Mohammed Kamin

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Mohammed Kamin
Born: 1978 (age 29–30)
Detained at: Guantanamo
ID number: 1045
Conviction(s): material support for terrorism

Mohammed Kamin (born 1978) is a citizen of Afghanistan held in extrajudicial detention in the United States Guantanamo Bay detention camps, in Cuba.[1] His Guantanamo Internee Security Number is 1045. Joint Task Force Guantanamo counter-terrorism analysts estimate Kamin was born in 1978. Joint Task Force Guantanamo counter-terrorism analysts named a place of birth for all but a dozen of the detainees. Kamin is one of the dozen whose place of birth was left unnamed.

Contents

[edit] Combatant Status Review Tribunal

Combatant Status Review Tribunal notice read to a Guantanamo captive. During the period July 2004 through March 2005 a Combatant Status Review Tribunal was convened to make a determination whether they had been correctly classified as an "enemy combatant". Participation was optional. The Department of Defense reports that 317 of the 558 captives who remained in Guantanamo, in military custody, attended their Tribunals.
Combatant Status Review Tribunal notice read to a Guantanamo captive. During the period July 2004 through March 2005 a Combatant Status Review Tribunal was convened to make a determination whether they had been correctly classified as an "enemy combatant". Participation was optional. The Department of Defense reports that 317 of the 558 captives who remained in Guantanamo, in military custody, attended their Tribunals.

Initially the Bush administration asserted that they could withhold all the protections of the Geneva Conventions to captives from the war on terror. This policy was challenged before the Judicial branch. Critics argued that the USA could not evade its obligation to conduct a competent tribunals to determine whether captives are, or are not, entitled to the protections of prisoner of war status.

Subsequently the Department of Defense instituted the Combatant Status Review Tribunals. The Tribunals, however, were not authorized to determine whether the captives were lawful combatants -- rather they were merely empowered to make a recommendation as to whether the captive had previously been correctly determined to match the Bush administration's definition of an enemy combatant.

[edit] Summary of Evidence memo

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Mohammed Kamin's Combatant Status Review Tribunal, on 17 November 2004.[2] The memo listed the following allegations against him:

a. The detainee is associated with al Qaida:
  1. The detainee was trained by, worked for and was paid by a terrorist organization identified in the U.S. Department of Homeland Security Terrorist Organization Reference Guide.
  2. The detainee is directly associated with a leader for Jaish- E- Mohammed [sic] .
  3. The Jaish- E- Mohammed has been identified as a terrorist organization.
b. The detainee participated in military operations against the United States and its coalition partners.
  1. The detainee received military training in Mirali, Pakistan, which included learning to fire AK-47's [sic] , pistols, rockets, and machine guns.
  2. The detainee intended to use his training to ambush American forces.
  3. The detainee was taught to build mines.
  4. The detainee stored mines at his home.
  5. The detainee was trained in Quralemsha, Pakistan in the use, operation and detonation of remote control mines.
  6. The detainee purchased and sold weapons in Afghanistan.
  7. The detainee was in possession of a GPS device with stored grid points of key locations along the Afghan/Pakistan border.
  8. The detainee collected grid coordinates for the purpose of using them in attacks against runways, during takeoffs and landings of American and coalition planes.
  9. The detainee received compensation from a terrorist organization identified in the U.S. Department of Homeland Security Terrorist Organization Reference Guide, for his participation in attacks carried out against American and coalition forces.
  10. The detainee was captured on or about 4 May 2003, in Khowst [sic] , Afghanistan.

[edit] Testimony

There is no record that Mohammed Kamin participated in his Combatant Status Review Tribunal.

[edit] Administrative Review Board hearings

Hearing room where Guantanamo captive's annual Administrative Review Board hearings convened for captives whose Combatant Status Review Tribunal had already determined they were an "enemy combatant".
Hearing room where Guantanamo captive's annual Administrative Review Board hearings convened for captives whose Combatant Status Review Tribunal had already determined they were an "enemy combatant".[3]

Detainees who were determined to have been properly classified as "enemy combatants" were scheduled to have their dossier reviewed at annual Administrative Review Board hearings.[4] The Administrative Review Boards weren't authorized to review whether a detainee qualified for POW status, and they weren't authorized to review whether a detainee should have been classified as an "enemy combatant".

They were authorized to consider whether a detainee should continue to be detained by the United States, because they continued to pose a threat -- or whether they could safely be repatriated to the custody of their home country, or whether they could be set free.

[edit] First annual Administrative Review Board

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Mohammed Kamin's first annual Administrative Review Board, on 4 August 2005.[5] The memo listed factors for and against his continued detention.

