Talk:Marshall Plan

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[edit] Alert!! SPAM in this page to "Robert Rosemont" which is another SPAM page with some sort of German motto. Someone who knows what they're doing should freeze this and the link until someone knows what's going on

Jpowersbaseball 18:05, 4 December 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Major inconsistency under heading criticism

It says: "Tyler Cowen, economist, has stated that nations receiving the most aid from the Marshall Plan (Britain, Sweden, Greece) saw the least returns and grew the least between 1947 and 1955. Those nations who received little (Germany, Austria, and Italy) grew the most. It should be pointed out the latter countries were also the most devastated, and thus had the most potential for recovery."

Either this statement is false or the numbers given in this article before are wrong. If you calculate per capita marshall plan aid for these countries then Austria's would be higher than Sweden's or UK's. Even if it refers to aid per GDP I doubt that this statement holds.

Somebody competent please check this.

I was very confused by this as well, something is definitely not right here. --ReCover (talk) 21:54, 5 December 2007 (UTC)

[edit] So the Marshal Plan is basically the U.S. handing over large amounts of cash?

Seems reasonable. Considering everyones GDP fell at the end of WW2 and the U.Ss actually doubled (it was already twice as large as any other nation in pre war years).

-G What countries, if any, ever repaid the Marshal Plan? Like to know what countries and the amounts paid back.

[edit] Quote in the second paragraph

This quote should point to a reference or the quotation marks should be removed.

[edit] Help! I don't know how to add a reference

Hi, this is about the quote with a citation needed in the criticism section of the article. The quote about the Marshall Plan being 'the most unselfish act in history' was said by Churchill, but I have no idea how to add a citation. If any body knows how and can, there is a reference to Churchill saying the quote in 'The Cold War: Conflict in Europe and Asia' by Steve Phillips, page 25. Published 2001. Heinemann.

Events leading up to the implementation of the Marshall Plan

The Allied Control Council undertook the sole government of Germany from May, 1945 until 1949, when they created the limited self-government of the German Federal Rebublic and the German Democratic Republic.

The Marshall Plan came to be implemented after strong appeals by people such as Senator Homer E. Capehart of Indiana to the United States Senate on February 5, 1946. He delivered a mass of supporting evidence while he exposed the US policies of deliberate mass starvation in his address to the Senate

" Mr. President, the cynical and savage repudiation of these solemn declarations (It is not the intention of the Allies to destroy or enslave the German people) ,which has resulted in a major catastrophe, cannot be explained in terms of ignorance or incompetence. This repudiation, not only of the Potsdam Declaration, but also of every law of God and men, has been deliberately engineered with such a malevolent cunning, and with such diabolical skill, that the American people themselves have been caught in an international death trap.... For nine months now this administration has been carrying on a deliberate policy of mass starvation without any distinction between the innocent and the helpless and the guilty alike... The first issue has been and continues to be purely humanitarian. This vicious clique within this administration that has been responsible for the policies and practices which have made a madhouse of central Europe has not only betrayed our American principles, but they continue to betray the GIs who have suffered and died, and they continue to betray the American GIs who have to continue their dirty work for them. They have gave everything for this country and all everyone does is sit around!"

General Joseph T. MnNarney and Lucius Clay on April 13, 1946 in a formal statement pointed out the urgent need for food. "Ten months after V-E Day, only 600.000 tons of food had been imported into (the American Occupied Zone of Germany) by AMG, or about one ounce per person per meal. Yet AMG officers asked GI's to remind the Germans that they owe America a debt of gratitude for feeding them."

A general European famine was advertised by Washington. Senator Butler of Nebraska undertook a 33 countries trip after which he stated that the famine is mostly German, indicated by the fact that UNRRA has been used "to finance governments and not to feed the hungry". UNRRA has supported mostly the satellites of the Soviet Union, by supplying them with billions of dollars worth of goods, which they have sold to those with money to buy. In Germany, where there is widespread hunger and poverty, UNRRA is specifically forbidden to function for the benefit of any but "displaced persons" and then only by making requisitions against the starving Germans.

Cyril Osborn, M.P. in August 1946 denounced the so-called relief agency of the United Nations as "the biggest racket in Europe".

No Red Cross has been permitted in the German Reich. For a year the Washington administration strongly resisted all efforts to bring private relief to the Germans. Senator Albert W. Hawkes of New Jersey had made a strong appeal to the President urging him to permit private relief packages to prevent mass starvation of the German people.

Hal Foust wrote from Berlin, February 20, 1946 "Germans are dying in masses, not so much from starvation alone as from illness aggravated by acute malnutrition."

British Humanist and Publisher Victor Gollancz had also lamented the destructive policies of starvation of Germans.

The Allied Countrol Council disbanded and the Soviet Union Blockade took place.



I'm surprised at the inclusion of Britain as a receiver of Marshall Plan aid. As far as I remember Marshall Aid was only available to countries that had been occupied by Nazi Germany and the 'losing powers' themselves and apart from having the Channel Islands occupied, Britain was neither. The Soviet Union qualified and was offered Marshall Aid but Stalin refused it. My memory of things is that Britain still had rationing until 1955, having been deliberately bankrupted by the US demanding that Britain sell-off all its assets in the US and pay for everything in hard cash (e.g., Britain paid £500,000,000 - $2 billion USD to the US in 1940 for aircraft alone - 1940 values) prior to the US entry into the war and the introduction of lend-lease.

Iceland was never occupied by Germany to my knowledge during World War II. However, they also received aid. I believe the Marshall Plan was more of a rebuilding the entire continent than just the areas occupied by Nazi Germany. Britain suffered a lot of damage from German aircraft so it doesn't suprise that they received money. Here is a map that includes both Britain and Iceland. http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/marshall/wholemap.jpg -Falphin

[edit] Diffrent numbers

On page [1] numbers for Marshall plan are different from the table in our text. Can anybody explain the difference, especially the large Germany discrpeancy (~1,300 on Wiki, 2,219 on that page)? The one year difference (51 on the page, 52 on Wiki) doesn't account for such a big DECREASE (I could understand increse, but decrese??). --Piotr Konieczny aka Prokonsul Piotrus Talk 11:51, 15 May 2005 (UTC)

[edit] Effects?

