Talk:Metaphysical naturalism
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I suggest the bibliography be limited to books that actually argue for naturalism more or less as a complete worldview, and not be filled with books that merely pertain to naturalism or defend only one part of a naturalist worldview (which are legion).
I suggest the list of names after "prominent defenders of metaphysical naturalism as a complete worldview" be limited to persons who meet all three of the following criteria:
- Person wrote one or more books that singly or together argue for metaphysical naturalism as a complete worldview, rather than only writing on one or another aspect of the naturalist worldview.
- Person is still alive and actively publishing on the subject.
- Person is prominent enough to have a Wikipedia entry.
These were the criteria I employed when I composed the original draft for Wikipedia. No one has deviated from them as of yet, so I include them here only for the benefit of future editors. If anyone suggests changing these criteria, I suggest they also be willing to undertake the burden of adding those persons and books that meet the new criteria and otherwise warrant inclusion.
RichardCarrier 01:48, 23 May 2006 (UTC)
First, all mental contents (such as ideas, theories, emotions, moral and personal values, or beauty and ugliness) exist solely as the computational constructions of our brain, and not as things that exist independently of us.
- I understand the above sentence is more of a proposition in a naturalistic statement of faith, but some sort of citation of evidence would be helpful. After all, such a proposition swims upstream against the river of intuition. (The reality of personal, private thought is one reason why I reject naturalism.)
66.143.45.146 15:35, 9 June 2006 (UTC)
As I understand it, naturalism doesn't just rule out the supernaturtal, but also the un-natural and non-natural. I believe, that naturalism rules out things like universals as well, and that these are not generally considered "supernatural". Does anyone have any comment to make? I have made a similar remark on the naturalism discussion page. 86.134.41.134 04:13, 14 July 2006 (UTC)
I'll comment that all the things you just mentioned, as well as most of the article, are completely circular as definitions of naturalism. Is there just an arbitrary list of things which naturalists define as supernatural and reject, or is there actually some logical basis for it? If so, that needs to be refelcted in the article. 212.9.22.229 10:24, 17 August 2006 (UTC)
Just the things that science cannot explain?
I came across this article and having decided that metaphysical naturalism applies to my beliefs, I was amazed at the inconsistancies that came about between my naturalist philosophy and what this article implied were my beliefs. I was first taken aback by the constant reference to naturalistic metaphysics in terms of "mindlessness". whether one believes that everything is natural or not has nothing inherantly to do with mindlessness, nor does it have anything at all to do with your belief in God. the idea that God is supernatural is only a result of abrahamic religious bias, as many religions and philosophies of belief regard God in a very similar way to nature itself. God could be easily seen as the totality of nature, but insistance on the western ideas of intelligent design and creationism creates bias in this article that seem to contradict this notion. I am not placing a NPOV on this article, as this idea is symptomatic of centuries of exclusively abrahimic study of religion, but this article should be extensively edited in order to provide a more worldwide view of metaphysical naturalism in a more inclusive theoretical context. Flying Hamster 21:47, 11 December 2006 (UTC)
Indeed, the definition section contains an error caused by the mind bias; namely the falsity of MN does not entail "some minds, or some of the contents or powers or effects of minds, are causally independent of nature". MN would be false simply if, say, prayer worked or seven-league boots existed. I may change this section unless credible reasons for requiring mind effects are forthcoming. TobyK 01:15, 13 July 2007 (UTC)
Contents |
[edit] Arguments Against Naturalism
The Arguments Against Naturalism section needs a bit of a cleanup methinks. Only the main arguments need go up, we dont need silly things such as "Argument from reason" or "Argument from incoherence". --void main 15:14, 21 July 2006 (UTC)
Argement from reason is an important argument eta: Husserl's anti-psychologism was about the possibility of logic.
Reference for supernatural: Oxford companion to philosophy: Naturalism Eta: Sorry for all the edits Eta2: Should wikipedia really draw so much attention to (and rely on) the debate between two authors, neither of which seem to have even masters in philosophy?! I would have guessed that neither has nor can answer the question. No offense like.
It seems that this section of the article turns out to actually be more like 'arguments for naturalism.' A lot of the con arguments do not seem to represent the best arguments possible against naturalism. Some, in fact, seem like straw men. I think it is best to show the naturalist reply to criticism, yet I also think that the way the article stands makes it seem as though naturalism is obviously the best position to take. This may be the case, but I don't think an encyclopedic article, being informative rather than persuasive, should take this route.
