Talk:Munich Agreement

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"... Go home and get a nice quiet sleep." - was not said by Chamberlain on his arrival at Heston aerodrome, and this is what is implied by putting the text on the caption of the picture of him holding the agreement at Heston. He actually said it a few hours later outside of 10 Downing Street, and he was talking to the people who has been camped outside No. 10 for many hours. I don't think this text should be included as a caption for the said photograph. Mintguy (T) 10:25, 2 Aug 2004 (UTC)

Contents

[edit] great

this is only a complement, for the clarity and excelllent writing of this article.i see no other mistakes/ need for corrections.

"They severely overestimated Adolf Hitler's military ability at the time, and while Britain and France had superior forces to the Germans they felt they had fallen behind, and both were undergoing massive military rearmament to catch up."

Is this a citation? My feeling is that the german forces were not much overestimated, since 2 years later they would easily invade most of western europe. I don't see why the results would have been much different if war had been declared in 1938 instead of 39.

UnHoly 23:32, 6 Jun 2005 (UTC)

It was a clear example of betrayal,complete deception.The ends justify the means.

This is generic bad interpretation - germans army in 39 was not the same in 38. In case of war, Germany must place 2/3 of his army to Czechs borders to conquer it, and then have only few divs (mostly second line or not in full strenth), and simlpy comparing numbers - western allies have over 5 : 1 advantage in numbers of divs.
And invazion force to Paland have over 1/3 (in terms of firepower 37mm gun is much poverful to machine gun or 20mm) of all tanks have ben aqired in Czechs land, and rearmed over 10 inf divs by czechs arms. And to invazion to France - it is ironic that Czechs tanks seal fate of france - they closed encirclement of allied forces at Dunkirk (and if thisk task will be performed by Germans tanks, they will most probaly come by 2-3 day later to complete encirclemet and this delay may create chance to escpape most allied force before encirclement and outcome of fall of France may be tottaly different).

[edit] This fear influenced Stalin's decision to sign the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact with Nazi Germany in 1939.

Poor Stalin or rather ignorant author? Xx236 14:38, 5 January 2006 (UTC)

May I opt for rather ignorant author option, please? This is pretty shocking to see a complex issue like munich-->august 1939 being summarized this short. No doubt it did influence Stalin, but the word 'fear' seems to be present there solely for personal satisfaction of the author. History is a way to learn, for some people to enjoy it, but definitely not a mean to satisfy one's personal ambitions, tastes and wishes. Stalin was rather poor in a light of Western Betrayal. Please don't confuse what I mean here. I solely mean Western aggression against the USSR at the expense of central and eastern european countries. xiaoxiong

[edit] Merge proposal

The material at Western betrayal is more comprehensive than the material here. I propose that Western betrayal#Munich Conference be merged with this article; what remains at Western betrayal should be a more concise overview, focusing on comparisons with the other betrayals. It'll be a tricky move, so I hope someone else wants to do it. Anyone? Melchoir 20:23, 23 January 2006 (UTC)

I think it should stay (or some abstract), because the Munich Agreement is probably the biggest example of Western Betrayal - so it should be in the article called Western Betrayal. Szalas
Of course an abstract of the material would stay at Western Betrayal, since it's highly relevant; see Wikipedia:Summary style. But as long as we're going to have an article entitled "Munich Agreement", it should be the most detailed description of the Munich Agreement. You aren't proposing to merge Munich Agreement into Western Betrayal, are you? Melchoir 16:00, 16 February 2006 (UTC)
no, don´t merge it. If abstract will stay there - than ok.

i think thatthe idea to merge this page is crap

Would you like to explain why? Melchoir 20:48, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

I would say do not merge, as it is a seperate event in history, and should not be merge into bigger documents. What I mean is that, not move this under a bigger heading just like you should move all wars under a big header WAR. When I searched for this article, this is what I wanted to find, not a longer article where I must scan for the relevent portion.--Jack Quack 04:24, 23 March 2006 (UTC)

Look, it's only natural that our coverage on the Munich Agreement will expand and improve, whether the bulk of it is stored at Western betrayal or here at Munich Agreement. If the content is mostly kept at Western betrayal, then not only is it difficult to manage, but it decreases the readability of that article by its sheer length-- exactly the sort of concern you're voicing. On the other hand, if we carry out a merge as I suggest, then this article can later be broken into Wikipedia:Summary style, perhaps including separate pages for the Sudetenland Crisis and for the Agreement itself.
As for your WAR example, I have no idea what you're talking about... Melchoir 08:42, 23 March 2006 (UTC)

Hold on, the section to be merged disappeared while I wasn't looking... Melchoir 08:51, 23 March 2006 (UTC)

Okay, it's gone from that article, so I will reproduce it here. I urge interested editors to work the info into this article, since it currently exists nowhere:

[edit] Czechoslovakia: From Western Betrayal, 18 February 2006

See also: History of Czechoslovakia#Before WWII (1938 – 1939) and later sections

Unlike many of its neighbours, Czechoslovakia formed a stable republic after World War I and remained the only truly democratic state in Central Europe. However, territorial disputes with Germany, Poland and Hungary made the international situation of the state critical in the late thirties.

