Muhammad Surur Dakhilallah Al Utaybi

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Muhammad Surur Dakhilallah Al Utaybi is a citizen of Saudi Arabia, held in extrajudicial detention in the United States Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, in Cuba.^[1] His detainee ID number is 096. The Department of Defense estimates that Al Utaybi was born in 1983 in Qaisuma, Saudi Arabia.

Main article: minors detained in the global war on terror

[edit] Combatant Status Review Tribunal

Combatant Status Review Tribunals were held in a trailer the size of a large RV. The captive sat on a plastic garden chair, with his hands and feet shackled to a bolt in the floor.^[2][3] Three chairs were reserved for members of the press, but only 37 of the 574 Tribunals were observed.^[4]

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Initially the Bush administration asserted that they could withhold all the protections of the Geneva Conventions to captives from the war on terror. This policy was challenged before the Judicial branch. Critics argued that the USA could not evade its obligation to conduct competent tribunals to determine whether captives are, or are not, entitled to the protections of prisoner of war status.

Subsequently the Department of Defense instituted the Combatant Status Review Tribunals. The Tribunals, however, were not authorized to determine whether the captives were lawful combatants -- rather they were merely empowered to make a recommendation as to whether the captive had previously been correctly determined to match the Bush administration's definition of an enemy combatant.

[edit] Summary of Evidence memo

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Muhammad Surur Dakhilallah Al Utaybi's Combatant Status Review Tribunal, on 14 September 2004.^[5] The memo listed the following allegations against him:

a. The detainee is associated with al Qaida:

1. The detainee is associated with Lashkar-a-Tayyiba and/or Jaish-e-Mohammed.
2. Both Lashkar-a-Tayyiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed are know (sic) terrorist organizations that are based in Pakistan and have well-established ties to al Qaida.
3. During the summer of 2000, the detainee traveled from Saudi Arabia to Lahore, Pakistan, to attend the al Aqua military training camp so he could learn to fight against the Northern Alliance.
4. While at the al Aqua military training camp, the detainee received training in the use of the Kalashnikov rifle.
5. The detainee traveled from Saudi Arabia to Afghanistan during June 2001 to fight against the Northern Alliance.
6. The detainee surrendered to the Northern Alliance at Mazar-E-Sharif ^[sic] in late 2001.

b. The detainee participated in military operations against the United States or its coalition partners.

1. The detainee possessed a Kalashnikov rifle and was present on the front lines where he fought against coalition forces.
2. The detainee participated in the Mazir-E-Sharif prison riot.

[edit] Transcript

Muhammad Surur Dakhilallah Al Utaybi chose to participate in his Tribunal.^[6]

[edit] Testimony

Al Utaybi said he had never heard of Jaish-e-Mohammed (the Army of Mohammed) until he arrive in Camp Delta. He acknowledged training with Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, prior to the attacks of September 11, 2001. He said he didn’t know it was a terrorist organization. He said, when he went for training he knew nothing about Afghanistan or the Taliban, and he had no intention to fight against the Northern Alliance.

Al Utaybi repeated that he did not go to Afghanistan to fight. Another reason for his trip was that his family hoped he could locate and bring back one of his relatives who had previously traveled to Afghanistan.

He was present during the Mazar-e-Sharif riot, which he described as chaotic. He found a safe corner to hide in until the riot was over.

He did, eventually, find his relative, in Konduz. His relative was reluctant to leave. He was separated from his relative, who he heard died, prior to his imprisonment in Mazar-e-Sharif.

[edit] witness

Al Utaybi called Yusuf Rubeish as a witness that his quest for his relative was the purpose of his trip.

Al Rabiesh testified that he met Al Utaybi as they fled the American bombing. He testified that he never saw Al Utaybi carry a weapon, or engage in hostilities. He confirmed Al Utaybi's story that he had gone to search for a relative.

[edit] Administrative Review Board hearings

Hearing room where Guantanamo captive's annual Administrative Review Board hearings convened for captives whose Combatant Status Review Tribunal had already determined they were an "enemy combatant".^[7]

Detainees who were determined to have been properly classified as "enemy combatants" were scheduled to have their dossier reviewed at annual Administrative Review Board hearings. The Administrative Review Boards weren't authorized to review whether a detainee qualified for POW status, and they weren't authorized to review whether a detainee should have been classified as an "enemy combatant".

They were authorized to consider whether a detainee should continue to be detained by the United States, because they continued to pose a threat -- or whether they could safely be repatriated to the custody of their home country, or whether they could be set free.

[edit] First annual Administrative Review Board

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Muhammad Surur Dakhilallah Al Utaybi's first annual Administrative Review Board, on 16 August 2005.^[8] The memo listed factors for and against his continued detention.

