Talk:Marginal utility/Archive 2

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Archive 1

[edit] Economizer's changes

Economizer replaced

An individual will typically be able to partially order the potential uses of a good or service. For example, a ration of water might be used to sustain oneself, a dog, or a rose bush. Say that a given person gives her own sustenance highest priority, that of the dog next highest priority, and lowest priority to saving the roses. In that case, if the individual has two rations of water, the marginal utility of either of those rations is that of watering the dog. The marginal utility of a third gallon would be that of watering the roses.

with

An individual will typically be able to partially order the potential uses of a good or service. The marginal utility of a thing is its least useful application in satisfying the wants of a person. For example, a ration of water might be used to sustain oneself, a dog, or a rose bush. Say that a given person gives her own sustenance highest priority, that of the dog next highest priority, and lowest priority to saving the roses. In that case, if the individual has two rations of water, the marginal utility of either of those rations is that of watering the dog. If the individual has three rations of water, the marginal utility of a third gallon any given ration would be that of watering the roses. Therefore, as the supply of water increases a given ration of water is worth less and less to the individual. As a result, he is willing to part with one ration of water for something less useful to him in exchange than he would if he had less water. But, unless he acts altruistically, he will only part with a ration of water for something that is more useful in satisfying his wants than that ration of water. This is why, if it is assumed the individuals seek to maximize their own gain in trade, trade is mutually beneficial. This is because, barring mistaken predictions on the usefulness of things, both individuals who trade receive something more useful in satisfying their wants than that which they give in exchange.

Well:

  1. The first insertion is a somewhat careless definition of “marginal utility”. A careful definition was provided at the beginning of the article.
  2. The section change (concerning the third gallon) isn't particularly objectionable, but loses the notion of change.
  3. The next sentence (“Therefore … a given ration of water is worth less and less”) basically treats the “law” as if it really is a law; and it teeters in the brink of sneaking-in neoclassical presumptions.
  4. The next sentence (“As a result, he is willing … in exchange”) rushes us into the issue of marginal rates of substitution prematurely. These are covered further along, and they are not themselves part of the “law”. (Diminishing MRSs do not require that all goods and services obey the law.) Also, the wording is gender-biased.
  5. The next sentences (“unless he acts altruistically”) is just awful. Altruism does not represent acting contrary to one's priorities. Altruism simply represents having different priorities. The “law” will work if one gives highest priorities to the rose bushes, next to the dog, and last to oneself; it will work if one gives more priority to one's neighbor; &c.
  6. The next sentence (“This is why”) continues the error of the previous sentence. The “law” doesn't care what one's priorities are, so long as one has priorities of some sort!
  7. The last sentence (“This is because”) rushes-off to discuss trade. This section is not the place for it; this article is not the place for it. A good article on trade could discuss the point that individuals will only trade if the expect the trade to advance the objectives (egoistic, mutualistic, altruistic, or whatever) to which they give priority.

—SlamDiego 03:31, 10 March 2007 (UTC)

To trade altruistically is to trade without self-interest. It is to be fine with trading to receive something less useful by trading away something more useful. Marginalism assumes people seek to acquire things that are useful in satisfying their wants; they won't sacrifice something more useful in order to receive something less useful. About "the third gallon," it's ANY GIVEN GALLON that the marginal utility is decreased. It doesn't matter which one you pick. That's the poing of that edit. Economizer 03:38, 10 March 2007 (UTC)
Again, you are very wrong. You've confused the concept of usefulness with that of egoistic gratification. For an egoist, indeed a particular sort of gratification may be the ultimate measure of utility; but the concept of usefulness obtains no matter what one's priorities might be, and hence the concept of marginal utility obtains. Marginalism does not itself make any assumption of egoism; some marginalists did; others avoided making this unnecessary assumption. (And even if every marginalist had made that assumption, this article is about marginal utility itself, and would have to work out the peculiar implications of mutualism and of altruism if it needed to work-out the implications ofr egoism.)