The article states:

"The years 1948 to 1952 saw the fastest period of growth in European history. Industrial production increased by 35%. Agriculture had substantially surpassed prewar levels" Substantial post-war growth can be expected anyway, due to the necessary reconstruction. It's easy to increase by 35% when you produced next to nothing before. Since the funds started coming in 1948 for most of Europe, a higher resolution of the growth is needed. As it stands, the article is unable to show that the cited growth indeed was an effect of the Marshall Plan and not of independent reconstruction effort. Indeed, other sources claim that production was already close to pre-war levels as early as 1949, so that the key effects would be more political than economical. In any case, if the funds started flowing in '48, and taking into account a reasonabe timeframe for an effect, then at least '48 has to be taken out of the growth frame, and a comparison of pre- and post- plan implementation needs to be made to illustrate an effect. 141.5.194.218 09:33, 2 September 2005 (UTC)

That is why the next lines are "there is some debate among historians over how much this should be credited to the Marshall Plan. Most reject the idea that it alone miraculously revived Europe, as evidence shows that a general recovery was already underway. Most believe that the Marshall Plan sped this recovery, but did not initiate it." The article doesn't, and shouldn't, claim that the Marshall Plan was responsible for this growth. The background section also has a set of 1947 figures, so anyone who reads the article can make the desired comparisons. - SimonP 01:57, September 8, 2005 (UTC)

[edit] Millions vs. Billions

I'm not entirely sure how billions is "ambiguous to some readers" since--

  • the term "billions" is used throughout the article in various places, in fact, it is used in the sentence in question!
  • the term "billions", even in Europe, is understood to mean "a thousand million" (according to the Wiki on Billion).

I do, however, think ambiguity is created by mixing "billions" and "millions" in the same sentence. The sentence in dispute is--

"Of the some $13 billion allotted by mid-1951, $3,430 million had been spent on imports of raw materials and semi-manufactured products; $3,192 million on food, feed, and fertilizer; $1853 million on machines, vehicles, and equipment; and $1,567 million on fuel."

Locke Cole 19:41, 3 October 2005 (UTC)

On second thought I agree with you, and have reverted myself. - SimonP 20:59, 3 October 2005 (UTC)
Thanks Simon. - Locke Cole 21:12, 3 October 2005 (UTC)

[edit] Tightening the argument

There is too much material on pre-MP economics, often stretching back to the 1920s. In a short encyclopedia article that material belongs elsewhere. Rjensen 08:58, 28 November 2005 (UTC)

I disagree, information on where the Marshall Plan came from is central to understanding it. It's incorrect to present the Marshall Plan as appearing whole cloth in 1947, it had important historical precedents. The perceived successes and failures of post-WWI efforts directly translated into the formation of the Marshall Plan. - SimonP 16:11, 28 November 2005 (UTC)

One sentence is all that is necessary here. No need to encapsulate Europe's history for 25 years! The problem is that in 1947 most of the wartime damage was fixed, or irrelevant to the economic stagnation. The reader will be misled to thinking MP $$ was used to fix wartime damages. That is not what happened at all. It is a gross exaggeration to suggest that the planners spent much time looking at the 1919 situation. (For example, no one suggested bringing in Hoover, who was the #1 expert on European damage in 1919). Rjensen 17:25, 28 November 2005 (UTC)

[edit] Didn't Finland refuse the Marshall Plan?

because they didn't want to the Soviets to see them as capitalist lackeys, perhaps there should be something under the paragraph "Areas Not Under..."--Critic9328 23:59, 10 December 2005 (UTC)

The article does state that "the other Eastern European states immediately rejected the offer. Finland also did so, fearing the creation of any animosity with the Soviets." - SimonP 00:58, 11 December 2005 (UTC)

[edit] West Germany and the Marshall plan

When was the Marshall plan extended to include Germany (the western zones of allied ockupation)? I've been having difficulty tracking that datum down. Was it in 1949, when West Germany was created out of the three western ockupation zones? This interview seems to indikate so, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/lightner.htm. But was there no help at all given to Germany under the Marhsall plan before this? The oficial policy of the U.S.A. was after all fundamentally changed in July 1947 when the directive for ockupation was changed away from a policy of economic oppression (Joint Chief of Staff directive 1067) to one of economic development (JCS 1779): So, how was the Marshall plan involved in "west"-germany in the period 1947 to 1949? Anybody who knows?

I know now. It was not until West Germany was formed in 1949 that the plan was extended also to parts of Germany, and then only in the form of loans which had to be repayed. Clever idea and very good for the U.S. economy. Here, I give you 10$. But, you have to use them to buy something from me and no-one else. And then you have to repay the loan too. --Stor stark7 Talk 19:30, 23 August 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Early ideas

I've modified the text that stated that "large numbers of civilian industries were destroyed", to read "a number of civilian industries were destroyed"

That is because I can not be sure how many industries were destroyed. I only have the U.S. government document referenced below that states that "there have been general policies of destruction or limitation of possible peaceful productivity". This was on top of the more normal dismantling of industries for transport to France, Russia and the U.K. as war reparations.

Draft, The President's Economic Mission to Germany and Austria, Report 3, March, 1947; OF 950B: Economic Mission as to Food…; Truman Papers.

Anyone with access to documents that can clarify the number of destroyed industries, so as to make it possible to determine if the text should in fact be returned to state: "large numbers of..."?

Stor stark7 23:03, 26 January 2006 (UTC)

there is a loan for Germany mentioned which - what is stated in the article - was to help German economy to pay its repatriations after WWI. however, it didn't help a lot indeed because of the crisis in 1929 - German economy depended so much on USA that in fact all these loans only made things worse... and of course American funds were used to pay the repatriations which afterwards came back to USA as a repayment of British anf French loans...

[edit] Protest against biased history faking front-page snippet!

The Marshall plan is today featured on Wikipedia front page and as always says anglo-saxon propaganda instead of the historical truth!

>1948 - The Marshall Plan, an economic recovery program established by U.S. Secretary of State George Marshall >to assist the post-World War II re-building of Europe, was signed into law.

This is very biased! The programme was intended to re-build ONLY western Europe (the self-declared "free world" part only), not the entire Europe. The soviet sphere of influence (USSR and eastern-european satellite states) were purposefully excluded by crafting humiliating conditions which were not acceptable considering that WWII destruction was at least 5x more severe east of the Elbe. Therefore the above sentence is dishonest.

With these kind of "America is always right" style worded articles there is no wonder that scholars consider traditional encyclopaedias more trusted. Those are done by researchers who are bound by the inherent honesty of scientific methodology. Here on the Internet the numerically superior anglo-saxon netpopulation rewords history to its own liking regardless of the truth. Regards, Tamas Feher from Hungary. 195.70.32.136 08:04, 3 April 2006 (UTC)

Have you even read the article? It was a plan for rebuilding Europe, but as the article states, "The Soviet Union and the states of Eastern Europe were invited, but Stalin saw the plan as a threat and did not allow the participation of any countries under Soviet control." Why don't you, instead of spouting out hatred against America and Western-Europe edit the article to your liking, or more coherently formulate what it is that's so wrong about it.
I believe the map included at the top of the article is enough to satisfy the reality that only western europe was benefited with certain countries getting most of the pie. For that reason I don't think the article is clearly "anglo-saxon propaganda".

Lets not forget that the United States also gave aid to facist Spain. the article mentions this. So the aide was not only to "free nations", but to dictatorships as well.

The article didn't say anything about "free nations"... and according to Keylor Spain was excluded for a while because of its dictatorship... Brutannica 05:40, 22 April 2006 (UTC)

Aye, this was simply a US plan to control Western Europe, to sort of steal it from the Soviet Influence. We didn't need any help anyway. We did well ourselves rebuilding the country in 5 years.