- I entirely agree. The "argument from incoherence" just serves as a link refuting such argument, not giving a tenable example of one. I could probably make one just from scaning over the page, but that would be original research. Such as in the "argument from miricles" it states; But, naturalists argue, in every case where these claims became accessible to empirical inquiry they failed to be confirmed or were even refuted. the link given for the critique by Richard C. Carrier tries to separate the foundation of "scientism" from "naturalism" as the basis of the argument by Michael Rea, but it doesn't separate "empiricalism" from "naturalism", in fact, it seems to equate them specifically. Which ultimately seems as if it would make all of the inconsistences of Rea continue to stand true.
- For example the line where it has the example that points to the worlds presented in the movies Ghost Busters and Star Wars. In the former, Dan Akroyd's character "could measure the ghost 'residue' and make successful predictions of ghost activity," and in the latter "the Jedi knights could learn ... how to use 'the Force'" which was comparable to a "technology," and "by being able to repeat demonstrations of the Force," they "could at least in theory have tried to figure out how and why it worked the way it does" and that is, quite simply, "science." Yet neither world would be one naturalists could believe in and still call themselves 'naturalists' in any intelligible way. Here he tries to separate science & naturalism, but clearly these are showing science by example of empiricalism, which he goes on to equate the basis of naturalism to. Nagelfar 00:28, 28 April 2007 (UTC)
[edit] free will?
Does a person that is only made of matter really have any free will? 70.20.234.188 19:47, 30 October 2006 (UTC)
- It depends on your point of view. Metaphysical naturalism offers this explanation. --Ioeth 19:49, 7 November 2006 (UTC)
[edit] Proposed change to section "Argument to naturalism as best explanation"
This comment is in reference to the section Argument to naturalism as best explanation.
To me, the wording in this section (i.e. "God" with a capital "G") seems to be focusing on a naturalistic argument specifically against Abrahamic religions rather than against all supernaturalistic worldviews in general. I think that it might be good to re-word this section a bit so that metaphysical naturalism as a best explanation is not just an argument against Abrahamic religions. It's probably not a bad idea to check the rest of the article for this sort of neutrality either, although nothing else stuck out in my mind.
This is not to say that "God" can not or should not be referenced within the article. For instance, the section Arguments against naturalism uses the popular idea of "God" as a means to better define the naturalist worldview.
Any thoughts, or should I do a little rewriting? --Ioeth 07:26, 7 November 2006 (UTC)
- Sounds good to me. Gabrielthursday 17:09, 7 November 2006 (UTC)
-
- Here's my proposed rewrite:
- Some naturalists argue that sound naturalist hypotheses about facts still scientifically unexplained outperform all other hypotheses in explanatory scope and power, relative to explanatory simplicity. If that's true, then metaphysical naturalism is the best explanation of everything we observe and experience, and is therefore probably true. This amounts to arguing that everything makes more sense if naturalism is true, many details about ourselves and the world are more probable if naturalism is true, and to explain even the most mysterious of facts naturalism has to resort to fewer ad hoc assumptions than any known alternative. For example, resorting to the supernatural as explanation typically requires an array of completely ad hoc assumptions about the abilities, nature, limitations, and desires of supernatural forces. Even so, much of what remains unexplained is then elucidated as simply the "mystery" of the enigmatic will of the supernatural or as beyond human ken. Naturalism, on the other hand, relies much more heavily on assumptions already scientifically established as precedents and principles, and makes more specific predictions about what the observed results would be if naturalism were true, which align very well with actual observations.
- Opinions? --Ioeth 19:40, 7 November 2006 (UTC)
- Here's my proposed rewrite:
I reverted a change that shoeofdeath made. If he has a problem with it, I suggest he talk to me about it :roll:
[edit] Section Name?
Anyone have a better name for the subsection "Ancient Period"? Sanjat312
I changed the diambiguation page. As such I think both articles are wrong headed. I suggest leading out the arguments page until someone reads something written by someone with some qualifications ;)
Ricard Carrier has written this entry AND recommended his book/work in it! I think it needs to be rewrtten for thsi reason alone! Also, I don't think the arguments against section is neutral: most end in claims that the argument is incorrect, surely there is some academic disagreement as to whether e.g. the existence of qualia undermines naturalism? And why demand scientific evidence for supernatural causes, surely this is impossible as what was considered supernatural would then be natural?
[edit] Cites, please. Avoid (appearance of) original research.
In common with many of Wikipedia's philosophy pages, this article contains many assertions without cites which could be construed as original research / author's POV. IMHO, the section "Common beliefs" is particularly questionable here. (For what it's worth, I do share most of these beliefs myself -- I just want the assertions to be backed up with something.) Wikipedia:Citing sources, Wikipedia:No original research --Writtenonsand 17:06, 1 March 2007 (UTC)
[edit] "Primacy of happiness": A characteristically Naturalist belief or no?