I understood the point of your change w.r.t. the third gallon, which is why I said that the change wasn't particularly objectionable. —SlamDiego 03:53, 10 March 2007 (UTC)
"Usefulness" toward what end? Think about it. "Usefulness" doesn't mean anything by itself. When we talk of usefulness or utility in economics we are talking about usefulness toward satisfying the wants of any given person. The assumption in marginalism is that people seek to maximize the satisfaction of their wants. Therefore they seek to acquire things that are productive toward that end and as much of those things as possible up to the point where the usefulness in satisfying wants starts decreasing. Economizer 04:26, 10 March 2007 (UTC)
If people don't seek to maximize their well-being, then marginalism is useless. It would serve no purpose whatsoever. Marginalism is based on the observation of human behavior that they seek to maximize their own well-being. It can't be alienated from that. Economizer 04:44, 10 March 2007 (UTC)
The person who needs to think here isn't I. No matter what the ends, resources have or lack usefulness with respect those ends. So long as ends can be prioritized, resources have marginal usefulness. Unless you're going to trivialize the notion of “the wants of any given person” so that an altruists wants are said to be the well-being of others, and so forth, you are merely begging the question by assuming that utility must be w.r.t. one's own wants. (And, if you do trivialize the notion, then your giving away the argument.)
An assumption of marginalism is indeed that people prioritize — that's the same thing as maximizing — but marginalism doesn't care what their priorities might be. Without any assumption of egoism, marginalism gets downward sloping demand curves, upward sloping supply curves, &c.
In point of fact, you are making one of the fundamental mistakes of vulgar critics of marginalism, who think that, by attacking egoism, they can refute marginalism. —SlamDiego 04:48, 10 March 2007 (UTC)
I'm not critical of marginalism. I agree with it fully. Again, "usefulness" does not mean anything by itself. Useful for WHAT? Economizer 04:53, 10 March 2007 (UTC)
I was aware that you agreed with what you believe to be marginalism; so address my point: you are making one of the fundamental mistakes of vulgar critics of marginalism. Saying that “usefulness” doesn't mean anything is rather like saying that “3” doesn't mean anything. (“Three what?”) There is still a logic to usefulness just as there is still a logic to numbers. And, just as the logic of numbers gets along rather far without specifying three what, the logic of usefulness gets rather far without specifying usefulness for what. Further, just as there many some people who don't get the logic of numbers, there are many who don't get the logic of usefulness; so we need to talk about each.
Over and over again, you will find marginalism attacked for being a tautology. The reason for those attacks is that it pretty much is — it doesn't say useful for what. But math is also attacked for being a tautology. And we can see that marginalism and math were are useful tautologies, because people keep prescribing things that marginalism and math show are unreasonable. —SlamDiego 05:23, 10 March 2007 (UTC)
Open your eyes. There would be no law, or phenomenon, of diminishing marginal utility if people didn't seek to maximize their well-being. A being who didnt' seek to maximize his well being might keep drinking water perpetually no matter how full he got. Marginalism isn't a tautology. It is based on human behavior. It makes predictions based on assumption of how humans generally behave. Economizer 05:29, 10 March 2007 (UTC)
We don't know for sure why people behave the way they do, but if it assumed that they do seek to maximize their well-being, we are able to make accurate predictions. That's the value of marginalism. It's just a theory. There may come along a better theory eventually. Economizer 05:38, 10 March 2007 (UTC)
Illogical nonsense. If the person gives highest priority to the rose bush, next to the dog, and last to himself, then
  1. With one gallon, the marginal utility of a gallon is that of watering the rosebush.
  2. With two gallons, the marginal utility of a gallon is that of watering the dog.
  3. WIth three gallons, the marginal utility of a gallon is that of watering herself.
She doesn't drink three of three gallons, because that deprives the roses and the dog. She doesn't drink two or two gallons, because that deprives the roses and the dog. She dosn't drink one of one gallons because that deprives the rosebush; and if the rosebush were gone, then she still waters the dog.
