Mohammed Fenaitel Mohamed Al Daihani

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Mohammed Fenaitel Mohamed Al Daihani
Born:	November 4, 1965 (1965-11-04) (age 42) - Kuwait City, Kuwait
Detained at:	Guantanamo Bay camp
ID number:	229
Alleged to be a member of:	al-Qaeda
Status	In May 5, 2007 it was reported that he was to be released.[1]

Mohammed Fenaitel Mohamed Al Daihani is a citizen of Kuwait, held in extrajudicial detention in the United States Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, in Cuba.^[2] Al Daihani's Guantanamo detainee ID number is 229. Joint Task Force Guantanamo counter-terrorism analysts reports that Al Daihani was born on November 4, 1965, in Kuwait City, Kuwait.

[edit] Identity

Captive 229 was identified inconsistently on official Department of Defense documents:

• Captive 229 was identified as Mohammed Fenaital Mohamed Al Daihani on the Summary of Evidence memo prepared for his Combatant Status Review Tribunal, on 22 September 2004, on the Summary of Evidence memo prepared for his Administrative Review Board, on 22 April 2005, and on seven official lists of captives' names.^{[3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12]}
• Captive 229 was identified as Mohammad Finaytal Al Dehani on the official list released on May 15, 2006.^[2]
• Captive 229 was identified as Mohamad Funaitel Al-Daihani on an otherwise totally redacted page.^[13]
• Captive 229 was identified as Munammad Sihli Al Dayhani on the Questions for the family of Munammad Sihli al Dayhani.^[14]
• Captive 229 was identified as Mohamad Fenaytill Sahli Mohamad Al-Daihani on the translation of his Kuwaiti Civil ID Card.^[15]
• Captive 229 was identified as Mohamad Fenaytill Al-Daihani on translation of a letter from the Revival of Islamic Heritage Society.^[16]
• Captive 229 was identified as Mohammed Funaitel Al Dihani on the official list of captives whose habeas corpus petitions should be dismissed following their transfer from US custody.^[17]

[edit] Combatant Status Review Tribunal

Combatant Status Review Tribunals were held in a trailer the size of a large RV. The captive sat on a plastic garden chair, with his hands and feet shackled to a bolt in the floor.^[18][19] Three chairs were reserved for members of the press, but only 37 of the 574 Tribunals were observed.^[20]

The neutrality of this section is disputed. Please see the discussion on the talk page.(December 2007) Please do not remove this message until the dispute is resolved.

Initially the Bush administration asserted that they could withhold all the protections of the Geneva Conventions to captives from the war on terror. This policy was challenged before the Judicial branch. Critics argued that the USA could not evade its obligation to conduct a competent tribunals to determine whether captives are, or are not, entitled to the protections of prisoner of war status.

Subsequently the Department of Defense instituted the Combatant Status Review Tribunals. The Tribunals, however, were not authorized to determine whether the captives were lawful combatants -- rather they were merely empowered to make a recommendation as to whether the captive had previously been correctly determined to match the Bush administration's definition of an enemy combatant.

[edit] Summary of Evidence memo

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Mohammed Fenaital Mohamed Al Daihani's Combatant Status Review Tribunal, on 22 September 2004.^[4] The memo listed the following allegations against him:

a. The detainee is associated with al Qaida and provided support to forces engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners:

1. The detainee worked for the Revival of Islamic Heritage Society.
2. The Revival of Islamic Heritage Society appears on the Terrorist Exclusion List of the U.S. Dept of Homeland Security Terrorist Organization Reference Guide.
3. The detainee's name appeared on a hard drive recovered from a suspected al Qaida safe house in Islamabad, Pakistan.
4. The detainee voluntarily traveled from Kuwait to Mecca, Saudi Arabia on Hajj in 2000, where he met Faisal (FNU), an employee of the Sanabal Charitable Committee.
5. The Sanabal Charitable Committee is considered a fund raising front for the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group.
6. The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group is listed as a terrorist organization in the U.S. Department of Homeland Security Terrorist Organization Reference Guide.
7. The Detainee admitted to donating approximately 2,250 dinars to the Sanabal Charitable Committee.
8. The Detainee voluntarily flew from Karachi, Pakistan] on 9 September 2001, where he first joined Faisal and Abdul Hakeem.
9. Abdul Hakeem was identified as an employee of the Sanabal Charitable Committee.
10. Hakeem was also identified as a major recruiter for the LIFG
11. Sometime after 9 September 2001, the Detainee, Faisal and Hakeem traveled to Kandahar, Afghanistan.
12. In December 2001, the Detainee failed at attempts to be smuggled across the Iranian border.
13. The Detainee traveled between Kandahar, Kabul, Heart ^[sic] , and Jalalabad, Afghanistan during November/December 2001, before being smuggled into Pakistan, apprehended by Pakistani authorities and turned over to U.S. forces.