In the section "Common beliefs", "Primacy of happiness" strikes me as an item which is not obviously relevant here. Any discussion pro/con? -- Writtenonsand 17:12, 1 March 2007 (UTC)
I just added comments on the Evolutionary argument against naturalism section, as the counterpoint of naturalists was not mentioned. my major source for this was Richard Dawkins' The God Delusion. i apologise for not citing it or the lack of "quality standards" in my typed response, as i am ignorant of these procedures and unfortunately limited for time. i apologise also for the laziness and haste of my contribution, but i do hope someone better qualified can add these explanations/counterpoints in any relevant topics, including the main article on "Evolutionary argument against naturalism" if they are not present there.--Avidya 5:52 7 April 2007 (UTC)
[edit] method vs metaphysical
In the very end of the definition section: "but not all methodological naturalists are metaphysical naturalists." why?
My proposed rewrite of this article is as follows:
Metaphysical naturalism
1.0 Definition 2.0 History
2.1 Ancient period 2.2 Middle Ages to modernity 2.3 Marxism, Objectivism, and secular humanism
3.0 Common beliefs
3.1 Undesigned universe 3.2 Unplanned life 3.3 Evolution 3.4 Brain as Mind 3.5 Utility of reason 3.6 Value of society
4.0 Arguments for naturalism
4.1 Argument from precedent 4.2 Argument for naturalism as best explanation 4.3 Argument from absence 4.4 Argument from physical minds 4.5 Argument from the implausibility of alternatives
5.0 Arguments against naturalism
5.1 Argument from despair 5.2 Argument from religious experience 5.3 Argument from miracles 5.4 Argument from the necessity of God 5.5 Argument to cosmological design 5.6 Argument to biological design 5.7 Argument from consciousness 5.8 Argument from reason 5.9 Argument from physical law 5.10 Argument from incoherence 5.11 Moral argument
Metaphysical naturalism is any worldview in which the world is amenable to a unified study that includes the natural sciences and in this sense the world is a unity. According to such a view, nature is all there is, and all things supernatural (which stipulatively includes spirits and souls, non-natural values, and universals as they are commonly conceived) do not exist. It is often simply referred to as naturalism, and occasionally as philosophical naturalism or ontological naturalism, though all those terms have other meanings as well, with naturalism often referring to methodological naturalism. This article presents only a basic outline of the definition and history of metaphysical naturalism and the major arguments for and against it.
1.0 Definition
Metaphysical naturalism is most commonly distinguished from methodological naturalism which refers to the long standing convention in science of the scientific method, which makes the methodological assumption that observable events in nature are explained only by natural causes, without assuming the existence or non-existence of the supernatural, and so considers supernatural explanations for such events to be outside science. Metaphysics is the branch of philosophy concerned with what exists beyond what has already been established by science, so metaphysical naturalism refers to a belief about the totality of what exists. Methodology, however, is only the means by which knowledge is acquired. Thus, metaphysical naturalism entails the belief that nature is in fact all that exists, while methodological naturalism entails the belief that for one reason or another empirical methods will only ascertain natural facts, whether supernatural facts exist or not.The concept of "nature" embraced by contemporary metaphysical naturalists excludes by definition gods, spirits, and any other supernatural beings, objects, or forces. There are many different varieties of metaphysical naturalism, but all can be separated into two general categories, physicalism and pluralism. Physicalism entails the claim that everything everyone has observed or claimed to observe is in actual fact the product of fundamentally mindless arrangements or interactions of matter-energy in space-time, and therefore it is unreasonable to believe anything else exists. Pluralism, which includes dualism, adds to this the existence of fundamentally mindless things besides matter-energy in space-time; ie. reified abstract objects. What all metaphysical naturalists agree on, however, is that the fundamental constituents of reality, from which everything derives and upon which everything depends, are fundamentally mindless. So if any variety of metaphysical naturalism is true, then any mental properties that exist (hence any mental powers or beings) are causally derived from, and ontologically dependent on, systems of nonmental properties, powers, or things. This means metaphysical naturalism would be false if any distinctly mental property, power, or entity exists that is not ontologically dependent on some arrangement of nonmental things, or that is not causally derived from some arrangement of nonmental things, or that has causal effects without the involvement of any arrangement of nonmental things that is already causally sufficient to produce that effect. In lay terms, if metaphysical naturalism is true, then all minds, and all the contents and powers and effects of minds, are entirely constructed from or caused by natural phenomena; if metaphysical naturalism is false, then some minds, or some of the contents or powers or effects of minds, are causally independent of nature (either they partly or wholly cause themselves, or they exist or operate fundamentally on their own). Belief in the latter entails some form of supernaturalism (the opposite of naturalism), which is not limited to supernatural beings, but can encompass mindless things with distinctly mental properties, like magical objects (see magic and incantation) or causally efficacious Platonic forms or the existence of love as a cosmic force. Finally, it should be noted that the relationship between metaphysical and methodological naturalism is not one-dimensional and varies among individual thinkers. To understand this relationship, two varieties of methodological naturalism should be distinguished. Absolute methodological naturalism is the view that it is in some sense impossible for any empirical method to discover supernatural facts, even if there are some; this is compatible with (but does not entail) the view that something other than empirical methods might be able to discover supernatural facts. Contingent methodological naturalism entails the belief that, judging from past experience, empirical methods are far more likely to uncover natural facts than supernatural ones, so that it is generally an ill-advised waste of resources to pursue supernatural hypotheses, but it would not be impossible to confirm them empirically if any were true. With all this understood, every metaphysical naturalist will be either a contingent methodological naturalist or an absolute methodological naturalist, but not all methodological naturalists are metaphysical naturalists.
