MS Estonia

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MS Estonia
Career
Name: 1980-1990: MS Viking Sally
1990-1991: MS Silja Star
1991-1993: MS Wasa King
1993-1994: MS Estonia
Owner: 1980-1988: Rederi Ab Sally
1988-1992: Effoa
1992-1993: Effdo 3 Oy
1993-1994: Estline Marine Co Ltd
Operator: 1980-1987: Rederi Ab Sally (Viking Line traffic)
1987-1990: Rederi AB Slite (Viking Line traffic)
1990-1991: Silja Line
1991-1993: Wasa Line
1993-1994: EstLine
Ordered: 11. 9. 1979
Builder: Meyer Werft, Papenburg, West Germany
Yard number: 590
Laid down: October 18, 1979
Launched: April 26, 1980
Acquired: June 29, 1980
In service: July 5, 1980
Homeport: 1980-1991: Mariehamn, Flag of Finland Finland
1991-1993: Vaasa, Flag of Finland Finland
1993-1994: Tallinn, Flag of Estonia Estonia
Fate: Sunk 1994 (59°23′N, 21°42′E)
Notes: IMO 7921033
General characteristics
Tonnage: 15566 GRT
Displacement: 2800 metric tons of deadweight (DWT)
Length: 155.43 m (509 ft 11 in)
1984 onwards 157.02 m (515.16 ft)
Beam: 24.21 m (79 ft 5 in)
Draught: 5.55 metres (18 ft 3 in)
Ice class: 1 A
Installed power: 4 × MAN 8L 40 /45 diesels
combined 17,652 kW (23,671 hp)
Speed: 21-knot (39 km/h/24 mph)
Capacity: 2000 passengers
1190 passenger berths
460 cars
Model of the MS Estonia in Tallinn's Maritime Museum
Model of the MS Estonia in Tallinn's Maritime Museum

MS Estonia, previously MS Viking Sally (–1990), MS Silja Star (–1991), and MS Wasa King (–1993), was a cruiseferry built in 1980 at the German shipyard Meyer Werft in Papenburg. The ship's sinking in the Baltic Sea on September 28, 1994, claimed 852 lives and was one of the deadliest maritime disasters in the late 20th century.

Contents

[edit] Construction

The ship was originally ordered from Meyer Werft by a Norwegian shipping company led by Parley Augustsen with intended traffic between Norway and Germany. At the last moment, the company withdrew their order and the contract went to Rederi Ab Sally, one of the partners in the Viking Line consortium (SF Line, another partner in Viking Line, had also been interested in the ship).[1] Originally the ship was to be the same length as MS Diana II, built in 1979 by the same shipyard for Rederi AB Slite, the third partner in Viking Line. When Sally took over the construction contract, the ship was lengthened from the original length of approximately 137 meters to approx. 155 meters.[1] Meyer Werft had constructed a large number of ships for various Viking Line partner companies during the 1970s. Worth noting is the new ship's bow construction, which consisted of an upwards-opening visor and a car ramp that was placed inside the visor when it was closed. An identical bow construction was also used in MS Diana II, built by the same shipyard for Rederi AB Slite a year earlier.

[edit] Service history

[edit] Viking Line

On 29 July, 1980 Viking Sally was delivered to Rederi Ab Sally, Finland and was put into service on the route between Turku, Mariehamn and Stockholm[1][2] (during summer 1982 on the Naantali—Mariehamn—Kapellskär route)[3]. She was the largest ship to serve on that route at the time. Like all ships, Viking Sally suffered some mishaps during her Viking Line service, being grounded in the Åland Archipelago in May 1984 and suffering some propeller problems in April of the following year. In 1985 she was also rebuilt with a "duck tail".[1][2] In 1986, Reijo Hammar, an infamous Finnish criminal, strangled and stabbed a businessman on the ship.

