Mohammed Nasir Yahya Khusruf

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Mohammed Nasir Yahya Khusruf
Born:	1950 (age 57–58) Ta'iz, Yemen
Detained at:	Guantanamo
ID number:	509
Conviction(s):	no charge, held in extrajudicial detention

Mohammed Nasir Yahya Khusruf is a citizen of Yemen, held in extrajudicial detention in the United States Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, in Cuba.^[1] Khusruf's Guantanamo detainee ID number is 509. The Department of Defense reports that Khusruf was born on February 1, 1950, in Ta'iz, Yemen.

[edit] Combatant Status Review Tribunal

Combatant Status Review Tribunals were held in a trailer the size of a large RV. The captive sat on a plastic garden chair, with his hands and feet shackled to a bolt in the floor.^[2][3] Three chairs were reserved for members of the press, but only 37 of the 574 Tribunals were observed.^[4]

The neutrality of this section is disputed. Please see the discussion on the talk page.(December 2007) Please do not remove this message until the dispute is resolved.

Initially the Bush administration asserted that they could withhold all the protections of the Geneva Conventions to captives from the war on terror. This policy was challenged before the Judicial branch. Critics argued that the USA could not evade its obligation to conduct a competent tribunals to determine whether captives are, or are not, entitled to the protections of prisoner of war status.

Subsequently the Department of Defense instituted the Combatant Status Review Tribunals. The Tribunals, however, were not authorized to determine whether the captives were lawful combatants -- rather they were merely empowered to make a recommendation as to whether the captive had previously been correctly determined to match the Bush administration's definition of an enemy combatant.

[edit] Summary of Evidence memo

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Mohammaed Nasir Yahya Khusruf's Combatant Status Review Tribunal, on 12 October 2004.^[5] The memo listed the following allegations against him:

a. The detainee is an associate of the Taliban or al Qaida:

1. The detainee traveled to Afghanistan in August or September 2001.
2. The detainee attended the al Farouq training camp.
3. The detainee was trained on the Kalishnikov ^[sic] , Siminoff, and single shot rifle at the al Farouq training camp.
4. The detainee stayed at a house in a Taliban camp.

b. The detainee participated in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners.

1. The detainee fought for the Taliban in Afghanistan.
2. The detainee was in Afghanistan during the U.S. bombing campaign.
3. The detainee fled to Tora Bora and was subsequently captured.

[edit] Transcript

Khusruf chose to participate in his Combatant Status Review Tribunal.^[6] On March 3, 2006, in response to a court order from Jed Rakoff the Department of Defense published a twelve page summarized transcript from his Combatant Status Review Tribunal.^[7]

[edit] Responses to the allegations

Khusruf denied being associated with the Taliban or al Qaida.

Khusruf traveled to Afghanistan to teach the Koran to children.

Khusruf suggested his age, 59 years old, and his ill-health, would preclude him taking a role as a fighter.

"At approximately the end of July to the beginning of August, I went for the purpose of teaching. I am not a fighter. I went there to teach eight days after I got to Afghanistan, I met a man: he's the one who told me that Arabs here are considered to be helpers to the Taliban, and that all Arabs were subject to danger at any moment. I was told that all Arabs were in danger and you have to defend yourself and get training on weapons. When I heard this, I asked for my passport back because I came here to teach and not killing. I asked for it back several times, in Jalalabad, Kandahar and Tora Bora.

Khusruf acknowledged that he did agree to accept some training, simply because Afghanistan was so dangerous. He accepted less than twenty days training at a place called Al Estiqbar, near al Farouq, when his hosts would not return his passport and ticket. He got one hour of training a day, from a guy named Sab'e al Lail.

Khusruf denied staying in a Taliban house. He had a room in a private home in Kandahar.

Khusruf denied ever carrying a weapon in Afghanistan.

Khusruf acknowledged that he was in Afghanistan during the US Bombing campaign, but only because he could not get his passport or return ticket back from his hosts.

Khusruf repeated that he had voluntarily surrendered to the Afghanis. He said that they kept him for a month, before turning him over to the Americans, and that during this time they kept beating him, because they wanted him to admit that he was a fighter.

Khusruf pointed out that there was nothing in his conduct in Yemen that indicated militancy or fundamentalism.

Khusruf acknowledged that he did not pay for his own travel expenses. A foreign man, who hae married a Yemeni woman, talked to him about Afghanistan's problems, and suggested he could pay Khusruf's travel expenses, because he knew Khusruf was out of work.

The individual who held Khusruf's passport and tickets was Abou al Muntbir.

