Talk:List of states with nuclear weapons

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  1. December 2003 – January 2006
  2. January 2006 – October 2006


Contents

[edit] Japan

One of my friends thinks that Japan has nuclear bombs, I dont think that it is true but can someone please clear it up for me? —Preceding unsigned comment added by Takaja (talk • contribs) 01:12, 17 May 2008 (UTC)

[edit] Germany and Sweden

Why is Sweden and Germany there? They don't have any nuclear weapons. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 81.229.73.179 (talk) 10:01, 1 May 2008 (UTC)

[edit] Edit Wars

So, for those editing the page and trying to reinstill the list of states with former nuclear weapons programs and other nuclear capable countries, please talk here to give your explanation for why these sections should be included on the page. This is stupid; NP Guy, myself, and others have put forth reasons for why these sections should be deleted (see below), if you disagree, then put forth an argument for keeping them, but let's not do this stupid "undo" drill for days on end. CP Guy July 21

  • I am only now reading this discussion page, especially regarding my edits re-adding the "former nuclear weapons programs" list. I do think the list is interesting and informative, especially for anyone doing research on the subject. For now, however, I will take the list off. --Asiir 17:55, 5 September 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Changing the Page

Seriously, I think we've raised enough concerns about the "states formerly possessing nuclear weapons programs" and "other near nuclear states," that I think we can delete them. I've made my case, others have made this case, are there any objections? CP Guy, July 13

Ok, I'm deleting those two sections, since I've had no nays. CP Guy, July 16

So, I've changed the page three times now, trying to address the issues in the list of states formerly possing nuclear weapons and other nuclear capable states. Each time, edits have been undone by folks who I can only infer have not been following these discussions, as they indicated that I have provided no justification for editing (which I've been doing since March). Thus, I give you Wikipedia.

[edit] Problems with Figures

It is said that America has 7068 NOT the 5000 that the Page states

Along with that Russia has 8232 nuclear warheads Britain only has 180 not 200 (im from Britain i would know) France has 348 and both India and Pakistan have 30-40 estimated

Evidence is the book/Encyclopedia "The Times: A Complete History of the World" by Overy, Richards 2004 and has been updated every 2 years. It is highly regarded. I can give the full list of the Warheads, type (submarine based, defence etc) if it is needed. PastryTarget 21:47 11 July 2007

Precise number of warheads is classified. Any number put down is an estimate. Getting down the tens or even single numbers is not a helpful endeavor. Moreover, you "cite" an encyclopedia; a reference in an encyclopedia is not "evidence." CP Guy, 11 July.

The numbers here for the US and Russia are dramatically different from this source: http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/nudb/datab19.asp Bsharvy 14:12, 3 August 2007 (UTC)

[edit] North Korea

Obviously, North Korea claims to have nuclear capability, but the size of the explosions measured were not in the kiloton range. It was either a misfire or a hoax. It makes no sense to include it.

YOU have no sources. There was an explosion, Korea claimed it to be a nuke, so it should be listed as possible.

-G —Preceding unsigned comment added by 134.117.158.83 (talk) 04:00, 19 January 2008 (UTC)

[edit] List style problems

The links here for countries in their entries are really rather misleading. Some are outright links to a country - '''[[Germany]]''' - While Germany is a signatory of the NPT... - whilst others link to detail articles - '''[[Canada and weapons of mass destruction|Canada]]''' - Canada has a well developed....

This is somewhat confusing, and means that the highly useful daughter articles are quite hard to notice - especially since the casual reader can't easily tell which sections have daughter articles. Any ideas how best to deal with this? Shimgray | talk | 16:19, 10 October 2006 (UTC)

[edit] China

It cannot be possible that China has only 130 nuclear warheads. According to other sources, the number is much higher: [1] --Arado 17:29, 1 December 2006 (UTC)

A lot of the difference in the sources seems to be how weapons "in storage" are treated, i.e the semantics of arsenal/stockpile numbers. The CNS report you cite includes "150 [1970s era tactical] warheads in storage", and "150 nuclear gravity bombs" (mostly in storage I suspect) for 1965/1970 vintage aircraft. Once you factor those out of the 400 number in the CNS source, it is a close match for the 130 in the cited NRDC Nuclear Notebook source. Rwendland 01:01, 2 December 2006 (UTC)
Just noticed NRDC yesterday published a new report on China's nuclear weapons capability: [2] (press release [3]) which warrants a close read. It reports on page 22: On February 28, 2006, Lt. Gen. Michael D. Maples presented DIA’s estimates to the Senate Armed Services Committee ... "... China currently has more than 100 nuclear warheads." [4] which does give some support to the 130 estimate we currently use, rather than the 400 in the CNS report. Rwendland 01:54, 2 December 2006 (UTC)
Our sources are the most up to date estimates. The CNS page's references only are as recent as 1997 — almost a decade ago. Most estimates by current experts, such as both of those cited in the article, think China has a very small but very mobile strategic nuclear force. It's actually a pretty rational and non-aggressive approach — they don't pretend to have first strike capability at all, only second strike. --Fastfission 02:09, 15 December 2006 (UTC)
One Source claims that China has atleast, if not more, than 500 warheads. This being The Times Online: Complete History of the World. Overy, Richard. 2004. PastryTarget 21:36 11 July 2007

Am currently writing a book that deals with this. According to most of my sources it is widely believed by Western analysts that China, having a relatively low priority for their Second Artillery, and an implied LOW (Launch-On-Warning) doctrine it is supposed that the stockpile only refers to the bare minimum of strategically necessary active warheads. However lack of transparency muddles this considerably (any of you amateur war buffs know this from doing a simple Google on 'Chinese Arsenal') so one must go with not only the modern dynamics of the PLA as it moves fully into the realm of 'Modern-Limited Warfare' but with accurate counts of the missiles appropriated to the task as well as an assimilation of reliable and mostly unbiased sources. I would like to change the number to 400+ because after the research I have conducted it is clear that following bristling maneuvers across the Straits [Taiwan] and the 1999 Yugoslavian\Kosovo war the CMC initiated a robust program to build 100-200 strategic warheads every year. Of course one can only speculate as to actual figures but the 100+ estimates are almost a decade old now. If no one has an objection I would like to change this. Feedback? --Beifakah 18:55, 26 October 2007 (UTC)


[edit] Israel

Ohlmert gives a list of countries with nuclear weapons: America France Russia und Israel, in an interview in German TV. Is this offical enough to promote Israel into the status of an offical nuclear power?--Stone 16:07, 12 December 2006 (UTC)

Mention of this has already been made in the article, and they are now saying that it was a misunderstanding and that's not what Ohlmert meant, so I would say no. TomTheHand 16:11, 12 December 2006 (UTC)
It is real fun when sombody states something everybody knows, but is not allowed to tell. The situation in realety did not change, but the political world was turned upside down!--134.76.234.75 17:21, 12 December 2006 (UTC)
i saw the guy's interview with my own eyes and it was not a lapsus linguae unlike many journalists have reported, the guy clearly said something like "israel gets the bomb". Cliché Online 05:44, 14 December 2006 (UTC)
by the way, as far as i know, it is known they have the bomb, but it is unsure if they have mastered H-bomb or only have the, 1st step, A-bomb. whatever anyway, since if the french did not gave them the A-bomb during the cold war, the yanks will gave them tons of H models just in case. Cliché Online 05:49, 14 December 2006 (UTC)
I personally do not believe Israel should be included in the list until it is confirmed in the media. We will know when the time comes... it will be all over the news, and the USA might start a new war over it :P Tauntobr 05:52, 14 December 2006 (UTC)
what do you want more? they will not conduct atmospheric test anywhere now to demonstrate it. i bet an official speech will settle things before the week end. the us a new war are you crazy? against who? time has come to stop the bullshit and to focus on the real threat: iran and korea. Cliché Online 05:56, 14 December 2006 (UTC)
Great, once we get the official speech we'll list them as an official nuclear state. As long as they keep denying it they're still "suspected" and we'll just list all of the evidence that they have nuclear weapons. TomTheHand 13:27, 14 December 2006 (UTC)
LMAO I was just kidding about a new war... lol I was just bein a sarcastic and cynical Canadian.... lol my opinions about the USA don't belong here though, so nuff said Tauntobr 19:59, 14 December 2006 (UTC)
Israel is still an undeclared nuclear state. Until that officially changes then that's how it is categorized. --Fastfission 02:05, 15 December 2006 (UTC)
It is unfair to co-relate the Vela incident with Israel. The Vela incident is still under dispute with numerous theories abound. Israel would not have the means or the necessity to conduct a nuclear test at such a remote site. While I am not contesting the claim that Israel has nuclear weapons, I am not for attributing the Vela incident to Israel. 210.210.12.141 (talk) 13:30, 7 February 2008 (UTC)

[edit] France giving nuke bomb to israel

i've just heard politics analysts telling that france gave nuclear bombs to israel in the ~50/60s & 80s:

  • "the french gaullists gave the detonator" 50~60s
  • "the french socialists gave the bomb" 80s

heard this in N'ayons pas peur des mots (nov.13, 2006) on i-télé ([www.itele.fr])

is it true?

Cliché Online 19:22, 13 December 2006 (UTC)

It is far more likely that the us gave the plans as the french already built the reactor.--Stone 18:01, 14 December 2006 (UTC)
what about the bomb & detonator? do you mean they had developed/produced them themselves? Cliché Online 21:14, 14 December 2006 (UTC)
found this here: "the first remained very secret, we think the Jericho I project started in the years 50s and 60s. France would had exported some nuclear technologies toward Israel and offered a large military support". dunno if the source is reliable. will search more about this later.
for now, the Jericho wiki article confirms what the journalists said as well as this source. it mentions Dassault but not the US support. i have created the french article about jericho. Cliché Online 21:36, 14 December 2006 (UTC)
Reliable sources only, please. In any case there is little doubt that the French did assist the Israeli program to some degree. I'm not sure why they'd need that much help with a detonator — many of the types of detonators used in nuclear weapons have been declassified for a long time and are not that complicated anyhow. The biggest difficulty would be the production of fissile material, and it is well known that the Negev Nuclear Research Center reactor was built with French assistance in the 1950s. --Fastfission 02:13, 15 December 2006 (UTC)
don't be so self confident, there are still unheard things about france and united kingdom like secret plans during the cold war including the project of a union between the two old rival empires. churchill came with this proposition and the french government was skeptical but nobody know what could have been happened. this info has just been undisclosed now in england, it was unveiled in the BBC's site few days ago. about this article i've heard, the very same day it was published, a french former minister (Charles Pasqua) on french tv telling it really happened but de gaulle was against, but in the same time another politician answered who knows? i mean more infos about the french assistance to israel are welcome because it really happened, a french national tv is a valuable source as much as an british or an american one, don't be arrogant. Cliché Online 17:00, 19 January 2007 (UTC)
here is my source: [5]

Charles Pasqua is a vice-Interior Minister, he said Churchill proposed a union with France and de Gaulle was against it. Christine Clerc (journalist and writer) was the person i was refering to, she said nobody knows what de gaulle would have done at last. this political talk show was produced in december 2006 (cf. ending credits) but was first broadcasted on january 16, 2007 which is around the same period the BBC unveiled the frangleterre secret plan from a british POV that is different than the french one of course. channel is LCP and the shwo is named Où, Quand, Comment, l'Histoire? Cliché Online 20:49, 26 January 2007 (UTC)

FRANCE GAVE NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY TO ISRAEL INDEED! it happened after the Suez Crisis, this came after the secret agreements of the protocole de Sèvres. Shame On You 20:10, 4 April 2007 (UTC)

Why is there even a section entitled "List of Nuclear Capable States"? The list provided here is not exhaustive, and does not offer metrics on how to define "nuclear capable". Does "nuclear capable" mean access to the full fuel cycle? A stockpile of weapons usable material? Weapons design? CONOPS development? Doctrine? Second strike capability? We should either tighten up precisely what this means, or get rid of it. March 20, 2006

[edit] Canada should be removed from the list of nuclear capable states.