Related to this is "some criticize the plan for establishing a precedent of solving the problem of failing economies abroad by offering aid from US tax payers.", this is worded as it would be in a US political debate, not in a more descriptive way. Its US-centric.

I am myself inclined towards judging the US as an interfering country (anti-American maybe?), though mostly on military intervention. Here the US gave its managers and its money, no army. And there isn't enough political stuff here to say anything about the article's neutrality. This is a fantastic article with amazing detail and deserves being featured. └ VodkaJazz/talk┐ 15:41, 22 April 2006 (UTC)

Do note that the payments started in 1948 and that the entire Western European economy was already producing more than before the war by then. Also this can be seen as debt payment by the americans for bombing most of Western Europe (instead of the Germans who just captured it without causing major destructions). The plan was also an indirect means for subsidizing the US economy because the US gave dollars to the European countries so they were forced to buy US products with that money making both European and US economies interdependant. 84.192.178.129 06:51, 22 August 2006 (UTC)

Never mind, i see this is addressed in the article... Some factual data would be nice though (numbers etc.) 84.192.178.129 07:08, 22 August 2006 (UTC)

[edit] small issue

The caption from the picture says the following: "Map of Europe showing the countries that received Marshall Plan aid. The red columns show the relative amount of total aid per nation." To me, that begs the question "Relative to what?" Population, I assume, but it's not specified. Can somebody clarify that? Foxmulder 00:52, 22 April 2006 (UTC)

I think it is the total amount per nation. If it were by per capita, Iceland would probably have one of the tallest columns. --Bjarki 11:19, 22 April 2006 (UTC)
Per capita figures would be interesting - can anyone find them, or population numbers so we can work them out? -- ALoan (Talk) 12:33, 25 April 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Leninist Doctrine?

the article had a line where it said "Leninist doctrine states that as the capitalist economies began their final collapse they would, in desperation, seek to trade with the communist foes". I removed this sentence, because its totally unbacked. this was never officially said in an soviet document or speech to my knowledge. If someone could show me where this idea came from, the sentence can go back up.

[edit] Very last paragraph

I reverted the very last paragraph to the form it had before a user with an anonymous IP changed it to read 'American imperialism'. I did this because of NPOV issues, and because the assertion was not supported. As well, the article contradicted itself in the previous form; the initial response mentioned at the beginning of the paragraph was not the 'imperialistic' criticism, but rather the original assertion that the plan had economic benefits towards the United States. The reversion removes this contradiction.

Nobody should have any problem with an NPOVed version of the 'imperialism' paragraph, provided that accurate and reliable sources can be provided to justify that assertion. As of now, without any supporting evidence, the fact that the editor changed only the end of the paragraph without checking to ensure that the paragraph maintained internal consistency makes it highly suspect that the edit is reliable. AustinZ 02:57, 22 April 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Failure of Marshall Plan? Noam Chomsky

Everywhere I've read, the MP was declared a spectacular success. But I read this excerpt from a book by Noam Chomsky (Understanding Power: The Indispensable Chomsky), the notorious anti-American scholar, that says:

The "notorious anti-american scholar" noam chomsky? I'm ending reading now. At least he references his sources and never just speculates out of personal interest.
Uh.... he is notorious, and it's hard to debate that he's anti-American. I'm not attacking him, I'm just admitting that he's not really an unbiased observer. Brutannica 06:18, 22 January 2007 (UTC)
"This was right after the Marshall Plan had failed, right after the post-war aid programs had failed. There still had been no success as yet in reconstructing either the Japanese or Western European economies -- and American business needed them; American manufacturers needed those export markets desperately. See, the Marshall Plan was designed largely as an export-promotion operation for American business, not as the noblest effort in history and so on. But it had failed: [the US] hadn't rebuilt the industrial powers [it] needed as allies and reconstructed the markets [it] needed for exports. And at that point, military spending was considered the one thing that could really do it, it was seen as the engine that could drive economic growth after the wartime boom ended, and prevent the U.S. from slipping back into a depression. And it worked: military spending was a big stimulus to the U.S. economy, and it led to the rebuilding of Japanese industry, and the rebuilding of European industry --"

I'm sure this isn't an obvious conclusion, but surely it counts as a valid viewpoint? Any expert opinions? Brutannica 05:40, 22 April 2006 (UTC)

O.K., to be fair the anti-MP viewpoint is covered in the article, but this excerpt seems pretty extreme compared to what's there. Brutannica 05:43, 22 April 2006 (UTC)

Though Noam Chomsky is certainly a very smart and very respectable person, his POV when discussing US is well known. Almost all mainstream economists will say that Marshall Plan is extremely successful, resulting in almost miraculous economic recovery in Western Europe so I dont see how Noam Chomsky, a linguistic professor, could claim otherwise. Mparthas 16:48, 22 April 2006 (UTC)
Maybe his "POV" is well known in the states but his research and opinions are viewed favourably in Europe. Just because Americans don't like him doesn't mean he shouldn't be in there. How can you say "oh, but that researcher is POV, he doesn't deserve to be in the article". Nobody is entirely unbiased.
Mackan 01:50, 23 April 2006 (UTC)
My personal take on the subject would be (should anyone care) that, as the industrial heart of Europe, Germany was necessary for European recovery. Once the U.S. stopped mucking about with lowering the German standards of living, as ordained in the occupation directive, the JCS 1067, the West Germans bootstrapped themselves and pulled the rest of Western Europe up with them. Without the JCS 1067, which was finally scrapped in July of 1947 and which explicitly forbade efforts which could help the West German economy recover, we finally have the currency reform which takes place in 1948 and gets the economy going again. The slowing down of the programme of dismantling of German factories also helps a lot. By using the Marshall plan loans to pay for the reparations they have to pay they can effectively push the reparations forward in time, until they have a functioning economy again. As General Clay, military governor of the U.S. occupation zone said: "We began to slowly wipe out JCS-1067. When we were ordered to put in a currency reform this was in direct controvention of a provision of JCS-1067 that prohibited us from doing anything to improve the German economy. It was an unworkable policy and it wasn't changed just without any discussion or anything by those of us who were in Germany. It was done by gradual changes in its provision and changes of cablegrams, conferences, and so on."[2] Still, the Germans were not very happy with the policies that remained.
  • Letter from Ernest Bevin to Robert Schuman (30 October 1949) Brittish and French foreign ministers. Bevin argues that they need to reconsider the Allies' dismantling policy in the occupied zones

Stor stark7 22:16, 27 April 2006 (UTC)

Um... O.K. I still think this viewpoint should be represented, but it's true that Chomsky isn't famed for studying the Marshall Plan. I'll drop the issue for now. Brutannica 06:18, 22 January 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Marshall Plan Conditions

The article states that east bloc countries were required to become "democratic" in order to benefit from the Marshall Plan. My own memory -- and I don't have a source to hand -- is only that they were required to provide clear accounting of how the money was spent. Can anyone confirm the actual wording of the conditions placed upon countries receiving Marshall Plan money? David 13:39, 22 April 2006 (UTC)