You have completely confused marginal productivity in satisfaction of a type of want with marginal utility. You just don't get this stuff much at all. —SlamDiego 05:43, 10 March 2007 (UTC)
You're not following through with your thoughts. She doesn't drink three gallons because that deprives the roses and the dog. Fine. Now take it to the next level. Why does she not want to deprive the dog and the roses? Because if she did that, that would make her less happy than she would be if she watered the roses and the dog. Marginal utility assumes that people seek to maximize their well being. Maximization of well-being is what people aim to do when they are weighing alternatives. Having that as an assumption allows us to come up with marginal utility theory. Economizer 05:48, 10 March 2007 (UTC)
No, that's exactly the trivialization that I mentioned above when I wrote:
Unless you're going to trivialize the notion of “the wants of any given person” so that an altruists wants are said to be the well-being of others, and so forth, you are merely begging the question by assuming that utility must be w.r.t. one's own wants.
If you simply identify “well-being” with any satisfaction of any priorities, then “altruism” as you defined it ceases to be a coherent concept, any possible deliberate choices are “self-interested”, there is no point in mentioning self-interest. SlamDiego 06:00, 10 March 2007 (UTC)
I don't know how you're using the term "altruism." I'm using it to refer to people being motivated to increase the well-being of others instead of the well-being of themselves. Marginalism assumes that when individuals weigh which alternative to pursue, they do so by making a judgement on which alternative maximizes their OWN well-being. She doesn't drink all three gallons because doing so would diminish her well-being. It would make her unhappy to see the dog thirsty and her roses dying. Economizer 06:06, 10 March 2007 (UTC)
The reason that I put “alltruism” in quotes is because, for purpose of discourse, I accepted your definition. You are still not getting the logic here. Substitute Other Person A for the rosebush and Other Person B for the dog:
If the person gives highest priority to Other Person A, next to Other Person B, and last to himself, then
  1. With one gallon, the marginal utility of a gallon is that of watering Other Person A.
  2. With two gallons, the marginal utility of a gallon is that of watering Other Person B.
  3. WIth three gallons, the marginal utility of a gallon is that of watering herself.
She doesn't drink three of three gallons, because that deprives Other Person A and Other Person B. She doesn't drink two or two gallons, because that deprives Other Person A and Other Person B. She dosn't drink one of one gallons because that deprives Other Person A; and if Other Person A were gone, then she still waters Other Person B.
Whether it's a rosebush or another person, if someone dies of dehydration to save something else, then either she is not acting in “self-interest” and promoting her “well-being”, or the definition of “self-interest” and of “well-being” have been trivialized exactly as I said. —SlamDiego 06:13, 10 March 2007 (UTC)
You're still not following through. Why does she not want to deprive the other people of water? It's because it makes her happier allocating water to them before she allocates it to herself. That's self-interested behavior. Marginalism is based on the premise that people make decisions based upon what alternative has the most utility in satisfying their wants. Why does someone give someone a drink of water instead of themselves? Because it satisfies their OWN wants to do it. The happiness that one receives is of a larger magnitude than the happiness one receives by drinking the water oneself. Economizer 06:19, 10 March 2007 (UTC)
No, you are refusing to acknowledge the point about trivialization. Given the notion that doing what one wants is “self-interested”, no matter what it is that one wants, then “altruism” as you define it isn't even a coherent concept. Nothing but “self-interested” choices can be made. And “self-interested” doesn't give us any answer to “Useful for what?” because any possible use will ex definitione be “self-interested”. —SlamDiego 06:33, 10 March 2007 (UTC)
No, that's not to say that altruistic behavior doesn't occur. You have to realize that this is an abstraction which says that AS A GENERAL RULE people act to maximize the satisfaction of their own wants. Some people may act altruistically all the time. Some may act self-interested all the time. Some people may act altruistically sometimes and self-interested other times. But, overall human behavor is self-interested. In other words, if all behavior is not self-interested, then at the very least, more people act out of self-interest than not. And those that act sometimes out of self-interest and sometimes altruistically, act out of self-interest most of the time. That general assumption is the foundation of marginal utility theory. Economizer 06:37, 10 March 2007 (UTC)
Haha! Find an example of altruism which isn't like the person above who waters Other Persons A and B before herself. That is to say, find a case where one cannot say: She wanted to help someone else, and hence tried to satisfy her wants by trying to help that person.
