Muhammad Abd Al Rahman Al Kurash

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Muhammad Abd Al Rahman Al Kurash
Born: 1977 (age 30–31)
Ta'if, Saudi Arabia
Detained at: Guantanamo
ID number: 214
Conviction(s): no charge, held in extrajudicial detention
Status repatriated

Muhammad Abd Al Rahman Al Kurash is a citizen of Saudi Arabia who was held in extrajudicial detention in the United States Guantanamo Bay detention camps, in Cuba.[1] His Guantanamo Internee Security Number is 214. American intelligence analysts estimate he was born in 1977, in Ta'if, Saudi Arabia.

Contents

[edit] Combatant Status Review Tribunal

Combatant Status Review Tribunal notice read to a Guantanamo captive. During the period July 2004 through March 2005 a Combatant Status Review Tribunal was convened to make a determination whether they had been correctly classified as an "enemy combatant". Participation was optional. The Department of Defense reports that 317 of the 558 captives who remained in Guantanamo, in military custody, attended their Tribunals.
Combatant Status Review Tribunal notice read to a Guantanamo captive. During the period July 2004 through March 2005 a Combatant Status Review Tribunal was convened to make a determination whether they had been correctly classified as an "enemy combatant". Participation was optional. The Department of Defense reports that 317 of the 558 captives who remained in Guantanamo, in military custody, attended their Tribunals.

Initially the Bush administration asserted that they could withhold all the protections of the Geneva Conventions to captives from the war on terror. This policy was challenged before the Judicial branch. Critics argued that the USA could not evade its obligation to conduct a competent tribunals to determine whether captives are, or are not, entitled to the protections of prisoner of war status.

Subsequently the Department of Defense instituted the Combatant Status Review Tribunals. The Tribunals, however, were not authorized to determine whether the captives were lawful combatants -- rather they were merely empowered to make a recommendation as to whether the captive had previously been correctly determined to match the Bush administration's definition of an enemy combatant.

[edit] Summary of Evidence memo

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Muhammad Abd Al Rahman Al Kurash's Combatant Status Review Tribunal, on 1 October 2004.[2] The memo listed the following allegations against him:

a. The detainee is a member of the Taliban:
  1. The detainee traveled from Taif, Saudi Arabia to fight with the Taliban in the Jihad, after his high school graduation in May 2001.
  2. The detainee trained at the Moasqr Kari Bilal Camp in Afghanistan where he received weapons training.
  3. At this camp, the detainee learned to use the Kalishnikov [sic] rifle, PK machine gun, and rocket-propelled grenades.
  4. The detainee stated that he chose to fight with the Taliban against the Northern Alliance because he wanted to support their cause.
  5. The detainee was identified as having trained at a second terrorist training camp.

[edit] Transcript

There is no record that Al Kurash participated in his Combatant Status Review Tribunal.

[edit] Administrative Review Board hearings

Detainees who were determined to have been properly classified as "enemy combatants" were scheduled to have their dossier reviewed at annual Administrative Review Board hearings. The Administrative Review Boards weren't authorized to review whether a detainee qualified for POW status, and they weren't authorized to review whether a detainee should have been classified as an "enemy combatant".

They were authorized to consider whether a detainee should continue to be detained by the United States, because they continued to pose a threat -- or whether they could safely be repatriated to the custody of their home country, or whether they could be set free.

[edit] First annual Administrative Review Board

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Muhammad Abd Al Rahman Al Kurash's first annual Administrative Review Board, on 7 March 2005.[3] The memo listed factors for and against his continued detention.

[edit] The following primary factors favor continued detention

a. Commitment
  1. The detainee traveled from Taif, Saudi Arabia to fight with the Taliban in the Jihad, after his high school graduation in May 2001.
  2. The detainee trained at the Moasqr Kari Bilal Camp in Afghanistan where he received weapons training. Moasqr Kari Bilal was a facility used to train and house Taliban soldiers who fought on the Bagram front lines.
  3. Behavior while incarcerated.
a.

Detainee has struck guard force personnel on multiple occasions.

b.

Detainee threatened Block NCO by stating, “I will cut your throat.”

c.

