Miranda v. Arizona
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| Miranda v. Arizona | ||||||||||||||||
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| Argued February 28 – March 1, 1966 Decided June 13, 1966 |
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| Holding | ||||||||||||||||
| The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination requires law enforcement officials to advise a suspect interrogated in custody of his rights to remain silent and to obtain an attorney. Arizona Supreme Court reversed and remanded. | ||||||||||||||||
| Court membership | ||||||||||||||||
| Chief Justice: Earl Warren Associate Justices: Hugo Black, William O. Douglas, Tom C. Clark, John Marshall Harlan II, William J. Brennan, Jr., Potter Stewart, Byron White, Abe Fortas |
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| Case opinions | ||||||||||||||||
| Majority by: Warren Joined by: Black, Douglas, Brennan, Fortas Concurrence/dissent by: Clark Dissent by: Harlan Joined by: Stewart, White |
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| Laws applied | ||||||||||||||||
| U.S. Const. amends. V, Fourteenth Amendment | ||||||||||||||||
Miranda v. Arizona (consolidated with Westover v. United States, Vignera v. New York, and California v. Stewart), , was a landmark 5-4 decision of the United States Supreme Court which was argued February 28–March 1, 1966 and decided June 13, 1966. The Court held that both inculpatory and exculpatory statements made in response to interrogation by a defendant in police custody will be admissible at trial only if the prosecution can show that the defendant was informed of the right to consult with an attorney before and during questioning and of the right against self-incrimination prior to questioning by police, and that the defendant not only understood these rights, but voluntarily waived them.
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[edit] Background of the case
[edit] The Legal Aid Movement
During the 1960s, a movement which provided defendants with legal aid emerged from the collective efforts of various Bar Associations. In the civil realm, it led to the creation of the Legal Services Corporation under the Great Society program of Lyndon Baines Johnson. Escobedo v. Illinois, , a case which closely foreshadowed Miranda, provided for the presence of counsel during police interrogation. This reformist impulse extended to a concern over police interrogation practices, which were considered by many to be barbaric and unjust. Coercive interrogation tactics were known in period slang as the "third degree."
[edit] Arrest and conviction
In March 1963, Ernesto Arturo Miranda (Ernest Arthur Miranda) (born in Mesa, Arizona in 1941, and living in Phoenix, Arizona) was arrested for the kidnapping and rape of an 18 year old woman. He later confessed to robbery and attempted rape under interrogation by police. At trial, prosecutors offered not only his confession as evidence (over objection) but also the victim's positive identification of Miranda as her assailant. Miranda was convicted of rape and kidnapping and sentenced to 20 to 30 years imprisonment on each charge, with sentences to run concurrently. Miranda's court-appointed lawyer, Alvin Moore, appealed to the Arizona Supreme Court which affirmed the trial court's decision. In affirming, the Arizona Supreme Court emphasized heavily the fact that Miranda did not specifically request counsel.
[edit] The U.S. Supreme Court's decision
Chief Justice Earl Warren, a former prosecutor, delivered the opinion of the Court, ruling that due to the coercive nature of custodial interrogation by police (to bolster his point, Warren controversially cited several police training manuals), no confession could be admissible under the Fifth Amendment self-incrimination clause and Sixth Amendment right to an attorney unless a suspect had been made aware of his rights and the suspect had then waived them. Thus, Miranda's conviction was overturned.
| “ | The person in custody must, prior to interrogation, be clearly informed that he has the right to remain silent, and that anything he says will be used against him in court; he must be clearly informed that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with him during interrogation, and that, if he is indigent, a lawyer will be appointed to represent him. | ” |
The Court also made clear what had to happen if the suspect chose to exercise his rights:
| “ | If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease ... If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present. At that time, the individual must have an opportunity to confer with the attorney and to have him present during any subsequent questioning. | ” |
Although the ACLU had urged the Supreme Court to require the mandatory presence of a "station-house" lawyer at all police interrogations, Warren refused to go that far, or to even include a suggestion that immediately demanding a lawyer would be in the suspect's best interest. Either measure would make interrogations useless because any competent defense attorney would instruct his client to say nothing to the police.