2.0 History
2.1 Ancient period
Metaphysical naturalism appears to have originated in early Greek philosophy. The earliest presocratic philosophers, such as Thales, Anaxagoras or most especially Democritus, were labeled by their peers and successors "the physikoi" (from the Greek φυσικός or physikos, meaning "natural philosopher," borrowing on the word φύσις or physis, meaning "nature") because they sought to explain everything by reference to natural causes alone, often distinctly excluding any role for gods, spirits or magic in the creation or operation of the world. This eventually led to fully developed systems such as Epicureanism, which sought to explain everything that exists as the product of atoms moving in a void, or the advanced Aristotelianism of Strato of Lampsacus, which sought to explain everything that exists as the inevitable outcome of uncreated natural forces or tendencies. In their definition of nature, the ancient Greeks distinguished "nature" from "artifice." Anything that resulted from the innate properties of a thing was regarded as having a natural cause, regardless of whether those properties themselves were intelligently arranged or not, while anything that resulted from intelligent action was regarded as having an artificial cause, regardless of whether the intelligence itself was the product of natural causes. Thus, natural causes were partially distinguished from intelligent causes. It was often assumed that some intelligent causes were primary causes and not solely the product of natural properties, but not everyone agreed. Following the physikoi and their successors, some ancient intellectuals denied the existence of any intelligent causes that were not entirely the product of natural causes (thus reducing all intelligent causes to natural causes), and they represent the earliest metaphysical naturalists.However, only a few Greek and Roman intellectuals embraced such a view, though of those few, Epicurus and Strato of Lampsacus were the most famous. Metaphysical naturalism is most notably a Western phenomenon, but an equivalent idea has long existed in the East. Though unnamed and never articulated into a coherent system, one tradition within Confucian philosophy embraced a view that can correctly be called metaphysical naturalism, dating back at least to Wang Ch'ung in the 1st century, if not earlier. But this tradition arose independently and had little influence on the development of modern naturalist philosophy or on Eastern or Western culture.
2.2 Middle Ages to modernity
With the rise and dominance of Christianity and the decline of secular philosophy in the West, metaphysical naturalism became heretical and eventually illegal, thus making it difficult to document the history of metaphysical naturalism in the Middle Ages. When the Renaissance reintroduced numerous lost treatises by Greek and Roman natural philosophers, many of the ideas and concepts of naturalism were picked up again, contributing to a new Scientific Revolution that would greatly advance the study and understanding of nature. But social and legal hostility continued to prevent advocates of metaphysical naturalism from coming forward, if there were any, until the political advances of the Age of Enlightenment made genuine free speech possible. Then a few intellectuals publicly renewed the case for metaphysical naturalism, like Baron d'Holbach in the 18th century. In this period, metaphysical naturalism finally acquired a distinct name, materialism, which became the only category of metaphysical naturalism widely defended until the 20th century, when advances in physics as well as philosophy made the original premise of materialism untenable. In physics, matter was found to be a form of energy and therefore not the fundamental constituent of reality as materialists had been presuming. In philosophy, renewed attention to the problem of universals and other undeniable but "immaterial" realities, further called materialism into question. These developments refined naturalism into the two forms now widely advanced (physicalism and naturalist pluralism, as explained above), both corresponding more closely to the system historians believe was articulated by Strato, rather than the system advanced by Epicurus as is commonly thought. Currently, metaphysical naturalism is more widely embraced than ever before, especially but not exclusively in the scientific community, where acquaintance with the facts of nature is broader and more secure, though metaphysical naturalism is still a minority worldview. The vast majority of the population of the world remains firmly committed to supernaturalist worldviews. However, it is likely that a substantial minority or even a majority of the population in certain European and other first world countries might embrace metaphysical naturalism in some basic, unarticulated sense.To date, nothing that is not physical has ever been discovered, and so metaphysical naturalism remains a valid position based upon what is currently known. Today, noteworthy proponents are too numerous to count, but prominent defenders of metaphysical naturalism as a complete worldview include Mario Bunge, Richard Carrier, Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennett, Sam Harris, and David Mills.