OK, I see the answer further down, under "Rejection by the Soviets" -- participating countries were asked to have their economic situations independently assessed (i.e. audited), and to remove barriers against trading with other European countries. Unless there's some other evidence, the statement in the intro that the U.S. required participating countries to become democratic is wildly misleading. David 13:45, 22 April 2006 (UTC)

I sourced the information from American Pageant that the Soviet countries were required to accept some democratic reforms to participate in the program. Bill 17:01, 22 April 2006

[edit] Vandalism

Saw a instance or two of vandalism to this article. Someone inserted a phrase about George Kennan and William Clayton "having sex" in the first paragraph. Fortunately this was removed, but sensible Wikipedians should be on guard for vandalism, --Sunsetpacific 21:35, 22 April 2006 (UTC)

If only it were proveable... --Billah

Another instance of vandalism showed up at the end of a paragraph; reverted to previous text. --Auddie —Preceding comment was added at 18:39, 14 April 2008 (UTC)

[edit] Motivation and effectiveness

This is an excellent article, but I have a comment nonetheless... :-) IMHO the importance of the MP was that the victors in World War II actually learned from history and did not want to repeat the mistakes of the Treaty Of Versailles. This is mentioned in the body of the article, but perhaps there could be more emphasis of it? Especially since the initial overview mentions questions of motivation and effectiveness. While the MP might not have been a miraculous salve to Europe, it sprang from an attitude that the losers should not be kept in total submission. I don't think that effectiveness of this attitude can be dismissed? (I don't have the command of the material to write this myself.) --Postagoras 18:54, 25 April 2006 (UTC)

Deep sigh....
Please,
Proposed post surrender plan for Germany (September 1944)
Roosevelt and Churchill Signed a version of this plan at the second Quebeq conference.
When the press got wind of it and all hell broke loose, Roosevelt pretended it was raining and denied signing it.
Still:
General Eisenhower, military governor of the U.S. occupation zone, and later U.S. President distributed one thousand copies of it to his officers in Germany.
(Stephen Ambrose, Eisenhower: Soldier, General of the Army, President-Elect, p.422.)
Sort of a "hint, hint, nudge, nudge..."
Two years later, this kind of thinking was aparently still so ingrained in some U.S. officials thinking that former U.S. President Herbert Hoover had to make this warning in one of his situation reports on Germany.


'There are several illusions in all this "war potential" attitude.

a. There is the illusion that the New Germany left after the annexations can be reduced to a "pastoral state". It cannot be done unless we exterminate or move 25,000,000 people out of it. This would approximately reduce Germany to the density of the population of France.
...' [3]
And the British national archives have courteously made available the transcripts of Churchill’s War cabinet meetings.
http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/documents/cab_195_3_transcript.pdf
In the meeting on May 18th 1945, the U.K. Prime Minister Winston Churchill discusses the amount of German labour they will request for use in the British agriculture.
In the meeting on June 11th 1945 they discuss the provisions made for Slave Labour in the Yalta protocol, and how many slaves the Russians should get.
  • Ch. a) Only reparations worth havg = G. export markets.

Directive takes a/c of that, but shd. state it specifically. b) Also wd. like to omit last sentence in para 15. If we count against R. claim the labour they take, we cd. get the total figure up to $20 billion. $16.000 m. value cd. be assigned for 4 m. slave labour.

  • P.M.

At Yalta R. made it clear tht. their claim was exclusive of labour.

Lets just say the Russians were not at all nice to their slaves, and leave it at that. or check out Forced labor of Germans in the Soviet Union
For their part in the West the U.S. gave the French roughly 700,000 Germans to use as forced labor. Exactly how badly they were treated is a matter of contention.
Brittain was apparently decent to their 400,000 or so. Still, I imagine they would have much rather gone home to Germany so they could help feed and protect their families instead of being force to work in the victors coal mines and farms.
Now, General Marshal was a nice-guy, but how many years did it take for him to get to the top of the pile?
The U.S. was well on their way to make a far bigger mistake than Versailles. And it cost the Germans dearly.
If the policies had gone far enough and on for long enough to pull the Germans over to the Communist camp, then the entire world might have paid dearly.
But now I'm just tired and rambling, and need to go to bed.
Feel free to check out my previous post, a step or two up the list in Talk:Marshall_Plan#Failure_of_Marshall_Plan?_Noam_Chomsky
Let's just say that the Marshal plan was a belated reaction to the realisation in the U.S. that they had let things get real shitty in Germany (and as a consequence put the rest of Europe in limbo), and that this was not necessarily to the U.S. future advantage. (I admit to being real POV here, but feel fre to argue and maybe I'll change my mind)
To sum it up.
I seem to disagree with you completely. Cheers Stor stark7 21:04, 25 April 2006 (UTC)

[edit] More Spam on the Marshall Plan and Allied Economic policy towards Germany 1945 - 1947

  • Gunther Harkort Representative of the Federal Republic of Germany to the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA), 1949-52.

QUESTION: At what stage, in your view, was it recognized that German recovery was essential to full European recovery?

HARKORT: The waiver of implementation of the Morgenthau Plan and its toned-down offshoots -- (Directive JCS 1067, Potsdam Conference, Industrial Plans) -- points out the beginning of the realization that without including Germany we cannot make Europe viable again. In the Harriman Report of November 1947 this is stated quite clearly (p. 117): "No part of the economic aid requested by the CEEC (the later OEEC) countries is more fundamentally necessary to the recovery of Western Europe than the aid asked for the rehabilitation of German industry, agriculture and transport."


  • Charles P. Kindleberger Chief, Division German and Austrian Economic Affairs, Department of State, Washington, 1945-48

MCKINZIE: Of course, I should explain, one reason that I keep asking you about the positions that your office was taking is that I am aware that you got documents of a kind of conflicting nature. You got the Morgenthau business from the Treasury Department on one hand, and on the other hand there was residue of all of that planning that was done in the State Department by Leo Pasvolsky’s people, which did envision a rather early return of Germany into some sort of European economy. Dean Acheson says in his book that he didn't realize that Europe without a reconstructed Germany was analogous to a body without a heart. He and other people had felt that perhaps Great Britain could assume the economic role that had been played by Germany previously, and somehow this was all your heritage or the legacy that was dumped into your office.

KINDLEBERGER: I would allow no member of my staff to use the cliche "the heart of industrial Germany" for the Ruhr. I wasn't worried about that. If Acheson did it he was out of line. No, it's true that we very quickly became aware of the role of Germany in Europe. The Germans had problems of their own. The coal question is one I spoke of. Very quickly it became the repair of mining machinery in Poland--Poland acquired Silesia, the Silesian mines.

As all the capital equipment of Europe was very far depreciated it needed to be replaced and renewed and the Poles couldn't do it. How are you going to get Polish mining going without helping the German machinery industry. And we found ourselves in this very fast.