[edit] Transcript

Al Daihani chose to participate in his Combatant Status Review Tribunal.^[21] On March 3, 2006, in order to comply with a court order, the Department of Defense published a twelve page summarized transcript from his Tribunal.

[edit] Opening statement

Al Daihani said he was on a two month holiday. He decided to spend the last two weeks of his vacation visiting Afghanistan. He had donated some funds, for digging wells, and he wanted to visit the project, to make sure his money was being used wisely, for the purposes he donated it for. He left Kuwait on September 9, 2001. And wasn't able to leave because, in reaction to the attacks of September 11, 2001, All of Afghanistan's neighbors closed their borders. Travel within Afghanistan was very difficult. He wasn't able to cross into Pakistan until December 15, 2001. He had his passport and other travel documents. The Pakistani authorities he sought help from reassured him that they would take him to the Kuwaiti embassy. Instead they turned him over to the Americans.

Al Daihani said the allegations he faced were new to him. None of his interrogators had ever asked him any questions about these topics.

[edit] Response to the allegations

• Al Daihani said that the Society for the Revival of Islamic Heritage was a legitimate charity, recognized by the Kuwaiti government, that sponsored humanitarian projects around the world, even in the USA.
• Al Daihani said he didn't work for the Society. He only donated to it. Furthermore, that donation wasn't recent, it was six years prior to the attacks of 9-11.
• In response to the allegation that his name was found on a hard drive belonging to an al Qaeda suspect, Al Daihani pointed out that the names of the Kuwaiti captives in Guantanamo was a matter of public record. He disputed that his name being found on an al Qaeda suspect's hard drive implied he had any association with al Qaida. He suggested that if his interrogators had seen his name being found on the hard drive was significant, they would have interrogated him about it -- and since they didn't the Tribunal should assume they did not regard it as meaningful.
• Al Daihani acknowledged participating in the Hajj in 2000. He acknowledged meeting a man named Faisal in Mecca, who suggested he donate money to finance the drilling of wells in drought-stricken areas of Afghanistan.
• Al Daihani said that he had believed that the Sanabal Charitable Committee was a legitimate charity, with its main office in London. He had no idea that it had any association with terrorism.
• Al Daihani acknowledged donating money to the Sanabal Charitable Committee, but the amount was $2,250, not 2,250 dinars. $2,250 is worth one third as much as 2,250 dinars.
• Al Daihani acknowledged meeting Faisal and Abdul Hakeem when he arrived in Karachi on September 9, 2001.
• Al Daihani responded to the allegation that Hakeem was a terrorist recruiter by saying he knew Hakeem and Faisal as ordinary people.
• Al Daihani corrected the allegation that he traveled to Afghanistan after September 11th, this was incorrect. In all his interrogations he thought he had made clear he traveled to Afghanistan on September 10, 2001. He had told his interrogators, many times, when they had asked him, that there was no way he would have traveled to Afghanistan after September 11th.
• Al Daihani repeated that he had been trying to escape from Afghanistan ever since September 11.
• Al Daihani said that he was sold to the Americans for a bounty.

Al Daihani's Personal Representative reminded him to tell the Tribunal about his hospital stay. Al Daihani then told the Tribunal that the day he arrived in Afghanistan he came down with a severe case of food poisoning, that kept him in the hospital for three or four days. He called his family from the hospital. And he believes that

"I think the American Intelligence heard my calls to my family or something and they know this. A lot of people who are detained here, some of them, they provided to them their phone calls to their families from Afghanistan. But it wasn't to their advantage. But [it] works to my advantage, these phone calls, because it was me telling my family I was trying to get out of Afghanistan."

[edit] Tribunal member's questions

Unusually, the first question from the Tribunal members was posed first to the Recorder, and then to al Daihani's Personal Representative.

