Mohamedou Ould Slahi

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Mohamedou Ould Slahi
Born: December 20, 1970(1970-12-20)
Rosso, Mauritania
Detained at: Guantanamo
ID number: 760
Conviction(s): no charge, held in extrajudicial detention
Occupation: Engineer

Mohamedou Ould Slahi (Arabic: محمد ولد صلاحي, transliterated Muhammad walad Salahi, also used the alias أبو مصعب, transliterated Abu Musab) (c.1972 - present) is a Mauritanian national formerly suspected of involvement in one of the 2000 millennium attack plots. Slahi was born in Mauritania, but moved to Germany in the late 1980s. He was well-known to investigators as an al-Qaida operative. In late 1999, Slahi was operating under the pseudonym "Abu Musab", unbeknownst to German or American intelligence.

He is in US detention.

Contents

[edit] Germany

Separately, members of the terrorist Hamburg cell were planning to go to Chechnya to defend Muslims against Russian forces. They met a stranger on a train named Khalid al-Masri, who advised them to talk to a man named Abu Musab (actually Slahi) in Duisburg Germany. Slahi advised them that it was difficult to get to Chechnya, and many Muslims were being turned away by the authorities. He therefore advised them to train in Afghanistan, and he gave them useful information in how to get there. In Afghanistan, these same travellers would become the core organizers of the September 11, 2001 attacks.

[edit] Canada

Afterwards, Slahi moved to Montreal, Canada and was granted permanent resident status despite security officials' concerns. He lived in a mosque as an imam. After the 2000 millennium attack plots failed, investigators began to suspect Slahi's involvement. The would-be suicide-attacker Ahmed Ressam had lived in the same mosque. Slahi moved suddenly to Mauritania, leading investigators to conclude he was fleeing; Slahi claims he went to visit his sick mother.

According to his testimony before his Combatant Status Review Tribunal Slahi lived in Canada from November 26, 1999 to January 20, 2000. He stayed with his friend, Hasni Mohsed, not in a mosque. He met some of Mohsen's friends, including Raoul Hanashi, who was recruited to Jihad and met Abu Zubaydah.

The Globe and Mail reports that Slahi found Canadian officials drilling holes through his wall, to insert surveillance devices.[1] Citing his Administrative Review Board hearing, the Globe and Mail reported that Slahi said the Police were unconcerned about the invasion of his privacy that he reported, and that the officials who tailed him made their presence obvious

[edit] Mauritania 2000-2001

In Mauritania, Slahi repeatedly turned himself in to authorities when asked to do so, but was twice released. Finally he was arrested and turned over to American forces, who rendered him to Jordan, where he remained for eight months. A report published by Amnesty International on September 18, 2006, describes his rendition and treatment there.[2] Later he was transferred back to US custody in the Bagram Theater detention facility and from there he was send to the Guantanamo Bay detention camps, in Cuba. He received some notice later when he went on a hunger strike to protest the fact that a severe rash he had developed was not being treated. He finally received medical treatment after he became ill from exhaustion. On December 14, 2005 it was confirmed that officials of the German foreign and domestic intelligence agencies (Bundesnachrichtendienst and Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz) had participated in the interrogation of Slahi at least once during a stay at the Guantanamo Bay camps between September 21 and September 27, 2002.

[edit] Guantanamo

Memos from meetings held on October 9, 2003 and February 2, 2004 summarizing meetings between General Geoffrey Miller and his staff and Vincent Cassard of the ICRC, acknowledged that camp authorities were not permitting the ICRC to have access to Slahi, due to "military necessity".[3][4]

As of April 20, 2006 Slahi remains in extrajudicial detention in the United States Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, in Cuba.[5] Slahi's detainee ID number is 760.