[edit] The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment
  1. The detainee was a local Taliban cell leader.
  2. The detainee traveled in February 2003 from Khowst [sic] , Afghanistan to Naurak, Pakistan via Mirah Shaw [sic] , PK. Once in Naurak, he waited approximately two weeks before returning to Khowst [sic] , AF.
  3. The detainee is a Khowst [sic] al Qaida fighter.
  4. The detainee was trained by al Qaida and worked for them for about four months prior to his capture.
  5. The detainee was told not to tell anyone they [sic] worked for al Qaida but to say they worked for Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM).
  6. The JEM is an Islamic extremist terrorist group based in Pakistan.
  7. The detainee admitted he was part of a missile attack against an AMF compound.
  8. Al Qaida paid the detainee a total of 2,500 Rupees.
b. Training
  1. The detainee attended an al Qaida training camp and has demonstrated knowledge of various weapons and planned attacks against U.S. personnel and bases.
  2. The detainee stated he had received military training on an AK-47, RPG, and a PK (little larger than an AK-47). He stated he trained on stationary targets and moving targets; this training was to be used in ambushes against American forces.
  3. The detainee trained in Quralemsha, Pakistan on how to use, operate, and detonate remote control mines.
  4. The detianee said that he knew and worked with a Bagram detainee [sic] training al Qaida how to build and decorate improvised explosive devices (IEDs).
c. Connections/Associations
  1. The detainee replaced an al Qaida member named Work Sha [sic] who had been killed.
  2. Abdul Rahman and Rasul Khan worked with Abu Layth al Libi. Rasul Khan told the detainee that Abu Layth al Libi worked for al Qaida.
  3. Abu Layth al Libi controlled the "Southern Region" and was responsible for the Jemaah Islamiyah.
  4. Abdul Rahman paid the detainee 1,000 Pakistani Rupees to hid mines and missiles.
  5. The detainee was involved in purchasing and transporting weapons for Abdul Manan who was subordinate to Abu Layth al Libi.
  6. The detianee stated Abdul Manan was a local cell leader of a group called Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM). JEM is a cover name used for Al Qaida.
  7. Abdul Manan is a Jaish-e-Mohammed facilitator operating in the Khowst District, Khowst Province, Afghanistan. Abdul Manan is responsible for attacks against American firebases in the Khowst Province and is actively recruiting in the area to carry out these attacks.
  8. Abdul Manan paid the detainee 1,500 Pakistani Rupees to take pictures of the Khowst Airfield and the compound (next to the airfield) where the Americans are stationed.
d. Other Relevant Data
  1. The detainee said he was captured when trying to return to Khowst to deliver a GPS unit and a letter to al Libi.
  2. The detainee stated that he had lied to prior investigators and wanted to tell the truth.

[edit] The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a.

The detainee was asked whether or not he supports the jihad. Prior to his arrest he did, but now he claims he isn't sure where his allegiance lies.
b.

If the detainee is released, he wants to go back to teach the Quran, perform labor jobs taking care of homes and land, and take care of his handicapped father.

[edit] Second annual Administrative Review Board

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Mohammed Kamin's second annual Administrative Review Board, on 9 August 2006.[6] The memo listed factors for and against his continued detention.

[edit] The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment
  1. The detainee stated that he was recruited by an al Qaida cell leader.
  2. The detainee traveled over the Afghanistan/Pakistan with the deputy of a known al Qaida leader.
  3. The detainee received money from a known cell leader for procurement, storage and distribution of weapons, explosives and mines.
  4. In the six months prior to his capture, the detainee had made seven weapons transactions.
  5. The detainee stored twelve mines at his home for almost a month.
  6. The detainee stated that he aided in purchasing eight Russian-made rockets. The detainee stated that he wore women's clothing to conceal the rockets as he aided in transporting the rockets.
  7. The detainee stated the rockets were buried so they would be safeguarded until future use.
  8. The detainee stated that he was captured as he was attempting to deliver a ltter and a Global Positioning System to a senior al Qaida operative. The Global Positioning System was utilized in the surveillance of a coalition compound.
  9. The detainee stated that he worked for the Taliban as well as al Qaida.
b. Training
  1. The detainee stated that he was formally trained in military tactics by al Qaida operatives. The detainee spent varying amounts of time at madrassas that taught basic and advanced military skills to persons interested in engaging in jihadist-type behavior.
  2. The detainee spent a day training in Pakistan where he fired AK-27's [sic] , pistols, rockets and PK machine guns.
  3. The detainee stated that he spent a full day learning how to transform mines into improvised explosive devices. A trainer taught the detainee how to modify the mines and at the end of the day, the detainee and the trainer successfully tested one of the mines.
c Connections/Associations
The detianee was at a senior al Qaida member's home for approximately 04 days shortly before his capture.

[edit] The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a.

The detainee stated that if he is released he wants to go back to teaching the Koran and care for his handicapped father.
b.

The detainee stated that he realizes that he was manipulated by his peers to dislike Americans. The detainee was told that the Americans and the Coalition Forces were anti-Muslim.
c.

After his capture, the detainee lead an Afghan Army Unit to the buried location of the rockets that were originally intended to be used on the attack of a coalition force compound.
d.

The detainee stated the Americans are not as bad as he was led to believe.

[edit] Faces charges before a Guantanamo Military Commission

In March 11 [[2008 the Office of Military Commissions announced that Mohammed Kamin would face charges, including providing material assistance for terrorism.[7][8] Mohammed Kamin was the thirteenth captive to face charges before the Guantanamo military commissions authorized by the Military Commissions Act of 2006.

[edit] References

  1. ^ OARDEC (May 15, 2006). List of Individuals Detained by the Department of Defense at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba from January 2002 through May 15, 2006. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-09-29.
  2. ^ OARDEC (17 November 2004). Summary of Evidence for Combatant Status Review Tribunal -- Kamin, Mohammed pages 38-39. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2008-04-02.
  3. ^ Spc Timothy Book. "Review process unprecedented", JTF-GTMO Public Affairs Office, Friday March 10, 2006, pp. pg 1. Retrieved on 2007-10-10. 
  4. ^ Army Sgt. Sarah Stannard. "OARDEC provides recommendations to Deputy Secretary of Defense", JTF Guantanamo Public Affairs, October 29, 2007. Retrieved on 2008-03-26. 
  5. ^ OARDEC (4 August 2005). Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Kamin, Mohammed pages 62-64. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2008-04-02.
  6. ^ OARDEC (9 August 2006). Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Kamin, Mohammed pages 44-45. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2008-04-02.
  7. ^ William B. Britt. "Charge Sheet", Office of Military Commissions, March 11, 2008. Retrieved on 2008-04-02. 
  8. ^ "Charges sworn against detainee Mohammed Kamin", The Wire (JTF-GTMO), March 12, 2008, p. 10. Retrieved on 2008-04-02.