Rederi Ab Sally had been experiencing financial difficulties for most of the 1980s. In fall 1987 Effoa and Johnson Line, the owners of Viking Line's main rivals Silja Line, bought Sally.[4] As a result of this, SF Line and Rederi AB Slite forced Sally to withdraw from Viking Line.[1][2][4] Viking Sally was chartered to Rederi AB Slite to continue on her current traffic for the next three years.[1][2][4]

[edit] EffJohn

When her charter ended in April 1990, Viking Sally had an unusual change of service. She was painted in Silja Line's colours, renamed Silja Star and placed on the same route that she had plied for Viking Line: Turku—Mariehamn—Stockholm.[1][2] The reason for this was that Silja's new ship for Helsinki—Stockholm service was built behind schedule and one of the Turku—Stockholm ships, MS Wellamo, was transferred to that route until the new ship was complete in November 1990.[5] Also in 1990 Effoa, Johnson Line and Rederi Ab Sally merged into EffJohn.

The following spring Silja Star began her service with Wasa Line, another company owned by EffJohn. Her name was changed to Wasa King and she served on routes connecting Vaasa, Finland to Umeå and Sundsvall in Sweden.[1][2] It has been reported that the Wasa King was widely considered to be the best behaving ship in rough weather to have sailed from Vaasa.[citation needed]

[edit] Estline

In January 1993, at the same time when EffJohn decided to merge Wasa Line's operations into Silja Line, Wasa King was sold to Nordström & Thulin for use on EstLine's Tallinn—Stockholm traffic under the name Estonia. The actual ownership of the ship was rather complex, in order for Nordstöm & Thulin to get a loan to buy the ship. Although Nordström & Thulin were the company who bought the ship, her registered owners were Estline Marine Co Ltd, Nicosia, Cyprus, who chartered the ship to E.Liini A/S, Tallinn, Estonia (daughter company of Nodström & Thulin and ESCO) who in turn chartered the ship to EstLine Ab. As a result the ship was actually registered in both Cyprus and Estonia.[1][2]

[edit] Sinking

MS Estonia memorial in Tallinn
MS Estonia memorial in Tallinn

The Estonia disaster occurred on September 28, 1994 between about 00:55 to 01:50 (UTC+2) as the ship was crossing the Baltic Sea, en route from Tallinn, Estonia, to Stockholm, Sweden. The Estonia was on a scheduled crossing with departure at 19:00 in the evening on September 27. She had been expected in Stockholm the next morning at about 09:30. She was carrying 989 passengers and crew.

According to the final disaster report the weather was rough, with a wind of 15 to 20 m/s (29–39 knots/33–45 mph), force 7–8 on the Beaufort scale[6] and a significant wave height of 3 to 4 meters (10–13 ft) [7] compared with the highest measured significant wave height in the Baltic Sea of 7.7 metres (25.3 ft).[8] Esa Mäkelä, captain of the nearby Silja Europa who was appointed on scene commander for the subsequent rescue effort, described the weather as "normally bad", or like a typical autumn storm in the Baltic Sea. All scheduled passenger ferries were at sea.

The official report says that while the exact speed at the time of the accident isn't known, Estonia had very regular voyage times, averaging 16–17 knots, perhaps implying she didn't slow down for adverse conditions. The chief mate of the Viking Line passenger ferry MS Mariella tracked Estonia's speed by radar at approximately 14.2 knots before the first signs of distress, while the Silja Europa's officers estimated her speed at 14–15 knots at midnight.

The first sign of trouble was a strange sound of metal against metal heard around 01:00, when the ship was on the outskirts of the Turku archipelago; but an investigation of the bow visor showed no obvious damage. At about 01:15, the visor separated and the ship took on a heavy starboard list. At about 01:20 a weak female voice called "Häire, häire, laeval on häire", the Estonian words for "Alarm, alarm, there is alarm on the ship", over the public address system. Just a moment later an internal alarm for the crew was transmitted over the public address system. Soon after this the general lifeboat alarm was given. Soon the vessel lurched some 30 to 40 degrees to starboard, making it practically impossible to move about safely inside the ship. Doors and hallways became deadly pits. Those who were going to survive were already on-deck by then. A Mayday was communicated by the ship's crew at 01:22, but did not follow international formats. Due to loss of power, she could not give her position, which delayed rescue operations somewhat. The ship disappeared from the radar screens of other ships at around 01:50. Mariella arrived at the scene of the accident at 02:12; the first rescue helicopter arrived at 03:05.