Canada should be removed from the nuclear-capable states.

There are two factors here and unless they can be proved wrong,Canada should not be on the list:

  • For one nuclear weapons requires more than weapons grade uranium or plotonium.It requires many top secret materials,only known to states that currently posses(or formely possessed)nuclear weapons.
  • Assuming Canada has the capability of making the bomb(in terms of having the knowledge and the material),the question is not if Canada can make a bomb if attempted (as the article states),but if the USA would allow it.

Canada's geographic location as America's direct neighbor makes all it's facilities (yet alone the entire country) easily vunerable to an American missile strike. If the USA was able to detect Pakistan's nuclear activites by satellite,then there's no way Canada can work on a bomb that goes undetected by the Americans. It is unlikely the USA would tolerate another nuclear armed state,particularly on their own borders.

The author should consider these factors if he/she is to keep Canada on the list of nuclear capable states.Nadirali 08:54, 16 December 2006 (UTC)Nadirali

There is no single "author", but in any case: #1. 90% of the work needed for a weapons program is weapons grade uranium and plutonium. There are no other "top secret materials" required for a simple fission bomb. #2. Whether the USA would "allow it" has nothing to do with Canada being nuclear-capable or not. Nuclear-capable refers only to technical ability, not political feasibility. --Fastfission 03:26, 17 December 2006 (UTC)

I agree I was wrong about the political feasibility.However,I'd like to point out that uranium and plotonium bombs are independant from each other.Pakistan for example has a mainly uranium made bomb,but has not much record of possesing or formely possessing a plotonium bomb.True that roughly 90% of a nuclear bomb would require either of these materials,there are still materials unkown to the rest of the world except nuclear or former nuclear powers. Pakistan for example is alleged to have "traded"(note that doesnt necessarily mean providing materials at all) the technoligy with N.Korea in exchange for Nodhong missiles. Basically,no country can just aquire a bomb,even if they had the materials.The technoligy must be provided or researched,that is every component,not to mention the secret components. I do not find it difficult to belive Canada may be able to build nuclear weapons considering how advanced they are in nuclear technology,not to mention them having among the largest uranium deposits in the world.I just think more evidence should be provided of Canada's capability to build a proper warhead.Nadirali 06:27, 17 December 2006 (UTC)Nadirali

There's absolutely no evidence to suggest you need "secret materials" to construct a nuclear weapon. Gun-type fission weapons are extremely straightforward to construct. You slam two bits of HEU together, and they explode. That's all there is to it. Implosion designs are tougher, but the key technologies are: a) shaped-charge detonation b) precisely timed detonations, and c) very precise machining of the explosive "pit". None of these require "special materials" (other than the fissile material itself). Oh, and you need a neutron source - polonium/beryllium was used in early nuclear weapons, but it can be manufactured by irradiating bismuth in a nuclear reactor (which presumably you will have access to because it was needed to make the plutonium in the first place). --Robert Merkel 07:04, 17 December 2006 (UTC)

[edit] neutrality is disputed

A suyash 18:25, 18 January 2007 (UTC) The nuetrality of this article seems disputed and it shows that it is acting as the voice of united states, not a neutral one. firstly, israel is suspected to have 200 nuclear weapons. who is suspecting that? certainly united nations can't accuse or suspect any of its member without any proof. it must be united states. secondly, nuclear test by india showed that how use of uranium is secretly diverted from civilian purpose to military.when united states and other countries tested the same in a mass scale, then what was it? was it a good use of uranium? this article must be rated as its neutrality is very much disputed.

It is also interesting that the main articles for US, UK and France are titled 'US and Nuclear Weapons' and so on, but when the ones for China, Pakistan and others are titled 'Pakistan and Weapons of Master Destruction' and so on. May not have been conscious, but consistent nevertheless. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Wikiuser999 (talk • contribs) 05:15, 25 November 2007 (UTC)

[edit] NPT

In the opening paragraph of the article the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is mentioned but only by the initials NPT. I would suggest that the first usage be in the long form and that it link to the article on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Some one has put wrong numbers at least at active warheads of Russia. I'm 100% sure that there is more than 100 and so said also this article some days ago.

[edit] Analysis

I think it needs to be commented that U.S.A has more weapons than Iran in the section where US accusations against Iran are discussed, this is in order to put the situation in context. --RuleBrittania 20:38, 28 February 2007 (UTC)

  • Don't be ridiculous. Anyone who does not know that the US has more nuclear weapons than Iran (who has none) would have to be sub-literate. --Fastfission 02:43, 1 March 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Changes

Israel declared itself officially, as a nuclear power since. North Korea will abolish its nuclear weapons. --195.56.211.69 10:54, 2 March 2007 (UTC)

I deleted the Spanish section; there was no Spanish nuclear weapons program ever. Even the paragraph that listed it noted that they only developed a feasibility study.

[edit] Poorly Written Section

The paragraph on Spain is unintelligible. From the looks of the grammar, it may have been written by a beginning English speaker or directly translated from the contributor's native language. The paragraph was added by 87.220.31.203 in the last three edits made on February 23, 2007:

  • Flag of Spain Spain - Spain during the Franco's dictatorship it created the National Commission of the Energy. It managed to produce 150 Kg of plutonium a year to the margin of the international controls for the development of nuclear weapon, as well as the project of the missile capricornio. The project was so advanced that already the desert of the Sahara had been chosen as place to prove the first bomb. Both projects were cancelled after the signature of the agreement of not proliferation (due to the international pressure). Nonetheless today in day it would have capacity more that sufficient to develop the bomb in the space of relatively short time, since in the country 12 nuclear reactors of fission work and it(he) is doubtful that the advances obtained during the Franco's dictatorship were destroyed. The studies of 2004 reveal that Spain has the sufficient technology and it might construct nuclear weapon or develop a nuclear program, being able to construct one bomb and a half a year. It possesses reserves of uranium, possesses 10 nuclear power stations that produced last year the fifth part of the emaciated energy. Spain possesses, besides, a factory of nuclear fuel in Salamanca (Juzbado) and a center of storage of radioactive residues of fall and a half activity in Córdoba, in full Sierra Morena (El Cabril). There are rumors of the existence of a secret plan for the construction of small atomic bombs in moments of crisis (foreign threats, war, etc.), being alone necessary the direct order of the government for the immediate construction of these.

I have removed the paragraph for now - I started editing, but it is too incoherent in places (and there's no point in trying to make sense of false or speculative information!). I am hoping someone who knows more about the situation will be able to clarify further and validate the information soon as this is a Featured List.

Spain has a significant nuclear power program (world-nuclear.org) and has been helping other programs for quite a while, but I don't know anything about past or possible weapon programs. Spain does not have a profile on the Nuclear Threat Initiative (nti.org) which offers a lot of information on such activity, but it certainly seems they are capable, putting them in the same class as Italy and Norway. There are a few articles related to Spain's nuclear program: Search results from NTI; first few abstracts I browsed - successful establishment, 1982, general chronology, 1988, illegally exporting plutonium to France, 1990. Spain signed the NPT in 1987. - Slow Graffiti 08:19, 7 March 2007 (UTC)

I completely rewrote it based on a report published in El Mundo, a Spanish newspaper. As I am not a native speaker, I would appreciate any copyediting if deemed necessary. Regards,--Asteriontalk 00:07, 9 March 2007 (UTC)
Beautifully done. Thank you! - Slow Graffiti 07:05, 10 March 2007 (UTC)
Glad you liked it ;-) --Asteriontalk 22:57, 19 March 2007 (UTC)

there never was a Spanish nw program. See above about the 18 former nuclear weapons programs. Please reference more then one source before you declare a state of having had a nw program. 22 march 2007

[edit] Trident and Vangaurd links

I'm a relative newbie to Wiki so would like some help please. In the UK entry I tried to edit the last sentence to include the name of the UK submarine fleet (Vanguard) and the fact that they are nuclear powered thus: "It maintains the Trident ballistic missile fleet of four 'Vanguard' class nuclear powered submarines." However, can someone change the links so that 'Trident' goes to the missile page (link goes to Vanguard at the mo) and create a link so that Vanguard goes to the submarine page? Thanks Andywebby 11:59, 14 March 2007 (UTC)

[edit] List of Nuclear Capable Countries

I deleted the section "list of nuclear capable countries." It listed states without providing any solid metrics of what constitutes capability, other than saying that these states could develop NW within a range of weeks to several years. Under these terms, any state on the planet would be considered nuclear capable, since it takes several years to develop nuclear weapons. Moreover, not all capability is the same, as was intimated by this list, which included a span of technologically advanced states as Germany, as well as those developing states like Lithunia. Take Lithuania as an example: The article stated that it has one of the largest nuclear power reactors in the world. Perhaps, but this does not indicate whether or not they have access to the full fuel cycle, i.e., the ability to enrich uranium or reprocess plutonium to levels suitable to weapons grade. Moreover, nothing is said about their ability to acquire raw uranium, including the mining and milling necessary for a weapons program, and nothing is said about their weapons designing or machining capabilities. Beyond this, nowhere in the article is there any discussion of what is necessary for an aresenal: development of doctrine, concept of operations, delivery methods, etc. This is shoddy, shoddy work. Unless we can tighten this up, leave it out. 22 March 2007 —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 71.53.219.36 (talk) 21:58, 22 March 2007 (UTC).

[edit] Germany, not Nazi Germany

In the UK, Germany of the 1933-1945 era is simply referred to as "Germany" on many occasions. In the US, the term "Nazi Germany" is used but "Imperialist Japan" is never used. Some see that as subtle racism as one may think "it's ok to call the Japanese the bad guys but the Germans, those tall, blue eyed, white guys, we can't. Let's just say 'the Nazis did this or that' not 'the Germans committed genocide, etc.' ". Anyway, it's not necessary to debate the above because "Nazi Germany" was not the official name of the country nor was it used by the Germans at the time. The term "Great Satan America" is not used for the United States in this article because, despite common usage in some countries, it's not the official name of the U.S.VK35 22:09, 4 April 2007 (UTC)

Good point. Agreed. Lixy 12:51, 5 April 2007 (UTC)
Imperialist Britain is not used about the australian natives genocide by the british though... amazing ain't it? nor the american are named "colons" while they actually are vis-a-vis the apache they have exterminated and expropriated. however americans call the french pied-noir in french algeria "colons" while this territory was truly part of france (kind of a "lander") from 1830 to 1962, and the pied-noir were born in french algeria for generations. can you believe it? :) Shame On You 21:01, 6 April 2007 (UTC)

[edit] de gaulle/enterprise

can't remember where i red the charles de gaulle was the last nuclear armed carrier deployed by a country. are you sure the uss enterprise's nuclear capable aircraft are actually armed? Shame On You 20:53, 6 April 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Speculative and weakly substantiated content

A number of countries are listed either has having had nuclear wepons program or as being suspected of having nuclear weapons programs, for which there is scant evidence. I think the resulting map is highly misleading. I am aware of substantial evidence that the following countries had nuclear weapons programs:

  • Argentina
  • Brazil
  • Germany (but this was during World War II)
  • Iraq
  • Japan (but this was during World War II)
  • Libya
  • Romania
  • Sweden
  • Switzerland (theoretical work only)
  • Taiwan

I think the evidence in most of the other cases is weak or speculative. The citations do not support the claimed existence of nuclear weapons programs.

