Moral particularism

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Moral particularism is the view that there are no moral principles and that moral judgement can be found only as one decides particular cases, either real or imagined. This stands in stark contrast to other prominent moral theories, such as deontology or utilitarianism, for example. In the former, it is asserted that people have a set of duties (that are to be considered or respected); in the latter, people are to respect the happiness or the preferences of others in their actions . Particularism, to the contrary, asserts that there are no overriding principles that are applicable in every case, or that can be abstracted to apply to every case.

According to particularism, most notably defended by Jonathan Dancy, moral knowledge should be understood as knowledge of moral rules of thumb, which are not principles, and of particular solutions, which can be used by analogy in new cases.

A largely coincident view about law was defended by Castanheira Neves in his 1967 major work.

Contents 1 References and links 1.1 References 1.2 External links 1.3 Further reading

[edit] References and links

[edit] References

• Dancy, Jonathan (2004). Ethics without principles, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

[edit] External links

• Dancy, Jonathan (2005). "Moral particularism", in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

[edit] Further reading

Hooker B, Little MO (eds.) (2001) Moral particularism. OUP