Sabe al Lail used to give him his one hour of training first thing in the morning. He said during the rest of the day he was a trainer at al Farouq.

Khusruf's translator said his travel was associated with Jamaat al Daawa. In the next paragraph he said his travel was associated with the Jamaat al Tablighi -- a group where volunteers dedicated themselves to good works, humanitarian works.

Khusruf said he was not a fighter, and not only wouldn't have fought, but he wouldn't have taught others to fight.

[edit] Khusruf's response to questioning

Khusruf said he had not traveled much in the past. He had spent a year and a half in Saudi Arabia thirty years ago.

Khusruf said his initial plan was to spend several years teaching.

Khusruf confirmed that he was going to be paid to teach.

Although Khusruf had already told his Tribunal he was not captured in Tora Bora, but had handed himself over to the Afghani authorities in Jalalabad, his Tribunal's President asked him to talk about the other Arabs he was captured with in Tora Bora.

"In Jalalabad, I know that there are many Arab groups. I knew this in Afghanistan. Even al Qaida. I swear to God that I did not know al Qaida until I went to Afghanistan. In Afghanistan there are Arab groups that have fled from their countries, they are refugees there. Algerians, Libyans. You have powerful intelligence, you may know these things or you can out more than me. They say the Taliban is non-believers and they forbid any fighting with them. They consider anyone that fights with them non-believers as well. Some Arabs would go and just sit there for a while then return to their countries to say they were doing Jihad, but they were not. Some have escape from their counties [sic] . They live in Pakistan and Afghanistan. These people do not have anything to do with Taliban or al Qaida. Some of them are doing relief work, doctors, some are reporters, teachers, they are all there. That's what I knew when I was over there. I was told that guy is a doctor and so on. In Jalalbad it is known which groups are in certain areas. There are many that have nothing to do with al Qaida or Taliban. That is what I know from being in Afghanistan it is not certain. When I was given to the Americans, I decided to speak and tell everything I knew. Not from experience but from what I heard. I talked about everything I heard."

[edit] Administrative Review Board hearing

Hearing room where Guantanamo captive's annual Administrative Review Board hearings convened for captives whose Combatant Status Review Tribunal had already determined they were an "enemy combatant".^[8]

Detainees who were determined to have been properly classified as "enemy combatants" were scheduled to have their dossier reviewed at annual Administrative Review Board hearings. The Administrative Review Boards weren't authorized to review whether a detainee qualified for POW status, and they weren't authorized to review whether a detainee should have been classified as an "enemy combatant".

They were authorized to consider whether a detainee should continue to be detained by the United States, because they continued to pose a threat -- or whether they could safely be repatriated to the custody of their home country, or whether they could be set free.

[edit] First annual Administrative Review Board

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Mohammed Nasir Yahya Khusruf's first annual Administrative Review Board, on 7 July 2005.^[9] The memo listed factors for and against his continued detention.

[edit] The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

The detainee went to Afghanistan for jihad.

b. Training

1. The detainee did not perform any formal military service. He received small arms training at al Farouq camp in Afghanistan.
2. The detainee trained at al Farouq for 18 to 20 days. He shot the Siminoff rifle and Kalashnikov rifle twelve times. He received map and land navigation training.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee's plane tickets from Yemen to Pakistan were provided by a man named Muad. Another man provided the detainee with 3,000 Saudi Arabian riyals and a passport.
2. The detainee stayed at a guesthouse for Arabs in Karachi, called Madafat al Ansar, run by Riad.
3. Riad operates a safe house in Karachi, Pakistan, to facilitate movement of recruits into Afghanistan. He coordinates recruit travel to Kandahar, Afghanistan, via Quetta, Pakistan.
4. The detainee stayed in Jalalabad in the safe house of Abu Hatib al Libi.
5. Abu Hatib al-Libi, a member of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), was in charge of the guesthouse in Jalalabad, Afghanistan, that belonged to al Qaida. They used it as a residence complex before they moved to Kandahar, Afghanistan. Later it became the guesthouse for the al Qaida leaders when they visited Jalalabad. Usama bin Laden used it during his visits.
6. The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) was designated for asset freeze under Executive Order 13224 and United Nations Security Council Resolution 1333 in September 2001. Some members organize strictly against Libyan Government interests, but others are aligned with Usama bin Laden's al Qaida organization or are active in the International mudjahedin network.

d. Other Relevant Data

The detainee was injured during the bombing in Tora Bora. He walked with a group towards Pakistan, but near the border he was stopped. He was taken to prison in Kabul, Afghanistan, and subsequently turned over to United States forces.