(You already know where this is going, don't you? I suggest that you cut your losses.) —SlamDiego 07:04, 10 March 2007 (UTC)
If that's all you got then you're the one that needs to cut his "losses." I see you're looking at this as a competition when you should be looking at this as a learning experience. Economizer 07:07, 10 March 2007 (UTC)
See, you're not going to give an example, because you know that it's not possible. You generalized “self-interest” so that it would apply to any choices where marginalism applied; but because marginalism always applies, you were forced to generalized “self-interest” to apply to any choice. You defined “altruism” into impossibility! —SlamDiego 07:10, 10 March 2007 (UTC)
I didn't respond because I couldnt' make out what you were saying. No I havent defined altruism into an impossibility. If you want an example of altruism, one would be a person that gives to charity because it is ultimately useful in satisfying the wants of others. Marginalism on the other hand assumes that people ultimately do things because they are useful in satisfying their own wants. Economizer 07:13, 10 March 2007 (UTC)
Uh uh. Watering Other Person A or B is an act of charity. And when someone gives money to charity “It's because it makes her happier allocating” money to charity. Watering Other Person A or B “is ultimately useful in satisfying the wants of others” too. —SlamDiego 07:19, 10 March 2007 (UTC)
You're not following. Marginalism doesn't assume that people DO NOT act altruistically at times. It is based on the observation that it appears that people IN GENERAL act to maximize the satisfaction of their own wants. This observation is abstracted into as assumption that people do act to maximize the satisfaction of their wants. Economizer 07:23, 10 March 2007 (UTC)
I'm following your every dodge. Above, you claimed that the giving of water wasn't altruistic. If it was, then we see that one can talk about marginal utility without assuming self-interest. So you've been challenged to show that your argument for the “self-interest” of giving will apply to any giving, and you can't think of a case.
If you don't think of a case, then your claim that “self-interest” is an intrinsic assumption of marginalism per se falls apart. So meet the challenge, or admit that, whatever rôle the assumption of self-interest (non-trivially defined) might be in economics generally, it is orthogonal to the logic of marginal utility. —SlamDiego 07:33, 10 March 2007 (UTC)
I claimed that giving water wasn't altruistic, speaking from the perspective of marginalism. I don't KNOW whether it's altruistic or not. I'll tell you that it doesn't usually appear to be. The theory of maringal utility is not compatible with an assumption that people seek to do those things that they think has the most utility for others by neglecting what they think is useful for themselves. That would be totally incoherent given the concept of marginal utility. Economizer 07:39, 10 March 2007 (UTC)
You claimed that it wasn't altruistic because it attempted to satisfy a desire; all deliberate action does this. And, more importantly, the logic of marginal usefulness held for the watering example. So if it might be an altuistic act, then marginalism may be applied to altruistic acts. Again, the hypothesis that people are generally self-interested (non-trivially defined) has played an extremely important role in economics, but it is not an intrinsic part of marginalism. If you paid more careful attention to the article, you would have seen that it didn't need the assumption to get diminishing rates of marginal substitution, &c. You wanna throw self-interest into economic theory Good idea! Butnot here. —SlamDiego 07:48, 10 March 2007 (UTC)
I did not claim "that it wasn't altruistic because it attempted to satisfy a desire." I simply claimed that it was not altruistic. I simply assumed it. There is no reasoning at all behind that. It's simply the assumption that marginalism is based upon. That is an intrinsic part of marginalism. There is no such thing as a theory of marginalism compatible with the assumption that people act to satisfy the wants of others rather than their own. It's not coherent at all. Economizer 07:53, 10 March 2007 (UTC)
And I will indeed "throw self-interest" in this article. There are sources. If you delete them you are being disruptive. Economizer 07:55, 10 March 2007 (UTC)
Ah, no. One does not say
You're not following through with your thoughts.
because one has “simply assumed” something else. The reason that you claimed that it wasn't altruistic was because I showed that the logic of marginal utility applied to it.