The League of Nations was seen as the main guarantor of peace. To protect against possible threats, Czechoslovakia signed numerous international treaties including military alliances with France, Yugoslavia, and Romania. Additional pacts were signed with the Soviet Union.

[edit] Munich Conference

However when the German nationalist minority, led by Konrad Henlein and vehemently backed by Hitler, demanded the cession of the Sudetenland, Bohemian, Moravian and Silesian borderlands, the German territorial claims were met with what the Czechoslovaks regarded as apparent no opposition from Czechoslovak allies. Ever since March 1938 when the Anschluss with Austria occurred, there had been increased agitation in the Sudetenland for a union with Germany. At the same time, the German media started to denounce what the Germans claimed to be savage persecution of the ethnic German minority. It is true that the treatment of the ethnic Germans was not as ideal as many Czechoslovaks liked to pretend, but many of the German stories such as reports of massacres of Sudetenlanders were clearly false. In addition, the Germans denounced the Czechoslovak alliance with Moscow, and accused Czechoslovakia of being a Soviet “aircraft carrier” in Central Europe. More ominously, German troops started to mass on the Czechoslovak border.

In the Hossbach Memorandum of November 1937, Hitler announced that the period of German rearmament was over, and the time for war had come. In the near future, Hitler planned a series of swift lighting regional wars against such states like Czechoslovakia. Hitler did not place a precise timetable for when the wars were to begin. In May 1938, municipal elections were scheduled to take place in Czechoslovakia. In the run-up to the elections, rumors started to circulate that Germany was going to attack Czechoslovakia the weekend of the elections. Just before the elections, tensions were increased by the killing of two ethnic German farmers by the Czechoslovak police.

On Friday, May 19, 1938, a routine German troop movement was mistaken for the preliminary for an invasion. The Czechoslovak President Benes announced his country was under imminent danger and began a partial mobilization of the Czechoslovak military. Both the British and French governments were taken in by the false alarm and informed Berlin that if Germany attacked Czechoslovakia, they would go to war with Germany. France had a treaty obligation to Czechoslovakia, but beyond the Covenant of the League of Nations, Britain did not. However, the British government was determined to prevent another world war, and felt it best to warn Germany against aggression. The Germans denied being on the verge of aggression that weekend, but the German foreign minister was quite happy to make threats against Prague, Paris and London. By Sunday, the crisis had passed when it was clear that no German invasion was imminent. Many abroad felt that an invasion had planned for that weekend, but that the Czechoslovak mobilization and the Anglo-French warnings had forced Adolf Hitler to back down. Hitler was furious with this perception, regarding it as a personal humiliation. After the May Crisis, Hitler ordered an invasion of Czechoslovakia to begin no later than October 1, 1938.

Hitler's plan was to use the Sudetenland issue as pretext for war. In private, Hitler cared little for the Sudetenlanders. What Hitler wanted above all was a war to use his own words that would "Smash Czechoslovakia". Hitler planned to ask for the Sudetenland to transferred to Germany under the grounds of self-determination. Hitler neither expected nor wanted this demand to be granted. Once this request had refused, Hitler would use this rejection to justify a war of aggression.

All through the summer of 1938, the level of propaganda abuse of Czechoslovakia in the German media increased dramatically. With it went every increasing German troop build-up on the Czechoslovak border. France in 1938 was suffering from a serious financial crisis. In May 1938, there been a run on the franc, and only a bail-out from the Bank of England had prevented the Franc's total collapse. Moreover, French industrial production in the military sphere was slumping owing to the ill-thought moves of the Popular Front government. In March 1938, French aircraft production was around 60 planes compared to 300 planes made the same month in Germany. If France were to fight war, something would have done to increase French industrial productivity. The government of Edouard Daladier terminated the generous contacts made with French unions by the Popular Front government and broke a major wild-cat strike in October-November 1938 that was called to protest the move.