Warren pointed to the existing practice of the FBI and the rules of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, both of which required notifying a suspect of his right to remain silent; the FBI warning included notice of the right to counsel.
However, the dissenting justices thought that the suggested warnings would ultimately lead to such a drastic effect — they apparently believed that once warned, suspects would always demand attorneys and deny the police the ability to seek confessions—and accordingly accused the majority of overreacting to the problem of coercive interrogations.
[edit] Harlan's dissent
In dissent, Justice Harlan wrote that "nothing in the letter or the spirit of the Constitution or in the precedents squares with the heavy-handed and one-sided action that is so precipitously taken by the Court in the name of fulfilling its constitutional responsibilities." Harlan closed his remarks by quoting former Justice Robert H. Jackson: "This Court is forever adding new stories to the temples of constitutional law, and the temples have a way of collapsing when one story too many is added."
[edit] Clark's dissent
In a separate dissent, Justice Tom C. Clark believed that the Warren Court went "too far too fast." Instead, Justice Clark would use the "totality of the circumstances" test enunciated by Justice Goldberg in Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. at 514. Under this test, the court would:
consider in each case whether the police officer prior to custodial interrogation added the warning that the suspect might have counsel present at the interrogation and, further, that a court would appoint one at his request if he was too poor to employ counsel. In the absence of warnings, the burden would be on the State to prove that counsel was knowingly and intelligently waived or that in the totality of the circumstances, including the failure to give the necessary warnings, the confession was clearly voluntary.for the good of life
[edit] Effects of the decision
Miranda was retried, and this time the police did not use the confession but called witnesses and used other evidence. Miranda was convicted, and he served 11 years. After his release, he returned to his old neighborhood and made a modest living autographing police officers' "Miranda cards" (containing the text of the warning, for reading to arrestees). He was killed in a bar fight on January 31, 1976.[1] The police arrested a suspect, who exercised his right to remain silent, and the case was never solved.
Following the Miranda decision, the nation's police departments were required to inform arrested persons of their rights under the ruling, termed a Miranda warning.
The Miranda decision was widely criticized when it came down, as many felt it was unfair to inform suspected criminals of their rights, as outlined in the decision. Richard M. Nixon and other conservatives denounced Miranda for undermining the efficiency of the police, and argued the ruling would contribute to an increase in crime. Nixon, upon becoming President, promised to appoint judges who would be "strict constructionists" and who would exercise judicial restraint. Many supporters of law enforcement were angered by the decision's negative view of police officers. The federal Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 purported to overrule Miranda for federal criminal cases and restore the "totality of the circumstances" test that had prevailed previous to Miranda. The validity of this provision of the law, which is still codified at 18 U.S. Code 3501, was not ruled on for another 30 years because the Justice Department never attempted to rely on it to support the introduction of a confession into evidence at any criminal trial. Miranda was undermined by several subsequent decisions which seemed to grant several exceptions to the "Miranda warnings," undermining its claim to be a necessary corollary of the Fifth Amendment.
As the years wore on, however, Miranda grew to be familiar and widely accepted. Due to the prevalence of American television police dramas made since that decision in which the police read suspects their "Miranda rights", it has become an expected element of arrest procedure. Americans began to feel that the warnings contributed to the legitimacy of police interrogations. In the actual practice, it was found many suspects waived their Miranda rights and confessed anyway.
[edit] Subsequent developments
Since it is usually required the suspect be asked if he/she understands his/her rights, courts have also ruled that any subsequent waiver of Miranda rights must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Many American police departments have pre-printed Miranda waiver forms which a suspect must sign and date (after hearing and reading the warnings again) if an interrogation is to occur.
