Morgan v. Illinois
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Morgan v. Illinois | ||||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Supreme Court of the United States | ||||||||||||
Argued January 21, 1992 Decided June 15, 1992 |
||||||||||||
|
||||||||||||
Holding | ||||||||||||
A defendant facing the death penalty may challenge for cause a prospective juror who would automatically vote to impose the death penalty in every case | ||||||||||||
Court membership | ||||||||||||
Chief Justice: William Rehnquist Associate Justices: Byron White, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Sandra Day O'Connor, Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, David Souter, Clarence Thomas |
||||||||||||
Case opinions | ||||||||||||
Majority by: White Joined by: Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter Dissent by: Scalia Joined by: Rehnquist, Thomas |
||||||||||||
Laws applied | ||||||||||||
U.S. Const. amend. VI |
Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719 (1992), is a case decided by the United States Supreme Court.
[edit] Background
In an elaboration of the Witherspoon v. Illinois doctrine, the Rehnquist Court considered challenges to the selection of jurors who would automatically vote to impose the death penalty on a defendant convicted of a capital offense in Morgan v. Illinois in 1992. In a six-to-three decision Justice Byron White, speaking for the majority held that a defendant facing the death penalty may challenge for cause a prospective juror who would automatically vote to impose the death penalty in every case. Just as a juror who is unalterably opposed to the imposition of the death penalty must be excluded because he or she cannot conscientiously fulfill the oath to follow the law and the instructions to the jury pursuant thereto, so should one who would automatically vote to impose the death penalty be excluded for the same reason. Such a juror, he emphasized, would lack the qualities of impartiality and indifference required by due process. Furthermore, White noted, jurors who would automatically vote to impose the death penalty would not "in good faith ... consider evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances" as may be required by law and included in jury instructions.