The French Premier Edouard Daladier was prepared to fight if the Germans attacked Czechoslovakia, but knowing his country's weakness, he was determined to do whatever it took to prevent a war from breaking out in 1938. Daladier felt France needed more time to get itself ready for war with Nazi Germany that Daladier believed to be inevitable. In Daladier's view, if statement could be reached that prevented a war, then any almost price was worth paying.

The British Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain believed that it was possible to reach a settlement with Adolf Hitler that would appease Germany and so prevent another war. In December 1937, Chamberlain privately drew up his plans for a "Grand Settlement" with Germany. The "Grand Settlement" called for the return of pre-1914 German colonial empire in Africa and the Pacific, Anschluss with Austria, the cession of Sudetenland, and the return of the Memelland, Free City of Danzig, Upper Silesia and the Polish Corridor to Germany. To sweeten the offer, Chamberlain was prepared to pressure Portugal to hand part of its African empire to Germany and to offer privileged access to the economic zone created by the Ottawa Agreements of 1932. In return, Chamberlain wanted a cast-iron promise from Hitler that he would guarantee the borders of all his neighbours, especially those in Eastern and Central Europe, renounce war as a method of resolving disputes, rejoin the League of Nations, and sign a series of agreements limiting military spending in the air and on the ground along the lines of the Anglo-German Naval Agreement. Chamberlain hoped in a best case scenario this "Grand Settlement" may prevent an another war and in a worse case scenario, give Britain time to re-arm. All through the summer of 1938, the British had been attempting to serve as what they regarded as the "Honest broker" role that would preserve the peace. Chamberlain's plan was bizarre. On one hand, he warned Berlin that Britain would go to war if Germany attacked Czechoslovkia, and on the other hand, he pressured Prague to agree to handing-over the Sudetenland, which effectively left the country totally vulnerable to the inevitable German aggression. Beyond that, Chamberlain had the so-called "Plan Z", which was to fly to Germany, meet Hitler and see if an arrangement could be worked out.

On September 15, 1938, at the Nuremberg Party Congress, Hitler formally laid claim to the Sudetenland, and announced if Benes refused his demand to surrender it, he would to go to war in the very near future. To deal with the mounting crisis, Chamberlain flew to Germany twice and met with Hitler. At the first meeting, Chamberlain informed Hitler that if he agreed to put aside his deadline of October 1, 1938, then Britain and France would give their word of honour that they would pressure Benes into handing over the Sudetenland within six months. If Hitler insisted on attacking Czechoslovkia by October 1, then Chamberlain told Hitler that he would be at war with not only Czechoslovkia, but Britain and France as well. Hitler very reluctantly accepted Chamberlain's offer. Hitler was furious with Chamberlain for accepting his public demands as it deprived him of his excuse to have the war he wanted.

As soon as Chamberlain returned to London, Hitler upped the ante, and announced that the Sudetenland had to be handed over no later then October, or else war would begin. Chamberlain once again flew to Germany to meet, and once again he accepted Hitler's demand. Once again, Hitler was enraged as he was deprived of his pretext for war. Upon Chamberlain's return to the United Kingdom, Hitler again increased his demands, saying the timetable for the hand-over of the Sudetenland had to speed up. This time, Chamberlain refused Hitler's demand, and the world appeared to be on the verge of war. At the end of September, Benito Mussolini announced that Hitler was willing to meet with Chamberlain and Daladier in Munich for a last meeting to prevent a war.

In September of 1938 France and the UK decided to sacrifice the sovereignty of Czechoslovakia at the Munich Conference. On September 27, seeing Czechoslovakia in crisis as Germany prepared to invade, Poland issued an ultimatum demanding that Czechoslovakia cede its Tesin (Teschen) district. On September 29, the Munich Agreement was signed by Germany, Italy, France, and Britain. The Munich Agreement stipulated that Czechoslovakia must cede Sudeten territory to Germany. The government of Czechoslovakia was not invited to the meeting.

Though Hitler achieved what he claimed to want at the Munich Conference, in private he regarded the Conference as terrible diplomatic defeat that had "cheated" him out of the war he wanted so desperately to start against Czechoslovkia. It is not clear why Hitler accepted the offer made at the Munich Conference when all the evidence suggests that all he really wanted was a war against Czechoslovakia.