2.3 Marxism, Objectivism, and secular humanism
As a final note to the history of metaphysical naturalism, certain extreme varieties of politicized naturalism have arisen in the West, most notably Marxism in the 19th century and Objectivism in the 20th century. Marxism is an expression of communist or socialist ideals in a naturalist framework, while Objectivism is the exact opposite, an expression of capitalist ideals in a naturalist framework. However, today most advocates of metaphysical naturalism in first world countries reject both extremes and embrace the more moderate political ideals of secular humanism.
3.0 Common beliefs
Contemporary naturalists possess a wide diversity of beliefs and engage each other in healthy debate and disagreement on many issues. However, besides the basic beliefs already described above, most if not all contemporary naturalists believe the following, as a consequence of applying the core beliefs of naturalism to the findings of the sciences and their own personal experience.
3.1 Undesigned universe
The universe has either always existed or had a purely natural origin, being neither created nor designed. Either way, naturalists hold nature (rather than, say, God or Tao) to be the eternal ground of all being. Big Bang theory is now well-established and entails the observable universe had a beginning, unfolding from a process of natural laws, but this does not entail anything about what existed before, and thus does not resolve the question of whether all that exists began to exist or whether something of some sort has always existed, so most naturalists remain open to either hypothesis. Though it is neither required nor universally embraced by naturalists, multiverse theory is particularly popular now, as scientific advances have substantially increased the likelihood that the observable universe is only part of a much larger whole, and the explanatory power and relative simplicity of current multiverse cosmologies is remarkable. Another idea that has been put forth by naturalists is that energy, the source of matter, has always existed. They cite the first law of thermodynamics as a basis for this. It is often emphasized by naturalists of this position that energy, not the universe in its current state, exists eternally.
3.2 Unplanned life
Life is an unplanned product of blind natural processes. In our case, this meant the combination of a chain of chemicals called amino acids, into a pattern that was automatically self-replicating (possibly as autocatalytic RNA or PNA), in a sheltered but energy-rich environment. The extreme improbability of such a combination has ensured that life is extremely rare. However, though life is indeed rare, the observable universe is so incredibly old and large that even very improbable events are virtually guaranteed to happen a few times within it, and life on earth is one of those nearly inevitable outcomes. Our existence is therefore seen as lucky rather than planned or intended, and most naturalists call upon everyone to appreciate and make the best of their good fortune rather than devaluing or squandering it. Some scientific theories as to the origin of life are abiogenesis and panspermia, among other things.
3.3 Evolution
Evolution by natural selection is a staple of the naturalist worldview, perceived as a well-established scientific explanation for the rise and diversity of life on earth, which developed slowly and imperfectly over an extremely long period of time. Thus, our own existence as conscious animals of superior intelligence and sagacity, is explained not as the outcome of intelligent design nor as a mere accidental combination of chemicals (such as originated life), but as the product of a dynamic system that generates highly complex order on its own, without any guidance. Since this entails that the properties of living organisms like ourselves have been selected not according to a compassionate or prescient engineer, but solely according to their differential reproductive success, naturalists interpret cells, organs and species as having a "purpose" or "function" in terms of their ability to increase differential reproductive success, but do not perceive in this any moral goal that should be emulated or furthered, since nature is the cause, and nature has no compassion or plan. However, this does not exclude the possibility of true moral propositions derived from evolved facts.
3.4 Brain as Mind
Human beings have no independent soul or spirit, but only a material brain, which operates to produce a conscious mind. Since our mind, and hence our identity and existence as persons, is entirely the product of a physical process, three conclusions follow. First, all mental contents (such as ideas, theories, emotions, moral and personal values, or beauty and ugliness) exist solely as the computational constructions of our brain, and not as things that exist independently of us. Second, damage to the brain (from disease, drugs, malnutrition, or injury) frequently entails damage to the self and therefore should be of great concern. Third, the death or destruction of our brain cannot be survived, and therefore all humans are mortal. That means, given present technology, death is inevitable and entails our complete extinction. Since this entails there is no present hope of an afterlife, naturalists argue humans need to accept this and make the most of what they have.