Out of a total of 989 passengers and crew on board 137 were saved. The accident claimed 852 lives (501 Swedes, 280 Estonians, 10 Finns and 19 people of other nationalities), by drowning and hypothermia, (the water temperature was 10°C–11°C/50–52°F). 92 bodies were recovered.

The official report blamed the accident on the failure of locks on the bow visor, that broke under the strain of the waves. When the visor broke off the ship, it damaged the ramp which covered the opening to the car deck behind the visor. This allowed water into the car deck, which destabilized the ship and began a catastrophic chain of events. (Flooding on the car deck capsized the Herald of Free Enterprise, where the bow doors were left open, and the Princess Victoria, which sank in the same storm which caused the North Sea Flood of 1953. Roll-on/roll-off ferries are particularly vulnerable to capsizing due to the free surface effect if the car deck is even slightly flooded.)

The location of the hull is at 59°23′N, 21°42′E, about 22 nautical miles (41 km) on bearing 157° from Utö island, Finland. She lies in between 74 and 85 meters (243–279 ft) of water.

[edit] The rescue effort

The casualties "had an immense impact on the world concept of ferry safety" and led to changes in safety regulations and liferaft design[9] much as the Titanic disaster did in 1912. Search and Rescue followed arrangements set up under the 1979 International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (the SAR Convention) and the nearest Maritime Rescue Co-ordination Centre MRCC Turku coordinated the effort in accordance with Finland's plans. The Baltic is one of the World's busiest shipping areas with 2000 vessels at sea at any time and these plans assumed the ship's own boats and nearby ferries would provide immediate help and helicopters could be airborne after an hour. This scheme had worked for the relatively small number of accidents involving sinkings (3 in 2006), particularly as most ships have few people on board.[10]

According to the official report, Estonia carried 63 inflatable rafts and 10 lifeboats. 142 of her 188 crew had undergone an IMO-approved safety training course and were proficient with survival craft whilst the vessel herself had recently taken part in a fire training exercise. The first distress call was answered by the Mariella, the closest of 5 nearby ferries but Estonia's position was only established 21 minutes before it sank. MRCC Turku failed to acknowledge the Mayday immediately and Mariella's report was relayed by Helsinki Radio as the less urgent pan-pan message. A full scale emergency was only declared at 02:30. Mariella winched open liferafts into the sea onto which 13 people on Estonia's rafts successfully transferred. She also reported rafts sighted to helicopters and OH-HVG brought 11 survivors to her. Isabella saved 16 survivors with her rescue slide.

The Finnish helicopters OH-HVG and OH-HVD landed on the passenger ferries, but Swedish helicopters took the rescued survivors to land-based locations as landing on heaving and rolling ferries was too dangerous. The pilot of OH-HVG stated that landing on the ferries was the most difficult part of the whole rescue operation, however this single helicopter rescued 44 people, more than all the ferries.

Ships rescued 34 survivors and helicopters 104 survivors, one of whom died in a hospital. The ferries played a much smaller part than the planners had intended because it was too dangerous to launch their man-over-board (MOB) boats or lifeboats. Despite their success, the 2006 accident of Finnbirch shows just how difficult helicopter rescue of even fit and experienced seamen remains.

The commission estimate up to 310 passengers reached the outer decks and 160 climbed into the liferafts or lifeboats essential for survival. Most of 757 missing persons are believed to be inside the ship. “The longer a ship is able to stay afloat in the event of an accident the more successful evacuation and rescue operations will be” .[11] and the report was critical of the delays in sounding the alarm, the passivity of the crew and the lack of guidance from the bridge. In 1999, special training requirements in crowd and crisis management and human behaviour were extended to crew on all passenger ships as well as amendments to watch keeping standards.[12] Estonia's distress beacons or EPIRBs required manual activation which didn't happen. Had they activated automatically, it would have been immediately obvious that the ship had sunk and the location would have been clear. All EPIRBs were subsequently required to deploy automatically and the accident was "instrumental in the move to legislate Voyage Data Recorders" [13] New IMO SOLAS liferaft regulations for rescue from listing ships in rough water were introduced though launching such craft, even in training exercises, remains dangerous for the crew.[14] However "If you are out to sea, the best lifeboat is the ship itself." New designs, the “citadel concept” once again influenced by Estonia aim to ensure damaged ships have sufficient buoyancy to remain afloat though cost will determine if any are built. SOLAS 90 which comes into effect in 2010 specifies existing passenger ships stability requirements and those in North West Europe must also be able to survive 50cm of water on the car deck. [15]

