Talk:Khartoum Resolution

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[edit] Bias

This article has a section on "interpretations" of the Khartoum resolution, but proceeds to only detail revisionist-type interpretations, only obliquely mentioning the mainstream interpretation that this was a rejectionist document. In a clear example of distortion, whoever wrote this article points to a passage Benny Morris's Righteous Victims blaming Israel, but ignores that same books assertion that the resolution was indeed a "defiant, rejectionist platform that was to bedevil all peace moves in the region for a decade."

I've added this to the Morris quote so that the article to accurately reflects his view on Khartoum.

I wonder, then, if the Odd Bull reference, which has no page number associated with it, is similarly disingenuous.

Finally, I've removed the Sachar quote as it doesn't clearly relate to the resolution; the tangential reference seems to have been inserted as a way to buttress the Morris half-quote. Gni at you've included it, I don't think it really obfuscates the fundamental point at all, just makes for a more balanced discussion.

I'm the author of that section, however I think your edit probably makes for a more balanced discussion. My main point was to try and emphasize that in spite of the "three noes", negotiations did actually take place between Israel and the Arab states, so that Khartoum was by no means the outright rejectionist platform it appears to be. But it's probably true I overstated the case somewhat.
I left out the Morris quote you have included because, basically, it doesn't make much sense to me given that negotiations did in fact take place, so I thought it might only confuse the issue. But now that you've included it, I don't think it really obfuscates the fundamental point at all, just makes for a more balanced discussion.


As for Odd Bull, I can assure you the reference is not at all "disingenuous", OB is quite unequivocal on that point. I did originally include an extensive Odd Bull quote as a footnote but thought that alongside Morris and Sachar, it was rather too much. But if you like I can post the full quote here. Gatoclass 03:11, 27 June 2007 (UTC)

User:Gatoclass, I could take the easy way out, and point to the fact that since you added these revisionist interpretations to the article in the first place, the burden of proof is on you to show that they are the majority position. But this is really not needed. Shlaim is a self-declared revisionist “New Historian”. Revisionism, by definition, is the process by which currently accepted mainstream views are re-examined, and new interpretations are presented. Revisionist views may, in time, become the mainstream position, but since we already have in the article a fellow “New Historian” – Morris – who rejects that view, it is clearly evident that even among the ‘New Historians’ who are critical of Israel, Shlaim’s position is not widely accepted. Indeed, your own text confirms this, as you say “the Khartoum Resolution has often been presented as a clear example of Arab rejectionism, some scholars..” – notice the clear delineation between the position most often held, and that of “some” (weasel word) scholars, who do not deny the mainstream position, but add some nuances to it.

If you need any further proof that the mainstream historical interpretation is that Khartoum was rejectionist, have a look at these:

  • “Political confirmation of the Arab hard-line position towards Israel appeared to come at the Khartoum Summit Conference on 1st September 1967. It laid down the three no’s resolution: no recognition of Israel, no negotiations with Israel and no peace with Israel.” [1] – Syllabus of an MA course in The Arab-Israeli Conflict , at University College London
  • ‘September 1967: The "Three Nos". Late in the summer of 1967, eight Arab heads of state attend an Arab League conference in Khartoum, Sudan, where they reach a consensus that guides their nations' policies toward Israel for the next six years. On September 1, the Arab League approves the Khartoum Resolution, famous for its "Three Nos": No peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, and no negotiations with Israel. – [2]
  • ‘By adopting the dictum of no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel and no negotiations with Israel, the Arab states appeared to have slammed the door on any progress towards peace.’ – [3]
  • “on June 19 1967 the Israel government took a dramatic decision that called for the return of Sinai to Egypt ...and the return of the Golan heights to Syria...the decision was annulled when the Arab leaders, who met at Khartoum’s summit in September 1967, took the so-called ‘Three no’ decision...the Khartoum decision implied that the Arab leaders were not yet ready for direct negotiations with Israel...and the rejection might mean that the doves were losing ground. [4] - Israeli Politics and the Middle East Peace Process, 1988-2002, Hassan Abdulmuhdi, p.14
  • “The initial Israeli proposal to completely withdraw from the Golan in return for total Syrian demilitarisation of the area fell through following the Khartoum resolution and the three NOs.” [5] - The Golan Heights:Israel’s Predicaments , P.R. Kumaraswamy Strategic Analysis: A Monthly Journal of the IDSA ,October 1999 (Vol. XXIII No. 7)
  • “In 1967 it was the Arabs who published the Three NOs in the Khartoum Resolution...The position papers that are now being presented are a continuation of that same rejectionism.” [6]
  • “The Arab states, however, rejected outright any negotiations with the Jewish state” - Israel: Current Issues and Historical Background, Edgar Marshall, p.124

There are countless others. If you want to make the point that in spite of what the resolution clearly says (no negotiations), negotiations did take place, and quote Shlaim on it, that’s fine, but things that happened in spite of what the resolution says should not take preference over what the resolution clearly says, and what you acknowledge - that the resolution appears to be an 'outright rejectionist platform'. Canadian Monkey (talk) 17:00, 22 May 2008 (UTC)

