Mohmmad Ahmad Ali Tahar

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Mohmmad Ahmad Ali Tahar
Born: 1980 (age 27–28)
Ib, Yemen
Detained at: Guantanamo
Alias(s): Mohammad Ahmad Ali Tahar
ID number: 679
Conviction(s): no charge, held in extrajudicial detention
Occupation: student

Mohmmad Ahmad Ali Tahar is a citizen of Yemen, held in extrajudicial detention in the United States Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, in Cuba.[1] His detainee ID number is 679. American intelligence analysts estimate he was born in 1980, in Ib, Yemen.

Contents

[edit] Identity

Captive 679 was identified inconsistently on official Department of Defense documents:

[edit] Background

Captive 679 was apprehended by a mixed force of Pakistani and American counter-terrorism officials in March 2002. He was captured in an off-campus residence provided for students of Salafi University in Faisalabad, Pakistan together with a dozen other foreign students. He claims he was just a student at Salafi University, and had no ties to terrorism.

He faces the allegations that his photo was identified as someone who had been seen by an al Qaida member in Afghanistan, and that he had received a recruitment letter from the Taliban.

[edit] Combatant Status Review Tribunal

Combatant Status Review Tribunals were held in a trailer the size of a large RV. The captive sat on a plastic garden chair, with his hands and feet shackled to a bolt in the floor. Three chairs were reserved for members of the press, but only 37 of the 574 Tribunals were observed. The neutrality of this section is disputed. Please see the discussion on the talk page.(December 2007)Please do not remove this message until the dispute is resolved.
Combatant Status Review Tribunals were held in a trailer the size of a large RV. The captive sat on a plastic garden chair, with his hands and feet shackled to a bolt in the floor.[12][13] Three chairs were reserved for members of the press, but only 37 of the 574 Tribunals were observed.[14]
The neutrality of this section is disputed.
Please see the discussion on the talk page.(December 2007)
Please do not remove this message until the dispute is resolved.

Initially the Bush administration asserted that they could withhold all the protections of the Geneva Conventions to captives from the war on terror. This policy was challenged before the Judicial branch. Critics argued that the USA could not evade its obligation to conduct a competent tribunals to determine whether captives are, or are not, entitled to the protections of prisoner of war status.

Subsequently the Department of Defense instituted the Combatant Status Review Tribunals. The Tribunals, however, were not authorized to determine whether the captives were lawful combatants -- rather they were merely empowered to make a recommendation as to whether the captive had previously been correctly determined to match the Bush administration's definition of an enemy combatant.

[edit] Summary of Evidence memo

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Mohmmad Ahmad Ali Tahar's Combatant Status Review Tribunal, on 27 October 2004.[2] The memo listed the following allegations against him:

a The detainee is associated with the Taliban and al Qaida.
  1. The detainee traveled to Yemen from Pakistan in September 2001.
  2. The detainee was sent by the Jama’at al-Tablighi [sic] to travel.
  3. The detainee obtained his travel visa through Jama’at al-Tablighi [sic] .
  4. The detainee was met by a member of Jama’at al-Tablighi [sic] in Pakistan.
  5. Jama’at al-Tablighi [sic] , a Pakistan based Islamic missionary organization is being used as a cover to mask travel and activities of terrorism including members of al Qaida.
  6. The detainee was sent a personal greeting from the Taliban Deputy Minister of Intelligence.
  7. A senior al Qaida lieutenant recognized the detainee in a photograph.
  8. The senior al Qaida lieutenant ran an al Qaida safe house where a number of al Qaida members were captured.
  9. The detainee was captured in this safe house.
  10. The detainee stated that he is a terrorist.

[edit] Transcript

Tahar chose to participate in his Combatant Status Review Tribunal.[15][10] In response to a court order the Department of Defense was forced to comply with a Freedom of Information Act request and publish a sixteen page summarized transcript from Tahar's Tribunal.

