Lesson of Munich

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In international relations, the Lesson of Munich asserts that adversaries will interpret restraint as indicating a lack of capability or political will or both. The name refers to the appeasement of Adolf Hitler's Nazi Germany in negotiations toward the eventual Munich Agreement. Many scholars argue that Neville Chamberlain's capitulation to German demands guaranteed eventual war as Hitler believed he could do as he pleased without the other Great Powers going to war to stop him. Steven Chan describes the moral as "appeasement discredits the defenders' willingness to fight, and encourages the aggressor to escalate his demands."

[edit] References

  • Robert J. Beck. "Munich's Lessons Reconsidered". International Security, Vol. 14, No. 2. (Autumn, 1989), pp. 161-191.
  • Steven Chan. International Relations in Perspective. New York: Macmillan, 1984.
  • J. L. Richardson. "New Perspectives on Appeasement: Some Implications for International Relations". World Politics, Vol. 40, No. 3. (Apr., 1988), pp. 289-316. Especially pp. 290-292.