associations
  1. The detainee was dropped off at a Taliban house in a small village two hours outside of Kabul. The detainee waited for five to seven days then departed in a different pickup truck. He traveled to a Taliban center located on the outskirts of Kabul.
  2. The detainee's name was listed on a computer seized from members of the suspected al Qaida cell involved in the October 2002 attack on United States Marines on Faylaka Island.
  3. The detainee's name was found in a file that was recovered from a compupter associated with a senior al Qaida leader.
  4. The detainee's name was found on document listing 324 Arabic names, aliases, and nationalities recovered from raids on suspected al Qaida related safe houses.
  5. The detainee's name was found on a computer used by suspected al Qaida members. The file contains a list of 78 persons incarcerated. The information was found on a computer recovered by Allied personnel in a suspected al Qaida safe house.
  6. The detainee's name was found on a 79-page document that was printed from an internet site. The document contains information regarding the capture of Taliban and al Qaida fighters.
  7. A source recognized the detainee from the rear lines near Bagram (near an artillery section).
  8. A source identified the detainee as a Saudi who was fighting on the Bagram front line. The source spent two days with the detainee in Sohail, Afghanistand after Bagram.
c. Other Relevant Data
  1. The detainee admitted to having fought alongside the Taliban during initial screenings in Kandahar, Afghanistan; however, the detainee now claims he did not fight with any groups.
  2. A foreign government designated the detainee as a high priority individual.

[edit] The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a.

The detainee is willing to return to Saudi Arabia and forget about the bad times he had while confined. He would try not to have bad feeling [sic] against the United States.
b.

The detainee advised that if he were released he would return to Saudi Arabia and attempt to get a job. He also stated he would probably get married.
c. The detainee denied having any involvement or interaction with the Taliban.
d.

The detainee advised that he was not telling the truth initially when he provided the story about fighting with the Taliban. The detainee stated that the story he provided the Americans about his missionary work was the truth.
e.

The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001 and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

[edit] References

  1. ^ a b list of prisoners (.pdf), US Department of Defense, May 15, 2006
  2. ^ a b OARDEC (28 September 2004). Summary of Evidence for Combatant Status Review Tribunal -- Al Umari, Musa Ali Said Al Said page 8. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-12-07.
  3. ^ a b OARDEC (6 April 2005). Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Al Umari, Musa Ali Said Al Said pages 69-71. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-12-07.
  4. ^ a b OARDEC (3 March 2006). Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Al Amri, Musa Bin Ali Bin Said Al Amri pages 1-3. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-12-07.
  5. ^ list of prisoners (.pdf), US Department of Defense, April 20, 2006
  6. ^ OARDEC (July 17, 2007). Index for Combatant Status Review Board unclassified summaries of evidence. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-09-29.
  7. ^ OARDEC (August 9, 2007). Index of Transcripts and Certain Documents from ARB Round One. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-09-29.
  8. ^ OARDEC (August 9, 2007). Index to Summaries of Detention-Release Factors for ARB Round One. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-09-29.
  9. ^ OARDEC (July 17, 2007). Index of Summaries of Detention-Release Factors for ARB Round Two. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-09-29.
  10. ^ OARDEC. "Summarized Administrative Review Board Proceedings", Department of Defense, date redacted, pp. pages 195-196. Retrieved on 2007-12-07.