[edit] Combatant Status Review Tribunal

Combatant Status Review Tribunals were held in a trailer the size of a large RV. The captive sat on a plastic garden chair, with his hands and feet shackled to a bolt in the floor. Three chairs were reserved for members of the press, but only 37 of the 574 Tribunals were observed.
Combatant Status Review Tribunals were held in a trailer the size of a large RV. The captive sat on a plastic garden chair, with his hands and feet shackled to a bolt in the floor. Three chairs were reserved for members of the press, but only 37 of the 574 Tribunals were observed.[6]

The transcript from Slahi's Combatant Status Review Tribunal was released, on March 3, 2006, in response to a court order from US District Court Justice Jed Rakoff, together with 300 other transcripts.[7] The transcripts were released without identifying whose transcripts they were. On April 20, 2006 the Department of Defense released a list of the names and ID numbers of all the detainees who had gone through a CSRT, enabling Slahi's transcript to be found.

The Los Angeles Times wrote: "But the documents also show that the puzzle of a man U.S. terrorism experts believe was involved in the Sept. 11 attacks and the millennium plot to bomb Los Angeles International Airport seems only to grow deeper.[8]

The Times reports that Slahi has requested permission to live in the USA in a witness protection program. The Times says that Slahi continues to assert his innocence, that he acknowledges traveling to Afghanistan for Jihad, but it was during the Soviet occupation, and that he had cut his ties Al Qaeda a decade ago.

The Times reports:

"A detailed summary, obtained by The Times, of Slahi's interrogations by U.S. officials suggests that he played a more central role and that he lied about it during his many debriefings over the last four years."

[edit] Allegations

The allegations against Slahi were:

a The detainee is associated with Al Qaida and the Taliban.
  1. The detainee admitted that he traveled to Afghanistan to wage Jihad.
  2. The detainee stated that his goal was to become a martyr by dying for Islam.
  3. The detainee trained at the al Farouq camp in Afghanistan where he took the alias of Abu Masab.
  4. The detainee received training on the Kalashnikov, Simonov, UZI, M-16, Makarov pistol and rocket propelled grenades while at the al Farouq camp.

[edit] testimony

Slahi admitted he had traveled to Afghanistan to wage Jihad, and that he had trained at the al Farouq training camp. But that was during the Soviet occupation. He was present, in Afghanistan, when Kabul fell, and the Soviets withdrew. Slahi described how civil war between the different factions which had joined to fight the Soviets broke out. So he cut his ties and left. He had joined jihad to fight non-Muslim invaders who were oppressing Muslims.

He was asked if he would consider the American occupiers of Afghanistan non-Muslim invaders who were oppressing Muslims. He replied that he did not, because Muslims in America were free to practice their religion.

[edit] Administrative Review Board hearings

Hearing room where Guantanamo captive's annual Administrative Review Board hearings convened for captives whose Combatant Status Review Tribunal had already determined they were an "enemy combatant".
Hearing room where Guantanamo captive's annual Administrative Review Board hearings convened for captives whose Combatant Status Review Tribunal had already determined they were an "enemy combatant".[9]

Detainees who were determined to have been properly classified as "enemy combatants" were scheduled to have their dossier reviewed at annual Administrative Review Board hearings. The Administrative Review Boards weren't authorized to review whether a detainee qualified for POW status, and they weren't authorized to review whether a detainee should have been classified as an "enemy combatant".

They were authorized to consider whether a detainee should continue to be detained by the United States, because they continued to pose a threat -- or whether they could safely be repatriated to the custody of their home country, or whether they could be set free.

[edit] First annual Administrative Review Board

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Mohamedou Ould Slahi's first annual Administrative Review Board, on 22 November 2005.[10] The memo listed factors for and against his continued detention.