3.5 Utility of reason
Reason is the refinement and improvement of naturally evolved faculties, through discovering, then learning, and then employing methods and procedures that are found to increase the frequency with which we arrive at true conclusions and correct information about ourselves and the world. Naturalists thus believe that reason is superior to all the other tools available to us in ascertaining the truth, so anyone who wishes to have more beliefs that are true than are false should seek to perfect and consistently employ their reason in testing and forming beliefs.One outcome of this principle has been the discovery that empirical methods (especially those of proven use in the sciences) are unsurpassed for discovering the facts of reality, while methods of pure reason alone can securely discover only truths inherent in concepts and systems of ideas.
3.6 Value of society
Humans evolved as social animals, which is the only reason we have developed culture and civilization, and now in fact depend on them. This means that even in the neutral terms of differential reproductive success, as a species our future depends on developing and maintaining a healthy and productive culture and civilization, and any behavior contrary to that end threatens our survival as a species.
4.0 Arguments for naturalism
There are many arguments for metaphysical naturalism. Only a few will be surveyed here, and only in brief. There are many others, but most involve refinements, variants or sub-arguments to the following.
4.1 Argument from precedent
For over three hundred years empirical methods have consistently discovered only natural things and causes, even underlying many things once thought to be supernatural. Meanwhile, no other methods have produced any consistent conclusions about the substance or causes of anything, much less anything supernatural. The logical inference is that since countless past gaps in knowledge have been filled by naturalism, and by nothing else, probably all remaining gaps in knowledge will be filled by naturalism as well. This simply extends a principle fundamental to science as a whole, that we should presume any new phenomenon obeys known laws of physics until we have empirically proven otherwise. Hence we should presume that any unexplained fact has a natural explanation until we have empirically proven otherwise. Therefore, since we have not found empirical proof of anything supernatural, and since we have abundant reason from past precedent to expect that natural explanations underlie everything, metaphysical naturalism is most probably true.
4.2 Argument for naturalism as best explanation
Some naturalists argue that sound naturalist hypotheses about facts still scientifically unexplained outperform all other hypotheses in explanatory scope and power, relative to explanatory simplicity. If that's true, then metaphysical naturalism is the best explanation of everything we observe and experience, and is therefore probably true. This amounts to arguing that everything makes more sense if naturalism is true, many details about ourselves and the world are more probable if naturalism is true, and to explain even the most mysterious of facts naturalism has to resort to fewer ad hoc assumptions than any known alternative. For example, resorting to the supernatural as explanation typically requires an array of completely ad hoc assumptions about the abilities, nature, limitations, and desires of supernatural forces. Even so, much of what remains unexplained is then elucidated as simply the "mystery" of the enigmatic will of the supernatural or as beyond human ken. Naturalism, on the other hand, relies much more heavily on assumptions already scientifically established as precedents and principles, and makes more specific predictions about what the observed results would be if naturalism were true, which align very well with actual observations.
4.3 Argument from absence
One major way in which naturalism explains things better than alternatives is that if the supernatural exists (whether as gods, powers, or spirits), it is so silent and inert that its effects are almost never observed, despite vast and extensive searching. Even the relatively few alleged observations take place only under dubious conditions lacking in sound empirical controls or tests, and on those occasions when they are subsequently subjected to sound controls or tests, they turn out to be false. Our inability to uncover clear evidence of anything supernatural is somewhat improbable if anything supernatural exists, but very probable if nothing supernatural exists, and therefore metaphysical naturalism is probably true.
4.4 Argument from physical minds
Scientists have accumulated vast evidence that the human mind is a product of a functioning brain, which is entirely constructed from different interacting physical systems that evolved over time through the animal kingdom, and that our brain is now the most complex machine found anywhere in nature, and that our minds appear limited to our brain's physical needs and capabilities. We have discovered no clear evidence of any other kind of mind, nor any clear evidence that our minds can exceed the limitations of our physical brain, nor any clear evidence that our brains did not slowly evolve through billions 4.of years of natural selection. This is the only way we would observe the facts to be if naturalism were true (since there is no other way to have a mind on naturalism except as the product of a slowly evolved, highly complex physical system like our brain), but if supernaturalism were true (and therefore some minds or mental content exist independently of a physical machine like our brain), what we observe is not the only way things could be (since by now we could have and likely would have observed some supernatural elements of our or other minds or observed mental powers in other things). Since this observation is less probable if supernaturalism is true, metaphysical naturalism is more likely to be true.
4.5 Argument from the implausibility of alternatives
Finally, joining the first two arguments to the rest, we have an argument from implausibility. The only supernatural hypothesis that does not fall to any of the above arguments is a hypothesis wherein the proposed supernatural entity or ability is so rare, so obscure, so inert, so unrelated to human experience, and so strange and complex as to entail exactly the same observations already entailed by naturalism, that there is no reasonable argument to be made for believing it. Occam's razor is invoked .In the absence of any reasonable argument to believe anything supernatural exists or explains anything, and in the presence of some reasonable arguments to believe the natural world exists and explains everything, metaphysical naturalism should be accepted until disproved.