  • Australia assisted the UK weapons program, but didn't have one of its own.
  • Canada assisted the U.S. weapons program during World War II, but didn't have one of its own.
  • Egypt
  • Poland
  • Spain (the citation describes a report saying Spain could develop nuclear weapons, but no evidence that it acted on that report)
  • South Korea (the evidence is suggestive, but ambiguous)
  • Yugoslavia

And the list of nuclear capable countries is a complete mishmash. It seems like a random and completely unsystematic listing of countries with widely varying capabilities.

Here's my suggestion for making more sense of all this:
  • Have the primary map list only NPT nuclear weapon states, non-NPT states (all four have acknowledged or -- in the case of Israel -- assumed nuclear weapons), plus Iran (the only country credibly suspected of pursuing a nuclear weapons capability).
  • A second map could list (systematically) countries with nuclear weapons potential. This would include in bold color countries with enrichment and reprocessing facilities and capabilities, and in a lighter country countries with power reactors and with research reactors above a certain threshold (on the order of 10 MW thermal)
  • Add a category of countries formerly suspected of having nuclear weapons programs. I would add Algeria to that list, and the countries on the second list above except for Canada and Australia, for the reasons cited.
  • For countries that formerly had nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons programs, I would color code (1) to distinguish between actual weapons (e.g. South Africa, Ukraine) in a bold color and (2) countries that had nuclear weapons programs but not actual weapons (e.g. Sweden, Brazil). If it's not too busy, it might make sense to color them by the period when the program/weapons were abandoned, e.g.
- from WWII to the NPT (1970),
- after the NPT, and
- after the Cold War.
I think it would take a lot of work, but it would make this article much more useful. NPguy 21:42, 15 April 2007 (UTC)

[edit] L'escargot crisis

The article mentions an "escargot crisis" as a reason for the French research on nuclear weapons. The links is escargot and has nothing to do with any crisis. Is it a joke ? was there a real Escargot incident ? Thanks--Franchute 14:39, 9 May 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Changes in Pakistan section

"Estimates of the number of weapons Pakistan has vary from 40 to more than 100 warheads."

Look at what this staement says, not that pakistan has they following amount of nuclear weopons but that estimates from different sources range from 40 and higher. Therefore that is not the number of nuclear weopans this countries possess but what different sources exclaim that pakistan possess. I will change back to the previous reliable source number known. if someone dissagrees please present a reliable source for your point of veiw. Mandeep 619 (talk) 18:16, 5 April 2008 (UTC)


Incorrect statement: “Pakistan is known to have proliferated enrichment technology to North Korea, in exchange for the North Korean IRBM Nodong missiles ( which Pakistan calls Ghauri ), enabling North Korea to conduct its first nuclear test in 2006.”

There is no evidence Pakistan proliferated enrichment technology to North Korea. If there is, please provide reference.

There is no evidence that Pakistan exchanged Nuke tech for Nodong missile. Pakistan president in his book “in the line of fire” said that Pakistan bought Nodong tech from North Korea with hard cash.

North Korea’s Nuclear program is based on Plutonium. Pakistan’s Nuclear program is based on enriched Uranium. The device North Korea detonated in 2006 was a Plutonium based device. They got the Plutonium from their Nuclear Reactor. Pakistan had nothing to do with North Korea’s Nuclear test.

Nodong is an MRBM not an IRBM. IRBM starts from 3000 Km onwards. Ghauri missile is based on the Nodong missile. It is not the exact copy of Nodong.

I have changed the above statement to the following:

“A.Q. Khan is suspected to have proliferated enrichment technology to North Korea, although there is no evidence to back this allegation.” Raza0007 02:00, 29 May 2007 (UTC)

This is not correct. A.Q. Khan has admitted providing centrifuges and components to North Korea, and President Musharraf has confirmed this. NPguy 03:22, 10 June 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Dispute

This is a really, really bad page. There are no metrics for what constitutes a near nuclear weapons state, the number of states with actual, abandoned NW programs is well documented (read any recent issue of Nonproliferation Review), and yet... We have this crappy page. Can someone wiht the time please go back, read the list of 18 countries that rolled back (see the November 2006 issue of Nonproliferation Review for the full list) and revamp this page? It is really, really bad, and anyone who understands proliferation issues laughs at this page. (added by 69.143.20.172, 00:25, May 30, 2007)

Our list is cited from several sources. Are there any particular points of divergence? Rmhermen 04:58, 30 May 2007 (UTC)
I agree with the criticism. This page is completely unsystematic, with randomly selected facts about randomly chosen states. I hope someone with more time than I have will try to revise it. NPguy 01:02, 31 May 2007 (UTC)

Here are an overview of problems: The list of "former NW programs" do not include some of the earliest programs, such as Indonesia (1964-1966 under Sukarno), Norway (1946-1962), and Italy (1958-1962). However, in includes in the list of former NW programs Spain and Poland, even though they are not considered by the combating WMD community to have ever had NW programs. Moreover, their entries do not even present any evidence that there ever was a "program." This begs the question, they are included... why?

The synopses of the states formally having NW program is poor in the extreme. While a majority of the 18 voluntary NW rollback countries are included, they, like NPguy stated, are not presented in any systematic fashion, but merely include some seemingly random facts.

Some basic facts are wrong throughout the page. One example: Brazil is listed as having ratified the Treaty of Tlateloco in 1968. This is not entirely correct, they signed it with reservations, including asserting the right to develop PNEs (peaceful nuclear explosives, indistinguishable technically from rudimentary atomic bombs), and became full members of the treaty in the mid-1990s.

Regarding the states suspected of clandestine NW programs... What are the metrics for making this assertion? Who suspects them? Suspects them of what specifically?

Regarding the virtual nuclear powers: Wow, is this a bad mish-mash of nonsense. Once again, what are the metrics for saying a state is a near or virtual nuclear power? What is their access to fissile material? What kind of access to weapons usable (80% or higher of HEU or Pu) or weapons grade (90% or higher) material do they have? How much can they make indigenously per year? What is their compentancy in the R&D aspects of weaponization? Can they create warheads, or old 1940s style bombs? How about ballistic missile delivery capabilities? How about second strike capabilites or their development of strategic doctrine (to say nothing of CONOPS)? The article states that these countries could be weapons capable within "several" years. What constitutes several? 5? 10? 20 years? Moreover, the cases are quite random. Japan, Germany, Netherlands, Canada, ok, those could be virtual nuclear powers, with all the components of a modern arsenal articulated above within 5 years. But you are still missing other states that fall into this category, such as South Korea, Brazil, etc. Moreover, Bulgaria, Norway, Lithauania, and probably Italy would not be able to do this within 5 years. However, if you expand the metrics of "several" to include 10 years in your development timespan, then half the states on the globe qualify. Moreover, there is no discussion at all of the two main pillars of how serious entities concerned with proliferation (such as the US Government) assess proliferation potential, those being capability and intent assessments. So, the real utility of this entire section of the page is... what?

To finalize, this is a really, really bad page. There are lots of writings on the subjects of past and potential future proliferation (see the works of Mitchell Reiss, Leonard Spector, Lew Dunn, Peter Lavoy, Daniel Poneman, Robert Einhorn, Rebecca Hersman and Robert Peters, etc.), but none of these people who actually write seriously on the subject (the majority of their work is in books such as Bridled Ambition, The Nuclear Tipping Point, Nuclear Proliferation Today, etc.) are even cited? Why?

I think this page gets to the heart of the problem of wikipedia. People who know a small amount about a subject, but not much depth, present poorly understood information in a way that misleads people. Unless you really, really understand what you are talking about, don't post on wikipedia. This entire page is a testament to what is worst about wikipedia. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 69.143.20.172 (talk • contribs) 23:17, 30 May 2007

If you know something, please fix it ! If you think that this article is not correctly source (then fail the Wikipedia:Verifiability policy), seek the source, if you can't find a source and you think that some information is not true go ahead remove it (note : If you just think it's not true but there are reliable source saying so, then you can't remove it. Wikipedia is not the truth, if the source are wrong then find another as reliable source (mean a blog doesn't count) to justify your statement in a contribution as neutral as possible).
If you think that this article "fail badly" that the fact are not sourced, that it's interpretated bad writed etc. etc. Then I urge you to go to Wikipedia:Featured_list_removal_candidates and follow the procedure to make this list fall from his featured status.
This list should be based on source and not on Wikipedia:Original research.
But if this article got sources that the fact are not overinterpretated and that it does not give an undue weight to a certain pov, but you just don't like it and find laughable, I would say that you will have some rough time to understand the editing process of wikipedia. -- Esurnir 04:35, 31 May 2007 (UTC)
By the way, can you provide source to your statement (like the Brazil reservation and stuff like that ? -- Esurnir 04:40, 31 May 2007 (UTC)

Thanks for the comments.

You mentioned sources: Here is a very short list of good sources:

General: Cirincioine, Joseph., Wolfsthal, Jon B., and Rajkumar, Miriam. Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threats, Second Edition. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington DC, 2005

Muller, Harald. “Compliance Politics: A Critical Analysis of Multilateral Arms Control Treaty Enforcement.” Nonproliferation Review, Summer 2000

Mitchell Reiss and Robert S. Litwak, ed., Nuclear Proliferation after the Cold War,. Woodrow Wilson Center Press, Washington, 1994

Yager, Joseph A. ed., Nonproliferation and US Foreign Policy. Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, 1980

Campbell, Kurt M., Einhorn, Robert J. and Reiss, Mitchell B., ed. The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices. Brookings Institution Press, Washington DC, 2004

Dunn, Lewis A. Containing Nuclear Proliferation. International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1991

Levite, Ariel E. “Never Say Never Again: Nuclear Reversal Revisited.” International Security, Vol. 27, No. 3, Winter 2002/2003

Martel, William C. and Pendley, William T. Nuclear Coexistence: Rethinking U.S. Policy to Promote Stability in an Era of Proliferation. Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, April 1994

Paul, A.V. Power Versus Prudence: Why Nations Forgo Nuclear Weapons. McGill-Queen’s University Press, Montreal, 2000

Reiss, Mitchell. Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain their Nuclear Capabilities. Woodrow Wilson Center Press, Washington DC, 1995

Reiss, Mitchell. Without the Bomb: The Politics of Nuclear Nonproliferation. Columbia University Press, New York, 1988

Spector, Leonard S., and Smith, Jacqueline R., Nuclear Ambitions: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons 1989-1990. Westview Press, Boulder, 1990

Spector, Leonard S. Nuclear Proliferation Today. Ballinger Publishing Company, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1984.