[edit] The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. During the summer of 2000, the detainee decided to travel to Kashmir for military training at the Al Aqsa training camp.
2. The detainee traveled to Pakistan to obtain training that would allow him to fight in the jihad in Afghanistan.
3. The detainee spent approximately three months in Afghanistan, fighting the Northern Alliance, and then returned home to Saudi Arabia.
4. During summer 2001, the detainee decided to travel back to Afghanistan to fight against the Northern Alliance for a second time. The detainee stayed at the Zubair safe house in Kabul and then traveled to the front lines.
5. The detainee was part of an all-Arab unit fighting in north Afghanistan.
6. The detainee stated that he was a guard for his unit.
7. The detainee was identified as being on the back lines at Takhar.

b. Training

1. The detainee spent approximately two months at the Al Aqsa camp in Lahore, Pakistan.
2. The Lashkur Ataiba ^[sic] orgranization ran the Al Aqsa training camp, which included training on the Kalashnikov rifle, Dokteriov rifle, PK machine gun, PPG, and hand grenades. After the training was completed, some of the trainees went to Kashmire to fight in the jihad, while others went to Afghanistan to fight with Taliban or al Qaida forces.
3. The Laskkar-e-Tayyiba ^[sic] is the armed wring of the Pakistan-based religious organization, Markaz-ud-Dawa-wal-irshad (MOI), a Sunni missionary organization with anti-U.S. sentiment, formed in 1989. The Secretary of State has designated LT as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. LIT is one of the three largest and best-trained groups fighting in Kashmire against India.
4. The detainee was trained at a camp known as Um Al Qura by a group he knew as Lashkur ^[sic] , which he claimed was the same as Jaish-e-Mohammed. Training consisted of small arms training.
5. The Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM) is an extremist group in Pakistan. The Secretary of State designated JEM as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. Members conduct terrorist activities primarily in Kashmire. The JEM has close ties to Afghan Arabs and the Talibanl Usama bin Laden is suspected of giving funds to the JEM.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee was identified as being associated with Abu Turab Al Nejdi.
2. Abu Turab was a Saudi Arabian in charge of a specific section of the front lines at Khojaghar City. All of the Arabs there were under Abu Turab's command.
3. The detainee related that, after his training with the Lashkar-e-Taiba ^[sic] at the Al Aqsa camp in the summer of 2000, he did not go directly back to Saudi Arabi. The detainee spent about 4 more months with the Jamil-e-Tabliq ^[sic] before returning to Saudi Arabia.
4. Tablighi Jamaat ^[sic] , aka Jamat-E-Tabligh ^[sic] , has been supporting Islamic terrorist groups in South and Southeast Asia under to the cover of conducting religious activities. The group is closely aligned with other Pakistani terrorist organizations and the al Qaida network.

d. Other Relevant Data

The detainee surrendered with seven other people at Mazar-e-Sharif ^[sic] and was taken to the Jinki Fortress. Five of the seven died during an incident at the fortress, but the detainee was not injured.

[edit] The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a.	The detainee denied having had any prior knowledge of the attacks on September 11th, 2001 or having any knowledge of future attacks on the U.S. or U.S. interests.
b.	The detainee stated that his purpose in going to the training camp was so that he could be a "missionary" and preach to his fellow brothers at the camp.
c.	The detainee was asked if he would fight the Americans if he were released and he said that he did not think so. He said that he wants to go home and continue his education.
d.	The detainee was identified by a foreign delegation as someone whom they believed to be of low intelligence or law enforcement value to the United States and unlikely to pose a terrorist threat to the United States or its interests.

[edit] Second annual Administrative Review Board

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Mohammed Ataby's second annual Administrative Review Board, on 19 April 2006.^[9] The memo listed factors for and against his continued detention.

[edit] The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. In 2000 the detainee met a Pakistani man at a furniture store in his neighborhood. The Pakistani talked to the detainee about training in Pakistan and Kashmir.
2. During the summer of 2000 the detainee decided to travel to Kashmir for military training at the al Aqsa training camp in Lahore, Pakistan.
3. When the detainee arrived in Lahore, Pakistan he called the number on a business card that the Pakistani had given to him and spoke to a representative of the Lashkar-e-Tayyiba ^[sic] organization. The representative transported the detainee from the airport to the Lashkar-e-Tayyiba office. The detainee stayed at the office that day and was transported the next day to the al Aqsa camp.
4. Lashkar-e-Tayyiba is the armed wing of a Pakistan-based anti-United States missionary organization. It is one of the three largest and best-trained groups fighting in Kashmire against India. It is listed by the United States Treasury Department as an organization which is believed to support terrorist groups.
5. After his training at al Aqsa camp, the detainee traveled from Lahore, Pakistan to Quetta, Pakistan and then to Kandahar, Afghanistan. The detainee spent approximately three months in Afghanistan fighting the Northern Alliance and then returned home to Saudi Arabia.
6. In June 2001 the detainee returned to Afghanistan to fight against the Northern Alliance again.
7. The detainee stated that he financed his trip through money he saved during his time spent in school. The school gives its students an allowance while they are enrolled there.
8. The detainee traveled from Riyadh, Saudi Arabia to Dubai, United Arab Emirates and then to Karachi, Pakistan. He stayed in Karachi for one day, then traveled to Quetta, Pakistan. The detainee spent one day in Quetta then traveled to Kandahar, Afghanistan. He spent one day in Kandahar then travled to Kabul, Afghanistan where he stayed for two weeks. During his travles, the detainee stated he did not stay at any mosques, only hotels, and he traveled alone.
9. The detainee traveled from Kabul to northern Afghanistan, stayed at a safe house for a few hours, and then traveled by taxi to the front lines to fight the Noarthern Alliance.
10. The detainee received a Kalashnikov rifle and went to the front lines. He stated that he was a guard for his unit.