The most probable explanation is that Hitler realized Chamberlain was serious in his threats that if Germany refused his offers and went to war with Prague, then Britain would go to war with Germany. Germany had little in the way of oil, and relied almost totally upon imports to fulfill her needs. 80% of the oil used in Germany in the 1930s came from the United States, Mexico, and Venezuela. Should an Anglo-German war break out, then given the relative strengths of the Royal Navy and the Kriegsmarine, the British would almost certainly impose a blockade on Germany that would have cut her off from oil imports from the Americas. The Germans had only stockpiled enough oil for a war against Czechoslovkia. The coal gasification process that would supply Germany with much of her oil during the Second World War had been invented by 1938, but very few coal gasification plants were in existence in 1938, leaving the Germans highly dependent on imported oil. And moreover, the two major centres of oil production in Europe were the Soviet Union and Romania, both allies of Czechoslovkia. Had war broken out in October 1938, it seems likely Germany would have conquered Czechoslovkia, and then been rapidly defeated by France and Britain owing to her lack of oil. Panzers did not go far on empty tanks. The principle difference between September 1938 and September 1939 is that under the terms of the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of August 1939, the Soviets committed themselves to sign an Economic treaty to supply the Germans with oil.

The term Munich betrayal (Mnichovská zrada in Czech) is frequently used to denote the Munich Agreement. During the crisis that led to the Munich Agreement, the Soviets repeatedly offered to come to Czechoslovakia's aid if she was attacked by Germany. However, since the Soviet-Czechoslovak alliance only came into effect if the Franco-Czechoslovak alliance came into effect first, and France wanted to avoid war almost at any cost, there was little chance of Franco-Czechoslovak alliance being activated. As the crisis deepened over the summer and fall of 1938, the Soviets proclaimed that they would come to Czechoslovakia's defence even if France did not. There has been considerable debate amongst historians over how serious Stalin was in making these offers. The analysis done by the American historian Igor Lukes in his essay "Stalin and Czechoslovakia in 1938-39: An Autopsy of a Myth" from the book The Munich crisis, 1938 suggests that Stalin was not serious. But regardless of whether these were sincere offers of help or just mere posturing, the Soviet offers made a considerable impression on the Czechoslovak people and much of the pro-Soviet and anti-French feelings of the 1940s can be traced to 1938.

In early November 1938, under the Vienna Award, which was a result of the Munich agreement, Czechoslovakia (and later Slovakia) was forced by Germany and Italy to cede southern Slovakia (1/3 of Slovak territory) to Hungary, and Poland obtained small territorial cessions shortly thereafter. In late November 1938, the truncated state, renamed Czecho-Slovakia [the so-called Second Republic], was reconstituted in three autonomous units - Czechia (i.e. Bohemia and Moravia), Slovakia, and Ruthenia. On 14 March 1939, Slovakia gained nominal independence as a satellite state under Jozef Tiso. One day later, Hitler forced the president of Czecho-Slovakia, Emil Hácha, to surrender remaining Czechia to German control and made it into the German protectorate "Bohemia and Moravia". On the same day (March 15), the Carpatho-Ukraine (Subcarpathian Ruthenia) declared its independence and was immediately invaded and annexed by Hungary. Finally, on March 23 Hungary invaded and occupied from the Carpatho-Ukraine some further parts of Slovakia (eastern Slovakia).

[edit] Second World War Ally

During the Second World War, former president Edvard Beneš and other Czechoslovak exiles in London organized a Czechoslovak government-in-exile and negotiated to obtain international recognition for the government and a renunciation of the Munich Agreement and its consequences. In the summer of 1941, the Allies recognized the exiled government. Czechoslovak military units fought alongside the Allied forces.

On 8th May 1944, Beneš signed an agreement with Soviet leaders stipulating that Czechoslovak territory liberated by Soviet armies would be placed under Czechoslovak civilian control. During the war, it was understood in the western capitals that a restored Czechoslovakia would be democratic, but within the Soviet sphere of influence. In the light of the fact that Beneš felt precisely the same way, it is hard to argue that this was a "betrayal" by the West. Beneš, who always had been something of a "Fellow traveller," felt deeply betrayed by the Munich Agreement, and came to the conclusion that the West could never be relied upon to defend Czechoslovakia. Instead, Beneš decided that the Soviets were Czechoslovakia's only true friends. Beneš believed that a democratic but pro-Soviet Czechoslovakia would be a bridge between the Soviet and Western worlds.