So what we tried to do was to convert the Morgenthau doctrine in U.S. economic policy toward Germany into a statement which said, "The Germans have sinned. They have gotten way out of line and they have hurt people, therefore, we are going to pull them down quickly to the level of the neighboring countries and it's going to be short, sharp, quick, surgical," but then we let them go. Now the Russians never would agree to this as far as I know, and we had to agree that there were some industries which they could not operate. But that was the interpretation and I think that's a reasonable way to sort of thread your way. We also would add, by the way, in the spring of ‘47 when food was scarce, that the Germans were last in line. Food got terribly scarce worldwide and the Marshall plan I think was in large part a response to a very bad harvest.


  • E. Allan Lightner, Jr. Assistant Chief, 1945-47, and Associate Chief, 1947-48, of the Central European Affairs Division, Department of State

MCKINZIE: Kindleberger contends that sometime in 1946 the economic people came around to the view that there would have to be some reconstruction of German industry even above the level of industry agreement, which was being hassled around about then or had been hassled around previously.

LIGHTNER: Well, to us those months between V-E Day and mid-'46 seemed a long time. That's when much of the dismantling was taking place. It was a crucial period when much time was being lost in restoring the economy and our group in CE found that we were being opposed at every turn by those who wanted to carry out literally the provisions of JCS-l067. You know, Jimmy Riddleberger was the one who sweated out this whole business of dealing with the Civil Affairs Division of the War Department during the days of planning for the occupation of Germany, and also later on in dealing with the Kindleberger group.

MCKINZIE: You look at the period between the Morgenthau plan and the Marshall plan, one of which represents a "salted earth" policy, and the other an industrial development policy. The question of historians who are always concerned with pinning things down to precise things inevitably comes down to: what was the turning point? Was there any particular event or any absolutely crucial time period in which the change from the Morgenthau plan to the direction of the Marshall plan was made?

LIGHTNER: I think it was fairly gradual. I think the military had their directives based, as I said before, very much on the philosophy of the Morgenthau plan, the basic JCS-l067. They had to accomplish the main chores, which everyone agreed had to be done at first, the denazification and the demilitarization. Germany never was to be in a position to wage war again. But how does one prevent a modern state from ever waging war again? Easy answer -- you strip it of its industries and you make it economically unable to produce the weapons of war. But that was overlooking a whole lot of other features, which made that concept impractical and unwise, Yet that was not apparent to the proponents of the Morgenthau idea at the beginning; but they found in practice, in administering defeated Germany, that it wasn't enough to prevent "disease and unrest;" the Germans could not live on that basis in the modern world. You couldn't hold them down to that point; we weren't that kind of conquerors. Anyway, it gradually became clear to our people who had favored the Morgenthau plan that in our own interest, in terms of our ability to accomplish our political goals in Germany, you had to give them hope for the future. How could we make them a democratic country by treating them as the Romans treated the Carthaginians. I guess the turning point was Secretary Byrnes' speech in Stuttgart in September 1946. By that time after the experience of running occupied Germany for a year, the more Draconian policies of JCS-1067 were being interpreted differently. More and more people along the line were coming to see that we had to help the Germans restore their economic life, their industries and so on. We were breaking up cartels, we were shipping some reparations to the Russians (dismantled industrial equipment), but at the same time with the other hand we were helping small industries and encouraging other forms of economic activity.

One of the reasons why it took so long to get the economy of Germany going after our own policy changed, was that the Germans took some time to recover from the effects of their defeat. Furthermore, you had an untenable situation in that Germany was divided into four zones -- four economic units. Potsdam said it should be one economic unit, but that wasn't the way it worked. There were four economic units, like little countries, with barriers between them, and it was impossible for them to have a viable economy under the circumstances. So, first you had two zones getting together for economic reasons -- the British and American. And finally, in the spring of 1948 on the eve of the London negotiations which led to the decision to create the Federal Government of Germany, all three Western zones came together as trizonia. This was nearly two years after the Stuttgart speech and the economic situation in Germany was still at a very low ebb. But the big upturn, the start of the economic miracle of West Germany's recovery was in sight. At least what sparked the recovery of Germany was the currency reform, the revaluation of the currency in Western Germany on a ten to one basis in May 1948. For the first time since the end of the war the Germans began to have some confidence in their future. The stocks that they had sitting on their shelves began to move off the shelves to be sold.


  • General William H. Draper Jr. Chief, Economics Division, Control Council for Germany, 1945-46; Military Government Adviser to the Secretary of State, Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers, 1947; Under Secretary of War, 1947; Under Secretary of the Army, 1947-49;

We were more hardboiled than anybody except the Russians. The British were the most sensible. The French were even better than we were, although they were pretty severe, too. The Russians went even beyond the Morgenthau plan. They were basing their tough attitude on the fact that their whole country had been ravaged and millions of their people killed. They had been invaded, and you have a certain point of view when that happens. They were there to take it out on Germany, I guess, and we were pretty near as bad, although we hadn't been invaded. Anyway, the level of industry was finally determined on a level that didn't last long; it wasn't realistic. It took about two years to change. It was after I was back in Washington as Under Secretary before that directive was finally officially revoked.

In the meantime, we didn't pay as much attention to it as perhaps we should from the point of view of military discipline. There were several efforts to pull me back and have me charged with not carrying out the directive.

General Clay always defended me. He knew perfectly well that such a policy couldn't last just as well as I did. We fought it out and finally persuaded Washington. General Marshall himself defended me in testimony before a Congressional Committee. So, it finally worked out. The real turning point came when the currency was devalued or revalued in 1948. At that time we gave the Russians the opportunity to do the same to revalue the mark in their sector, in their zone; they refused. I was back in Washington before this -- when they walked out of the four power council meeting -- the Kommanditura. A few days later they declared the blockade of Berlin.


  • Joseph D. Coppock Economic adviser, International Trade Policy, Department of State, 1945-53

I don't know just when the change of attitude shifted the other way, but I would guess that it came in the course of '46 or '47. That was the '46-'47 winter, which was bad; it became clear to some that you simply couldn't have a stripped down, poverty stricken Germany. Here I would say that Kennan and Nitze, and the political officers in the Department, were right. Emergency aid and then the Marshall plan were the answers.

Well, let's see, where were we?

MCKINZIE: Well, we had gotten off on the problems of Germany. I didn't want to interrupt you there.

COPPOCK: I don't know the exact timing, but certainly whatever support there had been for the pastoral Germany disappeared pretty largely during 1946, because it became very evident that the overriding question was which side Germany was going to be on in the postwar situation. The threat of the Russians was evident enough, very evident indeed to those of us who had been through the OSS experience and were in the State Department. And all this time we hoped for, but did not expect, a cooperative Russia.


  • General Lucius D. Clay Deputy to General Eisenhower, 1945; deputy military governor, Germany (U.S.) 1946; commander in chief, U.S. Forces in Europe and military governor, U.S. Zone, Germany, 1947-49; retired 1949.