5.0 Arguments against naturalism
In much the same way that theology consists largely of working out which theories of divinity are plausible and coherent (and which are not), so naturalist philosophy consists largely of working out which naturalist worldviews are plausible and coherent (and which are not). Consequently, attacking inept constructions of naturalism or caricatures of naturalism is akin to attacking inept theologies or caricatures of theology. Just as critics of the existence of God need to address the most carefully constructed and best defended theologies, critics of naturalism need to address the most carefully constructed and best defended naturalist worldviews., Metaphysical naturalism has no lack of critics. It has been loathed by countless defenders of supernatural worldviews for thousands of years and has been subject to countless attacks. Most of these attacks consist of obviously fallacious or ineffective criticism or empty rhetoric. But some arguments present significant though not insurmountable challenges to naturalist philosophy. Only those arguments will be briefly surveyed here.
5.1 Argument from despair
The most commonly voiced argument against naturalism is that it leads to human despair. There are many forms of this argument. Some emphasize the fact that naturalism entails there is no cosmic meaning of life, others propose that a religion promising eternal salvation is a safer bet (as in Pascal's Wager), while others claim naturalism entails the elimination of free will, which allegedly entails there is no knowledge, hope or moral responsibility. A common Naturalist answer to these arguments is that they only argue for what someone wants to be true, not what actually is true. Naturalists further respond that humans define their own meaning in life, that life contains too much potential happiness to warrant despair, and that naturalism does not eliminate free will in any sense that eliminates knowledge, hope, or moral responsibility.
5.2 Argument from religious experience
Many people claim to have seen, felt, or talked to God or any number of other spirits, and claim these experiences refute naturalism. Naturalists respond that religious experiences routinely (and often radically) contradict each other, and therefore most must be false, and if most are false, then all could be. Naturalists also observe that these experiences never reveal more than the cultural and psychological knowledge and assumptions of the experiencer, suggesting they originate entirely in the experiencer's own mind. At the same time, these experiences have scientifically known causes in human biology and psychology. Naturalists argue that for all these reasons, naturalism actually explains the content, diversity and limitations of religious experience better than supernaturalism does.
5.3 Argument from miracles
Often some miracle is offered as evidence refuting naturalism, including alleged cases of supernatural healing, fulfilled prophetic or psychic predictions, or the supposed impossibility of composing some book (like the Bible or the Koran) without divine aid. Naturalists respond that none of these claims have ever survived empirical inquiry. Most are inaccessible to such inquiry and thus amount to mere assertions rather than actual evidence against naturalism. But, naturalists argue, in every case where these claims became accessible to empirical inquiry they failed to be confirmed or were even refuted. In fact, naturalists argue, this very failure to confirm any miracle claims, despite centuries of trying, is better explained by naturalism than supernaturalism.
5.4 Argument from the necessity of God
One of the more esoteric arguments against naturalism is to claim that it is in some sense impossible for the universe to exist unless it is caused or cohabited by a supernatural person. There are several forms of this argument, some requiring a demonstration of the premise that the universe began to exist (like the Kalam cosmological argument), which, naturalists argue, cannot be demonstrated, since contemporary Big Bang theory no longer entails time began, and arguments from the alleged impossibility of infinite series fail to include a formal logical proof of that impossibility. Naturalists respond to this and other forms (like the ontological argument) that no sound argument has yet been presented that follows from demonstrably true premises to the conclusion that a supernatural person must exist.
5.5 Argument to cosmological design
Also known as the Fine Tuning argument, this is the claim that the fundamental constants of physics appear so finely-tuned to permit life that only a supernatural engineer can explain it. Naturalists respond that even apparent fine-tuning has yet to be scientifically demonstrated, and apparent fine-tuning does not entail actual fine-tuning and only actual fine-tuning argues against naturalism. Since the known and suspected interrelationships of the physical constants entails that altering one necessarily alters others, and no one has correctly worked out the consequences of any change, much less shown that it would result in a uniformly lethal universe, no one has yet demonstrated even the appearance of fine tuning. For example, altering the speed of light will likely alter the masses of all the fundamental particles, but we do not yet know to what degree such a change would have this effect, so we do not know what the actual consequences of changing the speed of light would be. It has also not been shown that a collapsing universe will not produce a new universe, yet many proposed alterations of the physical constants supposedly entail a collapsed universe. For this and many other reasons, naturalists note that multiverse theory is more scientifically plausible now than ever before, and yet consistently produces apparent fine tuning without any intelligent design. As far as we know this sort of universe is the only kind that we could ever find ourselves in if naturalism were true. Therefore, it is argued, naturalism actually explains the particular complexity of our cosmos better than supernaturalism does.