Yager, Joseph A. Prospects for Nuclear Proliferation Rollback. Discussion Paper, Department of Energy, Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation, Washington, DC July 6, 1992

For Former Soviet Republics, see:

Bertsch, Gary K. and Potter, William C., ed. Dangerous Weapons, Desperate States: Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. Routledge, New York, 1999

For Latin America: Redick, John R., “Military Potential of Latin American Nuclear Energy Programs,” International Studies Series, Sage Professional Paper, London, 1972

Redick, John R., “Nuclear Illusions: Argentina and Brazil,” Occasional Paper 25, Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, December 1995

Redick, John R., “The Tlatelolco Regime and Nonporliferation in Latin America,” in Quester, George H., Nuclear Proliferatin, Breaking the Chain, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1981

For Australia: Hymans, Jacques. “Isotopes and Identity: Australia and the Nuclear Weapons Option, 1949-1999.” Nonproliferation Review, Spring 2000

Walsh, Jim. “Surprise Down Under: The Secret History of Australia’s Nuclear Ambitions.” Nonproliferation Review, Fall 1997

Barletta, Michael. The Military Nuclear Program in Brazil. Stanford University Center for International Security and Arms Control, Palo Alto, 1997

Krasno, Jean. “Brazil’s Secret Nuclear Program.” Orbis, June 1994

For Egypt: Rublee, Maria Rost, “Egypt’s Nuclear Weapons Program: Lessons Learned,” Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 13, No. Nov. 2006

Gregory, Barbara M., “Egypt’s Nuclear Program: Assessing Supplier-Based and Other Developmental Constraints.” Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 3, No. 1, Fall 1995

Indonesia: Cornejo, Robert M. “When Sukarno Sought the Bomb: Indonesian Nuclear Aspiration s in the Mid-1960s.” Nonproliferation Review, Summer 2000

Italy: Nuti, Leopoldi. “’Me Too, Please’: Italy and the Politics of Nuclear Weapons, 1945-1975”, in Diplomacy &Statecraft, Vol. 4, No. 1, March 1993

Nuti, Leopoldi. “The F-I-G Story Revisted.” History of International Relations. L.S. Olschki, Florence, 1999.

Libya: Bhattacharjee, Anjali. and Salama, Sammy. Libya and Nonproliferation. Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey, December 24, 2003

DeSutter, Paula A. Testimony of Paula A. DeSutter, Assistant Secretary of State for Verification and Compliance, Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Department of State, Washington, DC, February 26, 2004

Indyk, Martin S. and Walker, Edward S., “What Does Libya’s Disarmament Teach About Rogue States,” Middle East Institute Policy Brief, April 7, 2004

Jentleson, Bruce W., and Whytock, Christopher A. “Who ‘Won’ Libya? The Force-Diplomacy Debate and Its Implications for Theory and Policy,” International Security, Vol. 30, No. 3, 2005/2006

Leverett, Flynt, “Why Libya Gave Up the Bomb,” New York Times, January 23, 2004

Miller, Judith, “How Gadhafi Lost His Groove,” The Wall Street Journal, May 16, 2006

Miller, Judith, “Gadhafi’s Leap of Faith,” The Wall Street Journal, May 17, 2006

Norway: Clive Archer and Ingrid Sogner, Norway, European Integration and Atlantic Security, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, 1998.

Erik Beukel, Norway’s Base Policy: Historical Interplay Between International Security Policy and Domestic Political Needs, The Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, 1977

Forland, Astrid. “Norway’s Nuclear Odyssey: From Optimistic Proponent to Nonproliferator.” Nonproliferation Review, Winter 1997

Romania: Aurel Braun, Romanian Foreign Policy Since 1965: The Political and Military Limits of Autonomy, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1978

Ilie Ceausescu, Romanian Military Doctrine: Past and Present, Columbia University Press, New York, 1988

South Africa: Purkitt, Helen E., and Burgess, Stephen F., South Africa’s Weapons of Mass Destruction, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 2005

de Villiers, J.W., Jardine, Roger. and Reiss, Mitchell. “Why South Africa Gave Up the Bomb.” Foreign Affairs, November/December, 1993

Republic of Korea (South Korea): Englehardt, Michael J. “Rewarding Nonproliferation: The South and North Korean Cases.” Nonproliferation Review, Spring-Summer, 1996

Kang, Jungmin., Hayes, Peter., Bin, Li., Suzuki, Tatsujiro. and Tanner, Richard. “South Korea’s Nuclear Surprise.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January/February 2005

Kim Dae-Jung, “Abandoned at a Nuclear Crossroads,” Chosun Ilbo, March 12, 2007

Hayes, Peter. “The Republic of Korea and the Nuclear Issue,” in Asian Flashpoint: Security and the Korean Peninsula. ed. By Mack, Andrew. Allen & Unwin, Canberra, 1993

Sweden: Cole, Paul. Atomic Bombast: Nuclear Weapon Decision Making in Sweden 1944-1972. Henry L. Stimson Center Occasional Paper No. 26, Washington, DC, April 1996

Switzerland: Stussi, Jurg. Historical Outline on the Question of Swiss Nuclear Armament. Swiss Federal Administration, Bern, April 1996

Taiwan: Albright, David. and Gay, Corey. “Taiwan: Nuclear Nightmare Averted,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January-February 1998, Volume 54, Issue 1

Yugoslavia: Koch, Andrew. “Yugoslavia’s Nuclear Legacy: Should We Worry?” Nonproliferation Review. Spring-Summer 1997

Potter, William C., Miljanic, Djuro. and Slaus, Ivo. “Tito’s Nuclear Legacy.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March-April 2000.Vol. 56, Issue No. 2

This is a SMALL, non-exhaustive bibliography examining those states that rolledback NW programs. This list of states who abandoned NW programs conforms with the one that Rebecca Hersman and Robert Peters laid out in the Nov. 2006 issue of Nonproliferation Review (see "Nuclear U-Turns).

The fact that only a very small handful of these are even included in the citations of this page is worrisome enough. However, what is worse, are the utter lack of definitions, metrics, and terms of reference.

I go back to my earlier statement, that their is no uniform means presented to assess states' capability and intent. While factual data needs a serious revamping, to be sure, we need to lay out some definitions and metrics, including: 1) What constitutes a nuclear program? 2) What constitutes capability? 3) What constitutes intent? 4) What measurements do we use to quantify capability/intent? 5) How do we measure levels of influence on states' decisionmaking to both proliferate and rollback? 6) How do we measure "nuclear capable" or "near nuclear" states?

And I'm not saying that we need to remake the wheel on all these issues, not at all. These questions all have answers in actual nonproliferation studies, both in the scholarship world and in the policy world. Understanding the nuances involved, however, requires reading books like those listed above, as well as many others. Putting a mish-mash of facts (many of which are simply not true) down without working through first principles and your fundamental methodological approach is a recipe for chaos, which is what we have on this page.

I understand your standpoint of "if you see a problem fix it," but we have a larger problem: This page, due to a lack of metrics, definitions, and terms of reference, does not work conceptually. It needs to be redone, from scratch. I would start with 1) eliminating the section talking about states that could become a nuclear power in the near term. It is so flawed, as to be unusable. 2) Eliminating the states suspected of having covert/clandestine programs. The Saudi paragraph is bad. 3) Seriously revamping the list of states that abandoned programs. And most importantly, 4) identify what your definitions, metrics, terms of reference, and scope will be. The nature of this project, however, is on the level of a book (or several, as there is an entire field out there that we're tyring to summarize). A project of this size requires a single editor, or a small, cohesive editorial board, which is fundamentally opposite of how wikipedia operates. This is why I say, this page demonstrates what is worst about wikipedia, why I think it got to be this bad (no single editor with established methodological parameters), and why I think the wikipedia experiment will ultimately fail (unfortunately). → CP Guy

[edit] Major Dispute

This article is on Wikipedia featured lists! I do not want to belittle the hard work of all the people who have contributed to this article, but there is something fundamentally wrong with it. The heading of the article is "List of States with Nuclear Weapons" but the body of the article also includes states that only have a Nuclear Program. There is a huge difference between Nuclear weapons capability (Nuclear warheads design capability) and simple Nuclear program. In my opinion the only countries that should be listed under the heading “List of States with Nuclear Weapons” are the countries that currently possess Nuclear warheads (US, Russia, UK, France, China, Israel, India, Pakistan and North Korea) and those countries that previously possessed Nuclear Warheads ( South Africa, former Soviet countries etc.). Any other country should not be included in this article. I mean, what is Saudi Arabia doing here. They don’t even have a Nuclear program of any kind. To include them in this article appears to be a joke of some kind. Even Iran. They have only managed to enrich Uranium to a level of 3%, what are they doing under the list of states with nuclear weapons? Even if they manage to enrich Uranium to 90%, the level required for a weapon, what are they going to do, throw a container of highly enriched Uranium at somebody! Iran should only be included in this article when they have successfully developed a Nuclear Warhead.

Either this article needs to be heavily edited or the name of the article needs to be changed to “List of States with Nuclear Programs and Nuclear Weapons” or simply “List of Nuclear States”.

Does anyone agree? --Raza0007 03:31, 26 June 2007 (UTC)

I agree Raza. This is an awful page that should be redone from the beginning. I've been trying to change it for months, and have ultimately given up on the effort. Good luck affecting a change.--CP Guy, 26 June, 2007

Yes CP Guy, it needs to be redone, maybe not all of it just parts of it. This page should only be dedicated to the Nuclear Weapons States; the rest of the countries should be removed from here. I guess the people who regularly come to this page should edit it. The problem with Wikipedia is that no one wants to spend a lot of time working on an article as anyone can come and destroy all your hard work with the flick of a keyboard. Just imagine you spend 4-5 hours improving an article and someone changes it the very next day. The problem with this page is that it is part of an encyclopedia visited by people with various academic backgrounds. Somebody who does not know anything about Nuclear technology would end up believing that all the countries mentioned in this article have something to do with Nuclear weapons, which is not true. I guess this is the reason why most professors in universities advise not to use the information from wikipedia as reference. At least most professors in my university do. And I agree with them. Just look at this page. Some student with... lets say agriculture major, looking for some information about Nuclear weapons states would get very confused if he ended up reading this article. Well, I am not willing to edit it on my own because of the reasons mentioned above but I just wanted to mention this here so that anyone who is confused should know that this article is fundamentally incorrect. -- Raza0007 22:33, 27 June 2007 (UTC)

Yeah, its bad, and I've been trying to change it for a while. Even the bibliography is piss poor; the problem is anyone who knows stuff about the subject will know that this page is a joke, and those who don't, as you pointed out, will leave confused (at best) or misinformed (at worst, and probably more likely). Once again, to me, this page is the perfect example of what is bad about wikipedia.--June 27, 2007, CP Guy


MAJOR REWORKING OF PAGE So, now that we've got this page taken off the "featured lists" page, can we start to actually clean up this page, starting with deleting "states with former nuclear weapons programs" and "nuclear-capable states"? CP Guy, 6, July

That's one option. Another would be to change the title and be more systematic about the categories of states: those with nuclear weapons, those that had nuclear weapons in the past, those that had nuclear weapons programs in the past, and those that have significant nuclear weapons-related capabilities (i.e. enrichment or reprocessing programs). This would be more work than just deleting countries that don't now have nuclear weapons, but it would eliminate most of the gargbage entries and provide a systematic basis for fixing the rest.
In any case, I'm too busy (lazy?) to do anything but harp on this, so I defer to others to actually make the fixes. NPguy 02:51, 7 July 2007 (UTC)