MCKINZIE: It also makes it difficult, doesn't it, in matters of policy setting, because you had JCS-1067, which was as I understand it, a compromise between the War Department and the Department of State on how...

CLAY: JCS-1067 would have been extremely difficult to operate under. If you followed it literally you couldn't have done anything to restore the German economy. If you couldn't restore the German economy you could never hope to get paid for the food that they had to have. By virtue of these sort of things it was modified constantly; not officially, but by allowing this deviation and that deviation, et cetera. We began to slowly wipe out JCS-1067. When we were ordered to put in a currency reform this was in direct controvention of a provision of JCS-1067 that prohibited us from doing anything to improve the German economy. It was an unworkable policy and it wasn't changed just without any discussion or anything by those of us who were in Germany. It was done by gradual changes in its provision and changes of cablegrams, conferences, and so on.

MCKINZIE: You must have had some backstopping in Washington to be able to do that.

CLAY: At that time I happened to have been very close to Mr. Byrnes, having worked for him. I could go to Mr. Byrnes (he was very close to the President), and he would go to the President. We'd get this thing resolved in short order.

MCKINZIE: Did you discuss with Mr. Byrnes the deteriorating situation with the Soviets before he made his very famous speech, now called the Stuttgart speech, in September of 1946?

CLAY: I urged him in the first place to come to Stuttgart. I had written him a letter about my own views of the situation and it was that letter which he used as the basis for this speech. He visited me in Berlin and we went over together. He had that passage in there, "as long as any other foreign country's troops are in Germany we're going to be there," which was the most important part of the speech. He tried all of that morning to get hold of the President by telephone to get his approval, and then left word that he was going to put this in if he didn't hear anything to the contrary. I'm sure that whatever he said there he had assurance that President Truman approved.

At that time their relationships were very close.

//

MCKINZIE: In the winter of 1946-47, you were under a directive that the German standard of living couldn't be any higher than that of France, in particular. Do you recall when you began to think in terms of rebuilding Germany as a part of solving a larger problem?

CLAY: In 1946 we got authority, as we brought food into Germany, to sell it to the Germans for German marks. We could use this money as we saw fit; for our own support, but also to aid and help the German economy. When we put in the currency reform in 1948, I saw a Germany where the people were working; which was going to come back quicker than the rest of Western Europe. I, of course, saw that that would never be allowed to happen.

My interest in having a revived Western Europe came from my realization that we could not have an economic recovery in Germany unless it was done as a part of all of Western Europe. It was about this time that the congressional committee came over studying the Marshall plan, the Herter Committee. We preached this to this committee all the time. As a matter of fact, one of the members of that committee, who spent a whole month in Germany at that time, was Everett Dirksen. He came back a very strong supporter of an economic program that would apply to all of Western Europe, including West Germany. I would say that this came to me, in a reverse sense, in '46. I began to realize that we couldn't develop Germany faster than Western Europe. On the other hand, if we left an economic vacuum in Germany, Western Europe could never come back.


  • Clifford C. Matlock Economist and political officer, U.S. Dept. of State, 1946-62; Political adviser, European Coordinating Committee, London, 1949-50;


MATLOCK: Yes, the German problem was the heart of the Europe problem.

MCKINZIE: Yes.

MATLOCK: That's a quote from Churchill about 1952 and I happen to agree with it as of that date.

MCKINZIE: Until 1950 it appeared that very many people in the State Department did not particularly see it that way.

MATLOCK: You mean they didn't favor German rearmament?

MCKINZIE: They didn't favor German rearmament or German industrial redevelopment very much.

MATLOCK: That's right, the whole U.S. policy until 1950 was to hold Germany down and deny it military strength. The British were still dismantling German industry as reparations when I went to London. They were getting the stuff out. Germany was trade competition. The British always thought about trade. They don't much anymore, but they did then. So they were among the last I think to stop dismantling German industry.

Well, you know, I was just a staff man, I didn't raise any objections to the demilitarization policy. I don't remember thinking there was anything wrong with it.

MCKINZIE: There was some talk too that unless Germany were given a full part in NATO that the influence of the occupying powers would begin to decline, that there was a kind of natural life of occupation after which you get out and make friends or you...

MATLOCK: That's right. Well, there was a real issue within Draper's immediate staff, and David Bruce's staff, involving me and Tommy Tomlinson and some others. One point of view, which I espoused, was that the occupation was over. The Contractual Agreements had not been signed, but I said, "The occupation in substance is over. We have told Germany (the West German Federal Republic of course) that we want it for a partner in alliance against Russia. The occupation is therefore over,

Stor stark7 22:16, 27 April 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Time Magazine

I think this article sums it up beautifully....

Oct. 5, 1983 FOREIGN RELATIONS Challenge & Response [4]

It is a shortened/censored? version of the Jul. 28, 1947 Pas de Pagaille! [5]


The committees to study Europe's needs and resources under the "Marshall approach" got down to work this week in the Grand Palais, one of the few really ugly buildings in the center of Paris.

Coal was the central issue at Paris.

And coal meant the Ruhr and Germany.

Without Ruhr coal, and without the German industrial output which depends on Ruhr coal, the rest of Europe cannot recover. To help remedy that paralysis, the U.S. last week issued a new directive to Germany's occupation chief, General Lucius D. Clay, superseding Joint Chiefs of Staff Directive 1067 (which had directed the U.S. commander to take "no steps looking toward the economic rehabilitation of Germany..."). The new directive said: "An orderly, prosperous Europe requires the economic contributions of a stable and productive Germany." The U.S. suggested that the permissible level of industry in Western Germany be raised by boosting steel production from 5.8 to 12 million tons a year.

When they heard that, the French promptly raised the roof, almost threatened to sabotage the Paris conference.

The Communists hastened to aggravate these fears; L'Humanité cried: "Let French Mothers Again Tremble!" The British made difficulties too. They did not like a U.S. suggestion that their plans to socialize Ruhr mines be postponed.

Last week, it looked as though many Europeans were far ahead of their own leaders in understanding that it was more important to make the "Marshall approach" work than to keep Germany down. Said Henri-Albert Joinville, 46, a road repair man: "The Marshall plan was quite simple when it started and now the politicians are trying to make it complicated. It is still simple for me. We are in trouble. If we don't get help, there may be anarchy in France. Now let's get ahead.

Pour l'amour de Dieu, pas de pagaille!

[For God's sake, let's not mess around!]."

France wants more coal and is entitled to it, but will not permit the necessary industrial production to feed and supply the German miners to produce more coal. Britain, which wants both greater coal and industrial production, wants both under her control and socialization program."

Quite Simple. Last week, it looked as though many Europeans were far ahead of their own leaders in understanding that it was more important to make the "Marshall approach" work than to keep Germany down or to keep somebody's schemes from getting hurt.

[edit] Territorial Unit

I would like to know if Stalin declined the PM and made the countries under his influence to do so because,perhaps, he was afraid that the acceptance of PM could affect Soviet's Union territorial unit?