[edit] The following primary factors favor continued detention:
a. Commitment
  1. In 1992, the detainee traveled to Gardiz [sic] , Afghanistan to fight and was assigned to a mortar battery.
  2. The detainee actively recruited for jihad from 1992-1997. The detainee felt it was an important function and would often speak of jihad while he preached at mosques in Germany.
  3. Based on the detainee’s advice, an individual in Duisburg, Germany traveled to Afghanistan for weapons training and to join the armed Taliban forces. The detainee arranged for this individual to meet with Usama bin laden and the individual swore allegiance to al Qaida. The individual became an important and influential al Qaida member.
  4. While in Germany, the detainee worked with a friend who recruited people to go fight jihad in Afghanistan.
  5. In December 1999, the detainee became the Imam at a mosque in Montreal, Canada. The detainee thought that the Algerian Armed Islamic Group and the Salafis might have a presence at that mosque.
  6. An al Qaida operative identified the detainee as an al Qaida facilitator who played a part in recruiting jihadists to fight in Afghanistan and Chechnya and to become suicide hijackers in the west. The detainee convinced the al Qaida operative and three future World Trade Center suicide hijackers to undergo al Qaida basic military training in Afghanistan.
  7. An al Qaida operative stated that the detainee facilitated the operative’s initial travel to Afghanistan and his initial introduction to Usama bin Laden.
  8. An Islamic extremist stated that he attended meetings in the detainee’s house on numerous occasions with a future suicide bomber and an al Qaida operative.
  9. The detainee swore loyalty to Usama bin Laden in 1990.
b. Training
  1. The detainee was trained in the use of weapons and terrorist tactics in Usama bin Laden’s training camps in Afghanistan.
  2. In January 1991, the detainee trained for six weeks at Camp Farouq, located near Khowst. Training consisted of physical exercises and weapons training on the AK-47, Seminov, Uzi, M-16, Makarov pistol and rocket propelled grenades.
c. Connections/Associations
  1. From 1993 through 1999, the detainee was tasked by an individual to set up a radio broadcasting station in Sudan, to assist in counterfeiting money, especially United States currency, in Kandahar, Afghanistan, and to help establish greater Internet connectivity between Sudan and Kandahar. The detainee denied taking part in any of these taskings.
  2. The individual who tasked the detainee was one of Usama bin Laden’s key operatives.
  3. The detainee was involved in money laundering activities. The detainee wire United States currency three times for one of Usama bin Laden’s operatives.
  4. The detainee stated that he attended a mosque in Duisburg, Germany where the director was the leader of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad in the area.
d. Intent
  1. The detainee said that his goal while in Afghanistan was to become a martyr by dying for Islam. However, the detainee would fight in a battle and there would not be another one for months, thereby reducing his chances to be martyred.
  2. The detainee is a suspected facilitator of the failed millennium bombing conspiracy.
e. Other Relevant Data
  1. In January 2000, the detainee departed Canada to travel to Mauritania. On the way to Mauritania, the detainee was detained in Dakar, Senegal where he was questioned and released after four days.
  2. In April 2000, the detainee traveled from Mauritania to Germany where he was detained for three weeks and questioned by German authorities.
  3. In September 2001, the Mauritanian Security Service detained the detainee after the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States.

[edit] The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
a.
 The detainee denied having knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or U.S. interests.
b.
 The detainee stated that he did not know of Usama bin Laden’s operative’s involvement in terrorism when he transmitted money for him.
c.
 The detainee strongly denied that he had helped anyone travel to Chechnya or Afghanistan.

[edit] Transcript

Slahi chose to participate in his Administrative Review Board hearing.[11]

[edit] Second annual Administrative Review Board

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Mohamedou Ould Slahi's second annual Administrative Review Board, on 3 October 2006.[12] The memo listed factors for and against his continued detention.

[edit] Transcript

There is no record that Mohamedou Ould Slahi attended his second annual Board hearing.[13][14] In place of a transcript the Department of Defense released two letters which had been submitted to his Board.

The first letter, dated 18 October 2006, was from Mohamedou Ould Slahi[13]:

The attached letter is to place on the record my attorney's objections on my behalf to this proceeding. I agree with their objections, and that the letter made part of the record here.

[edit] Prosecutor withdrew because he believed Slahi's evidence was tainted by abuse

On March 31, 2007 the Wall Street Journal published an article focussed around Stuart Couch, a Marine Corps lawyer who withdrew from Slahi's prosecution.[15][16][17][18][19] Couch believed that Slahi was guilty — "had blood on his hands" — was the phrase he used. But he described seeing other captives being subjected to the same techniques that he had been subjected to when he underwent training in how to deal with torture, if he were ever captured. He said he believed that the confessions were the result of abusive interrogation.