[edit] Opening statement

  • Ali Tahar denied being a member or associate of any group, not al Qaeda, not the Taliban, not even Tablighi Jamaat, although he acknowledged that Talbligh had helped with his travel arrangements.
  • Ali Tahar claimed her has learned there were Tabligh branches in both the USA and in Tel Aviv.
  • Ali Tahar claimed he had never heard of al Qaeda or the Taliban, prior to his arrival in Guantanamo. He said he still didn't really know anything them.
  • Ali Tahar said he was just a medical student, in Pakistan, where he was captured.
  • Ali Tahar said all his travel documents to Pakistan were completely in order.
  • Ali Tahar said none of his letters to his family. He had been counting on their help in establishing proof that the allegations against him were based on incorrect information, and he was very disappointed none of his mail was being received.

[edit] Response to the allegations

[edit] Response to Tribunal questions

[edit] Administrative Review Board hearing

Hearing room where Guantanamo captive's annual Administrative Review Board hearings convened for captives whose Combatant Status Review Tribunal had already determined they were an "enemy combatant".
Hearing room where Guantanamo captive's annual Administrative Review Board hearings convened for captives whose Combatant Status Review Tribunal had already determined they were an "enemy combatant".[16]

Detainees who were determined to have been properly classified as "enemy combatants" were scheduled to have their dossier reviewed at annual Administrative Review Board hearings. The Administrative Review Boards weren't authorized to review whether a detainee qualified for POW status, and they weren't authorized to review whether a detainee should have been classified as an "enemy combatant".

They were authorized to consider whether a detainee should continue to be detained by the United States, because they continued to pose a threat -- or whether they could safely be repatriated to the custody of their home country, or whether they could be set free.

[edit] First annual Administrative Review Board

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Mohmmad Ahmad Ali Tahar's first annual Administrative Review Board, on 2 June 2005.[3] The memo listed factors for and against his continued detention.

[edit] The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment
  1. The detainee traveled from Yemen to Pakistan in mid-September 2001.
  2. the detainee stated he is a terrorist.
b. Connections/Associations
  1. The detainee was sent to Pakistan by a member of the Jama'at al-Tablighi [sic] .
  2. The detainee obtained his travel visa through the Jama'at al Tablighi.
  3. The Jama'at al Tablighi, a Pakistani based Islamic missionary organization, is being used as a cover to mask travel and activities of terrorists including members of al Qaida.
  4. A senior al Qaida lieutenant recognized the detainee in a photograph.
  5. The senior al Qaida lieutenant ran an al Qaida safe house where a number of al Qaida members were captured.
  6. The detainee was captured in this safehouse.
  7. The detainee was sent a personal greeting from the Taliban Deputy Minister of Intelligence.
c. Other Relevant Data
  1. The detainee stated if Muslim scholars said the attacks of September 11, 2001 were the correct actions to take, he would support the scholars.
  2. The detainee stated if Muslim scholars say that people must die, Muslims must follow their words.
  3. The detainee stated he wants the infidels, non-Muslims, destroyed.
  4. The detainee said those who do not follow Islam will go to hell or be killed.

[edit] The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a.

The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the U.S. prior to their execution on September 11, 2001.
b.

The detainee denied having any knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the U.S. or U.S. interests.

[edit] Transcript

Tahar chose to participate in his Administrative Review Board hearing.[17] In response to a court order the Department of Defense responded to a Freedom of Information Act request and published a twelve page summarized transcript from his first annual Review Board in the spring of 2006.

[edit] Enemy Combatant Election Form

Tahar's Assisting Military Officer reported on notes recorded on the Enemy Combatant Election Form. He reported they met on 13 June 2005 for 90 minutes, and on 15 June 2005 for 40 minutes. He reported Tahar was "polite and cooperative throughout both interviews."