Point taken. Any other thoughts?--CP Guy, 8 July, 2007

Why not just splitting the list into separate articles? Even if most of the content at the moment is about former nuclear weapon programs states, many of these entries are sufficiently referenced. Personally, I am against indiscriminate deletion of content unless it is unverified. Regards, --Asteriontalk 14:51, 8 July 2007 (UTC)

Asterion, I'd disagree; the citations for the list of former nuclear weapons states is not sufficient, it is in fact quite poor. I put up a very truncated bibliography for list of states with former NW programs up in a previous section. A good list of citations should at least examine the major works done on states that engaged in NW rollback. This has not been done anywhere on this page, other then a few articles from FAS and Atomic Bulletin here and there (which is insufficient). I'd kill the entire section. CP Guy, July 10

  • Firstly, apologies for the deletion CP Guy; was on general vandalism watch on recent changes; the removal without a descriptive reason why was going to get catch everyone's attention as vandalism. As for the discussion, I understand what you are saying here - and the creation of a seperate page appears justified - but I'm not at all certain there's any consensus here. In the interim, not approving or disapproving of the page, it should be left be (the 50K version) until this is settled. MojoTas 03:28, 23 July 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Iran

Is it just the US which suspects Iran of having a nuclear weapons programme? Does not the IAEA share those suspicions? And surely also the UK, France and others? DSuser 20:25, 30 July 2007 (UTC)

No, it's not just the United States. Many countries suspect that Iran is developing the ability to enrich uranium in order to produce - or at least to have the capacity to produce - nuclear weapons. However, direct public evidence of this is limited, based on links between Iran's nuclear program and the military, Iranian possession of documents on manufacturing uranium metal hemispheres (relevant to nuclear weapons and little else), and on documents reportedly found on an Iranian computer related to placing a nuclear weapon on a missile. This shortage of direct evidence is not surprising, since nuclear weapons actifities are hard to find. It is far easier to identify activities related to the production of fissile material than activities related to weapons research and development.
That is why the international verification system operated by the IAEA - the IAEA safeguards system - focuses on tracking nuclear material and seeking indications of undeclared nuclear activity. And that is why violations of IAEA safeguards must be taken very seriously as indications of potential nuclear weapons programs.
The IAEA Board of Governors reported in November 2003 that Iran had a number of "breaches" and "failures" to comply with its safeguards agreement, failing to declare a variety of enrichment and reprocessing activities and engaging in a pattern of concealment for 18 years. After allowing Iran several opportunities to resolve the matter through negotiation with the EU-3 (France, Germany and the United Kingdom) on a suspension of its enrichment-related activities in exchange for nuclear and other cooperation, in February 2006 the Board lost patience and reported Iran's non-compliance to the UN Security Council. In July 2006 the Security Council, acting under its authority to maintain international peace and security, demanded that Iran suspend its enrichment program, and imposed sanctions in December 2006 after Iran failed to do so. NPguy 00:55, 31 July 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Stockpile numbers and references

Someone, or perhaps several editors, keep making changes to the stockpile numbers in the article, but without changing the citations. If the reference says that Israel has 70-120 warheads, you can't use it so support a claim that Israel has 120-200 warheads. The numbers are certainly open to question, but to change the numbers requires a citation from a credible source. I also note that some of the citation links no longer work and probably need to be updated anyway. NPguy 03:04, 5 October 2007 (UTC)

The UK is down for 750 but the wiki article on UK nuclear weapons states c.200. There has also been recent statements about who has the smallest number of nuclear weapons between the UK and China. 62.56.49.30 15:11, 3 November 2007 (UTC)

[edit] "Proliferation record"

I don't know who thought it was a great idea to signal out Pakistan and North Korea as having a "proliferation record" but I think it is worth noting that

  1. at the moment, the North Koreans have no well-established record of proliferation of nuclear materials
  2. at the moment, it has not been established that the Pakistani government knew about the proliferation ring of one of its scientists
  3. there are many instances of the US, France, and the USSR doing things that could easily be regarded as proliferation of some sort (in regards to giving knowledge and technology to their allies, esp.in the cases of the United Kingdom, Israel, and China)

Lastly, sorting people by their "proliferation record" is by definition an inexact form of categorization. It is not a useful form of organization for a page like this. --24.147.86.187 (talk) 03:21, 23 November 2007 (UTC)

Correction, I do know who it was: User:Chanakyathegreat, who seems to have made it his pet project to post anti-Pakistan material on this page. I have no love for Pakistan, but let's keep things as neutral as possible, ok? --24.147.86.187 (talk) 03:25, 23 November 2007 (UTC)

I agree. Furthermore this article is about List of Nuclear Weapons States, not about Nuclear proliferation. The proliferation info should be mentioned under its own appropriate article. I noticed that in this particular article only proliferation info about Pakistan is mentioned. In order to be neutral either mention the proliferation record of every state or do not mention it at all. In any case proliferation record should not be mentioned under this article. {Raza0007 | Talk} 02:27, 4 December 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Warheads

This might sound odd but, they don't seem to make mention in the sources whether they are talking about warheads as in the entire missile payload being one warhead or whether they are talking about warheads in the sense of each individual nuclear bomblet? A Trident D5, for example has 8 nuclear warheads within the missile, as I understand it (with the possibility to have more, but limited due to MRV treaties). Is this counted as 1 or 8 on the list? Narson (talk) 15:39, 31 December 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Pruning the list

I have deleted the sections listing Iran, Syria and Taiwan. None of these countries is believed to have nuclear weapons. If we want to list states that have, had, or are suspected of having or of having had nuclear weapons programs, that should be a separate article. List of states suspected of having nuclear weapons programs. Let's keep this article limited to known cases. NPguy (talk) 03:49, 7 February 2008 (UTC)

I have reinserted that information. The list has more than strictly "nuclear weapons states" listed in the various subsections - the entries for those countries are in accord with nonproliferation publications and common viewpoints. Please don't take the title of the list too literally - the other subsections are important, too. Georgewilliamherbert (talk) 03:55, 7 February 2008 (UTC)
We've been through this before (see Major Dispute discussion). The problem is that there are no objective criteria for listing countries suspected of having nuclear weapons ambitions at some point in the past. The list was ridiculous. When Taiwan was added I realized that we were going down the same path again. There's no end to it. NPguy (talk) 03:44, 8 February 2008 (UTC)
I essentially agree as it seems ridiculous to list every country which has ever been accused of having a weapons program. --68.23.10.26 (talk) 04:05, 8 February 2008 (UTC)
All of these (all countries which have had, or been accused of having a nuclear program) are well sourced, and the sources support the categories they all are in. This is not a black/white situation - there are a lot of countries that walked up to starting programs, and then stopped, or started one and then stopped it under external pressure. Georgewilliamherbert (talk) 04:24, 8 February 2008 (UTC)
As an aside, we know a fair amount about Taiwan's interest in a program, and South Korea's program, etc... Georgewilliamherbert (talk) 04:25, 8 February 2008 (UTC)
If you remove those states, you must also remove Israel. Israel has never declared that they have nuclear weapons, but the world (I use "rest of the world" very liberally) suspects they do. Since there are many sources linking all of the accused states of having nuclear weapons, I believe a consensus must be reached as to the exact nature of this article before any data is removed. As such, I am going to revert the article to the status before the three states were removed. In the future, please discuss any major changes on the Talk Page before making them. Goalie1998 (talk) 06:18, 8 February 2008 (UTC)
The difference of Israel is than an overwhelming number of countries and organizations (including some of its own leaders) assert it currently has actual nuclear weapons. Most of the outher countries being discussed for removal include states which some Western countries suspect or allege to have a nuclear weapons ambition. So when the leader of one of these countries accidentially slips that the country has nuclear weapons, the head of the IAEA says he believes the country has nuclear weapons, and when numerous countries work under the assumption that the country has nuclear weapons [6] [7] [8] etc., then we can assume they meet the threshhold for the article. --68.23.10.26 (talk) 16:00, 8 February 2008 (UTC)
The article doesn't assert that they have weapons, it states that there's verifyable evidence that they had or have programs, which is clearly true. South Africa has no weapons now, either, but it did - and admitted it, as part of the disarmament program and joining IAEA and the NPT. Others have disclosed programs to IAEA. Others (Iran, for example) have not. Georgewilliamherbert (talk) 19:48, 8 February 2008 (UTC)
Israel's "admission" that they do in fact possess nuclear weapons is still debated. That wasn't the point of my statement; my point was simply that it is impossible to only include states that have definitely declared their weapon status. If we tried to do that, we would have to also remove the number of nuclear weapons per state because we assume that all of the governments have actually disclosed the true amount of weapons they possess (I do not believe in conspiracy theories; just pointing out that nuclear stockpile is a matter of national security and there is a possibility that numbers are not accurate). Anyway, my true point - in my opinion, it is better to air on the safe side and include all states that have been accused of possessing nuclear weapons. Goalie1998 (talk) 21:01, 8 February 2008 (UTC)
Where we define the threshhold is of course open for debate and I'm open to it. The best thing would de to come up with a clear and consistent standard so it is obvious whether something should or shouldn't be included in the article. Self-admission or investigation by international body would both seem like possible standards to me. Other thoughts or suggestions? --68.23.10.26 (talk) 02:31, 9 February 2008 (UTC)
Here's the logic to keeping Israel but deleting Iran, Syria and Taiwan. Isreal is widely presumed to have nuclear weapons. Its policy of opacity fools no one, particularly not since Vanunu. The others are/were suspected of having nuclear weapons programs. As long as the title of the article is "list of states with nuclear weapons," they don't belong. And if you look at what this page looked like six months ago you'll realize what a rathole you open up when you include countries suspected of having illicit nuclear programs. I don't mind having a separate article on states that have/had/are or were suspected of having nuclear weapons programs. But let's not confuse this page. NPguy (talk) 05:00, 9 February 2008 (UTC)
I mostly agree with this and note that Israel is defined as having a nuclear weapons program by an overwhelming majority of the reliable sources. If there are some secondary which describe a policy of ambiguity, then they can be listed in a secondary position. This article shouldn't list every country who has ever been accused of having one because it doesn't match the description and it would balloon the article too much. --68.23.10.26 (talk) 16:35, 9 February 2008 (UTC)

[edit] Fair use rationale for Image:Vanuunu-Article.jpg

Image:Vanuunu-Article.jpg is being used on this article. I notice the image page specifies that the image is being used under fair use but there is no explanation or rationale as to why its use in this Wikipedia article constitutes fair use. In addition to the boilerplate fair use template, you must also write out on the image description page a specific explanation or rationale for why using this image in each article is consistent with fair use.

Please go to the image description page and edit it to include a fair use rationale. Using one of the templates at Wikipedia:Fair use rationale guideline is an easy way to insure that your image is in compliance with Wikipedia policy, but remember that you must complete the template. Do not simply insert a blank template on an image page.

If there is other fair use media, consider checking that you have specified the fair use rationale on the other images used on this page. Note that any fair use images lacking such an explanation can be deleted one week after being tagged, as described on criteria for speedy deletion. If you have any questions please ask them at the Media copyright questions page. Thank you.