I am not opposed to the inclusion of different views in this article, at all. What I am opposed to is the arbitrary labelling of one historian's view as "mainstream" as opposed to another's as "revisionist". I don't believe it is supportable by the evidence - certainly not that which you have presented here - and it does nothing to enhance the article.
I'm amenable to compromise on the content, but these labels are neither necessary nor helpful and I think we'd be better off leaving them aside. Gatoclass (talk) 14:37, 23 May 2008 (UTC)
Shlaim is both a self-described "revisionist", and has been described as such by numerous 3rd party sources. There is nothing arbitrary in labelling his views "revisionist". Canadian Monkey (talk) 23:10, 25 May 2008 (UTC)
IIRC Shlaim basically rejected the label. But that is beside the point. The point I am making is that you have made an arbitrary and WP:OR distinction between "mainstream" and "revisionist" views. But revisionists are not "fringe" historians (as you commented elsewhere) as opposed to a "mainstream". They are "revisionist" or "new" historians as opposed to the old or previous generation of historians. Indeed if anything in Israeli historiography these days is "mainstream", it's the revisionists! They are not a new phenomenon anymore, they have been around for decades and their conclusions are widely accepted and rarely challenged by other scholars. So there simply isn't any basis for this distinction you have made, and in any case it is superfluous to the content. Gatoclass (talk) 09:18, 26 May 2008 (UTC)
In a word, nonsense. I have already shown you that even within the small community of revisionist historians, Shalim's position is not widely accepted, per the Morris comments. The position that the KR was not rejectionist is a minority within a minority. It can be presented in the article, properly attributed, but certainly not ahaead of the mainstream view tha tit challenges. Canadian Monkey (talk) 15:05, 26 May 2008 (UTC)
I don't really care which view leads. My concern is simply the labelling of one historian's view as "mainstream" and another's, by implication, as somehow outside of the mainstream. That is just well poisoning. What's wrong with simply presenting the different arguments and allowing them to stand on their merits? Gatoclass (talk) 16:33, 26 May 2008 (UTC)
Claims of consensus (mainstream) must be sourced. WP:RS#Claims_of_consensus Just giving both views without prioritizing one seems best to me for now. There's rather more to say here. One important thing is the word "peace" in No Peace. Arabic has two words for peace, salaam and sulha. Sulha is stronger and means peace and reconciliation, friendship. What Khartoum said was no sulha - no strong peace, leaving a door open for weak peace, salaam. This wasn't unknown to the rest of the world at the time. After Khartoum King Hussein went to England and tried to explain to the British foreign minister that Khartoum hadn't sunk peace negotiations. The FM sarcastically replied - So it means "peace without kissing." I think both of them had a point.John Z (talk) 21:07, 23 May 2008 (UTC)
why did Hussein need to go to England and try to explain to the British foreign minister that Khartoum hadn't sunk peace negotiations - unless that was the prevailing view? Canadian Monkey (talk) 23:10, 25 May 2008 (UTC)
What the "prevailing view" may or may not have been 40 years ago is hardly relevant to the debate today. Gatoclass (talk) 09:18, 26 May 2008 (UTC)
Thanks for conceding that the prevailing view was that it was a rejectionist platform. Now, if you have some proof that that view has changed, and that the revisionist view has become the more prevalent, let's see it. Canadian Monkey (talk) 15:05, 26 May 2008 (UTC)
Sorry, but I don't have to prove anything, because I am not in favour of slapping arbitrary labels on people. You, on the other hand, would need to demonstrate that Morris' view is "mainstream" while Shlaim's is not. Like JohnZ said, see WP:RS#Claims_of_consensus. Gatoclass (talk) 16:33, 26 May 2008 (UTC)

(outdent) - I think we can amicably resolve this, since you wrote that you don't care which view leads, and I am not insisting that we label people. I'll edit to remove the labels while keeping the order, and we can hopefully move on. Canadian Monkey (talk) 17:46, 26 May 2008 (UTC)

Thanks. That seems like a reasonable compromise to me. I'm glad we could come to an agreement :) Gatoclass (talk) 08:00, 27 May 2008 (UTC)

[edit] Recent changes by MikeSlater

Hi there Mike, and welcome to Wikipedia! I'm sorry I didn't realize you were a new user when I reverted your edit as Khartoum resolution yesterday, or I would have been a little less outspoken in my edit summary.

While I'm not entirely averse to some of the changes made, I do see a number of problems that would need to be hammered out first. To begin with, it isn't correct to suggest the Arab states had military superiority - the opposite is the case. Secondly, UN Resolution 242 has very little to do with Khartoum. Gatoclass 07:40, 25 September 2007 (UTC)


To Mike,

To begin with you wrote that you felt that the Arab states did not have military superiority ? Acording to Wikepedia itself....http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Six-Day_War

here are the facts. What reason do you have to imply otherwise ?


Israel

264,000 (incl. 214,000 reserve troops) 300 combat aircraft 800 tanks [1]


Egypt: 240,000 Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and Iraq:307,000 957 combat aircraft 2,504 tanks[2]