And, again, your definition of “altruism” as
people being motivated to increase the well-being of others instead of the well-being of themselves.
and “self-interest” as acting to satisfy one's wants (no matter what one wants) then it is your claim that some acts might be altruistic which is incoherent. “Self-interest” couldn't then ever not hold.
The Watering example showed that the logic of marginal utility holds for altruistic behavior. If we examined any other act of charity, it would be likewise. And, because it holds, we see that self-interest is going to be irrelevant to the article. If your only excuse for including “self-interest” is that you define it to mean any desire, then you are now just going to edit in bad faith the article for reasons of ego. —SlamDiego 08:17, 10 March 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Citation

Don't confuse citing an author who agrees with you with citing proof that you're right. All sorts of things have been said about marginalism, some of which I promise you even you would see were patently false. A simple disproof of this claim of egoism is in examination of the assumptions of Menger; you can find them distilled in the article by Georgescu-Roegen or that by McCulloch. You won't find egoism in there. —SlamDiego 04:48, 10 March 2007 (UTC)

I don't trust your understanding of marginalism. I've given a source and it is more reliable than your word. Marginalism would not apply if individuals sought to decrease their well-being or didn't care one way or the other. Economizer 04:51, 10 March 2007 (UTC)
You have no idea how reliable my word might or might not be.
I know that your word is not a good enough source for Wikipedia. Economizer 04:59, 10 March 2007 (UTC)
You want me to follow your nonsense claim immediately with one that says “Marginalism makes no presumption of egoism.” and then ref the Georgescu-Roegen and McCulloch articles? Are we going to have a self-contradictory article, because your screwy notion of citation legitimizes such things? Think! —SlamDiego 04:57, 10 March 2007 (UTC)
If you have a source that says marginalism makes no presumption of egoism then sure, go ahead and add it. That wouldn't make the article self-contradictory. It would just tell the reader that there is not agreement on the matter. Economizer 04:59, 10 March 2007 (UTC)
It would make it self-contradictory because you'd stated the (false) opinion as bald fact. Here is a non self-contradictory alternative:
Some authors insist that marginalism assumes that people act in their rational self-interest by pursuing opportunities that increase the satisfaction of their wants, such as pleasure or happiness, by weighing which alternative is most productive in the long run toward that end.[1] However, no assumption of egoism is found, for example, in the fundamental assumptions of important marginalists such as Menger.[2][3]
If this should go in the article, then it still doesn't belong where you put the claim. It would belong as a second paragraph of the section “Marginalist theory”. —SlamDiego 05:12, 10 March 2007 (UTC)
As far as I know it's a "bald fact." Of course if you find something that disputes it and it is not a fringe opinion then I wouldn't be state it as a "bald fact." Menger certanily does assume that people want things because they are useful in satisfying their wants. He says that's what gives something a price. Economizer 05:15, 10 March 2007 (UTC)
""The presupposition of a strict regularity in economic phenomena, and with this of a theoretical economics in the full sense of the word, includes not only the dogma of ever-constant self-interest, but also the dogma of the 'infallibility' and 'omniscience' of men in economic matters." Menger, Problems of Economics and Sociology, p. 84 Economizer 05:20, 10 March 2007 (UTC)
""Among human efforts those which are aimed at the anticipation and provision of material (economic) needs are by far the most common and important. In the same way, among human impulses that which impels each individual to strive for his well being is by far the most common and most powerful." Menger Economizer 05:24, 10 March 2007 (UTC)
In reverse order:
  1. Wow, you really fail Logic 101 here. Menger calls egoism a dogma, lumps it in with infallibility and omniscience, and says that these are required for there to be strict regularity. And you think that this shows that he must believe in egoism. Menger was rejecting strict regularity, not embracing dogma.
  2. Menger wasn't identifying one's wants egoistically. Whatever might be one's objectives, the means for satisfying them are wants, even if those objectives are not egoistic.