[edit] Testimony

  • Tahar confirmed he had traveled from Yemen to Pakistan.
  • Tahar denied claiming to be a terrorist.
  • Tahar confirmed that a member of Talibhi Jamaat had helped him with his travel visa. He denied any knowledge of a tie between the Tabligh movement and terrorism.
  • Tahar stated he was captured in his University dormitory.
  • Tahar pointed out that the captive who identified his photo made a mistake, and asked for him to be brought to identify him in person.
  • Tahar denied that he had ever said he would support violence just because Muslim scholars endorsed it.
  • Tahar denied stating that he wants infidels and non-Muslims to be destroyed.
  • Tahar confirmed that he had no knowledge of plans to attack the USA or US interests.
  • Tahar stated that he never broke any laws in Yemen or Pakistan, and suggested his capture was due to a case of mistaken identity.
  • Tahar denied knowing any al Qaida or Taliban members, and that he had never heard of al Qaida until after his capture.
  • Tahar said the GUantanamo guards had described the Review Board as "a matter of paperwork":

Everybody is saying that these ARBs are nothing but a formality. These are not interrogators even you don't know that this is just a formality. They, the soldiers and interrogators, said it was a matter of paperwork and paper pushers and the American politics is just playing its rold and that's true. You can check with your countrymen, you'll find out that's true. A lot of people, they end up leaving the camp here without having to attend the ARB or the Tribunal. They were accused of larger crimes than myself. You people know that as well.

  • Tahar said he knew the owner or manager of the house as "Issa Pakistani".



[edit] Second annual Administrative Review Board

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Mohammad Ahmad Ali Tahar's second annual Administrative Review Board, on 22 March 2006.[11] The memo listed factors for and against his continued detention.

[edit] The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment
  1. The detainee wanted to study medicine in Pakistan. The detainee was told by a visiting Jamaat al Tablique [sic] missionary, that before he could do so, the detainee would have to study the Koran.
  2. In mid-September of 2001, the detainee traveled from Sanaa, Yemen to Karachi, Pakistan via Dubai, United Arab Emirates. The detainee was met in Karachi by someone form the Jamaat al Tablique [sic] who took him to the Maki Mosque. The detainee hten traveled to Lahore, Pakistan and spent two days there, then he went to a mosque in Raywant, Pakistan.
  3. The headquarters of the Tablique Jammat [sic] is located in Raywand.
  4. The detainee then enrolled at the Salafeyah University in Faisalabad, a university run by the Jamaat al Tablique [sic] .
  5. After Ramadan, the detainee moved from university housing to an off-campus house with five fellow Yemeni. There were about 12 other students already at this house.
b. Connections/Associations
  1. A representative from the Jamaat al Tablique Mission [sic] went to the Pakistani embassy and got the detainee a visa.
  2. Tablique Jammat [sic] is a Pakistan-based Islamic missionary organization used as a cover for action by Islamic extremists, including members of al Qaida.
  3. The detainee was sent a personal greeting from the Taliban Deputy Minister of Intelligence.
  4. The detainee was recognized by a senior al Qaida operative as someone from the Crescent Mills residence in Faisalabad, Pakistan.
  5. A number of suspect al Qaida members were arrested at the al Qaida Crescent Mills safe house in March 2002.
c. Intent
  1. The detainee stated that he should be considered a terrorist.
  2. The detainee stated that if muslim scholars say that people must die, muslims must follow the scholars' words. The detainee stated if the scholars issued a fatwa for the attacks of 11 September 2001, then the attacks would have been legitimate.
  3. The detainee threatened to instigate an uprising in the Guantanamo camp, claiming that the Americans are assaulting Islam.
  4. The detainee advised he wishes to remain in the group of detainees who do not cooperated and who will never leave.

[edit] The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a.

The detainee claims he did not respond to a fatwa. The detainee visited Pakistan to attend a university to study medicine to aid muslims. The detainee withdrew from the classes because they were too difficult. The detainee is not a Jamaat al Tablique member but needed their assistance to get into medical school.
b.

The detainee noted that he did not observe any type of weapons, computers or telephones in the Issa house. The detainee further stated that he did not observe or hear anyone preaching about jihad or recruiting for the Taliban and al Qaida.
c.