BetacommandBot (talk) 02:48, 12 February 2008 (UTC)

[edit] consensus to prune the list (?)

The preceding topics "dispute," "major dispute" and "pruning the list" discussed whether to limit the scope of the article to match its title or change the title to match the list. It's hard to figure when you have "consensus," but I read the discussion as leading to the logical conclusion that we should prune the list. The discussion seemed to be hinge on whether we needed to keep a few extra countries as a cover for Israel, which doesn't formally acknowledge having nuclear weapons. I thought I had dispensed with that argument (since Vanunu, who doubts that israel has nuclear weapons), so I went ahead and deleted the extraneous references. Someone didn't like that, so I'm trying again. Let's give ourselves another week to sort this one out.

First, should we prune the list to match the title or should we change the title to match the list?

Second, if we prune the list, should we add another article with the borderline list?

Third, if we either start a new article or broaden the scope of this one, how do we make the list match the title?

I vote for pruning the list. The problem with the current list is that three of the entries (Iran, Syria and Taiwan) clearly don't match the title. If someone wants to discuss the grey list countries, let them start a new article on states that have or had nuclear weapons programs, or that are or were suspected of having such programs. Either way the list still wouldn't match because it's incomplete. What about Iraq, Libya, South Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, Brazil? The history of this article shows that quality control for the grey list will be difficult, with lots of junk entries (Canada, Australia, Spain, Poland). NPguy (talk) 21:40, 16 February 2008 (UTC)

So how do you define consensus? If no one replies (and no one objects) is that good enough? NPguy (talk) 02:15, 4 March 2008 (UTC)
Solution: Formally expand the scope of the article to include established and suspected (by a reputable agency, of course...) nuclear programs/stockpiles. Problem solved. MalikCarr (talk) 23:24, 4 March 2008 (UTC)
Also "current and historical..." Georgewilliamherbert (talk) 23:42, 4 March 2008 (UTC)
This sounds simple, but as noted above (under major dispute) it has major problems. Once you open the list to countries that have ever been suspected of having a nuclear weapons program, you lose all quality control. Have you seen what the list looked like six months ago? Poland? Spain? Canada? It made no sense. There is no more basis for including Syria than those countries. Taiwan is more plausible since at least there's some relevant information available, but then why not Brazil? Argentina? Where do you stop? And by the way, Taiwan is not recognized as a "state." NPguy (talk) 04:29, 5 March 2008 (UTC)
Sure it is. There's a difference between "diplomatically recognized as" and "recognized and treated as a country". People with Taiwanese passports can travel on them around the world, including to countries that rather specifically are hostile to Taiwan diplomatically.
The basis for including Syria is a presumptive secret nuclear materials program in progress at the presumptive reactor site. Every nation which has secretly sought to produce fissile materials has had a nuclear weapons program (as judged by international community consensus, including Iran now, though they may have stopped the active weaponization), except Syria about whom we're not sure. Every other country has admitted it, either to IAEA or others, and either abandoned it or gone nuclear in the end. I know some proliferation experts who feel that this correlation is overenthusiastic, but all the weapons technical experts I know take it pretty much as given truth, and I think that's the NPT community policy consensus. That said, we don't publically know anything more about Syria than that they had what appears to have been a reactor that appears to have been bombed.
If anything, there are known (in the community) programs not on here, which we can't publically document, but which entirely appropriately do belong here from a list contents point of view. Georgewilliamherbert (talk) 05:28, 5 March 2008 (UTC)
The problem is that secret documents are meaningless to Wikipedia because you need a reliable source to support what you say. The second problem is that "a presumptive secret nuclear materials program in progress at the presumptive reactor site" neither proves a nuclear program nor is implied to be contained within the contents of the article via the article's title.
Just to note: The Federation of American Scientists has said "although Syria has long been cited as posing a nuclear proliferation risk, the country seems to have been too strapped for cash to get far"([9]) while the Nuclear Threat Initiative has said "although the Israeli and U.S. governments have expressed concerns about Syrian nuclear weapons aspirations, there is little convincing evidence of such an objective"([10]). The allegation may be noteworthy, but it needs to be included within an appropriate article based on rationale supported by reliable sources.
Renaming the article with a mutually acceptable and content appropriate title, as well as keeping in mind that the article must be based off of citable reliable sources, seems like the best option moving forward to me..--68.21.95.247 (talk) 06:13, 5 March 2008 (UTC)

Starting over again. There is no credible public evidence of a nuclear weapons program in Syria. Israel bombed a nondescript building. No one knows what it was but a nuclear connection is sheer speculation.

That exemplifies the problem with trying to expand this page to cover all the dubious cases. Let's limit this page to things we know and leave speculation to another page. I don't think broadening this page to invite further speculation is a good choice. NPguy (talk) 04:35, 6 March 2008 (UTC)

It is widely verifyably citably correct that many people in the global security and nonproliferation communities are speculating about a Syrian weapons program following the raid. We can say that perfectly validly here. Georgewilliamherbert (talk) 04:18, 7 March 2008 (UTC)
It is also widely verifyably citably correct that many expert organizations feel the speculations are grossly overstated. The main question being raised is whether an allegation about every country belongs in the article, especially given its title.. --68.21.95.247 (talk) 05:37, 7 March 2008 (UTC)
It's a pretty low standard for inclusion in an online encyclopedia that there is widespread speculation. Is that really the standard we want? Shouldn't we demand relevant facts? NPguy (talk) 03:39, 8 March 2008 (UTC)
It's a speculation that led to an act of war by one country against another. That's only happened twice (Iraq / Osirak reactor attack by Israel, and Syria / possible reactor strike by Israel). It's significant enough to report here. Georgewilliamherbert (talk) 03:48, 8 March 2008 (UTC)
Actually, we don't know what led to the act of war. That is, we don't know why Israel bombed the site in Syria. It's all just speculation. NPguy (talk) 20:40, 8 March 2008 (UTC)

Oh man, I take a break from this page in July, with a sense of "job well done" after NP Guy, me, and a few others finally win the fight to end the terrible hell that was this page, and come back here to find this. Here we go again with "suspected programs" etc. And, Taiwan? Yes, Taiwan had a nuclear weapons program that ended in the mid 1970s, and again terminated a small-scale effort in 1988. So what does that have to do with an article about states that have NW program today? Does anyone really think that Taiwan is moving forward on a NW program today? Anyone? Is anyone in the indicators and warnings community offering this? No. So why is it here? And why is Syria listed, when no one in the open community knows what was blown up by the Israeli's last summer? A good point is made, we lack evidence of an Israeli NW capability, but there is overwhelming consensus on the subject, so we include it. We have little evidence on Syria, and there is no consensus on the nature of what was blown up. Zero. So why are they on this page?

Finally, Georgwilliamherbert, if you really want to include all the cases of states that were rolledback, we already fought this battle last summer. Check out the discussion pages that NP referenced; hell, check out the "milestones" discussion on why it was decided to delete all those cases. There were very good reasons for doing so. CP Guy, March 14, 2008. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 198.76.89.7 (talk) 20:31, 14 March 2008 (UTC)

[edit] stockpile estimates

There was recently a change replacing the stockpile estimates of one source (the folks who write for the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists) to anotherset of estimates from another, less established source. This change was then reverted. Given that there are a variety of sources with a variety of stockpile numbers, how do we pick?

I'm inclined to select one source as reputable and representative. The current main source meets that standard. An alternative would be to take cite a number of sources and construct a meta-estimate from all of them. Another might be to produce a table that includes several of them. In any case, I think it makes sense to include alternate sources as references and to note the fact that there are various estimates and none is definitive. NPguy (talk) 02:22, 4 March 2008 (UTC)

I tend to trust the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists as the most reliable source for statistical information (regarding nuclear weapons and theories of nuclear war, maybe not so much). They're the tenders of the Doomsday Clock and all... probably know how things are. That's why I revered the new figures, since they were only cited to an online source I've never heard of before, not to mention cited very bizarre numerations in general. Also borked the rest of the references block... MalikCarr (talk) 23:22, 4 March 2008 (UTC)
NRDC via BAS is the easiest and usually most up-to-date approach to stockpile estimates, and their methodology has been consistent over time. Considering they update their estimates on a regular basis and make their methodology pretty transparent, I think that's the best approach. --Fastfission (talk) 15:09, 19 March 2008 (UTC)

[edit] Iranian nuclear program

The latest IAEA report and the director of the IAEA have both pointed out the major outstanding issue facing verification of the Iranian nuclear program is allegations put forth by the United States regarding alleged weapons studies that Iran has supposedly conducted in the past. Whether allegations of nuclear weapon ambition belong in the article is one issue, but the IAEA's current stance on the remaining verification issues is rather clear and it should be represented accurately. I am open to paraphrasing, but the summarisation should reflect what the IAEA has been saying. --68.21.95.247 (talk) 03:26, 7 March 2008 (UTC)

I think a neutral summary needs to indicate that Iran violated its NPT safeguards obligations for many years by hiding work on enrichment and reprocessing - the very technologies that are necessary to produce materials for nuclear weapons. As IAEA Director General ElBaradei has stated repeatedly, that created a "confidence deficit." That is, the previously clandestine program has raised doubts about the nature and intent of Iran's nuclear program. This is why the UN Security Council has demanded that Iran suspend that program. The fact that Iran has come close to meeting its safeguards obligations, while it continues to pursue this program in open defiance of the Security Council, does not erase those questions. A summary that omits these facts is not neutral.
As to whether Iran belongs on this page, I think it is the only one of the three listed (the others are Taiwan and Syria) that comes close to fitting the title of this article. If this article is split into two - one on countries that have (or had) nuclear weapons and another with countries that have, had, are or were suspected of having nuclear weapons programs, Iran could be removed from this article but placed at the top of the list of the new article. NPguy (talk) 03:36, 8 March 2008 (UTC)
A neutral wording can certainly document why the investigation was began and why it is on-going, but it should also note some of the progress from 5 years of investigation. 'Questions' just seems to be very ambiguous and only document one side..
Noting previous issues, continued enrichment, failure to fully and permanently implent the Additional Protocol, etc. are all fine as long as they represent the document and a different viewpoint is also provided. So, it'd probably be best for us to reach an acceptable version here.. I'd encourage you to start with one of the issues provided or your own, but to then note resolution of some major issues, lack of any specific evidence, Iranian rationale for continuing enrichment, etc. If you can't come up with one I'll try, but I tend to have spacial constraint issues.. --68.21.95.247 (talk) 23:26, 8 March 2008 (UTC)

Here is an example proposal:

The United Nations Security Council has imposed sanctions against Iran three times, because Iran refuses to suspend its nuclear enrichment. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has been been able to resolve many outstanding issues of Iran's nuclear program but continues verification on alleged weapon studies and the status of Iranian uranium enrichment. Iran has argued the Security Council sanctions compel Iran to abandon its rights under the NPT to peaceful nuclear technology.