5.6 Argument to biological design
Recently popular is the claim that certain structures in evolved organisms are too complex to have evolved by natural selection and can only be explained as the result of intelligent design. Naturalists respond that this claim remains a mere assertion, since no one has ever scientifically demonstrated that such structures actually exist. For example, no one has performed the necessary gene sequencing and gene splicing experiments to confirm the hypothesis that removing or altering any piece of a particular structure will eliminate all function and thus prevent the structure from arising by natural selection. Hence confirmed examples of irreducible complexity have yet to be demonstrated, and only the demonstration of such a structure's existence would challenge naturalism.
5.7 Argument from consciousness
Since no one has yet explained the qualitative nature of conscious experience, otherwise known as qualia, some argue that naturalism is therefore refuted or should not be believed. Naturalists respond that all the arguments for naturalism (especially the argument from precedent and the argument to the best explanation) entail that whatever the explanation of qualia actually is, it is far more likely to be a natural explanation than a supernatural one, and therefore naturalism is still the most credible worldview. Naturalists also point out that no supernatural theory of qualia has been produced or verified, either, and therefore supernaturalism has also failed to explain this phenomenon. And in such a case, our best bet is to follow past precedent, which in cognitive science has been a consistent and remarkable trend of confirming physicalism in almost every other aspect of the study of mind. Science has already confirmed that qualia-production has identifiable locations in the brain and requires the expenditure of energy (oxygen and nutrients), two indications that qualia have a physical cause.
5.8 Argument from reason
Some have argued that certain features of human reason cannot be explained by naturalism. For example, it is claimed that naturalism cannot explain intentionality, mental causation, or the existence of logical laws or abstract objects. Naturalists respond that a naive formulation of naturalism might have this failing, but robust formulations actually explain the existence of these things better than supernaturalism does. This is a complex subject discussed in a Critical Review of Victor Reppert's Defense of the Argument from Reason by Richard Carrier (2004) to which Victor Reppert responds on his blog.
5.9 Argument from physical law
Some claim naturalism cannot explain the existence of physical laws. This argument takes many forms, but the two most common are the claim that the mathematical nature of physical laws entails a supernatural mind behind them, and the claim that naturalism can provide no ontological foundation for physical laws, requiring some supernatural power or being to realize and maintain them. Naturalists respond, again, that a naive formulation of naturalism might have this failing, but robust formulations actually explain the existence of these things better than supernaturalism does. To date, no one has proven that any mathematical laws don't simply describe a physical fact of the geometry of matter-energy in space-time, and such a correlation remains the most scientifically plausible foundation for those laws, so neither the existence of physical laws nor the applicability of mathematics in describing them presents a challenge to naturalism. On the general issues involved, see Fundamental Flaws in Mark Steiner's Challenge to Naturalism by Richard Carrier (2003), and for the best recent articulation of how the laws of physics simply are a necessary consequence of the physical arrangement of matter-energy in space-time, see Victor Stenger's The Comprehensible Cosmos: Where Do the Laws of Physics Come From? (2006; ISBN 1-59102-424-2).
5.10 Argument from incoherence
Sometimes it is claimed that naturalism entails self-contradictory commitments. Naturalists respond that a naive formulation of naturalism might have this failing, but robust formulations do not. For example, see Defending Naturalism as a Worldview: A Rebuttal to Michael Rea's World Without Design by Richard Carrier (2003)Another argument from incoherence involves the claim that metaphysical naturalism precludes all nonphysical data in its premise. Because metaphysical naturalism assumes that everything is physical, using physical data in support of it would constitute circular reasoning. At this point in the argument, the only data that could plausibly support metaphysical naturalism would be nonphysical data. Opponents then argue that any existence of such data would be a direct contradiction of metaphysical naturalism. Finally, it is concluded that metaphysical naturalism is a self-contradictory and logically broken worldview.
5.11 Moral argument
There are two kinds of moral argument: the claim that naturalism eliminates morality and the claim that moral facts exist that naturalism cannot explain. The first claim, that there can be no moral truth if naturalism is true, is a variety of the argument from despair already noted above, and naturalists respond in the same way here as there. In addition, naturalists argue we can derive moral propositions from actual facts about human needs and desires and the social and physical environment we inhabit. As to the second claim, naturalists respond that no one has ever demonstrated the actual existence of any moral facts that naturalism cannot explain.
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