• Al Daihani repeated that none of his interrogators had ever said anything about his name being found on an al Qaida suspect's hard drive.
• The Tribunal member then asked: "They must have asked you at one point about your associations with al Qaida?" -- Al Daihani told his Tribunal that none of his interrogators had ever asked him about al Qaida. He went on:

  "...the Revival of Islamic Heritage Society just once did they ask me, 'Did you donate to it?' I said yes, I donated to it. Even I mentioned this in the papers ^[sic] . They asked me about Kuwaiti organizations; just did I know of [them] in a general sense. Even the Revival of Islamic Heritage Society, they didn't ask me about it in great detail. Even if they had asked me about it, I don't know anything specific about it. Only they asked me ^[sic] , 'How do you present any project to them?' and I told them how I did it. I signed [up] a contract with the organization in the country they are working in. All official business, you know how it is between nations. When the project [is complete] they just bring me the pictures and everything. That's what I told them.

• Al Dahaini confirmed he was an educated man, with a good job, in Kuwait. He was a government auditor, and had worked as a government auditor since 1989.
• Al Daihani was asked if he was aware, when he traveled to Afghanistan, that Afghanistan was in the midst of a civil war. Al Daihani responded:

  "In the Kuwaiti media, some people visited Afghanistan, and they described the situation inside of Afghanistan and the war was in the North of Afghanistan. The situationw was better than before; there was peace in most of the cities in Afghanistan.

• Al Daihani donated enough money to dig five wells. If the projects had been handled by the Revival of Islamic Heritage he wouldn't have felt a need to travel to see the projects in person. The Revival of Islamic Heritage Society handled its projects in a very professional way, with contracts, and installments when they could document that certain stages of the work had been accomplished. He decided to visit in this case because the project to dig wells wasn't being overseen by the Society for the Revival of Islamic Heritage.
• Al Daihani said he was with eight or nine other people when he was captured. He wasn't with Faisal or Abdul Hakeem.
• Al Daihini confirmed his group had hired a local guide to take them through the mountain passes.
• Al Daihani agreed that a small donation like his wasn't sufficient, in and of itself, to justify and inspection visit. The reason he planned an inspection trip was that, if the project had gone well, he was considering sponsoring the drilling of further wells.

[edit] Administrative Review Board hearing

Hearing room where Guantanamo captive's annual Administrative Review Board hearings convened for captives whose Combatant Status Review Tribunal had already determined they were an "enemy combatant".^[22]

Detainees who were determined to have been properly classified as "enemy combatants" were scheduled to have their dossier reviewed at annual Administrative Review Board hearings. The Administrative Review Boards weren't authorized to review whether a detainee qualified for POW status, and they weren't authorized to review whether a detainee should have been classified as an "enemy combatant".

They were authorized to consider whether a detainee should continue to be detained by the United States, because they continued to pose a threat -- or whether they could safely be repatriated to the custody of their home country, or whether they could be set free.

[edit] Summary of Evidence memo

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Mohammed Fenaitel Mohamed Al Daihani's Administrative Review Board, on 22 April 2005.^[5] The memo listed factors for and against his continued detention.

[edit] The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Connections/Associations

1. A foreign government service has linked the detainee to the official spokesman for al Qaida.
2. After 11 September 2001, the detainee was at the home of an individual who helped facilitate travel to Afghanistan.
3. This individual is an extremist who "was contacted by a senior al Qaida lieutenant to raise money for operations in Israel. This individual has personally traveled to Afghanistan to deliver a message to Usama Bin Ladin in Qandahar.
4. The detainee's name appeared on a hard drive recovered from a suspected al Qaida safe house in Islamabad, Pakistan.