The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001 and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.
d.

After being shown the HBO documentary, In Memoriam, concerning the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on New York City, the detainee said what he saw was a terrible event.

[edit] Press reports

Canadian journalist, and former special assistant to US President George W. Bush, David Frum, published an article based on his own reading of the transcripts from the Combatant Status Review Tribunals, on November 11, 2006.[18] It was Frum who coined the term "Axis of evil" for use in a speech he wrote for Bush. Tahar's transcript was one of the nine Frum briefly summarized. His comment on Tahar was:

"Another detainee, a Yemeni, explained that he had come to Pakistan to study medicine at a university. Unfortunately, the particular university he had selected lacked any medical faculty. He ended up instead studying Koran in a student guesthouse – and when one of his housemates suggested they take a sightseeing tour of Afghanistan, he agreed to go along. The housemate’s name? He had forgotten it."

Frum came to the conclusion that all nine of the men whose transcript he summarized had obviously lied.[18] He did not, however, state how he came to the conclusion they lied. His article concluded with the comment:

"But what’s the excuse of those in the West who succumb so easily to the deceptions of terrorists who cannot invent even half-way plausible lies?"

[edit] References

  1. ^ a b OARDEC (May 15, 2006). List of Individuals Detained by the Department of Defense at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba from January 2002 through May 15, 2006. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-09-29.
  2. ^ a b OARDEC (27 October 2004). Summary of Evidence for Combatant Status Review Tribunal -- Tahar, Mohmmad Ahmad Ali pages 40-41. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2008-03-01.
  3. ^ a b OARDEC (2 June 2005). Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Tahar, Mohmmad Ahmad Ali pages 94-95. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2008-03-06.
  4. ^ OARDEC (April 20, 2006). List of detainee who went through complete CSRT process. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-09-29.
  5. ^ OARDEC (July 17, 2007). Index for Combatant Status Review Board unclassified summaries of evidence. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-09-29.
  6. ^ OARDEC (September 4, 2007). Index for testimony. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-09-29.
  7. ^ OARDEC (August 9, 2007). Index of Transcripts and Certain Documents from ARB Round One. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-09-29.
  8. ^ OARDEC (August 9, 2007). Index to Summaries of Detention-Release Factors for ARB Round One. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-09-29.
  9. ^ OARDEC (July 17, 2007). Index of Summaries of Detention-Release Factors for ARB Round Two. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-09-29.
  10. ^ a b OARDEC (December 7, 2004). [Summarized Unsworn Detainee Statement (but see page 2 where the detainee agrees to take his own oath and makes a sworn statement): pages 84-99. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2008-03-06.
  11. ^ a b OARDEC (22 March 2006). Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Tahar, Mohammad Ahmad Ali pages 15-17. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2008-03-06.
  12. ^ Guantánamo Prisoners Getting Their Day, but Hardly in Court, New York Times, November 11, 2004 - mirror
  13. ^ Inside the Guantánamo Bay hearings: Barbarian "Justice" dispensed by KGB-style "military tribunals", Financial Times, December 11, 2004
  14. ^ Annual Administrative Review Boards for Enemy Combatants Held at Guantanamo Attributable to Senior Defense Officials. United States Department of Defense (March 6, 2007). Retrieved on 2007-09-22.
  15. ^ OARDEC (December 7, 2004). Summarized Unsworn Detainee Statement (but see page 2 where the detainee agrees to take his own oath and makes a sworn statement): pages 100-116. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2008-03-06.
  16. ^ Spc Timothy Book. "Review process unprecedented", JTF-GTMO Public Affairs Office, Friday March 10, 2006, pp. pg 1. Retrieved on 2007-10-10. 
  17. ^ OARDEC (date redacted). Summary of Administrative Review Board Proceedings of ISN 579 pages 71-82. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2008-03-06.
  18. ^ a b David Frum. "Gitmo Annotated", National Review, November 11, 2006. Retrieved on April 23.