Melbourne-Voyager collision

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The Melbourne-Voyager collision, also referred to as the "Melbourne-Voyager incident" or simply the "Voyager incident", was a collision between two warships of the Royal Australian Navy (RAN); aircraft carrier HMAS Melbourne and destroyer HMAS Voyager. On the evening of 10 February 1964, the two ships were performing manoeuvres in Jervis Bay, when Voyager sailed under Melbourne’s bow, where she was cut in two and sunk. 82 of Voyager’s crew were killed.

Two Royal Commissions were held to investigate the incident; the first studying the events of the collision, while the second focused on claims by a former Voyager officer that the destroyer's captain was unfit for command. It is the only time in Australian history two Royal Commissions have been held for a single incident.

[edit] Ships

HMAS Melbourne underway with Daring class destroyers HMAS Vendetta and HMAS Voyager in 1959

HMAS Melbourne (R21) was the lead ship of the Majestic class of aircraft carriers. She was laid down on 15 April 1943, although delays brought on by the end of World War II and the upgrading of her design, systems, and equipment meant she was not completed until 1955. Melbourne was sold to the Royal Australian Navy in 1948, along with sister ship HMAS Sydney.

HMAS Voyager (D04) was a ship of the Daring class of destroyers. She was laid down by Cockatoo Island Dockyard in Sydney on 10 October 1949, launched on 1 May 1952, and commissioned into the RAN on 12 February 1957.

[edit] Collision

On 10 February 1964, Melbourne was performing trials in Jervis Bay under the command of Captain John Robertson, following the refit.^[1] The Daring class destroyer HMAS Voyager was also present, undergoing her own trials following refit, under the command of Captain Duncan Stevens.^[1] That evening, Melbourne was to perform night flying exercises, while Voyager acted as the carrier's planeguard escort.^[1] This required Voyager to maintain a position 20° off Melbourne’s port quarter at a distance from the carrier of 1,500 to 2,000 yards.^[2]

During the early part of the evening, Voyager had no difficulties maintaining her position during the manoeuvres both ships performed.^[2] During a series of manoeuvres intended to reverse the courses of both ships beginning at 8:40 pm, Voyager ended up to starboard of Melbourne.^[2] At 8:52 pm, Voyager was ordered to resume the planeguard station.^[3] The procedure to accomplish this required Voyager to turn away from Melbourne in a large circle, cross the carrier's stern, then advance along Melbourne's port side.^[3] Instead, Voyager first turned to starboard, away from Melbourne, then turned to port without warning.^[3] It was initially assumed by Melbourne’s bridge crew that Voyager was conducting a series of tight turns in order to lose speed before swinging behind Melbourne, but Voyager did not alter course again.^[4]

Animation showing the courses and positions of the two ships leading up to the collision

At 8:55 pm, with Voyager still turning to port, Melbourne’s navigator ordered the carrier's engines to half astern speed, with Robertson ordering an increase to full astern a few seconds later.^[4] At the same time, Stevens, having just arrived on Voyager’s bridge, gave the order "Full ahead both engines. Hard-a starboard.", before instructing the destroyer's Quartermaster to announce that a collision was imminent.^[4] Both ships' measures were too late to avoid a collision; Melbourne hit Voyager at 8:56 pm.^[5]

HMAS Melbourne en-route to Sydney, immediately after the collision. The damage to the bow can be seen.

Melbourne impacted just aft of Voyager’s bridge structure; the destroyer rolled to starboard before she was cut in half.^[6] Voyager’s forward boiler exploded, briefly setting fire to the bow of the carrier before it was extinguished by seawater.^[6] The destroyer's forward section sank quickly, due to the weight of the two 4.5-inch gun turrets.^[7] The aft section did not begin sinking until half an hour after the collision, and did not completely submerge until just after midnight.^[8] Messages were sent to the Fleet Headquarters in Sydney immediately after the collision, although they initially underestimated the extent of the damage to Voyager.^[9] Melbourne launched her boats almost immediately after the collision to recover survivors, and the carrier's wardroom and C Hanger were prepared for casualties.^[10] At 9:58 pm, Melbourne was informed that HMA Ships Snipe, Teal, Hawk, Ibis, and Curlew, as well as search-and-rescue boats from HMAS Creswell and helicopters from Naval Air Station Nowra, had been despatched.^[11] From the 314 personnel aboard Voyager at the time of the collision, 14 officers, 67 sailors, and 1 civilian dockyard worker were killed, including Stevens and all but one of the bridge crew.^[9] Melbourne returned to Sydney with the survivors, and was docked at Cockatoo Island Dockyard for repairs.^[12]