The so-called Third Republic came into being in April 1945 and at first included representatives from the Beneš government-in exile. The Third Republic was proclaimed at Košice and comprised a National Front (also known as the People's Front) that comprised representatives of every "non-collaborating" Czech and Slovak political party. Most of Czechoslovakia had been "liberated" by the Red Army and in May 1945, the Red Army was received rapturously in Prague. The fact that Soviets were perceived as being Czechoslovakia's only friends during the dark days of 1938, the leading role played in the resistance by the Czechoslovak Communist Party (which usually won about 10% of the vote before 1938), and the role of the Red Army in "liberating" Czechoslovakia did much to increase the prestige of Communism to the Czechoslovak people. There was much pro-Communist feeling that in December 1945, the Red Army was pulled out. Stalin felt the Red Army's presence was not necessary to secure a pro-Soviet orientation in Czechoslovakia.

In the May 1946 elections, which were completely free and fair, the Communists won a sweeping triumph with 38% of the vote. The Communist leader, Klement Gottwald became the Premier of a coalition government. Even when a Communist did not occupy a portfolio, there was always a Communist as deputy minister. The Soviet-backed communist parties grew in power and in 1947 the communist-controlled Ministry of Interior deployed police regiments to sensitive areas and equipped a workers' militia. On 25 February, Beneš, perhaps fearing Soviet intervention, capitulated. He accepted the resignations of the dissident ministers and received a new cabinet list, thus completing the communist takeover. In February 1948, when the Communists definitively took power in what was known as the "Victorious February", Czechoslovakia was declared a "people's democracy".


[edit] End of the agreement

The agreement was withdrawn after Czechoslovakian soldiers assassinated one of the most powerful nazis, Reinhard Heydrich, 1942 in Prague during the Operation Anthropoid. This secton doesnt seem to fit in with the rest of the article (or make much sense) Surely the agreement was effectively dead after the Nazi invasion of the non-Sudeten regions of Czechoslovakia ?

[edit] References

  • David Dutton Neville Chamberlain, London : Arnold ; New York : Oxford University Press, 2001.
  • Robert Kee Munich : the eleventh hour , London : Hamilton, 1988.
  • Igor Lukes & Erik Goldstein (editors) The Munich crisis, 1938 : prelude to World War II, London ; Portland, OR : Frank Cass Inc, 1999.
  • Gerhard Weinberg A world at arms : a global history of World War II , Cambridge, United Kingdom ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 1994.
  • John Wheeler-Bennett Munich : Prologue to Tragedy, New York : Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1948.
  • Paul E. Zinner "Czechoslovakia: The Diplomacy of Eduard Benes" pages 100-122 from The Diplomats 1919-1939 edited by Gordon A. Craig & Felix Gilbert, Princeton University Press: Princeton, New Jersey, United States of America, 1953.

Melchoir 09:16, 23 March 2006 (UTC)


Some of this is certainly relevant.
Something about the consequences of the Munich Agreement would be good - citing analysis by notable historians, plus relevant facts. E.g. as I understand it, from my basic study of history:
  • Czechoslovakia was much harder to defend, without the Sudetenland.
  • After the subsequent takeover of Czechoslovakia, Hitler gained prestige among his military officers, many of whom would have preferred a moderate line. Munich increased the sense that Hitler's bold approach could succeed, and other nations would not be a threat;
  • Mussolini was wavering, unsure of whether to support Hitler or Britain and its allies, until the Munich conference.
  • Nazi Germany gained advantages from Czechoslovakia in WWII - strategically, having more land, taken the Czech defences, and having the military-industrial capability of Czechoslovakia (esp the Sudetenland).
Of course these points would need to be checked and verified; where they are only opinions (e.g. of notable historians) they should be cited as such. --Singkong2005 16:13, 25 April 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Hungary

Hungary isn't mentioned at all. Czechoslovakia says that Hungary obtained "southern Slovakia (one third of Slovak territory)", i.e. much more than mentioned Poland. Xx236 10:18, 17 May 2006 (UTC)

Oh, yes. Poland take important part of Slovakia too, not only Tesin area. And not mentioned overtake of Carpatia-Rhutenia by Hungary in 39.

[edit] This fear influenced Stalin's decision to sign the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact with Nazi Germany in 1939.

It's a method of whitewashing Soviet imperialism rather than professional historical opinion. Nazi Germany weren't able to invide the SU, because there was no common border. Hitler wasn't able to invide the SU in October 1939, because germany was too weak. Hitler wasn't able to invide the SU in 1940 because of France. Stalin was too competent to ignore those facts. Xx236 11:50, 19 May 2006 (UTC)

MR pact have secret appendix - partion of Poland to Germany and SU - and in this light, non-agresion pact between G a SU make sense. Anf if MR pact show imperialism - then for booth - G and SU. And non-agression pact is not only "Im to weak to invade this day this country" but "Im want to be sure this borders are safe from invazion" too. Czert.
Well, let's not whitewash imperialism, shall we? Yes, it is mentioned that Poland took part in partition of Czechoslovakia. It is known that Poland had a non-agression pact with Germany. Molotov is not there yet, while the poor victimized poles hastily grab what they can from neighbouring countries. So let's not whitewash polish imperialism. We should have a phrase in the opening paragraph that ultimately Munich agreement led to the partition of Czechoslovakia between Germany, Poland and Hungary, with Slovakia being made into a puppet-state. Ko Soi.

