Miracles (book)

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Miracles is a book by C. S. Lewis originally published in 1947 and revised in 1960. In it, Lewis makes the case for miracles by first arguing that there must be something more than nature or "the whole show", and then arguing that the something more is a benevolent being, and that it is likely that he would intervene in nature after creating it. The book is similar to Mere Christianity in that it progresses from an agnosticism to a fully Christian world view.

In a chapter on "Natural Laws", Lewis addresses the issue of whether miracles are incompatible with natural law or science. He argues that rather than being mutually exclusive, miracles are definite interventions that go beyond natural laws. Miracles are consistent with nature, but beyond natural law. They are caused by a benevolent being.

All of the major miracles of the New Testament are treated, with the incarnation (in which God becomes man) playing the central role. Also included are two appendices which deal with matters of free will and the value of prayer.

Contents

[edit] Critical discussion

In chapter four of his book C.S. Lewis and the Search for Rational Religion, the philosopher John Beversluis critically examines Lewis' central positions in Miracles, in particular his arguments against naturalism.

[edit] The Argument From Reason

Philosophers and scientists such as Victor Reppert, William Hasker and Alvin Plantinga have expanded on the so-called Argument from Reason and credit C.S. Lewis--who called it "The Cardinal Difficulty of Naturalism," the title of chapter three of the book--with first bringing the argument to light in Miracles[1].

In short the argument holds that if, as thoroughgoing naturalism entails, all of our thoughts are the effect of a physical cause, then we have no reason for assuming that they are also the consequent of a reasonable ground. Knowledge, however, is apprehended by reasoning from ground to consequent. Therefore, if naturalism were true, there would be no way of knowing it--or anything else not the direct result of a physical cause--and we could not even suppose it except by a fluke[2]

By this logic, the statement "I have reason to believe naturalism is valid" is self-referentially incoherent in the same manner as the sentence "One of the words of this sentence does not have the meaning that it appears to have." or the statement "I never tell the truth" [3]. That is, in each case to assume the veracity of the conclusion would eliminate the possibility of valid grounds from which to reach it. To summarize the argument in the book, Lewis quotes J. B. S. Haldane who appeals to a similar line of reasoning:[4]

If my mental processes are determined wholly by the motions of atoms in my brain, I have no reason to suppose that my beliefs are true ... and hence I have no reason for supposing my brain to be composed of atoms. (J. B. S. Haldane, Possible Worlds, p. 209)

In modern philosophic discussion, the argument is closely related to David Chalmers's hard problems of consciousness, Jaegwon Kim and the problem of mental causation, and debates concerning the incompatibility of naturalism and free will.

[edit] Bibliography

  • John Beversluis C.S. Lewis and the Search for Rational Religion. Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. erdmans, 1985. ISBN 0-8028-0046-7
  • C.S. Lewis Miracles. London & Glasgow:Collins/Fontana, 1947. Revised 1960. (Current edition: Fount, 2002. ISBN 0006280943)
  • Victor Reppert C.S. Lewis's Dangerous Idea. Downers Grove, Illinois: InterVarsity Press, 2003. ISBN 0-8308-2732-3

[edit] References

  1. ^ Victor Reppert C.S. Lewis's Dangerous Idea. Downers Grove, Illinois: InterVarsity Press, 2003. ISBN 0-8308-2732-3
  2. ^ Victor Reppert C.S. Lewis's Dangerous Idea. Downers Grove, Illinois: InterVarsity Press, 2003. ISBN 0-8308-2732-3
  3. ^ A Response to Richard Carrier's Review of C.S. Lewis's Dangerous Idea
  4. ^ The Cardinal Difficulty Of Naturalism