[edit] The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on September 11th, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or its interests.

[edit] Transcript

Khusruf chose to participate in his Administrative Review Board hearing.^[10] In the Spring of 2006, in response to a court order from Jed Rakoff the Department of Defense published a Summarized transcripts from his Administrative Review Board.^[7]

[edit] Second annual Administrative Review Board

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Mohammed Nasir Yahya Khusruf's second annual Administrative Review Board, on 29 March 2006.^[11] The memo listed factors for and against his continued detention.

[edit] The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee went to Afghanistan for jihad.
2. The detainee was injured during the bombing in Afghanistan.

b. Training

1. The detainee shot the Siminoff rifle, a Kalashnikof rifle, and a single shot rifle twelve times.
2. The detainee trained for approximately 20 days on small arms at the al Farouq training camp.
3. The detainee was given additional instruction on map and land navigation.
4. A source claims that the detainee received training at al Farouq.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee's name was found on a document listing 324 Arabic names, aliases, and nationalities recovered from suspected al Qaida safe houses.
2. The detainee's name was found on a computer associated with a senior al Qaida operative.
3. A source identified the detainee as Abu Abdul Rahman al Ta'izi, a light weapons trainer at the al Farouq training camp. He also claims that the detainee fought in Tora Bora.

[edit] The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a.	The detainee said he had tried to refuse training and leave but that the leadership would not give him back his passport.
b.	The detainee claims he never fired a weapon during training, nor was he issued a weapon.
c.	The detainee claimed that he was never issued a weapon following training and never fired any rounds outside of training.
d.	The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or its interests.

[edit] Transcript

Khusruf participated in his second annual Review Board hearing.^[12] In September 2007 the Department of Defense published a fourteen page summarized transcripts from his second Review Board hearing.

• They also published Khusruf's three page response to the factors in allegations memo.^[13]
• They also published a translation of an from a Yemeni newspaper from October 17, 2005, at the height of the 2005 hunger strike.^[13]
• The DoD withheld 44 pages of ICRC letters.^[14] The Department of Defense did not offer an explanation as to why these letters were withheld.

[edit] Testimony

At his second ARB hearing, he stated "It appears that our lives don't mean anything to the Americans...I have a feeling that I might be here until my death".^[15]

[edit] References

1. ^ list of prisoners (.pdf), US Department of Defense, May 15, 2006
2. ^ Guantánamo Prisoners Getting Their Day, but Hardly in Court, New York Times, November 11, 2004 - mirror
3. ^ Inside the Guantánamo Bay hearings: Barbarian "Justice" dispensed by KGB-style "military tribunals", Financial Times, December 11, 2004
4. ^ Annual Administrative Review Boards for Enemy Combatants Held at Guantanamo Attributable to Senior Defense Officials. United States Department of Defense (March 6, 2007). Retrieved on 2007-09-22.
5. ^ OARDEC (12 October 2004). Summary of Evidence for Combatant Status Review Tribunal -- Khusruf, Mohammaed Nasir Yahya pages 36. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2008-03-15.
6. ^ OARDEC (date redacted). Summarized Statement pages 11-22. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2008-03-15.
7. ^ ^{a b} "US releases Guantanamo files", The Age, April 4, 2006. Retrieved on 2008-03-15. 
8. ^ Spc Timothy Book. "Review process unprecedented", JTF-GTMO Public Affairs Office, Friday March 10, 2006, pp. pg 1. Retrieved on 2007-10-10. 
9. ^ OARDEC (7 July 2005). Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Khusruf, Mohammed Nasir Yahya pages 69-70. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2008-03-15.
10. ^ OARDEC (date redacted). Summary of Administrative Review Board Proceedings of ISN 509 pages 1-12. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2008-03-15.
11. ^ OARDEC (29 March 2006). Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Khusruf, Mohammed Nasir Yahya pages 96-97. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2008-03-15.
12. ^ OARDEC (date redacted). Summary of Administrative Review Board Proceedings of ISN 509 pages 12-25. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2008-03-15.
13. ^ ^{a b} Mohammed Nasir Yahya Khusruf (April 5, 2006). Translation of Detainee's written statement submitted by ISN 509 on 05 Apr 2006 by OARDEC Linguist #### pages 26-28. OARDEC. Retrieved on 2008-03-15.
14. ^ OARDEC. Yemenese continues the hunger strike in Guantanamo page 32. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2008-03-15.
15. ^ http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20070909/ap_on_re_la_am_ca/guantanamo