b. Intent

1. The detainee voluntarily traveled from Kuwait to Mecca, Saudi Arabia, on Hajj in 2000, where he met Faisal, an employee of the Sanabal Charitable Committee.
2. The Sanabal employee and the detainee saw each other every month to every month and a half. The Sanabal employee spoke with the detainee on at least four occasions about going to Afghanistan.
3. Sanabil's first priority was providing support to the Jihad activities of the Libyan Islamic fighting Group.
4. The detainee admitted donating approximately 2,250 dinars to the Sanabal Charitable Committee.
5. The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) is designated a foreign terrorist organization by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.
6. The detainee voluntarily flew from Kuwait to Karachi, Pakistan, on 9 September 2001, where he joined Faisal and Abdul Hakeem.
7. Abdul Hakeem was identified as an employee of the Sanabal Charitable Committee.
8. Hakeem was also identified as a major recruiter for the LIFG.
9. Sometime after 9 September 2001, the detainee, Faisal, and Hakeem traveled to Kandahar, Afghanistan.
10. In December 2001, the detainee failed at attempts to be smuggled across the Iranian boarder.
11. The detainee traveled between Kandahar, Kabul, Herat and Jalalabad Afghanistan, during November/December 2001, before being smuggled into Pakistan, apprehended by Pakistani authorities, and turned over to US forces.

[edit] The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

According to the detainee, the purpose of his eventual travel to Afghanistan was solely to verify the Sanabal Charitable Committee's work of building wells. Although the detainee had reservations about traveling to Afghanistan, he wanted to ensure that the money he donated, 2,250 dinars, had in fact been used to build five wells.

[edit] Transcript

On March 3, 2006, in compliance with a court order, the Department of Defense pubished a two page summarized transcript of his hearing.^[23] Captive 229 did not attend his hearing. He did ask his Assisting Military Officer to convey his response to the memo to his Board:

When asked if the Assisting Military Officer had any information to present on behalf of the detainee to the Administrative Review Board, the Assisting Military Officer stated that the detaiene did not provide any written statements but the detainee did ask the Assisting Military Officer to present his comments related to the Unclassified Summary of the Evidence to the Administrative Review Board.

The Assisting Military Officer made comments relating to the Review Board interviews.

The transcript from his Board hearing does not record any of the comments captive 229 made in response to the allegations in the Summary of Evidence memo.

[edit] Unclassified dossier

There is no record that Al Daihani participated in his Administrative Review Board hearing.^[24] But 61 pages of documents that his lawyers submitted to his Board were released to the public.

[edit] Board recommendations

In early September 2007 the Department of Defense released two heavily redacted memos, from his Board, to Gordon England, the Designated Civilian Official.^[25][26] The Board's recommendation was unanimous The Board's recommendation was redacted. England authorized his transfer on 26 June 2005.

The Administrative Review Board assessment and recommendation included these points:

The detainee is a habeas petitioner in the case of Al-Odah v. Bush Civil No 02-0828 (D.D.C.). As of the date of this memorandum, there is no court order requiring the government to provide the detainee's counsel or the court advance notice prior to removing the detainee from U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay. The Legal Sufficiency Review (Tab A) and the Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation (Tab B) with enclosures, are attached. There factors outside of the context of the ARB that warrant serious consideration of ########### decision: ############# ############ ########### ############## ############# ############ ############# ############ ########### ############## ############# ############ ############# ############ ########### ############## ############# ############ ############# ############ ########### ############## ############# ############ ############# ############ ########### ############## ############# ############ ############# ############ ########### ############## ############# ############

[edit] Press reports

Canadian journalist, and former special assistant to US President George W. Bush, David Frum, published an article based on his own reading of the transcripts from the Combatant Status Review Tribunals, on November 11, 2006.^[27] It was Frum who coined the term "Axis of evil" for use in a speech he wrote for Bush. Al Daihani's transcript was one of the nine Frum briefly summarized. His comment on Al Daihani was:

"One detainee, a Kuwaiti national named as an al Qaida operative on a captured al Qaida hard drive, was captured as he tried to flee from Afghanistan into Iran. He insisted that he had no association with any terrorist organization. What then had brought him to Afghanistan? His answer: He had donated 750 Kuwaiti dinars (“not a lot of money” he added) to an Islamic charity to dig wells in Aghanistan – and had decided to travel from Kuwait to see that his money was properly spent."

Frum came to the conclusion that all nine of the men whose transcript he summarized had obviously lied.^[27] He did not, however, state how he came to the conclusion they lied. His article concluded with the comment:

"But what’s the excuse of those in the West who succumb so easily to the deceptions of terrorists who cannot invent even half-way plausible lies?"