I'm not perfectly attached to it, but it

  • presents previous and current problems while acknowledging progress
  • presents important specifics rather than ambiguous terms
  • presents the perspectives of the most relevant parties

I'm not perfectly happy with it, but I would work with that or something similar you propose.. --68.21.95.247 (talk) 01:22, 9 March 2008 (UTC)

That's incomplete since it doesn't say why the Security Council imposed sanctions. I propose the following:

After investigating previously undeclared elements of Iran's nuclear program, the IAEA reported Iran's non-compliance with its NPT safeguards obligations in 2006. The UN Security Council demanded that Iran suspend uranium enrichment activities and imposed sanctions three times when Iran refused to do so. A U.S. National Intelligence Estimate of December 3, 2007 judged that Iran halted an active nuclear weapons program in fall 2003.[1] Iran has stated that it categorically rejects the development of nuclear weapons.[2]

In that context, the current status of the IAEA investigation is not essential since it answers the what but not the why of Iran's secret nuclear activities. You could add the IAEA's equivocal finding of "no evidence" of links to weapons and inability to verify the peaceful nature of Iran's program, but I don't think that adds much. NPguy (talk) 17:04, 9 March 2008 (UTC)
The current status of the IAEA investigation is essential because it verifies many of Iran's previously undeclared nuclear activities, and says the only major remaining issue is "alleged weapon studies" which so far have yet to turn anything up (and which the IAEA was able to share with Iran only right before the latest report, making it hard for Iran to directly respond to). The IAEA has also verified "the scope and nature of Iran´s enrichment programme". I think the first sentence should document the accusations/sanctions/..., the second sentence should document IAEA progress and continued needs, while the last sentence should document the Iranian perspective or response. So I guess I would propose:

After the IAEA found Iran in non-compliance with its NPT safeguards obligations in 2006, the UN Security Council demanded that Iran suspend uranium enrichment activities and imposed three sets of sanctions against Iran. The IAEA reports it has clarified "all the remaining outstanding issues" of Iran's nuclear program except for "alleged weaponization studies that supposedly Iran has conducted in the past." Iran states that it categorically rejects the development of nuclear weapons.

Acknowledging the reason for sanctions is fine, but the IAEA's latest report and the Iranian perspective certainly would be acknowledged as well. --68.21.95.247 (talk) 18:25, 9 March 2008 (UTC)
The fact that Iran cheated on its safeguards agreement for 18 years with a clandestine enrichment program (a fact you have omitted) is more important than the fact that the IAEA has now figured out the scope (but not really the nature) of that program. Without clarification, the reference to "all outstanding issues" would suggest that Iran's underlying non-compliance has been (nearly) resolved. Since the Security Council demanded a suspension of enrichment as a necessary step to resolve questions about the peaceful nature of Iran's program, that seems misleading. NPguy (talk) 00:42, 10 March 2008 (UTC)
What we are doing is quoting the sources. You recommended including the IAEA's findings about Iran's previous noncompliance, so it was added in. The Security Council's demands are also being included, so I don't understand what your problem is. If you aren't happy with the paragraph, then come up with something you are happy with and suggest it instead. The director general of the IAEA has made these statements, and they are being quoted directly (they are found in the latest IAEA report as well); specifically, the document says the IAEA has resolved "the scope and nature of Iran´s enrichment programme" (note: the IAEA still needs to resolve "alleged weapon studies" and have the Additional Protocol implemented to verify the scope and nature of all of Iran's undeclared activities). So if you feel a fact has been glazed over, I would be happy if you'd point it out and make a new suggestion, but I don't understand how you can argue with the IAEA about what it has said. The only major issues I'm aware of that the IAEA is investigating are alleged weapons studies that Iran has supposedly conducted in the past and enrichment which Iran claims it has a right to, but please enlighten with whatever else.. --68.21.95.247 (talk) 06:19, 10 March 2008 (UTC)
I know this is frustrating. I haven't had time to look up references to fix this. One factual point: I do not find the cited quote that the IAEA has resolved the scope and nature of Iran's enrichment program. I may get to this in the next week or so. This can wait. NPguy (talk) 01:39, 11 March 2008 (UTC)
I appreciate you're just trying to reflect the history. For your reference, the IAEA http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/News/2008/iranreport0208.html source] says "... we have managed to clarify all the remaining outstanding issues, including the most important issue, which is the scope and nature of Iran´s enrichment programme...". This release came out before the latest sanctions and UNSEC resolution though, so I believe the statement will change slightly as the IAEA begins a few new tasks it was given. If you can come up with a specific wording for the past issues, I think I'd be open if a citation is also provided.. Beyond that, maybe it is better to see what the IAEA says after the sanctions and enrichment were added to its plate.. --68.21.95.247 (talk) 06:23, 11 March 2008 (UTC)

The rhetoric indeed seems to have shifted somewhat (though I'm not sure how much has to do with the latest sanctions). More recently, ElBaradei has told reporters the IAEA is in a "stalemate" and that it cannot resolve "outstanding issues of concern", while also saying the Agency had "not seen any diversion of nuclear materials... nor the capacity to produce weapons usable materials". I still believe the quote should show some signs of progress from four years of investigation, but the quotes make it clear that there is still a significant amount of investigation going on.. Sorry about the nitpicking earlier.. --68.23.8.245 (talk) 06:26, 16 March 2008 (UTC)

I updated the text in the article. Hopefully this resolves most of the issues about unresolved issues.. --68.23.8.245 (talk) 06:53, 16 March 2008 (UTC)
Thanks. I added a sentence at the front identifying the root cause as Iran's sareguards violations and secret enrichment program. NPguy (talk) 01:08, 17 March 2008 (UTC)
I tried to reduce the wordage in the lead a bit since this article is supposed to be about a lot of states, but I tried to maintain the meaning.. --68.23.8.245 (talk) 06:16, 17 March 2008 (UTC)

I hate to go in to nitpicking mode again, but both the sources cited say Iran had many "failures and breaches" of obligations under its Safeguard Agreement including "reporting of nuclear material, its processing and its use, as well as the declaration of facilities where such material had been processed and stored"; however, the sources do not specifically mention secret enrichment activities as far as I can tell. Both documents do call on Iran to immediately suspend its enrichment.

So I think it would be fine to say Iran's failures/breaches of its obligations under its Safeguard Agreement, specifically listing any of the things listed in the quote above. I also think it would be fine to note the IAEA calling on Iran to immediately suspend its enrichment. The document doesn't say that Iran "violated" its safeguard agreement by pursuing a "secret uranium enrichment program" though. I'm only open to this wording if it can be specifically presented in a source. Again, sorry for the nitpicking. --68.23.8.245 (talk) 08:04, 17 March 2008 (UTC)

The IAEA reports say "failures and breaches," but the Board of Governors resolution in September 2005 says "non-compliance," which is synonymous with violation. NPguy (talk) 03:23, 18 March 2008 (UTC)

  • ""Iran’s policy of concealment has resulted in many breaches of its obligation to comply with its Safeguards Agreement"
  • "Recalling Iran’s failures in a number of instances over an extended period of time to meet its obligations under its NPT Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC 214)..."
Those are two of the relevant quotes I can find in the reports cited. The word non-compliance or violations may have come up in other reports (or may have been in the spirit of these resolutions), but it also may not have been. To avoid potential disputes, it would be best to stick as close to the language of the reports as possible. Using the word non-compliance is fine with me if you can point out where it appears.. --68.23.8.245 (talk) 12:15, 18 March 2008 (UTC)

The two key paragraphs of the September 2005 resolution are the first two operative paragraphs:

The Board of Governors, . . .

1. Finds that Iran’s many failures and breaches of its obligations to comply with its NPT Safeguards Agreement, as detailed in GOV/2003/75, constitute non compliance in the context of Article XII.C of the Agency’s Statute;

2. Finds also that the history of concealment of Iran’s nuclear activities referred to in the Director General’s report, the nature of these activities, issues brought to light in the course of the Agency’s verification of declarations made by Iran since September 2002 and the resulting absence of confidence that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes have given rise to questions that are within the competence of the Security Council, as the organ bearing the main responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security;

The relevant excerpts from the February 2006 resolution are:

The Board of Governors, . . .

2. Requests the Director General . . . to report to the Security Council all IAEA reports and resolutions, as adopted, relating to this issue;

Article XII.C of the Statute requires the Board to report non-compliance to the Security Council. Normally that is done at the same time as the non-compliance finding, but in this case the Board chose to separate the two actions.

In any case it is not the reports of the Director General, but the decisions of the Board of Governors, that are definitive.

Please don't go back and edit the text to quote this more directly. That will make the text less readable and no more accurate. NPguy (talk) 03:10, 19 March 2008 (UTC)

Just to point out, the quotes you provided still don't support the original version which was edited out of the article. Some might argue that "violates" and "secret enrichment program" carry certain connotations with them, as others might argue that a correct summarisation of the document is that Iran had a "discontinuity in particular aspects of its safeguards program" which "required Security Council channels for resolution". This is why it would be best to stick as close to the language of the document as possible (and provide a blockquote with citations to help readers quickly locate the material you are using). --68.23.8.245 (talk) 03:47, 19 March 2008 (UTC)

The quotes I cited support the statement that Iran "violated its safeguards agreement." You have to read a little farther than those resolutions - particularly the IAEA report of November 2003 which those resolutions cite - to see that the "history or concealment" and "many failures and breaches" refer mainly to Iran's having kept its enrichment program secret from the IAEA. It's all there. NPguy (talk) 01:47, 20 March 2008 (UTC)

Using either of those quotes is fine. The point is for the reader to be able to verify that these are the actual findings of the IAEA, and not the analysis of a well-informed, well-intentioned, etc. analyst. That Iran "violated its safeguards agreement" may or may not be true, but the information has to be attributed and verifiable. --68.253.50.109 (talk) 22:39, 29 March 2008 (UTC)

Someone just reverted my change, inappropriately. The relevant quotes from the two resolutions are cited above. NPguy (talk) 03:19, 30 March 2008 (UTC)

The quotes still say non-compliance in the context of Article XII.C of the Agency’s Statute, not non compliance with its safeguards agreement per se. The article must have verifiable material. --68.253.50.109 (talk) 14:51, 30 March 2008 (UTC)

Article XII.C is the mechanism for reporting non-compliance with safeguards agreements. There is no other possible form of non-compliance at issue with Iran. NPguy (talk) 14:57, 30 March 2008 (UTC)

If the document doesn't say this, then I believe you may be engaging in original research. The best way to resolve this would probably be through dispute resolution or a third opinion. I believe it is very important not to bend the language of the sources, specifically given your past misinterpretations. --68.253.50.109 (talk) 15:02, 30 March 2008 (UTC)

[edit] Problems with original analysis

In regards to our discussion about the IAEA reports in the lead, Wikipedia: No original research states:

Wikipedia does not publish original research (OR) or original thought. This includes unpublished facts, arguments, speculation, and ideas; and any unpublished analysis or synthesis of published material that serves to advance a position. ... you must cite reliable sources that provide information directly related to the topic of the article, and that directly support the information as it is presented.

So the issue is about whether the IAEA references cited support the position that the IAEA found Iran in "non-compliance with its NPT safeguards agreement". The IAEA document cited says "Iran’s many failures and breaches of its obligations to comply with its NPT Safeguards Agreement, as detailed in GOV/2003/75, constitute non compliance in the context of Article XII.C of the Agency’s Statute". So either Iran had "many failures and breaches of its obligations to comply with its NPT Safeguards Agreement" or Iran's actions "constitute non compliance in the context of Article XII.C of the Agency’s Statute". Using the language of the documents is required by WP:V, and is especially important given past original analysis issues with this topic.

