MS Herald of Free Enterprise

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Career (UK)
Herald of Free Enterprise in Dover's Eastern Docks, 1984
Name:	Herald of Free Enterprise
Owner:	Compañía Naviera S.A.
Operator:	Townsend Thoresen
Launched:	1980
Fate:	Capsized 6 March 1987 Raised and scrapped in 1988
General characteristics
Class and type:	RORO car and passenger ferry
Tonnage:	13,601 brt
Length:	131.91 m (432 ft 9 in)
Beam:	23.19 m (76 ft 1 in)
Draught:	5.72 m (18 ft 9 in)
Propulsion:	3 x Sulzer 12ZV 40/48
Speed:	22 knots (41 km/h)
Capacity:	1,300

MS Herald of Free Enterprise was a roll-on roll-off (RORO) car and passenger ferry owned by Townsend Thoresen. She was one of three ships commissioned by the company to operate on the Dover–Calais route across the English Channel. The ferry capsized on the night of 6 March 1987 killing 193 passengers and crew. This was the worst maritime disaster involving a British registered ship in peacetime since the sinking of the Iolaire in 1919.

1 Construction
2 Background to the capsizing
3 The capsizing
4 The inquiry
5 The aftermath
6 Gallantry awards
7 Footnotes
8 See also
9 External links

[edit] Construction

In the late 1970s, Townsend Thoresen decided to commission the design and construction of three new identical ships for their Dover–Calais route for delivery in 1980. The ships were branded the Spirit class and were named Herald of Free Enterprise, Pride of Free Enterprise and Spirit of Free Enterprise.

The Dover–Calais crossing of the Channel is the shortest route between the two countries, and in 1987 (prior to the opening of the Channel Tunnel) it was the quickest route; the ships were designed to permit fast loading and unloading and quick acceleration. The ships comprised eight decks numbered A to G from top to bottom which contained the following:

A Deck: Crew accommodation and radio room
B Deck: Crew accommodation and galley
C Deck: Passenger areas and galley
D Deck: Suspended vehicle deck within E deck
E Deck: Upper vehicle deck
F deck: Mezzanine level
G deck: Main vehicle deck
H deck: Engine rooms, stores and passenger accommodation

Loading of vehicles onto G deck was through watertight doors at the bow and stern. Both sets of doors were hinged about a vertical axis. Loading of vehicles onto E deck and F deck was through a weathertight door at the bow and an open portal at the stern. Vehicles could be loaded and unloaded onto E and G deck simultaneously using double deck linkspans in use at Dover and Calais.

The ships were constructed by Schichau-Unterweser AG in Bremerhaven, Germany.

[edit] Background to the capsizing

On the day of the disaster, the Herald of Free Enterprise was working the route between Dover and the Belgian port of Bruges-Zeebrugge. The linkspan at Zeebrugge comprised a single deck and so could not be used to load decks E and G simultaneously. The ramp could also not be raised high enough to meet the level of deck E due to the high spring tides being encountered at that time. This was commonly known and was overcome by trimming the ship bow heavy by filling forward ballast tanks. The Herald was due to be modified during its refit in 1987 to overcome this problem. Before dropping moorings, it was normal practice for a member of the crew, the Assistant Bosun, to close the doors, the First Officer also remained on deck to ensure they were closed before returning to the wheel house. To keep on schedule, the First Officer returned to the wheel house before the ship dropped its moorings leaving closing of the doors the responsibility of the Assistant Bosun, Mark Stanley. Mark Stanley had taken a short break after cleaning the car deck upon arrival at Zeebrugge. He had returned to his cabin and was still asleep when the ship dropped its moorings. The captain could only assume that the doors had been closed since he could not see them from the wheel house due to their construction and had no indicator lights in the wheelhouse. There was confusion as to why no one else closed the doors.^{[citation needed]}

[edit] The capsizing

The ship sailed at 6:05pm British time with a crew of 80 and carrying 459 passengers, 81 cars, 3 buses, and 47 trucks. When the ferry reached 18.9 knots (33 km/h) 90 seconds after leaving the harbour, water began to enter the car deck in large quantities. The resulting free surface effect destroyed her stability. Within seconds, at 6:28pm, the ship began to list 30 degrees to port. The ship briefly righted herself before listing to port once more, this time capsizing. The entire event took place in less than a minute. The water quickly reached the ship's electrical systems, destroying both main and emergency power and leaving the ship in darkness.

The ship ended on her side half-submerged in shallow water just 100 yards (90 m) from the shore. Only a fortuitous turn to starboard in her last moments, and then capsizing onto a sandbar, prevented the ship from sinking entirely in much deeper water.

A nearby dredger noticed the Herald's lights disappear, and notified the port authorities. A rescue helicopter arrived within half an hour, shortly followed by assistance from the Belgian Navy who were undertaking an exercise within the area.

The disaster resulted in the deaths of 193 people. Many of those on board had taken advantage of a promotion in The Sun newspaper for cheap trips to the continent. Most of the victims were trapped inside the ship and succumbed to hypothermia because of the frigid (3 °C) water. Due to the rescue operation of the Belgian Navy the death toll was limited. It was not until the end of April 1987 that the ferry was refloated. After some inspections, the decision was taken not to repair the ship. It was fully dismantled in 1988.

[edit] The inquiry

After a public inquiry into the sinking in July 1987, Britain's Lord Justice Barry Sheen published a report that castigated Townsend Thoresen, the ship's owners as part of the P&O Group, and identified a "disease of sloppiness" and negligence at every level of the corporation's hierarchy. It was confirmed that the ferry left port with her bow doors open.