b. Training

The detainee spent approximately two months at al Aqsa training camp and was trained on the operation fo the Kalashnikov.

c. Connections/Associations

The detainee stated that his cousin was Abu Turab Najdi Ribal, who was in charge of some men in Afghanistan. The detainee stated that Abu Turab was killed in action.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee stated that while at the front in northern Afghanistan, the 11 September 2001 attacks occurred. He heard of the attacks by radio. The detainee became scared because it is forbidden to kill women, children, and innocent people. Many people with him felt the same way. He wanted to leave the front line and return home, but could not get out of Afghanistan because everything was closed down and bombs were being dropped everywhere. Before Ramadan, an Arab leader told everybody to leave. The detainee later surrendered at Mazar-e-sharif ^[sic] .

[edit] The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a.	Prior to his surrender, the detainee had no prior arrests. He denied having had any prior knowledge of the attacks on 11 September 2001 or having any knowledge of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.
b.	The detainee denied having ever met or seen Usama bin Laden during any of his travels to and through Afghanistan, and further stated that he was not part of al Qaida or the Taliban.
c.	The detainee denied any allegiance to the Taliban and further stressed that he was never armed during any period of his time spent in Afghanistan. He further denied any known familial associations to al Qaida. The detainee stated that based upon what he has learned of al Qaida since his capture, he would never support Usama bin Laden or al Qaida's objectives.
d.	The detainee stated that is released, he wants to go home. He stated he was interested in continuing his studies and finishing his degree. The detainee also stated he wanted to marry and start a family.
e.	When asked if he would join forces with others and fight Americans if he were released, the detainee stated he did not think so; he wants to live a normal life.

[edit] Board recommendations

In early September 2007 the Department of Defense released two heavily redacted memos, from his Board, to Gordon England, the Designated Civilian Official.^[10][11]

[edit] Transfer to Saudi Arabia

On June 25, 2006 14 men were transferred from Guantanamo to Saudi Arabia.^[12][13] A Saudi identified as Mohammad Soror Dakheelullah al-Otaibi was identified as one of the released men.

[edit] References

1. ^ list of prisoners (.pdf), US Department of Defense, April 20, 2006
2. ^ Guantánamo Prisoners Getting Their Day, but Hardly in Court, New York Times, November 11, 2004 - mirror
3. ^ Inside the Guantánamo Bay hearings: Barbarian "Justice" dispensed by KGB-style "military tribunals", Financial Times, December 11, 2004
4. ^ Annual Administrative Review Boards for Enemy Combatants Held at Guantanamo Attributable to Senior Defense Officials. United States Department of Defense (March 6, 2007). Retrieved on 2007-09-22.
5. ^ OARDEC (14 September 2004). Summary of Evidence for Combatant Status Review Tribunal -- Al Utaybi, Muhammad Surur Dakhilallah pages 16-17. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-11-06.
6. ^ Summarized transcripts (.pdf), from Muhammad Surur Dakhilallah Al Utaybi'sCombatant Status Review Tribunal - pages 1-16
7. ^ (Spc Timothy Book. "Review process unprecedented", JTF-GTMO Public Affairs Office, Friday March 10, 2006, pp. pg 1. Retrieved on 2007-10-10. 
8. ^ OARDEC (16 August 2005). Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Al Utaybi, Muhammad Surur Dakhilallah pages 32-34. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-11-20.
9. ^ OARDEC (19 April 2006). [? Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Ataby, Mohammed]. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-11-06.
10. ^ OARDEC (June 5, 2006). Administrative Review Board assessment and recommendation ICO ISN 96. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-11-06.
11. ^ OARDEC (24 May 2006). Classified Record of Proceedings and basis of Administrative Review Board recommendation for ISN 96 pages 74-84. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-11-06.
12. ^ Thirteen Saudis and a Turkistani return to Saudi from Guantanamo, Middle East News, June 25, 2006
13. ^ Anant Raut, Jill M. Friedman (March 19, 2007). The Saudi Repatriates Report. Retrieved on April 21, 2007.