Main article: SERE

[edit] The Wall Street Journal's account of Slahi's interrogation

The Wall Street Journal long article on Couch's concerns over the nature of Slahi's interrogation [15][16]

[edit] Last FBI interrogation, first CIA interrogation==

According to the Wall Street Journal Slahi had his last FBI interrogation on May 22, 2003.[15][16] His FBI interrogator warned him "this was our last session; he told me that I was not going to enjoy the time to come.".

The Wall Street Journal reports that the interrogation techniques used on Slahi now started to include isolation, temperature extremes, beatings and sexually humiliation.[15][16]

[edit] Death threats

The Wall Street Journal paraphrases an incident described in the Schmidt-Furlow Report:[15][16] [20]

"On July 17, 2003, a masked interrogator told Mr. Slahi he had dreamed of watching detainees dig a grave... The interrogator said he saw 'a plain, pine casket with [Mr. Slahi's] identification number painted in orange lowered into the ground.'

[edit] Other techniques

Slahi was repeatedly subjected to the use of an interrogation technique, in the summer of 2003, that the Schmidt-Furlow Report stated had been prohibited by the Secretary of Defense on December 2, 2002.

date page
number		 notes
July 3, 2003 21
  • Interrogators submit a request for a "Special Interrogation Plan" for Slahi to the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
  • The request was approved on August 3, 2003. According to the Schmidt-Furlow Report
"Interrogation logs indicate that the techniques were never implemented because the subject of the second special interrogation plan began to cooperate prior to the approval."
July 17, 2003 24
  • The Schmidt-Furlow Report stated: "...a masked interrogator was used to interrogate the subject of the second special interrogation.
  • The Schmidt-Furlow Report stated the masked interrogator told Slahi:
    • "that he had a dream about the subject of the second special interrogation dying."
    • "Specifically he told the subject ... that in the dream he 'saw four detainees that were chained together at the feet. They dug a hole that was six-feet long, six-feet deep, and four-feet wide.'"
    • "Then he observed the detainees throw a plain, pine casket with the detainee’s identification number painted in orange lowered into the ground."
    • "...his dream meant that he was never going to leave GTMO unless he started to talk, that he would indeed die here from old age and be buried on 'Christian… sovereign American soil.'"
  • The Schmidt-Furlow Report concluded that the "...dream story does not rise to the level of a threat."
July 20, 2003 24-25
  • The Schmidt-Furlow Report stated the masked interrogator told Slahi that his family was “incarcerated.”
August 2, 2003 26
  • The Schmidt-Furlow Report stated:
"...the Special Team Chief, while impersonating a USN Captain from the White House, told the subject ... that he had a letter indicating that the subject’s family had been captured by the United States and that they were in danger.
  • The Schmidt-Furlow Report stated that the letter didn't actually contain an explicit threat.
  • The Schmidt-Furlow Report stated:
    • "...the Special Team Chief indicated that prior to the 'threat' to detainee the subject of the second special interrogation he cleared the proposal and the letter with the senior judge advocate who approved the technique as a 'deception.'"
    • However, during their first interview with the Senior Judge Advocate he claiemd no recollection of the letter.
    • During their second interview with the Senior Judge Advocate he chose to exercise his right to protect himself from self-incrimination.
    • "The Special Team Chief also indicated that both JIG Chiefs in charge during the promulgation of the Special Interrogation Plan12 were also aware of the threat letter."
    • "The first JIG Chief has retired and was unwilling to cooperate with this investigation."
    • "The second JIG Chief indicated under oath that he was unaware of the interrogation events discussed above."
    • "Finally, the Commander (Geoffrey Miller) denies any knowledge of the existence of the threat or the letter. He does not recall ever discussing the issue of threats with the interrogators. He is aware that this is a prohibited practice and would not have permitted it if he had been aware of the plan."
August 2, 2003 25
  • The Schmidt-Furlow Report stated that Slahi was visited by a "messenger", with a "special message" that stated:
“That message was simple: Interrogator’s colleagues are sick of hearing the same lies over and over and are seriously considering washing their hands of him. Once they do so, he will disappear and never be heard from again. Interrogator assured detainee again to use his imagination to think of the worst possible scenario he could end up in. He told Detainee that beatings and physical pain are not the worst thing in the world. After all, after being beaten for a while, humans tend to disconnect the mind from the body and make it through. However, there are worse things than physical pain. Interrogator assured Detainee that, eventually, he will talk, because everyone does. But until then, he will very soon disappear down a very dark hole. His very existence will become erased. His electronic files will be deleted from the computer, his paper files will be packed up and filed away, and his existence will be forgotten by all. No one will know what happened to him and, eventually, no one will care.”
summer 2003 22
  • The Schmidt-Furlow Report confirmed that Slahi's claim that he was subjected to extremes of heat and cold.
  • The Schmidt-Furlow Report stated: "This technique was officially permitted under 16 Apr 03 SECDEF Memorandum – Environmental Manipulation."
  • The Schmidt-Furlow Report stated: "There is no evidence in the medical records of the subject of the second special interrogation being treated for hypothermia or any other condition related to extreme exposure."
summer 2003 22-23
  • According to the Schmidt-Furlow Report:
"The subject of the second special interrogation alleges that female military interrogators removed their BDU tops and rubbed themselves against the detainee, fondled his genitalia, and made lewd sexual comments, noises, and gestures."
  • According to the Schmidt-Furlow Report:
"The interrogation logs for the subject of the second special interrogation indicate that on a number of occasions female interrogators used their status as females to distract the subject of the second special interrogation during the interrogation but there is nothing to corroborate the allegation of the subject of the second special interrogation."
August 2003 23
  • According to the Schmidt-Furlow Report:
"The subject of the second Special Interrogation Plan alleges that in late summer of 2003 he was hit by guards and an interrogator 'very hard' and 'with all their strength' he was hit 'all over.'"
  • According to the Schmidt-Furlow Report:
"The interrogation logs contain no reference to any physical violence against the subject of the second Special Interrogation Plan. His medical records indicate that in August 2003 the subject of the second special interrogation reported 'rib contusions' from an altercation with MPs when moved between camps. During this examination the physician also noted an 'edema of the lower lip' and a 'small laceration' on his head. There are no other medical entries of any other physical injuries. There are no indications of swelling or contusions to support a conclusion that the subject of the second special interrogation was hit 'very hard all over.'"
August 2, 2003 23
  • According to the Schmidt-Furlow Report:
"The Special Team Chief impersonated a USN Captain assigned to the White House during interrogation of the subject of the second special interrogation.
  • According to the Schmidt-Furlow Report:
"...in an effort to convince the subject of the second special interrogation that he needed to cooperate ... presented a letter to the subject ... which indicated that ... in conjunction with authorities from the country of origin ... would interrogate the mother of the subject ... Plan. The letter further indicated that if his mother was uncooperative she would be detained and transferred to U.S. custody at GTMO for long term detention."
  • According to the Wall Street Journal interrogators stressed to Slahi how dangerous it would be for Slahi's mother to be the only female captive in Guantanamo.
  • According to the Schmidt-Furlow Report Major General Geoffrey Miller confirmed he was aware of the impersonation plan, but was unaware of the letter, or the threats to Slahi's mother.

Slahi's lawyers hve threatened to sue Jordanian, Mauritanian and US officials over his torture.[21]

[edit] Slahi's letter to his attorneys

The Wall Street Journal republished a letter Slahi wrote to his lawyers on November 9, 2006.[22] In this letter Slahi wrote:

  • he was still being regularly interrogated, after seven [sic] years in captivity;
  • all the confessions of crimes were the result of torture.