I welcome NPguy's response to this, and would encourage any other editors to leave their feedback as well. I see nothing wrong with using either of the quotes supplied, finding another IAEA document which supports the statements being made, etc. I'm also curious what is so wrong with directly paraphrasing the IAEA quotes given above. Whether we agree or not though, Wikipedia requires sources which directly support the material being added. --68.253.50.109 (talk) 16:38, 30 March 2008 (UTC)

If we wish to make the assertions noted using NPGuy's language, it may be more appropriate to cite the US Department of State:

"It is clear now that for 18 years, while portraying itself as in full compliance with the NPT, Iran violated safeguards, engaged in deception and denial, and conducted undeclared, clandestine experiments in all sensitive aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle," he said. "Iran's pattern of deception and denial continued even after the commencement of investigations by the IAEA; we believe it continues to this day. Iran grudgingly admits to facets of its sprawling secret nuclear program only when confronted with evidence that disproves its previous denials."- America.gov: U.S. Cites Response to NPT Noncompliance As Greatest Challenge

It is clearly wrong to read information or labels from the US Department of State's Bureau of International Information Programs in to the IAEA's report though, just as it would be wrong to read Iranian denials in to them. The documents should speak for themselves (which would require using quotes, paraphrases which aren't challenged, etc). --68.253.50.109 (talk) 16:48, 30 March 2008 (UTC)
I have also found a source from the US delegation which uses similar language, a source from the IAEA which uses the language with North Korea, and one from the IAEA which describes why they don't use this characterization with Iran. I don't understand why using the IAEA language is so controversial when we are reporting what they are saying, and I have selected a quote from the IAEA which NPguy recommdended above. --68.253.50.109 (talk) 16:30, 31 March 2008 (UTC)

This whole discussion is assinine and pedantic. Iran was found in non-compliance. With what? The only actions cited were failures to comply with its safeguards agreement. That's the only legal obligation that the Board could have been referring to. This is not original research. It's understood by all in the nuclear nonproliferation community. It's inappropriate to link it to the U.S. government since it's universally understood. The insistence on direct quotes - as opposed to summaries - of the basic document has left us with a muddled and incomprehensible mess instead of a crisp summary of the facts. I find it hard to believe that people are making so much effort to take a clear explanation and make it muddy.NPguy (talk) 04:00, 1 April 2008 (UTC)

WP:V is neither assinine nor pedantic. The IAEA uses the language it does for a reason, and the resolutions which are voted on undergo many draft versions and are voted on in a particular final form (one in the nuclear nonproliferation field might know this?). To one in the "nuclear nonproliferation community" (of which country?) it may be universal, but to other parties (notably the IAEA which is being cited) there may be (and is) a very particular reason why certain language is used. A clear explanation is stating what the document says, not summarizing it with certain assumptions. So any of these are fine:

After the IAEA Board of Governors

  • reported Iran's failures to meet obligations of its NPT Safeguards Agreement
  • found Iran breached obligations of its NPT Safeguards Agreement
  • found Iran in non compliance with the Agency's Statute
These are three easy to read statements which are actually supported by the IAEA documents cited. Rather than continually getting miffed, it would be better to propose something which is easy to understand and which is directly supported by the documents.. If you still find these statements lacking, then just propose something here which is directly supported by the sources. --68.253.50.109 (talk) 11:41, 1 April 2008 (UTC)

What is pedantic is insisting on repeating the words of the resolution verbatim rather than trying to understand what they mean. The resolution cites "non compliance" and refers to Article XII.C of the IAEA Statute. This does not mean that Iran violated Article XII.C (the suggestion in the third bullet above is incorrect). Violations of the statute are dealt with elsewhere (mainly Article XIX). Article XII.C is the mechanism in the Statute for responding to safeguards violations. It says that safeguards inspectors shall report non-compliance to the Director General, who shall report to the Board of Governors and the Board shall report it to the Security Council. The Board has ultimate responsibility for deciding what is and is not "non-compliance."

Article XII.C It refers to non-compliance with conditions in an agreement between the State and the IAEA. The relevant agreements are those that relate to safegaurds, which are described in Article III.A.5. In this case, the agreement in question is Iran's safeguards agreement. By its own terms, that safeguards agreement is pursuant to the requirements of the NPT. Such agreements are known as "NPT safeguards agreements."

The Board of Governors has made a non-compliance finding under Article XII.C on six other occasions: once in Iraq (1991), once in Romania (1992), three times in North Korea (1993, 1994, 2003) and once in Libya (2004). In each case the non-compliance was with an NPT safeguards agreement.

The fact that Article XII.C is the mechanism for reporting safeguards violations is widely understood - and seems fairly obvious.

The central element of the September 2005 resolution is the "finding" of "non-compliance" with Iran's NPT safeguards agreement. The central element of the February 2006 resolution is the "report" of that finding to the UN Security Council. If you want to amplify, you could add the secondary finding (from September 2005) that Iran's nuclear program raised questions of international peace and security (as provided in Article III.B.4).

One final point - just as the Board of Directors is a part of the corporation it directs, the Board of Governors is part of the IAEA. Under the Statute, it is the part of the IAEA responsible for identifying and reporting safeguards non-compliance. So it is perfectly accurate to say that the IAEA took action - just as we might say that the UN acted based on a decision of the Security Council or a company acted based on a decision of its Board.

So it is entirely accurate - and not in any way misleading - to summarize the two cited sources by saying:

The IAEA reported Iran's non-compliance with its NPT safeguards agreement to the UN Security Council.

Since this is the overview, there is no need to amplify on this summary, but further explanation could be provided elsewhere - either further down in the body of the article or through a link to a separate article. Stringing together quotes from the resolution serves only to obscure the point - not clarify. It is not more accurate to use any of the formulations you suggest; in fact, they are all less accurate (and less comprehensible) summaries of the two resolutions. NPguy (talk) 02:35, 2 April 2008 (UTC)

I see no stringing together of quotes, I see a desire to reflect the sources via Wikipedia's policies of WP:V and WP:NOR which I have explored above. I will note that the only reason that using these quotes is necessary is because your past interpretations of the IAEA documents have more reflected the view of the US IAEA delegation or US State Department than those of the document itself. The very fact that you disagree with my paraphrasings is why quotes were introduced (to avoid any potential misparaphrasings).
When there is a debate about the meaning of documents, WP policy says that passages open to interpretation should be precisely cited or avoided. WP:NPOV also requires including significant viewpoints, and what might be relevant to include here is the fact that the resolution also called on Iran to return to the negotiation table or that the resolution passsed in a vote with 12 abstentions (which is fairly rare, as noted in the American Society of International Law source).
I believe that your paraphrasing is fundamentally correct, but that it does not capture some of the other main points associated with the document (i.e. calls to return to the negotiating table, how uncommon a non-consensus decision is, etc). Nonetheless, here is another proposition:

After the IAEA found Iran in non-compliance with its Safeguards Agreement in a rare non-consensus decision, ...

So if we don't want to 'pedantically' quote the source, then we have to reach a consensus about the paraphrasing. Try to propose a few more if you disagree with the one I have come up with.--68.253.50.109 (talk) 16:41, 2 April 2008 (UTC)
Another option would be:

After the IAEA Board of Governors found Iran in non-compliance with its Safeguards Agreement, the UN Security Council imposed sanctions against Iran three times when it refused to suspend enrichment. Iran argues that the sanctions are illegal and compel it to abandon its rights under the NPT to peaceful nuclear technology.

Here we would offer an attributed Iranian opinion that the sanctions are illegal (supported by an information circular Iran provided to the Agency recently). My concern is just to stay close to the document and to offer multiple perspectives.--68.253.50.109 (talk) 20:32, 2 April 2008 (UTC)
That is much better, but it still misses one key fact: that Iran had kept its enrichment program secret for 18 years. I propose the following (with appropriate references):

In 2005, the IAEA Board of Governors found Iran in non-compliance with its NPT safeguards agreement. The UN Security Council imposed sanctions against Iran three times in 2006-2008 after Iran refused to suspend its previously undeclared uranium enrichment program. Iran argues that the sanctions are illegal and compel it to abandon its rights under the NPT to peaceful nuclear technology.

—Preceding unsigned comment added by NPguy (talk • contribs) 02:24, 3 April 2008 (UTC)
I'm mostly okay with what you suggest, I'm just not sure why you'd want to include a timeline on the sanctions as the sanctions are quire current and ongoing. Also wasn't sure how my proposal missed "that Iran had kept its enrichment program secret for 18 years" and how yours compensated for this, but again yours looks mostly alright to me. I think putting a timeline on the sanctions makes it look like they ended though. --68.253.35.13 (talk) 08:23, 3 April 2008 (UTC)

The delete the dates on the sanction. The only important date is 2005. If this is OK I'l make the change tomorrow, including citations. NPguy (talk) 01:30, 4 April 2008 (UTC)

I went ahead and made the changes as I think we agreed to. If there's anything else, I don't think it should be as major of an issue.. --68.253.35.13 (talk) 03:51, 4 April 2008 (UTC)

[edit] Syria

There is no consensus that Syria is pursuing NW. Besides which, this is not a page about who is pursuing NW, but about who has NW. CP Guy, April 28, 2008 —Preceding unsigned comment added by 198.76.89.7 (talk) 17:14, 28 April 2008 (UTC)

I disagree on this one. With the revelation of on-site photographs of an undeclared production reactor, and with the White House statement, I think there is about as good a basis for listing Syria as Iran. As long as the issue is whether they are accused of having a nuclear weapons program, I think Syria fits the bill. Consensus is not the criterion, or else Iran would not be listed. I do think the entry Syria could be shortened.

I'll let this discussion go on, but my inclination is to restore a shortened entry for Syria. The alternative would be to take out Iran as well and start a new page on States accused/suspected of having nuclear weapons programs, either now or in the past. NPguy (talk) 00:51, 29 April 2008 (UTC)


You raise a good point. I've actually been pretty uncomfortable with Iran being listed on this page. I would be much more comfortable with a "states accused of pursuing nuclear weapons" page than Iran being listed here. It does not have NW, so it should not be listed. Similarly, I deleted the weapons sharing section. Seriously, does anyone think that a state that has American NW on their soil, under American guards, that can only be detonated using American codes, is the same thing as having an indigenous arsenal? CP Guy —Preceding unsigned comment added by 198.76.89.7 (talk) 16:47, 29 April 2008 (UTC)

If you want to create other pages as new main pages for countries in weapons sharing programs (ex-USSR states might count as well) and states credibly accused of weapons programs, and link to those main pages from here, that's fine.
Continuing to just delete sections off this article and making the content go away entirely, without moving it, is vandalism, and not appropriate behavior.
198.76.89.7 - You have already violated Wikipedia's 3 revert limit policy on this article. Further reversions of the content will lead to a 24 hour block on your editing, per the 3RR policy. If you create a new page and move content and link to it, that will be acceptable. But no more reversions / vandalism. Please work harder to find consensus on the talk page here, and avoid deleting material. Thank you. Georgewilliamherbert (talk) 23:22, 29 April 2008 (UTC)
I think it's fine to list the material with countervailing opinions, but I also think it would be appropriate to start another list for states "credibly" accused of weapons programs. What constitutes a credible accusation is another matter, but that could be taken care of there. The controversy seems to be semantic, and I think this would resolve it. --68.72.46.218 (talk) 23:50, 29 April 2008 (UTC)