My answer to this would be- It could be that the marshall plan could have been used to destablize the eastern states, and bring them into the american sphere but how would you ever figure this out with evidence, stalin was always a strange man, even more so during his later years, maybe you could interview stalin. The major reason has to be that the conditions where unacceptable, its suggested that possibly intentionaly so. Its not like there where no precedants of soviet acceptance of western (american) aide, i.e. the lend-lease program.

"Stalin was always a strange man" - well, that's personal speculation. You should provide some sources here. By the way, the talk page needs an archiving. Aran|heru|nar 07:40, 22 August 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Source saying the Soviet Union was excluded as well as Spain

According to Tony Judt's Postwar: A history of Europe since 1945, both the Soviet Union and Spain were excluded from being invited to the July 12th Paris Conference. This would seem to contradict the passage in the Wikipedia article that reads, "Every country of Europe was invited, with the exceptions of Spain (which had stayed out of World War II but had sympathized with the Axis powers) and the small states of Andorra, San Marino, Monaco, and Liechtenstein. The Soviet Union was invited with the understanding that it would refuse." [p. 91]

Since this article has been featured, I will not change it unless other contributers support the change. --Vince 04:08, 13 August 2006 (UTC)

I think Judt is wrong here, pretty much every source I have read agrees that an invitation was given to the USSR. For instance Grogin, a book I happen to have on hand, states that "Marshall made it clear that most European nations could participate in the program, including the Soviet Union and its satellites in Eastern Europe." pg. 116. - SimonP 04:29, 13 August 2006 (UTC)
But I believe Grogin is mentioning that the invitation to recieve Marshall Aid was extended to the USSR, which Judt mentions it was earlier. What I was questioning was the invitation to the actual Paris Conference. --Vince 09:27, 20 August 2006 (UTC)
I'm fairly certain Stalin was invited to Paris. Here is a more specific source "Bidault extracted from Bevin two important concessions. First, the upcoming conference would be held in Paris rather than London, and second, any invitation to the rest of Europe would include the Soviets."[6]. What might be incorrect is the chronology. The invitation to the July 3rd event that Molotov did attend, might have been the one to which the Soviet Union was invited with no invitation to the main conference. - SimonP 13:25, 20 August 2006 (UTC)
Hmm, yes perhaps. Until I find more information on it, I think the statement in the article fine. I remember reading the passage from Judt and being surprised because it contradicted what I was taught in IB history a bunch of years back. I will try to pick up some more sources. --Vince 20:20, 20 August 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Relation of Aid to GDP?

It would be interesting to compare the amount of aid given to the GDP of the different countries (and the US). Piet 14:56, 22 August 2006 (UTC)

Though a nice idea in theory, in practice it isn't that useful; different countries took differing amounts of damage, and France and the UK in particular got hammered. There is no actual relationship as far as I can tell; though all of the nations which DIDN'T get Marshall Plan aid are worse off that those which did (with the exceptions of Finland and Switzerland), amongst those who did recieve Marshall Plan aid there's no correlation. Ireland and Norway recieved relatively little, yet have the highest per-capita income. Though it is true that France, Great Britain, and Germany have the largest GDPs of those countries, their populations are also the largest and the don't have quite as high of per-capita income (though they are still quite well off, as is all of Western Europe save Spain). Titanium Dragon 10:54, 21 September 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Cold war

"The Marshall Plan ... is not a philanthropic enterprise ... It is based on our views of the requirements of American security ... This is the only peaceful avenue now open to us which may answer the communist challenge to our way of life and our national security." (Allen W. Dulles, The Marshall Plan) "Marshall Plan 1947-1997 A German View" by Susan Stern

--Stor stark7 Talk 19:33, 23 August 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Added text on Germany and the Marshall plan

I’ve added the following

The West German economic recovery was partly due to the economic aid provided by the Marshall Plan, but mainly due to the currency reform of 1948 which replaced the Reichsmark with the Deutsche Mark as legal tender, halting rampant inflation. This act to strengthen the German economy had been explicitly forbidden during the two years that the occupation directive JCS 1067 was in effect. The Allied dismantling of the West German coal and steel industry finally ended in 1950.

Contrary to popular belief, the Marshall Plan, which was extended to also include the newly formed West Germany in 1949, was not the main force behind the German economic recovery.[1][2] Had that been the case, other countries such as Great Britain and France (which both received more economic assistance than Germany) should have experienced the same phenomenon. In fact, the amount of monetary aid received by Germany through the Marshal plan was by far overshadowed by the amount the Germans meanwhile had to pay as reparations and by the charges the Allies made on the Germans for the cost of occupation ($ 2.4 billion per year).

Even so, in Germany the myth of the Marshall plan is still alive. Many Germans believe that Germany was the exclusive beneficiary of the plan, that it consisted of free gifts of vast sums of money, and that it was solely responsible for the German economic recovery in the 50’s.

Sources:

--Stor stark7 Talk 21:24, 28 September 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Added text on the reversal of JCS 1067

I've added the following text on the reversal of JCS 1067:

In view of increased concerns by General Lucius D. Clay and the Joint Chief of Staff over growing communist influence in Germany, as well as of the of the failure of the rest of the European economy to recover without the German industrial base on which it previously had been dependent, in the summer of 1947 Secretary of State General George Marshall, citing "national security grounds" was finally able to convince President Harry S. Truman to rescind the punitive U.S. occupation directive JCS 1067, and replace it with JCS 1779. [3] In July 1947 JCS 1067, which had directed the U.S. forces of occupation in Germany to "…take no steps looking toward the economic rehabilitation of Germany", was thus replaced by JCS 1779 which instead stressed that "An orderly, prosperous Europe requires the economic contributions of a stable and productive Germany.”[4] JCS 1067 had then been in effect for over two years.

Some sources:

And for those intrested, a link to the text of the directive.

  • Joint Chiefs of Staff Directive 1067 JCS 1067/6 of 28 April 1945 (The final version, JCS 1067/8 of 10 May 1945, contained an amendment allowing the production of just enough synthetic rubber and oil, aluminum, and magnesium to meet the needs of the Allied occupying forces, where the previous version (JCS 1067/6) had ordered the complete destruction of such industries.)

--Stor stark7 Talk 21:24, 28 September 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Marshall Plan: US Imperialist Plot to Control Europe

As economist Tyler Cowen has noted, the countries that received the most Marshall Plan money (allies Britain, Sweden, and Greece) grew the slowest between 1947 and 1955, while those that received the least money (axis powers Germany, Austria, and Italy) grew the most. In terms of post-war prosperity, then, it eventually paid to be a political enemy of the U.S. instead of a "beneficiary" of international charity.

But the real upshot of the Marshall Plan was a political maneuver to loot American taxpayers to keep influential American corporations on the government dole. The Plan's legacy was the egregious and perpetual use of foreign aid for domestic political and economic purposes.