[edit] Causes of the disaster

[edit] Official investigation and report

The wreck was examined and videotaped by remotely operated submersibles (ROVs) and by divers from a Norwegian company, Rockwater A/S, that was contracted for the investigation work. It was discovered that the locks on the bow door had failed and that the door had separated from the rest of the vessel. The official report indicated that the bow visor and ramp had been torn off at points that would not trigger an "open" or "unlatched" warning on the bridge, as is the case in normal operation or failure of the latches. There was no video monitoring of this portion of the vehicle bay either. However, a video camera monitoring the inner ramp showed the water as it flooded the car deck. If the crew had known of the condition it is likely that they would have slowed the ship or even reversed its motion, which might have prevented the swamping and sinking. Recommendations for modifications to be applied to similar ships included separation of the condition sensors from the latch and hinge mechanisms, and the addition of video monitoring.

[edit] Independent investigations

A number of theories exist to explain the disaster, elements of which have been vindicated by new evidence gained from independent investigations, as well as testimony from witnesses. According to Stephen Davis, writing in the New Statesman in May 2005, American adventurer, Gregg Bemis and his crew who dived to and filmed the wreck recovered pieces of metal which, in laboratory tests, showed evidence of an explosion. Davis says the ship was carrying a secret cargo of military equipment smuggled from the Russians by the British MI6 on behalf of the CIA, as part of ongoing efforts to monitor the development of Russia's weapons. This would explain Britain's signing of the Estonia Agreement.

The German journalist Jutta Rabe also carried out her own investigations, which resulted in a book, which was turned into the 2003 motion picture Baltic Storm, which portrays the Russian secret service as being responsible for the sinking. The plot portrays the Swedish government as being responsible for using the ship to covertly transport Russian high-tech components to the United States. The story is unveiled by a young female journalist, not unlike Rabe herself. According to Rabe, divers hired by the Swedish government (signing contracts swearing lifetime secrecy) spent hours breaking into cabins frantically searching for a black attaché case carried by a Russian space technology dealer, Aleksandr Voronin. She highlighted US interest in various Soviet technology, including nuclear-powered satellites. It has been suggested that panic about the stability of some form of nuclear device is the most likely reason behind the initial Swedish government suggestion of burying the wreck in concrete, a highly unusual proposal for a wreck, reminiscent of Chernobyl's sarcophagus. In early 2005, Jutta Rabe reported that a helicopter log book had been found showing that some of the crew of the Estonia, including one of the captains, Avo Piht, had been flown to hospital after the disaster. Their stay at the hospital could supposedly be verified by the unidentified telephone logs of the hospital which unveiled calls to their families. These nine people, who would be strong eyewitnesses about the condition of and events on the ship, have since disappeared without trace. Eyewitnesses have since tried to debunk Piht's survival though cannot account for the phone calls or logs. He was initially listed as a survivor when a man resembling him was seen on television; later a tape of the broadcast was reviewed and the list was corrected. The legend of the "mysterious disappearance" of his name from the list of survivors lives on.

[edit] Re-opening of investigations by the Swedish and Estonian Governments

In Autumn 2004, a scandal erupted in the Swedish media after the revelation by a retired customs officer that shortly before the accident in 1994, MS Estonia had been used by Swedish military intelligence to bring in electronic equipment illegally acquired in Estonia from the Russian Army (former units of USSR Baltic Military District). Swedish court investigator Johan Hirschfeldt later confirmed that the military intelligence indeed used MS Estonia in September 1994 for bringing in secret military equipment, but the content of the shipment will remain classified for 70 years.