The statements like "It's a method of whitewashing Soviet imperialism" are not neutral, and therefore should not be used here.--Victor V V (talk) 03:30, 27 April 2008 (UTC)

[edit] Wasn't this a pact?

Why is this called an "agreement" and why is Molotov-Ribbentrop called a "pact"? Are the uses of these terms leftovers from allied propaganda efforts? Geir Gundersen 13:13, 31 May 2006 (UTC)

Do you know what a pact is? 129.171.233.24 14:05, 29 January 2007 (UTC)

[edit] 1938 assasination of Hitler

In some books and pages I find interesing information - In 1938 before Munich Brits aqured information of planed assanition of Hitler in case of war by German generals, but not give this infarmation to Czechs, and simply dissmis this as provokation (or nonsens). Can be this added ? Czert.


[edit] Requesting to add a new link

I would like to enter a link to a historical article that talks about how the desire to achieve peace at all cost consequently led to war. http://www.omedia.org/Show_Article.asp?DynamicContentID=1815&MenuID=719&ThreadID=1014008

Omedia is an academic and not a commercial site – it sells nothing and doesn't even have ads in it.

is this link fit to enter the related links list ?

yuval

[edit] "citations needed"

Because Hitler soon violated the terms of the agreement, it has often been cited in support of the principle that tyrants should never be appeased.

I see that someone has marked this statement as needing a cite. I'm not sure if a citation would make this statement, which reads like an opinion, any more appropriate. It seems more like an opinion, one which I happen to agree with, but unencyclopedic, nonetheless.

Opinions? --Superluser 23:06, 26 October 2006 (UTC)

[edit] David Irving

This article uses David Irving, a convicted Holocaust denier and neo-Nazi associate, as one of its sources for the text:

“ After Hitler personally inspected the Czech fortifications, he privately admitted to Joseph Goebbels that ‘We would have shed a lot of blood,’ and said that it was fortunate things turned out the way that they did. ”

Frankly, that's ridiculous. Irving has been well and truly disgraced as an historian, so I'd like to think we can find a better - that is to say, reputable - source for that statement. Irving's questionable use of sources and pre-disposition towards painting Hitler in a positive light (as is done in this statement) really makes me worry about the wisdom of citing him, I'm removing that citation. Daveydweeb (chat/patch) 11:29, 1 November 2006 (UTC)

And I will support the above with this quote, from the libel suit which Irving filed against Deborah Lipstadt:
“ Not one of [Irving's] books, speeches or articles, not one paragraph, not one sentence in any of them, can be taken on trust as an accurate representation of its historical subject. All of them are completely worthless as history, because Irving cannot be trusted anywhere, in any of them, to give a reliable account of what he is talking or writing about. ... if we mean by historian someone who is concerned to discover the truth about the past, and to give as accurate a representation of it as possible, then Irving is not a historian. ”
 
--Daveydweeb (chat/patch) 11:42, 1 November 2006 (UTC)

I agree. David Irving should not be used as a source.--Johnbull 04:11, 10 June 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Removed line from introduction

I removed the following line from the introduction:

Others, however, believe that starting World War II over the German-majority Sudetenland would have been foolhardy, akin to starting World War I over competing claims to part of Serbia.[citations needed]

After re-reading it several times, I think I see what is meant here, but it's rather poorly phrased. The phrase also suffers from the "weasel-words" problem. Tullie 23:26, 16 December 2006 (UTC)

There was a contemporary quote from someone (I can't remember if they were British or French) of "why should we care if three million Germans want to be in Germany" which sums up the issue. Certainly it would be difficult to sell the war as morally justifiable at a time when public and political opinion in both countries was sceptical (look at the Iraq invasion for an idea of how difficult it would be to take either country into total war united behind the war effort). Timrollpickering 01:32, 17 December 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Neilson's Book?

re: "The discontent of the ethnic Germans, and the response of the German Chancellor at the time, came from the abuse the ethnic Germans suffered at the hands of the Czechs. These two documents are cites in Neilson's book, The Makers of War."