Detainee has encouraged other detainees to harass guard force. Detainee incites disturbance and also has past incidents of “failure to comply”.

b. Training
At the Moasqr Kari Bilal camp, the detainee learned to use the Kalashnikov rifle, PK machine gun, and rocket propelled grenades.
c. Connection
  1. The detainee stated that he chose to fight with the Taliban against the Northern Alliance because he wanted to support their cause.
  2. The detainee’s name was found on an undated letter which listed probable al Qaida members incarcerated in Pakistan, along with materials linked to al Qaida.
d. Intent
The detainee was identified as having trained at a second terrorist training camp.

[edit] The following primary factors favor release or transfer

Not applicable.

[edit] Transcript

Captive 214 did not participated in his hearing.[4] On March 3, 2006, in response to a court order, the Department of Defense published a two page summarized transcript of the hearing that stated: {{quotation|It was noted by the Presiding Officer that from the [[Enemy Combatant Election Form (Exhibit EC-B), the detainee was uncooperative and unresponsive and choose not to be present for the Administrative Review Board proceedings.}}

[edit] Second annual Administrative Review Board

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Muhammad Abd Al Rahman Al Kurash's second annual Administrative Review Board, on 26 February 2006.[5] The memo listed factors for and against his continued detention.

[edit] The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment
  1. After the detainee's high school graduation in May 2001, the detainee traveled to Afghanistan to fight the "opposition" with the Taliban.
  2. The detainee decided to join the Taliban after reading the fatwas issued by Shaykhs Abdallah bin Jibrin and Humud al Uqla.
  3. Upon arrival in Karachi, the detainee identified himself as an Arab traveling to join the jihad in Afghanistan.
b. Training
  1. The detainee received training at that Moasqr Kari Bilal Camp in Afghanistan.
  2. Moasqr Kari Bilal Camp was a Taliban training facility. Trainees learned to use the Kalashnikov [sic] rifle, the PK machine gun and rocket-propelled grenades.
  3. The detainee was identified as having been at the al Farouq Camp in 2001.
c. Connections/Associations
  1. The detainee stated that he chose to fight with the Taliban against the Northern Alliance because he wanted to support this cause.
  2. The detainee's name was found on an undated letter, along with materials linked to al Qaida, which listed probably al Qaida members incarcerated in Pakistan.

[edit] The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a.

The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001, and also denied any knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or Unites [sic] States interests.

b.

The detainee was queried regarding any knowledge or planning of internal uprisings at the Guantanamo Detention Facility with negative results.

c.

The detainee does not have an opinion on Usama Bin Laden because the detainee's reasons for going to fight had nothing to do with Usama Bin Laden.

d.

The detainee believes those who died in the 11 September 2001 attacks were innocent because they were not involved in fighting.

e.

The detainee was not aware that Usama Bin Laden and the Taliban were aiding each other and working together. After talking to the interviewers, the detainee believes Usama Bin Laden could be bad, but the detainee is no longer sure of what is the truth.

f.

The detainee stated he did not fight any Americans while in Afghanistan and has no reason to fight them now. If a fatwa was issued that told Muslims they should fight Americans, the detainee would have to know the reason behind it.

[edit] Repatriation

A saudi named "Muhammad al-Qurashi" was repatriated on July 16, 2007 with fifteen other men.[6][7] Historian Andy Worthington wrote:

...it may be assumed that many of the allegations ... were revealed as inaccurate, leading to the authorities' decision to release them.

[edit] References

  1. ^ OARDEC (May 15, 2006). List of Individuals Detained by the Department of Defense at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba from January 2002 through May 15, 2006. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-09-29.
  2. ^ OARDEC (1 October 2004). Summary of Evidence for Combatant Status Review Tribunal -- Al Kurash, Muhammad Abd Al Rahman page 29. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2008-03-13.
  3. ^ OARDEC (7 March 2005). Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Al Kurash, Muhammad Abd Al Rahman pages 63-64. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2008-03-13.
  4. ^ OARDEC (date redacted). Summarized Administrative Review Board Proceedings pages 60-61. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2008-03-13.
  5. ^ OARDEC (26 February 2006). Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Al Kurash, Muhammad Abd Al Rahman pages 28-29. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2008-03-13.
  6. ^ Raid Qusti. "More Gitmo Detainees Come Home", Arab News, July 17, 2007. Retrieved on 2007-07-17. 
  7. ^ Andy Worthington. "Who are the 16 Saudis Released From Guantánamo?", Huffington Post, July 18, 2007.