In May 2006, the Estonian parliamentarian and member of the Estonian Parliament's Commission re-investigating the disaster, Evelyn Sepp, during her press conference in the Swedish Parliament, accused Johan Hirschfeldt of destroying the evidence which he collected as result of his investigation, a fact that Swedish government failed to explain. According to Ms. Sepp, the Swedish Government has not helped the Estonian team of investigators as was initially promised. Moreover, she declared that "Estonia sees connection between the military shipment and the disaster." Eventually, in the wake of Estonian election campaign and facing yet another instance of missing evidence, this time disappearance in archives of the Swedish maritime authority of a videotape of surveillance of the wreckage, done before placing it under concrete cover, in November 2006. Ms. Sepp suggested a possibility of a case of crime against humanity perpetrated in the disaster.

On 22 September 2005, Estonian state prosecutor Margus Kurm announced that the investigation conducted by the Estonian authorities confirmed the fact that military equipment was aboard the ship on 14 and 20 September 1994, and that Republic of Estonia was no part of this "Swedish operation." He claimed no evidence was found that such equipment was aboard the ship at the night of the disaster. Despite this, suspicions surrounding the alleged Swedish activities continued to exist, and in March 2006, Sepp expressed her opinion that the suggestion to cover the wreckage of the ship in concrete as proposed by the Swedish authorities may have been attempt to conceal the circumstances of the disaster. According to her, the Estonia Agreement of 1995 in fact prevents further in-depth reinvestigation of the disaster. On the 30 March 2006, a special commission set up by the Estonian government to investigate the secret military shipments aboard the ship partly disclosed its findings. In the published report the commission came close to blaming Swedish authorities for hiding the evidence and the circumstances of the disaster. Among other things, the commission emphasized the contradictions in the testimonies of witnesses and in the accounts of the persons who took part in the investigation in 1994. The Swedish government on several occasion refused to permit interviews with the witnesses. According to the commission, the contract with the private company (Rockwater) responsible for the divers and their operations at the wreckage in 1994 has made several crucial areas within the wreck, covered by the divers inside the ship, inaccessible. The Swedish government refused to give access to the file. The commission notes a case of the Swedish member of the 1994 investigation team disposing of an important piece of the evidence brought to the surface from the ship (the lock on the bow door, detached by the divers). Finally, the commission claimed that the divers had retrieved a specific piece of luggage, as seen in the film, content of which the Swedish government refused to discuss. The part of the ship with the item in question could not have been accessed through extant breaches, the commission said.[16]

On the 12 September 2006 the Swedish MEP, Lars Ångström, accused his government in the newspaper Dagens Nyheter of possible secret divings by the military prior to the beginning of the official divings performed within the framework of the investigation. The deputy then presented his claims against the government to the Swedish ombudsman.[17]

In October 2006 Estonian media (EE, 5 Oct) reported that a group of relatives of the victims registered several complaints against Sweden in the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg.

On 22 November 2006, the Norwegian newspaper Aftenposten reported that a film, taken at the turn of 1995–96 to investigate the depth to which the Estonia had sunk and the conditions of the seabed around the wreck, had disappeared from the archives of Sweden's Shipping Inspectorate.[18]

To put the accusations at rest, Swedish government commissioned two independent studies to use models and advanced computer simulations to verify the cause and sequence of events as well as test for alternative theories (like an explosion, leak below waterline etc).

In May 2008, both studies came to a conclusion that "Altogether the results of the analysis carried out show a similar sinking sequence to the one worked out already by the official investigation after the accident." [19] [20]

[edit] Protection of the wreck

MS Estonia memorial in Stockholm
MS Estonia memorial in Stockholm

In the aftermath of the disaster, many relatives of the deceased demanded that their loved ones should be raised from international waters and given a land burial. Demands were also made that the entire ship should be raised so that the cause of the disaster could be discovered by detailed inspection.

Citing the practical difficulties and the moral implications of raising decaying bodies from the sea floor (the majority of the bodies were never recovered), but also fearing the financial burden for the costs of lifting the entire hull to the surface and the salvage operation the Swedish government suggested burying the whole ship in situ with a shell of concrete.