What documents are these exactly and where are the further bibliographical details for this book, including the full author name and title? (obviously too, "cites" should be "cited", but the typographical problem is less important than the substantive and bibliographical problem.)

2006.06.22


[edit] Munich dictate, not "agreement"

The denotation of this article is incorrect. The right denotation is Munich dictate in disregard of article´s content. It was cowardly treason of France and Britain to Czechoslovakia. "Agreement" - this is embarrassing eufemism of an absurd act, made under Hitler´s pressure WITHOUT PARTICIPATION of Czechoslovakia and its conditions were DICTATED - so, what an "agreement" ! This denotation is only demonstration of inability of "big powers" to confess their guilt. --Jan Blanicky 21:06, 23 June 2007 (UTC)

I am afraid it's not as simple. The most common Czech point of view is probably dictate but let me ask, who forced Edvard Beneš to resign? was the pre-war Czech policy really fair towards the German citizens? --a.c. 21:30, 23 June 2007 (UTC)

Beneš´s political and strategical mistakes are another case. Czech policy towards German citizens was very correct. Nazi regime through Henlein´s SPD "freie korps" made provacations (murdered Czech officials, terrorized and lynched Czech people - no word about it in your article) in Czech borderland (not "Sudetenland - it has been never exist - this another incorrect denotation in your article - it was only political teleologic denotation. This region has never been described, it has never been official not even unofficial geographic territory, it was all history constituent of Czech state) with minimal Czech response. I am surprised , your diction is similar to Nazi propaganda of "Czech terror" in those times. Czech soldiers and police not to be allowed to intervene. It was Beneš´s first mistake ! Of course, "the truth is on the side of stronger", this is "big power" truth. And after WWII second betrayal of western "friends" - Czechoslovakia was thrown in Jalta into Stalin´s mouth.--Jan Blanicky 22:13, 23 June 2007 (UTC)

First of all, it's not my article. Talking about very correct Czech policy towards German citizens, why president Masaryk never visited Stavovské divadlo after 1920? I hope that you did not mean to say that I am advocating Nazi's policy here. --a.c. 07:53, 24 June 2007 (UTC)

Its true that for us is more common to call this a Dictate and I have to agree. As far as I know from our history books representatives of French and Britain just sit there, listen and did nothing, just signed the paper and nothing else (please note that this can be true as well as lie). This so called agreement ordered(!!!!) us to give up our border regions, part of our homeland, or face full-scale attack if we don't obey. French and Britain sacrificed us, small state of little world importace but great strategic importance, to Nazi Germany for their own safety and the most importantly we were not allowed to be there and say something to oppose it (that's why we also sometimes call it "Agreement about us without us"). Thanks to it we've lost our first line of defense and were almost wide open for invasion, almost because second line consisted with stronger and better equipped bunkers with AT guns and machineguns. Nazis and also Soviets tryed to destroy many of them, my Grandfather was present on one of these demolition. Tank guns had no use, walls were and still are too thick to punch trough them (thinking tank guns and weaker weapons only), so they tryed explosives. Quess what happened. Bunker just jumped up a bit and landed back. So they stuff it with explosives and drilled holes in the walls (explosives put inside the holes), boom, bunker is gone. This was the way to destroy it, but too expansive to destroy all of them, you can still see many of them here some are even over 80 years old. Nice display of czech ingeneering and construction capabilities. Nevertheless, if we tryed to defended our selfs it would not be for long without help, defence grid was not completed. If Poland and other neighbouring countries attacked us too, we would be under siege from all directions. But we could still put a hell of a fight and teach Jerry a lesson, we had have better tanks than Nazis in that times, good equiped and trained infantry, but this way we would lose more than we did in WWII. And its true when Hitler made a tour of what he get so easily and saw our defences, he admited that if we fight for our lands with guns in hands he'll pay great tax in blood and armor and be unable to lead his planed war. But we have become a protectorate, if we did not submit rest of our land to Hitler then early Luftwaffe was ready to turn Prag and other cities into smoking pile of ruins, we did not have enough AA defenceses and aircrafts, thouse were too old, to protect all cities. Guess why he wanted our lands. We had here heavy industry that was among the best in the world in that times. Rich natural resources of iron, coal etc. Perfect combination to lead a war. A little suprise for you, Tigers and AA/AT Flak 88 guns, one of best german ground weapons, are our products. I wouldn't be suprised if other tanks like Panther, Panzer IV, etc. were our designs too. Tiger was slightly modifided version of our heavy tank planed to undergo prototype construction and testing as I found out. Thanks to it he gained a perfect place to build up and muster his warmachine ready to be released on unsuspecting Europe. Britain payed for it extremely, cities bombed and many people dead. But if I take it from bright side, we owe them a bit. Thanks to this our country was not turned into wasteland, some cities were destroyed, yes, but most of historical buildings were intact or lightly damaged. And I also think that Germany still owes us something for Lidice and Ležáky, really I think only because I'm not familiar with all after-war reparations. If there was not that stupid line, cutting Europe in half, going trough Prag but Bratislava instead, putting Czech, Poland, Austria and entire Germany to free zone, think where could we be now. Or better if there was no such thing and after war all countries were free, no cold war and no iron curtain. If I was the president now I'll demand the return of all tresures stolen from our country during all wars, and we'll return all stolen things we have. As for Jalta. I saw some documentaric movie, and there was that Beneš disgusted by formal allies treachery (French and Britain) signed some pact or agreement with Soviets. Maybe he thought: "Old friends betrayed us, lets try these guys. They fought againts Nazi too.". But who knows what thoughts were going trough his mind. Tomáš czech 19:08, 26 May 2008 (UTC)