[edit] First Royal Commission

A Royal Commission into the events of the collision, headed by Sir John Spicer, was announced by Prime Minister Robert Menzies on 13 February 1964.^[13] This commission was directed to primarily investigate the causes of the collision and the circumstances leading to the collision, with secondary considerations including the suitability of both ships for the exercise and the rescue and treatment of survivors.^[13] These instructions were prepared without the consultation of the RAN.^[13] The number of competing arguments caused the progress of the investigation to slow, and it was not until 25 June that the inquiry was ended and the report begun.^[14] The Spicer Report was released publicly on 26 August 1964.^[15]

The report is considered to be of poor quality, with a disjointed narrative and failures to cite the relevant evidence.^[16] In it, Spicer concluded that the collision was primarily the fault of Voyager's bridge crew neglecting to maintain an effective lookout and awareness of the carrier's location, although he did not blame individual officers.^[17] When reporting on the contribution of Melbourne and her crew to the collision, Spicer specifically indicated failures of Robertson and two other bridge officers, primarily to alert Voyager to the danger she was in and to take measures to prevent Melbourne from colliding.^[18] Robertson was posted to HMAS Watson, a training base in Sydney, and the decision was made by the Admirals of the RAN to prevent Robertson from serving on Melbourne again.^[19] Robertson submitted his resignation on 10 September 1964, two days after receiving official notice of his new posting.^[20] The media considered Robertson to be a scapegoat for the incident.^[21]

[edit] Second Royal Commission

Over the next few years there was increasing pressure from the public, the media, and politicians of the Government and Opposition over the handling of the first Royal Commission, as well as claims made by Lieutenant Commander Peter Cabban, the former executive officer of Voyager, that Captain Stevens frequently drank to excess and was unfit for command.^[22] On 18 May 1967, Prime Minister Harold Holt announced a second Royal Commission into the Melbourne-Voyager collision, with Sir Stanley Burbury as presiding Commissioner, to investigate the claims made by Cabban.^[23] It was the only occasion in Australian history that two Royal Commissions have been held on the same incident, although it was emphasised that the enquiry was to focus on Cabban's allegations, not the accident itself.^[24] The commission opened on 13 June 1967, with hearings beginning on 18 July.^[25]

During the Commission, it was argued that Stevens was unfit for command on the evening of the incident due to illness, drunkenness, or a combination of the two, and that the description of the collision in Spicer's report and the conclusions drawn from it were inconsistent with events.^[26] The hearings lasted 85 days, and the Burbury Report was released publicly on 25 February 1968.^[27] It found that Stevens was medically unfit for command and that some of the findings of the first Royal Commission were based on incorrect assumptions.^[28] Robertson and the other officers of Melbourne were absolved of blame for the incident.^[29]

[edit] Repairs and replacement

Repairs to Melbourne’s bow were completed at Cockatoo Island Dockyard by May 1964.^[12] She remained in service with the RAN until 1982, and was sold for scrap to China in 1983.

Following the collision, both the United Kingdom and the United States of America offered to loan ships to the RAN as a replacement; the Royal Navy offering Daring class destroyer HMS Duchess while the United States Navy offered two Fletcher class destroyers: US Ships The Sullivans and Twining.^[12] Duchess was accepted and modernised, and as she was only intended to be in RAN service for four years (although she was later sold to the RAN and served until 1977), the RAN ordered the construction of two improved frigates based on the River or Type 12 class design.^[30] HMAS Swan and HMAS Torrens entered service in 1970 and 1971 respectively.^[31]

[edit] References

[edit] Bibliography

• (2001) in Stevens, David: The Royal Australian Navy, The Australian Centenary History of Defence (vol III). South Melbourne: Oxford University Press, p. 108. ISBN 0195541162. 
• Frame, Tom (2005). The Cruel Legacy: the HMAS Voyager tragedy. Crows Nest, NSW: Allen & Unwin. ISBN 1-74114-421-3.