But the words "knowing, intelligent, and voluntary" mean only that the suspect reasonably appears to understand what he/she is doing, and is not being coerced into signing the waiver; the Court ruled in Colorado v. Connelly, that it is completely irrelevant whether the suspect may actually have been insane at the time.
A confession obtained in violation of the Miranda standards may nonetheless be used for purposes of impeaching the defendant's testimony: that is, if the defendant takes the stand at trial and the prosecution wishes to introduce his/her confession as a prior inconsistent statement to attack his/her credibility, the Miranda holding will not prohibit this. Harris v. New York, .
A "spontaneous" statement made by a defendant while in custody, even though the defendant has not been given the Miranda warnings or has invoked the right to counsel and a lawyer is not yet present, is admissible in evidence, as long as the statement was not given in response to police questioning or other conduct by the police likely to produce an incriminating response. Rhode Island v. Innis, .
There is also a "public safety" exception to the requirement that Miranda warnings be given before questioning: for example, if the defendant is in possession of information regarding the location of an unattended gun or there are other similar exigent circumstances which require protection of the public, the defendant may be questioned without warning and his responses, though incriminating, will be admissible in evidence. New York v. Quarles, .
A number of empirical studies by both supporters and opponents of Miranda have concluded that the giving of Miranda warnings has little effect on whether a suspect agrees to speak to the police without an attorney. However, Miranda's opponents, notably law professor Paul Cassell, argue that letting go 3 or 4% of criminal suspects (who would be prosecuted otherwise but for defective Miranda warnings or waivers) is still too high a price to pay.
Miranda survived a strong challenge in Dickerson v. United States, , where the validity of Congress's overruling of Miranda was tested. At issue was whether the Miranda warnings were actually compelled by the U.S. Constitution, or were rather merely measures enacted as a matter of judicial policy.
In Dickerson, the Court held 7-2 that the "the warnings have become part of our national culture," speaking through Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist. In dissent, Justice Antonin Scalia argued that the Ellis Smith warnings were not constitutionally required, citing a panoply of cases that demonstrated a majority of the then-current court, counting himself, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, and Thomas, "[were] on record as believing that a violation of Miranda is not a violation of the Constitution."
Dickerson reached the Court under a bizarre set of circumstances. Although the Justice Department under President Clinton had treated Miranda as valid, the Supreme Court was forced to grant certiorari to prevent a circuit split after the 4th Circuit (on its own initiative) took up Professor Cassell's suggestion and ruled that Congress had overruled Miranda with the Crime Control and Safe Streets Act. The Solicitor General refused to defend the constitutionality of the Act, so the Court invited Professor Cassell to argue against the validity of Miranda.
Over time, interrogators began to think of clever techniques to honor the "letter" but not the "spirit" of Miranda. In the case of Missouri v. Seibert, , the Supreme Court halted one of the most egregious practices. Missouri police were deliberately withholding Miranda warnings and questioning suspects until they obtained confessions, then giving the warnings, getting waivers, and getting confessions again. Justice Souter wrote for the plurality: "Strategists dedicated to draining the substance out of Miranda cannot accomplish by training instructions what Dickerson held Congress could not do by statute."
Even leaving aside deliberate circumvention, the issue of "free will" in waiving Miranda rights has been raised, with the suggestion that a suspect, simply by being in custody, is already sufficiently coerced as to call "free will" into question.
[edit] See also
[edit] Further reading
- Baker, Liva (1983). Miranda: Crime, law, and politics. New York: Atheneum. ISBN 0689112408.
- Levy, Leonard W. [1969] (1986). Origins of the Fifth Amendment, Reprint, New York: Macmillan. ISBN 0029195802.
- Stuart, Gary L. (2004). Miranda: The Story of America's Right to Remain Silent. Tucson, Arizona: University of Arizona Press. ISBN 0816523134.
[edit] External links