[edit] Repatriation

On May 12, 2007, the Kuwait Times reported that Kuwait the USA concluded negotiations regarding the repatriation of the remaining Kuwaiti captives.^[1]

[edit] References

1. ^ ^{a b} B Izzak. "US to free last Kuwaiti Guantanamo detainees", Kuwait Times, May 12, 2007. Retrieved on May 14. 
2. ^ ^{a b} OARDEC (May 15, 2006). List of Individuals Detained by the Department of Defense at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba from January 2002 through May 15, 2006. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-09-29.
3. ^ OARDEC (April 20, 2006). List of detainee who went through complete CSRT process. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-09-29.
4. ^ ^{a b} OARDEC (22 September 2004). Summary of Evidence for Combatant Status Review Tribunal -- Al Daihani, Mohammed Fenaital Mohamed pages 52-53. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2008-03-12.
5. ^ ^{a b} OARDEC (22 April 2005). Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Al Daihani, Mohammed Fenaitel Mohamed pages 24-25. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2008-03-12.
6. ^ OARDEC (July 17, 2007). Index for Combatant Status Review Board unclassified summaries of evidence. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-09-29.
7. ^ OARDEC (September 4, 2007). Index for testimony. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-09-29.
8. ^ OARDEC (August 8, 2007). Index for CSRT Records Publicly Files in Guantanamo Detainee Cases. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-09-29.
9. ^ OARDEC (August 9, 2007). Index to Summaries of Detention-Release Factors for ARB Round One. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-09-29.
10. ^ OARDEC (August 9, 2007). Index of Transcripts and Certain Documents from ARB Round One. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-09-29.
11. ^ OARDEC (July 17, 2007). Index to Transfer and Release Decision for Guantanamo Detainees. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-09-29.
12. ^ James R. Crisfield Jr (October 12, 2004). Declaration of Legal Advisor page 1. Office for the Administrative Review of Detained Enemy Combatants. Retrieved on 2007-06-27.
13. ^ Otherwise totally redacted page page 56. Office for the Administrative Review of Detained Enemy Combatants (October 12, 2004). Retrieved on 2007-06-27.
14. ^ Questions for the family of Munammad Sihli al Dayhani page 57. Office for the Administrative Review of Detained Enemy Combatants (October 12, 2004). Retrieved on 2007-06-27.
15. ^ translation of Mohamad Fenaytill Sahli Mohamad Al-Daihani Kuwaiti Civil ID Card page 61. Office for the Administrative Review of Detained Enemy Combatants (October 12, 2004). Retrieved on 2007-06-27.
16. ^ Jamal Yousuf Al-Haddad (March 3, 1996). translation of a letter from the Revival of Islamic Heritage Society page 65. Office for the Administrative Review of Detained Enemy Combatants. Retrieved on 2007-06-27.
17. ^ "Exhibit B: List Of Enemy Combatant Detainees With Pending Habeas Corpus Petitions Who Have Been Released From United States Custody", United States Department of Justice, April 17, 2007. Retrieved on 2008-05-05. 
18. ^ Guantánamo Prisoners Getting Their Day, but Hardly in Court, New York Times, November 11, 2004 - mirror
19. ^ Inside the Guantánamo Bay hearings: Barbarian "Justice" dispensed by KGB-style "military tribunals", Financial Times, December 11, 2004
20. ^ Annual Administrative Review Boards for Enemy Combatants Held at Guantanamo Attributable to Senior Defense Officials. United States Department of Defense (March 6, 2007). Retrieved on 2007-09-22.
21. ^ OARDEC (date redacted). Summarized Statement pages 71-82. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2008-03-12.
22. ^ Spc Timothy Book. "Review process unprecedented", JTF-GTMO Public Affairs Office, Friday March 10, 2006, pp. pg 1. Retrieved on 2007-10-10. 
23. ^ OARDEC (date redacted). Summary of Administrative Review Board Proceedings of ISN 229 pages 131-132. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2008-03-12.
24. ^ Summarized transcript (.pdf), from Mohammed Fenaitel Mohamed Al Daihani's Administrative Review Board hearing - page 169
25. ^ OARDEC (26 June 2005). Administrative Review Board assessment and recommendation ICO ISN 229 pages 17-18. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2008-03-12.
26. ^ OARDEC (29 April 2005). Classified Record of Proceedings and basis of Administrative Review Board recommendation for ISN 229 pages 19-23. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2008-03-12.
27. ^ ^{a b} David Frum. "Gitmo Annotated", National Review, November 11, 2006. Retrieved on April 23.