It was apparent from the testimony of crew members that the member responsible for shutting the doors was Mark Stanley, but when he finished cleaning the car deck after the arrival in Zeebrugge he had had a short break. It was also found that Stanley was not on the car deck before the ship set sail. When he was questioned, investigators found that at the time when he should have closed the doors, he was still asleep during his break. There was confusion as to why no one else closed the doors. The other crew members expected Stanley to close them because he was scheduled to close them. Before the ship dropped moorings the First Officer should have stayed on the car deck to make sure the doors were closed, but trying to stay on schedule he left the car deck and went to the bridge before the doors were closed. This was normal practice, and the final factor was that from his position on the bridge the captain was not able to see the bow doors clearly, leading him to assume that they were closed.^{[citation needed]}

A few years earlier, one of the Herald's sister ships sailed from Dover to Zeebrugge with the bow doors open, but she made it to the destination without incident.^{[citation needed]} It was therefore believed that leaving the bow doors open alone should not have caused the ship to capsize.

After looking at possible reasons for reduced clearance between the doors and water line, investigators found that there was a problem during the loading of the car decks. The loading ramp at Zeebrugge was too low to reach the upper car deck at high tide. To clear the gap, the captain put sea water into the front ballast tanks to lower the ship's bow. The clearance between bow doors and water line was 2.5 metres. The problem arose due to the fact that Dover-Zeebrugge was not her regular route. Had the Herald survived she was to have been modified to avoid this procedure.^[1]

Another factor that contributed to the capsizing was the depth of the water. When a vessel is underway, the movement under it creates low pressure, which has the effect of increasing the vessel's draft. This effect is known as ship "squat". In deep water the effect is small. However, in shallow water it is greater, because as the water passes underneath it would move faster and cause the draft to be increased further. This reduced the clearance between the bow doors and water line to 1.5 meters. Although the bow doors were open and they were 1.5 meters above the water, it was still not enough to cause the ship to capsize, so the investigators looked at the height and volume of water produced by the bow wave.

After extensive tests, the investigators found that when the ship travelled at a speed of 18 knots (33 km/h), the wave was enough to engulf the bow doors. This caused a "step change": if the ship was below 18 knots (33 km/h) and not in shallow water, people on the car deck would probably have had time to notice the bow doors were open and close them, but even this did not cause the final capsizing.

Almost all ships are divided into watertight compartments below the water line so that in the event of flooding, the water would be confined to one compartment, keeping the ship afloat. The Herald's design had an open car deck with no dividers, allowing vehicles to drive in and out easily, but this allowed water to flood the whole of the car deck, putting the ship in danger. As she turned the water flooded to one side and the vessel capsized.

In October 1987, a coroner's inquest jury into the capsizing returned verdicts of unlawful killing. Many of the individuals involved at the company were prosecuted for manslaughter, as was the operating company, P&O European Ferries (Dover) Ltd (for a discussion of the legal issues, see corporate manslaughter). The disaster was one of a number that influenced thinking leading to the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998.^[2]

[edit] The aftermath

A few scenes of the disaster videotaped live by the media were used by film director Krzysztof Kieślowski as part of the conclusion of his film Three Colours: Red that bound together the Three Colours trilogy.

In Britain, a group named Ferry Aid released a charity record.

Following the sinking, the Herald was raised and renamed "Flushing Range" for a final one-way trip to Kaohsiung, Taiwan,^[3] where she was broken up in 1988. Her two sister ships are still operational, though the ex-Spirit of Free Enterprise was extended to increase her cargo capacity during her time under the P&O flag in a process commonly described as jumboisation. The Pride of Free Enterprise is still more or less as built.^[4]

The Right Hon Nicholas Ridley MP, a government minister at the time, was criticised for alluding to the accident (while speaking on another subject) on 10 March. He was quoted as saying that "although he is the pilot of the Bill, he has not got his bow doors open". He apologised for the remark.^[5]

Since the accident several improvements to the design of this type of vessel have been made, these include indicators that display the state of the bow doors on the bridge, watertight ramps being fitted to the bow sections of the front of the ship, and "freeing flaps" to allow water to escape from a vehicle deck in the event of flooding. Some vessels omit the bow door configuration altogether and vehicles enter and exit from rear doors only. New International Maritime Organization (IMO) regulations are in place that prohibit an open (undivided) deck of this length on a passenger RORO vessel.

The disaster was the subject of an episode from Series 2 of Seconds from Disaster.

[edit] Gallantry awards

The following British awards for gallantry on the night of the sinking were gazetted on 30 December 1987:^[6]

Herald of Free Enterprise crew
- Michael Ian Skippen, Head Waiter, George Medal (posthumous)
- Leigh Cornelius, Seaman, Queen's Gallantry Medal
- Stephen Robert Homewood, Assistant Purser, Queen's Gallantry Medal
- William Sean Walker, Seaman, Queen's Gallantry Medal
- Thomas Hume Wilson, Quartermaster, Queen's Gallantry Medal
Herald of Free Enterprise passenger
- Andrew Clifford Parker, Assistant Bank Manager, Nippon Credit International, George Medal
Belgian Navy
- Luitenant-Ter-Zee 1ste Klas Guido A. Couwenbergh, Queen's Gallantry Medal
- Luitenant-Ter-Zee 1ste Klas Alfons M. A. C. Daems, Queen's Gallantry Medal
Royal Navy
- Lieutenant Simon Nicholas Bound, Queen's Gallantry Medal
- Able Seaman Eamon Christopher McKinley Fullen, Queen's Gallantry Medal
- Chief Petty Officer Edward Gene Kerr, Queen's Commendation for Brave Conduct
- Chief Petty Officer Peter Frank Still, Queen's Commendation for Brave Conduct
Tijdelijke Vereniging Bergingswerken
- Piet Lagast, Diver, Queen's Gallantry Medal
- Dirk van Mullem, Diver, Queen's Gallantry Medal