  3. You've just found one citation, with your quote), and I previously gave you two. (Even if Menger had, after all, believed in egoism, that would necessarily have placed it amongst the assumptions of his marginalism.
—SlamDiego 05:36, 10 March 2007 (UTC)
Maybe you should recheck those sources you say you have and see if they actually say what you think they say. Economizer 05:25, 10 March 2007 (UTC)
Again, you fail Logic 101. —SlamDiego 05:36, 10 March 2007 (UTC)
Why do you have to be so insulting? I was expecting, when I encountered you and saw some of your good work on this article, that I would be dealing with a reasonable person. But I've found out that I was dead wrong. I despise you now. Economizer 05:40, 10 March 2007 (UTC)
When you snidely write “Maybe you should recheck those sources you say you have and see if they actually say what you think they say.” don't expect things to remain cordial.
Would you rather me say "I think you're lying about what those sources say"? Economizer 05:49, 10 March 2007 (UTC)
Well, to stay with the immediate point, I'd rather that you weren't a hypocrite about insults; at the very least you could despise yourself for being insulting.
But, moving on: If you're going to accuse me of lying about my source, then what makes you think that you're going to be insulated from the same claim about yours? How would anyone know that you hadn't made up that quote? Well, the very same way that I expect you to know that I hadn't: I asked you to look-up one or both of the referenced sources.
Again, these are all pretty much points of logic. —SlamDiego 06:06, 10 March 2007 (UTC)
I haven't accused you of lying about what your sources say. I simply think you're mistaken about what they say. That's why I said "Maybe you should recheck those sources you say you have and see if they actually say what you think they say." I don't know how to put it any more civilly than that. Economizer 06:14, 10 March 2007 (UTC)
Your now asking how you could have stated made an insulting proposition in more civil way. And the answer is that perhaps you couldn't, but that didn't make the proposition other than an insult. Note that I haven't so much objected to your being insulting as to your being hypocritical about insults.
But let's get back to the real point: The Menger passage that you cited rejects strict regularity in part because it rejects a presumption of egoism (which it disparages as a “dogma”). I don't happen to agree that strict regularity requires egoism, but the point is that you found a passage in which a great marginalist rejected egoism, and that should get you to recognize that egoism is not an intrinsic feature of marginalism, even if you continue to believe that egoism is correct. —SlamDiego 06:24, 10 March 2007 (UTC)
You don't understand Menger. He didn't think that ALL human behavior was based in rational self-interest, but that it is in general. That is what marginalism is based on. It is based on the assumption that AS A GENERAL RULE people act to maximize the satisfaction of their own wants. Economizer 06:27, 10 March 2007 (UTC)
I understand Menger, and unlike you I've actually read his books. The fact that Menger assumed that self-interest — defined in a non-trival way — generally obtained didn't mean that he hung his fundamental theory on it. Menger did not argue that there were times that marginalism failed because people were not self-interested; he simply declared that people weren't always self-interested.
And he wouldn't have said that they were ever not “self-interested” if he'd defined “self-interested” to be choosing what one chose amongst the possibilities before one. —SlamDiego 06:59, 10 March 2007 (UTC)
"Menger begins from the reasonable position that all theories employ abstractions. He then moves to the position that the specific abstraction of assuming economic motivation and self-interested behavior on the part of agents is legitimate, for it captures one of the most important sides, if not the most important side, of huaman life."Caldwell, Bruce (2003). Hayek's Challenge. University of Chicago Press. p. 69 —The preceding unsigned comment was added by Economizer (talk • contribs) 06:33, 10 March 2007 (UTC).
That quote isn't going to do anything for you. Noting that Menger didn't think that “self-interest” always held doesn't demonstrate that he didn't think that marginalism more generally held. Like Menger, I think that people usually but not always pursue self-interest (non-trivially defined); yet I recongize that the logic of marginalism holds even when people have other objectives.