In the end, the Estonia Agreement 1995, a treaty between Sweden, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Denmark, Russia and the United Kingdom (though the UK itself is not a Baltic state), declared sanctity over the site, prohibiting its citizens from even approaching the wreck. The treaty is, however, only binding for citizens of the countries that are signatories. The Swedish Navy has, at least twice, discovered illegal diving operations at the wreck. The wreck is monitored by radar by the Finnish Navy.

On 8 May, 2006 the organizations of Estonian and Swedish relatives requested suspension of the diving ban by sending a letter to the governments who ratified the treaty: Estonia, Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Russia, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. The joint letter entreats all who read it to use their influence to amend, modify, repeal, revoke, or suspend all practical or administrative measures prohibiting inspection of the wreck in order to secure new evidence. The letter also calls for an independent group of experts, working in a transparent manner, to conduct a new investigation of the sinking of MS Estonia.[21]

[edit] See also

[edit] References

 The references in this article would be clearer with a different or consistent style of citation, footnoting, or external linking.
  1. ^ a b c d e f g h i (Swedish) www.vasabåtarna.se: Wasa King, retrieved 29. 10. 2007
  2. ^ a b c d e f g (Swedish) Fakta om Fartyg: MS Viking Sally (1980), retrieved 29. 10. 2007
  3. ^ (Finnish) FCBS Forum: Viking Sally:n aikataulut vuosilta 1980-1990, retrieved 29. 10. 2007
  4. ^ a b c Simplon Postcards: Viking Sally - Wasa King - Silja Star - Estonia, retrieved 29. 10. 2007
  5. ^ (Swedish) Fakta om Fartyg: MS Wellamo (1986), retrieved 29. 10. 2007
  6. ^ Final disaster report
  7. ^ Wave height
  8. ^ highest measured significant wave height
  9. ^ The Revised SOLAS Regulations for Ro-Ro Ferries, retrieved 21. 10. 2007
  10. ^ HELCOM reports a noticeable drop in shipping accidents in the Baltic, retrieved 21. 10. 2007
  11. ^ [ EC Directorate Improving Passenger Ship Safety, retrieved 30. 11. 2007
  12. ^ Passenger information required on all passenger ships from 1 January 1999, retrieved 21. 10. 2007
  13. ^ Simplified Voyage Data Recorders -Why choose float free, retrieved 22. 10. 2007
  14. ^ Liferaft Systems Australia: Maib Interim Safety Recommendation on The Use of Vertical Chute Type Marine Evacuation Systems, retrieved 21. 10. 2007
  15. ^ Guardian newspaper Herald of sea changes, retrieved 30. 11. 2007
  16. ^ The investigation Report of Margus Kurm, March 10, 2006
  17. ^ The Report of Lars Angström, September 12, 2006
  18. ^ Aftenposten:Estonia film missing
  19. ^ Research Study on the Sinking Sequence and Evacuation of the MV Estonia - Final Report. HAMBURGISCHE SCHIFFBAU-VERSUCHSANSTALT GmbH (2008-05-05). Retrieved on 2008-06-08.
  20. ^ Final Report - Research Study on the Sinking Sequence of MV Estonia. SSPA Consortium (2008-05-05). Retrieved on 2008-06-08.
  21. ^ Joint letter from M/S Estonia organizations in Estonia and Sweden, May 8, 2006
  • Jutta Rabe (2002), "Die Estonia. Tragödie eines Schiffsuntergangs" (The Estonia. Tragedy of a ship setting), Delius Klasing Verlag GmbH
  • Jutta Rabe, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 12 February 2005, "Estonia": Der Richter muss schweigen
  • Peter R. Limburg, "Deep-Sea Detectives. Maritime Mysteries and Forensic Science", 2004 ECW Press, Canada. 28 September 2005 (UTC)
  • William Langewiesche (2004) "The Outlaw Sea: Chaos and Crime on the World's Oceans" London: Granta Books.
  • Drew Wilson (2006), "The Hole. Another look at the sinking of the Estonia ferry on September 29, 1994", Diggory Press, UK

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