Corporate economic interests, then, overlapped with Truman's political interests, and an unholy alliance between business and government was born. They would use Europe's miseries to line their own pockets in the name of "rebuilding" and providing "security" against trumped-up threats to American security.

http://www.mises.org/freemarket_detail.asp?control=120&sortorder=articledate

"the countries that received the most Marshall Plan money (allies Britain, Sweden, and Greece)...those that received the least money (axis powers Germany, Austria, and Italy)"
These statements(here and in the article) don't seem to accord with the map, which does show Britain as receiving a high amount of aid and Austria a relatively low amount, but (in seeming contrast to the quoted statement) shows Sweden and Greece as receiving relatively little aid and Germany and Italy both receiving at least moderate levels of aid. Does anyone know which is right, the text or the map? Or are they talking about different things, in which case either the text or the map (or map caption) needs to be clarified. 74.224.203.77 10:39, 3 April 2007 (UTC)

[edit] The ERP map is wrong

Why is Portugal included in the map? By then, Portugal was a fascist state and Salazar did not accept any money from Marshall Plan, because he followed isolationist policies. —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 89.26.158.138 (talk) 21:28, 24 January 2007 (UTC).

Portugal was a member, if a marginal one, of the ERP. It attended the planning meetings and had an ECA office. It did receive some aid, if only a small amount. - SimonP 23:40, 24 January 2007 (UTC)

Can you provide me that information? Even in school they teach that Portugal didn't receive aid because of the isolationist policies. Salazar even used to say "Orgulhosamente sós" ("Proudly alone"). But well, if he accepted some us foreign aid, he was also a big hypocrit then.

Sure, check out the The Marshall Plan: Fifty Years After., which is where the figures on amounts per country come from. Also look at any of the images from the Marshall Plan era, such as the windmill one on this page, and you'll see the Portuguese flag included. - SimonP 15:37, 27 January 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Vandalism in Marshall Plan

This article has been vandalized at the top of the page preceding the first paragraph. —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 142.108.180.32 (talk) 20:52, 31 January 2007 (UTC).

[edit] Calculation for equivalent value of Marshal Plan in today's funds

I just wondered if this was correct, so I found the prime interest rate of america as posted here, http://mortgage-x.com/general/indexes/prime.asp, defined as "The base rate on corporate loans posted by at least 75% of the nation's 30 largest banks." If this is true, you can take the date difference between two interest rates, divide by 365.25 for the number of days in a year to get the years at that rate. Taking some amount and multiply it by (1+ rate)^years at that rate gives its new value. Repeating for the next set of dates would give the new value on that money. This gives the value of that Marshal Plan money near 655 Billion dollars, rather than 130 billion. This would be the value of that money, I suppose equivalent currency would use inflation rate. 0113, Feb 2, 2007 (EST)

the best way to make sense of the money is to compare it to the GDP at the time. Using corporate interest rates designed for short term loans is meaningless. As % of GDp is more like a half-trillion dollars Rjensen 12:09, 2 February 2007 (UTC)
How have the inflation rates been calculated? this german paper from 1997 states: "Sceptics there were, since Congress was being asked to approve the transfer of a considerable amount of money (it ended up at over $13 billion between 1948 and 1952, a sum equivalent to more than $65 billion today)" --Stor stark7 Talk 18:12, 12 February 2007 (UTC)
Inflation rates are meaningless in this kind of transfer--people in 1948 had no idea whatever what the economy would be like in 2007. How big was the $$ in terms of GDP at the time, is the proper question, because people in 1948 and 2007 can both relate directly to that statistic. Rjensen 18:16, 12 February 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Who ran the Marshall Plan?

I looked in the article and it doesn't look like anyone was listed as an administrator. However, I did find something in the book "In the Time of the Americans", by David Fromkin:

"Truman intended to appoint Dean Acheson or Will Clayton to oversee the plan. Either man might have done so with a broad strategic conception in mind. But Vandenburg vetoed them, fearing that Marshall Plan funds somehow might flow into Democratic party coffers, and insisted that the administrator should be a businessman, not a politician. He selected the nominee: Paul Hoffman, an automobile company executive. Under Hoffman, an array of American business, community, and labor leaders offered advice and guidance, but it was the Europeans themselves (as Marshall had intended) who shaped their own economic recovery." (p.505)

Can anyone find another source collaborating this? -66.41.27.200 00:52, 7 March 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Is Note 1 correct?

"The $13 billion compares to the U.S. gross domestic product of $41 billion in 1949."

I think US GDP then was much higher: $267 billion.

See: http://www.bea.gov/national/xls/gdplev.xls —Preceding unsigned comment added by Rick02840 (talk • contribs) 18:27, 2 October 2007 (UTC)


[edit] Significant mistakes

I wouldn't normally bring this up, but this is a featured article, and the mistakes it had were inappropriate for one of Wikipedia's top 0.1%.

The first paragraph referenced a George F. Keenan, who is actually Kennan. I don't know how long that's been there.

The second paragraph says the plan was developed at a meeting on October 3rd, 1963, which is obviously mistaken. This kind of vandalism happens all the time, I know, but that fact stayed there for five full days. That simply should not happen in the lead section of a featured article. Just keep an eye out for that kind of thing in the future. 72.75.19.54 (talk) 22:51, 28 January 2008 (UTC)

[edit] Yugoslavia

Sorry guys, but here there's a big mistake.

Communist Yougoslavia took part to the Marshall plan. Here there's the first source I found [7], but it's something everybody knows. I really wouldn't know where to start, and by the way I don't really want to do it myself, but both the map and the totality of the text should be corrected. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 193.253.199.143 (talk) 22:02, 3 April 2008 (UTC)

[edit] Saar

Another error is that Saar was a formally independent state much like Free Territory of Trieste, and the article should be corrected in that way

[edit] Continuity problem --> "Rejection by the Soviets" §

There appears to be a continuity problem with the first section Rejection by the Soviets under the introductory section. The first paragraph of the § states.

British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin heard Marshall's radio broadcast speech and immediately contacted French Foreign Minister Georges Bidault to begin preparing a quick European response to (and acceptance of) the offer. The two agreed that it would be necessary to invite the Soviets as the other major allied power. Marshall's speech had explicitly included an invitation to the Soviets, feeling that excluding them would have been too clear a sign of distrust. State Department officials, however, knew that Stalin would almost certainly not participate, and that any plan that did send large amounts of aid to the Soviets was unlikely to be approved by Congress.

Questions arise as to what 'radio broadcast of Marshall,' and what 'offer'? It appears that there is some leading introductory material to the quoted paragraph which was edited out or never written into the Wiki article. I can surmise that US Secretary of State George Marshall gave a speech somewhere (US or Europe?) which was broadcast somehow on radio (short-wave?) where Bevin (in the UK?) could hear it.

It would appear that there should be an clarification and possibly a new first section under the introduction which could be titled 'Orgin of the Marshall Plan', then proceeding to the 'Rejection by the Soviets' section. I don't really have access to the source material or have the time to do it myself, but it just seemed to me that this should be mentioned as the orgin of the MP just seems to drop out of the sky -- somehow.--TGC55 (talk) 14:21, 21 May 2008 (UTC)