[edit] Partition by Germany, Hungary and Poland

Could we have some numbers / maps / citations to see if such a statement is justified? Of course, all three states increased their territory at the cost of Czechoslovakia, but I was under the impression that a lion share of the territory went to Germany, and Poland and Hungary received but mere scraps in comparison? Is it neutral to put them together in one sentence in this context as "three equal partitioners"? PS. I found a map at de:Bild:Münchner abkommen4.png but it needs translation (and uploading to Commons).-- Piotr Konieczny aka Prokonsul Piotrus | talk  19:01, 6 August 2007 (UTC)

The other lion share actually went to Slovakia which received the second largest portion after Tiso declared independence. For the purposes of the article Tiso's Slovakia is considered still being part of CZ or what is the deal here? why is it not mentioned with the other states? Hobartimus 19:34, 30 November 2007 (UTC)
What do you mean by your words "for the purposes of this article"? Of course Slovakia was still part of Czechoslovakia by the time of the Munich Agreement and First Vienna Award. It became independent in March 1939. Tankred 19:45, 30 November 2007 (UTC)
I mean this sentence in the lead of the article "The purpose of the conference was to discuss the future of Czechoslovakia in the face of territorial demands made by German dictator Adolf Hitler, and it ended up dividing that state between Nazi Germany, Poland and Hungary." 'Dividing that state' and talking about partition makes it clear that the sentence is talking about events beyond the two you mentioned. It also talks about the events of march 1939, the German army entering Prague after Slovak declartion, where it is possible to talk about partitioning or "dividing up" until that time CZ was very much alive and well only weakened. Hobartimus 20:11, 30 November 2007 (UTC)
This is clearly a matter of interpretation. I understood that sentence as referring to the Munich Agreement and the immediately subsequent First Vienna Award, not the events that took place in March 1939. By the way, I somehow cannot recall any historian arguing that Czechoslovakia after the Munich Agreement was not effectively dismembered, but "very much alive and well only weakened". Tankred 23:03, 30 November 2007 (UTC)
I did my best translating the map I linked above. See Image:Partition of Czechoslovakia (1938).png-- Piotr Konieczny aka Prokonsul Piotrus | talk 20:21, 30 November 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Map

This article lacks a map! Albmont (talk) 18:29, 28 November 2007 (UTC)

Yes - see my post just above.-- Piotr Konieczny aka Prokonsul Piotrus | talk 19:02, 30 November 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Wrong Date?

This website states that the Munich Agreement was reached on September 29, 1938 not September 30, 1938. http://web.jjay.cuny.edu/~jobrien/reference/ob66.html

and this one

http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/document/munich1.htm

[edit] WOODROW WILSON

clarely demands he has done right? —Preceding unsigned comment added by 203.89.173.124 (talk) 22:50, 6 May 2008 (UTC)

[edit] Summary

I think the article would be greatly improved by adding a brief summary to the first section. Something along the lines of 'The Munich Agreement was a deal brokered by Chamberlain to Hitler in 1938. Hitler accepted that, exchange for (part of?) Czechoslovakia, he would agree not to incite war with other European countries'. It's not clear until deep into the 2nd and 3rd sections exactly what Hitler was offering.

However, I'm almost certainly misunderstanding the article in toto. Someone less historically dense than me could condense the article as best they can.81.105.60.196 (talk) 00:38, 18 May 2008 (UTC)