Moreover, above, you argue for the necessity of “self-interest” and somehow hence of its necessity for marginalism. Now you want to claim that a great marginalist didn't think that “self-interest” always held. But one then couldn't have believed that the necessity of “self-interest” somehow made it necessary for marginalism. —SlamDiego 06:59, 10 March 2007 (UTC)
I don't think you understand the philosophy of theories in general. It's not even asserted that people seek to maximize the satisfaction of their wants. It's simply an "assumption" that is useful. It's like before atoms were proven to exist, it was useful to assume that they existed, because doing so allowed us to develop theories that have great usefulness. Assuming that individuals always act to satisfy their wants allows us to develop the theory of marginal utility. And that theory is extremely useful. It doesn't matter whether humans seek to satisfy their wants or not. The theory of marginal utility could not exist if that ASSUMPTION wasn't there. Economizer 07:05, 10 March 2007 (UTC)
Oh, I understand them a darned sight better than someone who would fall into the snares associated with “psychological egoism”. Again, if “self-interest” is both as you define it above and an empirical assumption, then you can give me a case of “altruism” — that is to say a case where someone tries to do what she wants without trying to satisfy a “want” like watering Other Person A or B. —SlamDiego 07:15, 10 March 2007 (UTC)
Is that supposed to be a challenge? Nothing could be easier. An example of altruism would be a person doing something for someone else simply because it benefits someone else. For example, someone giving to charity because what he believes that what he is giving is useful in satisfying the wants of others even though he thinks doing so reduces the satisfaction of his own wants. Economizer 07:18, 10 March 2007 (UTC)
You've failed the challenge. Watering Other Person A or B is an act of charity. You claimed that necessarily this satisfied a want of the giver “because it makes her happier allocating” resources to that charity. Well, only exactly in the same sense as would any other act of giving. It doesn't matter whether the giving is of water, of blankets, of food, or of money. —SlamDiego 07:25, 10 March 2007 (UTC)
You're not still not following. "Watering Other Person A or B" may be an act of altruism and it may be an act of self-interest. We don't know. But marginalism ASSUMES that when it is done it is done because the person giving water calculates that it increases the satisfaction of his own wants by doing so. Economizer 07:28, 10 March 2007 (UTC)
And whether that assumption is correct or not doesn't matter, if the theory of marginal utility works. A theory is judged by how well it works, not on what it's assumptions are. Economizer 07:31, 10 March 2007 (UTC)
Above, you didn't merely claim that watering Other Persons A and B might be an act of self-interest; you argued that it was. And the reason that you didn't admit that it might be altruistic was because I showed how the logic of marginal utility applied to it. If you're now going to admit that it might be altruistic, then you've accepted that the logic of marginal utility doesn't intrinsically involve “self-interest”, and we're all done here except for the shouting.
Nonetheless, I will cruelly remind you that the argument that you made for “self-interest” didn't allow for any “may be an act of altruism”; you defined “self-interest” to include the satisfaction of desires to help others. Well, no one engages in deliberate action except to satisfy a desire of some sort. (And random behaviors don't count as altruism or egoism, no matter who ends-up benefiting or hurting.) —SlamDiego 07:41, 10 March 2007 (UTC)
No, the reason that I said that all acts people make because they think those acts will increase the satisfaction of their wants is because that is the assumption of marginalism. Marginalism assumes that people always act to maximize the satisfaction of their wants, whether that is correct or not. I've already given sources for that. Imagine if someone received no pleasure, and diminished no pain, by giving things to someone else. How would diminishing marginal utility apply to that person? Economizer 07:46, 10 March 2007 (UTC)
Uh uh; no escape here. You wrote
I don't know how you're using the term "altruism." I'm using it to refer to people being motivated to increase the well-being of others instead of the well-being of themselves.
(Underscore mine.) You cannot have your “well-being” and eat it too. If possible behavior is “altruistic”, then “well-being” and “self-interest” must mean something other than just satisfaction of desire. And, again, if the watering could be altruistic, then the logic of marginal usefulness applies to acts that are not “self-interested”. So marginalism per se doesn't intrinsically require “self-interest”. —SlamDiego 08:05, 10 March 2007 (UTC)
Whether you despise me or not, your case fell apart from illogic. —SlamDiego 05:47, 10 March 2007 (UTC)