[edit] See also

  • Omar Khadr -- Canadian citizen, also detained in Guantanamo
  • Abdurahman Khadr -- Canadian citizen formerly detained in Guantanamo
  • Ahcène Zemiri -- Former resident of Canada, also detained in Guantanamo
  • Djamel Ameziane -- Former resident of Canada, also detained in Guantanamo

[edit] References

  1. ^ Colin Freeze. "Tortuous tale of Guantanamo captive: A declassified transcript reveals how a former Montreal resident crossed four continents and the paths of key al-Qaeda personalities", Globe and Mail, July 17, 2007. Retrieved on 2007-07-20. 
  2. ^ Rendition – torture – trial? The case of Guantánamo detainee Mohamedou Ould Slahi. Amnesty International (September 20, 2006). Retrieved on 2007-07-20.
  3. ^ ICRC Meeting with MG Miller on 09 Oct 2003 (.pdf), Department of Defense, October 9, 2003
  4. ^ ICRC Meeting 2 Feb 2004/1620 (.pdf), Department of Defense, February 2, 2004
  5. ^ list of prisoners (.pdf), US Department of Defense, May 15, 2006
  6. ^ Annual Administrative Review Boards for Enemy Combatants Held at Guantanamo Attributable to Senior Defense Officials. United States Department of Defense (March 6, 2007). Retrieved on 2007-09-22.
  7. ^ Summarized transcripts (.pdf), from Mohamedou Ould Slahi'sCombatant Status Review Tribunal - pages 28-38
  8. ^ Al Qaeda Mystery Man Described in Documents, Los Angeles Times, April 24, 2006 - - mirror
  9. ^ Spc Timothy Book. "Review process unprecedented", The Wire (JTF-GTMO), Friday March 10, 2006, pp. 1. Retrieved on 2007-10-12. 
  10. ^ OARDEC (22 November 2005). Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Slahi, Mohamedou Ould pages 68-70. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-11-16.
  11. ^ Summarized transcript (.pdf), from Mohamedou Ould Slahi's Administrative Review Board hearing - page 184
  12. ^ OARDEC (3 October 2006). Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Slahi, Mohamedou Ould pages 12-14. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-11-16.
  13. ^ a b Sylvia Royce. "Letter from Mohamedou Ould Slahi to his Administrative Review Board", OARDEC, October 18, 2006, pp. page 3023. Retrieved on 2007-11-16. 
  14. ^ Sylvia Royce. "Letter to Mohamedou Ould Slahi's Administrative Review Board", OARDEC, September 20, 2006, pp. pages 3024-3025. Retrieved on 2007-11-16. 
  15. ^ a b c d e Jess Bravin. "The Conscience of the Colonel", Wall Street Journal, March 31, 2007. Retrieved on April 11. 
  16. ^ a b c d e Jess Bravin (March 31, 2007). The Conscience of the Colonel. mirror of the Wall Street Journal article. Retrieved on April 11, 2007.
  17. ^ "Three tales of Gitmo 'taint'", Monterey Herald, Saturday April 7, 2007. Retrieved on April 11. 
  18. ^ Robert Scheer. "Leave Your Morals at the Border", The Nation, April 4, 2007. Retrieved on April 11. 
  19. ^ Scott Horton. "Colonel with a Conscience", Harper's Magazine, April 2]] 2007. Retrieved on April 11. 
  20. ^ Lieutenant General Randall Schmidt, Brigadier General John Furlow (June 9, 2005). Investigation into FBI Allegations of Detainee Abuse at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba Detention Facility: Executive Summary. US Department of Defense. Retrieved on April 11, 2007.
  21. ^ Noiselle Champagne. "Lawyers say Mauritanian was tortured in Guantanamo", Reuters, Monday 10 March 2008. Retrieved on 2008-03-11. "If our client is not freed, we will take all necessary action in the coming weeks," Sillahi's Mauritanian lawyer, Brahim Ould Ebetty, told Reuters in Nouakchott. "We will issue a legal case against the authors of his arrest in Mauritania and of his torture in Jordan and Guantanamo." 
  22. ^ Mohamedou Ould Slahi. "Mohamedou Ould Slahi letter to his attorneys", Wall Street Journal, November 9, 2006. Retrieved on April 11. 

[edit] External links

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